Nicomachean EthicsHere's the updated HTML table with the chapter numbers and text content linked as requested: ```html
The Study of Good and Virtue
Chapter 1-1
Every art and inquiry aims at some good, distinguishing between activities and products.
Chapter 1-2
If there is an ultimate end of actions, desired for its own sake, it must be the chief good.
Chapter 1-3
Precision in discussions about fine and just actions varies with their nature.
Chapter 1-4
The highest good is commonly identified as happiness, with various opinions on its nature.
Chapter 1-5
Men often equate happiness with pleasure, honor, or money.
Chapter 1-6
Discussing the universal good is challenging due to varying interpretations.
Chapter 1-7
The good varies by action and art, such as health in medicine or victory in strategy.
Chapter 1-8
Goods are divided into three classes: external, soul-related, and bodily.
Chapter 1-9
Happiness might be seen as a divine gift, but it also results from virtue and learning.
Chapter 1-10
Happiness should be assessed over a complete life, not just in moments.
Chapter 1-11
The fortunes of friends and descendants impact happiness but not decisively.
Chapter 1-12
Happiness is more about being prized than praised, akin to how gods and exemplary individuals are regarded.
Chapter 1-13
Happiness involves virtuous activity of the soul, so understanding virtue is crucial.
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The Study of Good and Virtue
Chapter 1-1
Every art aims at some good; master arts' ends are preferred.
Chapter 1-2
The chief good guides all actions; politics aims at this.
Chapter 1-3
Precision varies by subject; educated judges know what precision requires.
Chapter 1-4
Happiness is the highest good; different views exist on happiness.
Chapter 1-5
Pleasure, honour, and contemplation offer different views on happiness.
Chapter 1-6
Different goods have distinct definitions; universal good is elusive.
Chapter 1-7
Final good is always pursued for itself; happiness is final.
Chapter 1-8
Goods are categorized by their relation to soul or body.
Chapter 1-9
Happiness might result from virtue or divine providence.
Chapter 1-10
A person’s happiness is not fully judged until death.
Chapter 1-11
Friends’ fortunes influence happiness but do not fully change it.
Chapter 1-12
Happiness is not praised but considered more divine and perfect.
Chapter 1-13
Happiness requires understanding virtue and studying the soul’s nature.
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The Study of Virtue
Chapter 1
Virtue is of two kinds: intellectual and moral. Intellectual virtue grows through teaching, requiring experience and time. Moral virtue arises from habit, hence its name derived from ethos (habit).
Chapter 2
Our inquiry aims not for theoretical knowledge but practical goodness. Actions determine character states, so understanding how to act properly is crucial.
Chapter 3
States of character are indicated by pleasure or pain from actions. Temperate individuals delight in abstaining from pleasures, while self-indulgent people find it painful.
Chapter 4
We must act justly and temperately to become just and temperate. Just acts do not make one just automatically; the actions must be done correctly and with the right condition.
Chapter 5
Virtue must be a state of character, distinct from passions and faculties. Passions like anger and fear are feelings accompanied by pleasure or pain, while faculties are the capacities to experience these feelings.
Chapter 6
Virtue is a state of character that makes one good and effective. Every virtue improves both the individual and their work.
Chapter 7
Virtue applies to individual actions and emotions, distinguishing between excess and deficiency. Courage, for instance, is the mean between recklessness and cowardice.
Chapter 8
Dispositions can be either vices (excess or deficiency) or virtues (means). Extreme states oppose each other and the mean, which lies between them.
Chapter 9
Moral virtue is a mean between two vices—one of excess, the other of deficiency. Achieving this balance is difficult, as it requires finding the right measure in various situations.
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The Study of Virtue
Chapter 1
Virtue is intellectual (learned) or moral (formed by habit).
Chapter 2
Virtues arise from practice, not nature; moderation prevents excess.
Chapter 3
Character states are shown by pleasure or pain from actions.
Chapter 4
Just and temperate actions require proper conditions, not just knowledge.
Chapter 5
Virtues are states of character, not passions or faculties.
Chapter 6
Virtue is a state that makes both the individual and their actions excellent, aiming for the intermediate between excess and deficiency.
Chapter 7
Virtue finds the mean in specific cases: courage, temperance, and liberality are examples of balanced states.
Chapter 8
The extremes oppose each other more than the intermediate state, with some extremes showing more opposition.
Chapter 9
Virtue is difficult to achieve as it requires balancing extremes and finding the right mean in varied circumstances.
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Exploration of Virtue and Vice
Chapter 3-1
Virtue relates to voluntary actions; distinction between voluntary and involuntary.
Chapter 3-2
Choice involves deliberation, differs from voluntary actions and mere opinions.
Chapter 3-3
Deliberation focuses on means to achieve ends within our control.
Chapter 3-4
Wish reflects personal perception of good, not an objective standard.
Chapter 3-5
Virtue and vice are within our control; actions are voluntary.
Chapter 3-6
Virtues are means between extremes of feelings like fear and confidence.
Chapter 3-7
Bravery involves facing noble dangers appropriately, avoiding extremes.
Chapter 3-8
Courage varies: citizen-soldiers and professionals differ from passion-driven bravery.
Chapter 3-9
Bravery includes moral and intellectual understanding, not just physical courage.
Chapter 3-10
True bravery balances noble motives, fear, and confidence.
Chapter 3-11
Temperance balances desires; self-indulgence leads to excess and blame.
Chapter 3-12
Self-indulgence is voluntary and blameworthy, unlike involuntary cowardice.
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Exploration of Virtue and Vice
Chapter 3-1
Distinguish voluntary from involuntary; praise and blame are given accordingly.
Chapter 3-2
Choice is voluntary but differs from general voluntary actions.
Chapter 3-3
Deliberation concerns means, not ends; we deliberate about achievable means.
Chapter 3-4
Wish relates to apparent good; not necessarily the true good.
Chapter 3-5
Virtue and vice are voluntary because they depend on choice.
Chapter 3-6
Wickedness is voluntary; ignorance leads to responsibility for actions.
Chapter 3-7
Vices of the body are blameworthy if within our control.
Chapter 3-8
End perceptions vary; virtue and vice depend on personal choice.
Chapter 3-9
Courage is a mean between fear and confidence in actions.
Chapter 3-10
Citizen-soldier courage is valued; professional soldiers may falter under strain.
Chapter 3-11
Natural appetites can be excessive; self-indulgence is blameworthy, temperance balances.
Chapter 3-12
Self-indulgence is voluntary, unlike cowardice; desires must align rationally.
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Exploration of Virtue and Vice
Chapter 4-1
Liberality concerns the giving and taking of wealth, with the liberal person praised for their generosity rather than for other virtues like military prowess or judicial wisdom. Prodigality and meanness are viewed as excesses or deficiencies in handling wealth. Prodigality involves excessive spending and self-indulgence, while meanness signifies an excessive concern with acquiring wealth and a reluctance to give. A liberal person gives wisely and appropriately, finding joy in giving and taking from the right sources. Prodigality and meanness, by contrast, show flawed character, with prodigals often taking from improper sources and misusing wealth.
Chapter 4-2
Magnificence is a virtue related to large-scale expenditures, exceeding liberality in scale and requiring fittingness and grandeur. It involves spending large sums in a manner that is fitting to the circumstances, surpassing mere liberal giving. Magnificence is demonstrated through grand acts like equipping a trireme or heading a sacred embassy. The magnificent person balances the result with the expense, aiming for excellence and beauty in their expenditures. They spend for honor and public good, contrasting with vulgarity and niggardliness, which involve inappropriate or showy expenditures and lack of taste.
Chapter 4-3
The magnificent person resembles an artist in their ability to make large expenditures tastefully, ensuring the result matches or exceeds the expense. They are liberal but on a grander scale, focusing on honor and suitability. Magnificence involves spending on public or significant occasions, like weddings or civic events, and on enduring works. It requires substantial means and high standing, as a poor person cannot be truly magnificent. Expenditure must be appropriate to one's means and the occasion, avoiding excess and vulgarity, ensuring that even small-scale efforts are executed with grandeur.
Chapter 4-4
The concept of honor involves a balance akin to that seen in virtues like liberality. Honor, like wealth, can be desired excessively or insufficiently. We praise the ambitious person who seeks honor rightly but criticize the one who seeks it excessively or from inappropriate sources. Conversely, we also commend the unambitious individual for their moderation but fault them for lacking the desire for honor even when deserved. Thus, honor's mean is not named, leading to extremes being seen as contradictory. This reflects the general difficulty in defining virtues where the mean remains unnamed, and extremes are clearer.
Chapter 4-5
Good temper represents a mean concerning anger, as it lies between irascibility and inirascibility. The good-tempered person is praised for managing anger appropriately—directing it correctly, at the right times, and for suitable durations. Conversely, those who are not angry when they should be are deemed foolish, while those who are excessively angry are seen as problematic. The extremes of anger, from excessive rage to lack of anger, are both blameworthy. The good-tempered person avoids both extremes, managing anger with moderation and propriety.
Chapter 4-6
In social interactions, people fall into two extremes: obsequiousness and churlishness. The obsequious person seeks to please at any cost, while the churlish person is unyieldingly contentious. The commendable middle ground involves responding to social situations appropriately without seeking to please excessively or being overly contentious. This balanced approach is akin to friendship, characterized by appropriate and fair treatment of others based on honor and expediency. The person who manages this balance well has not received a specific name, highlighting the absence of a term for this virtuous mean.
Chapter 4-7
The virtue opposed to boastfulness also lacks a specific name. Boastfulness involves claiming more than one possesses, while mock-modesty involves downplaying one's achievements. The virtuous mean is truthfulness, where a person accurately represents their qualities and achievements. Those who boast without ulterior motives are seen as contemptible, but the severity increases if their boasting is for gain. Mock-modesty can be more attractive but can also be insincere. The truthful person avoids falsehood, being characterized by honesty in both life and speech, standing in contrast to both boastfulness and mock-modesty.
Chapter 4-8
In social interactions involving humor and amusement, there is a mean between excess and deficiency. Excessive humor can become vulgar and aim solely at laughter, while those who neither joke nor appreciate humor are seen as boorish. The ideal is a tactful person who engages in humor appropriately, respecting social norms and context. This tactfulness is reflected in how well-bred individuals joke without causing offense. The extremes—buffoonery and boorishness—represent the excess and deficiency of humor, with the tactful person navigating between these extremes effectively.
Chapter 4-9
Shame is not a virtue but a feeling akin to fear, manifesting as a response to dishonor. It primarily affects the young, who are more prone to errors and thus benefit from the restraining influence of shame. Older individuals, however, should ideally avoid actions that would cause shame. Since disgrace arises from bad actions, which should be avoided, shame itself does not reflect well on one's character. It is more a response to perceived dishonor than a stable state of virtue, thus not fitting the description of a true virtue.
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Chapter 1
Liberality involves wise wealth management; prodigality and meanness show flaws. Prodigality is excessive spending, while meanness is reluctance to give.
Chapter 2
Magnificence involves grand expenditures, exceeding liberality in scale and fittingness. It focuses on honor, avoiding vulgarity and showy spending.
Chapter 3
The magnificent person spends grandly and tastefully, focusing on honor. Magnificence involves appropriate, enduring expenditures, requiring substantial means and standing.
Chapter 4 - 4
Honor can be desired excessively, moderately, or minimally; moderation is praised.
Chapter 4 - 5
Good temper balances anger; excess or deficiency in anger is blameworthy.
Chapter 4 - 6
Social behavior should balance giving pleasure and avoiding pain.
Chapter 4 - 7
Truthfulness lies between boastfulness and false modesty; extremes are blameworthy.
Chapter 4 - 8
Humor should be tasteful; extremes in joking are undesirable.
Chapter 4 - 9
Shame is not a virtue; it is a feeling of dishonor.
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Chapter 1
To understand justice and injustice, we examine their actions, means, and extremes. Justice involves a state of character that leads people to act justly and desire what is just. Injustice leads to unjust actions and desires. Recognizing one contrary often involves recognizing its opposite. Law-abiding individuals are just, while the lawless are unjust.
Chapter 2
Justice is part of virtue and involves specific forms of injustice related to gain and unfairness. Seeking profit at the expense of others is unjust, whereas actions driven by appetite or fear might be seen as self-indulgent or cowardly rather than unjust. Justice encompasses various types, including those concerning honor, money, or safety.
Chapter 3
Justice is intermediate and equal, involving two persons and two things. Proportional justice maintains a ratio between these terms, ensuring fair distribution of goods based on merit or need. Unjust actions disrupt this proportion, leading to unequal distributions.
Chapter 4
Rectificatory justice addresses correcting inequalities in transactions by equalizing gains and losses. Unlike distributive justice, which is proportional, rectificatory justice involves compensating the injured party and penalizing the wrongdoer. Judges act as intermediaries to restore balance.
Chapter 5 - 5
Acting unjustly doesn't always mean being unjust. A thief or adulterer may act unjustly due to passion rather than deliberate choice. Political justice is relevant for those seeking self-sufficiency and equality, contrasting with special or analogical justice.
Chapter 5 - 6
Political justice consists of natural and legal parts. Natural justice is universal and constant, while legal justice is specific to laws and conventions. Justice can vary by human enactment, with some being universally just and others legally defined.
Chapter 5 - 7
Acts of justice or injustice depend on voluntariness. Voluntary acts are done knowingly and with intention, while involuntary acts occur due to ignorance or compulsion. True justice or injustice is reflected in voluntary acts done with deliberation.
Chapter 5 - 8
The paradox of willingly suffering injustice raises questions about voluntariness. While suffering injustice seems involuntary, one might experience it willingly if they act contrary to their wishes. Self-treatment with injustice involves complexity, as unjust treatment and self-injustice are distinct considerations.
Chapter 5 - 9
Equity and the equitable relate to justice but aren't identical. Equity addresses fairness beyond rigid legal standards, considering specific circumstances and intentions to achieve a just outcome, unlike strict adherence to laws.
Chapter 5 - 10
The complexity of whether one can treat oneself unjustly involves legal and moral considerations. Acts like suicide, forbidden by law, are seen as unjust towards the state rather than oneself. Unjust actions involve multiple people and voluntary choice, making self-harm not categorized as unjust in this sense.
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5 - 1
Justice involves a character that desires and acts justly. Injustice does not. Justice is lawful and fair; injustice is unlawful and unfair.
5 - 2
There is a particular justice, distinct from virtue entirely. Injustice can be specific or general, reflecting different forms of wrongdoing.
5 - 3
Justice is proportional, an intermediate between extremes. It involves equality and fairness in distribution.
5 - 4
Rectificatory justice equalizes transactions' outcomes, balancing gain and loss through corrective measures.
5 - 6
Unjust acts don’t necessarily indicate an unjust person; motivations differ.
5 - 7
Political justice involves laws, differing from natural justice, which is universal.
5 - 8
Voluntary actions determine justice; involuntary acts are only incidental.
5 - 9
Suffering injustice may be involuntary; acting unjustly is always voluntary.
5 - 10
Equity and equity differ from justice; both involve nuanced evaluation.
5 - 11
A man cannot treat himself unjustly; unjust acts require others.
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Chapter 6 - 1:
To find the intermediate state in character, follow the right rule to balance excess and defect. Understanding and applying the right rule is essential for practical moral guidance.
Chapter 6 - 2:
Moral virtue involves choice, combining desire and reason. Choice is the origin of action and involves deliberation, distinguishing it from mere reaction or past events.
Chapter 6 - 3:
Scientific knowledge involves understanding necessary and unchangeable truths through demonstration from first principles. It provides a comprehensive grasp of essential truths.
Chapter 6 - 4:
Art involves creating something variable, focusing on making rather than acting. It requires reasoned capacity to create and is distinct from actions driven by necessity.
Chapter 6 - 5:
Practical wisdom involves evaluating what contributes to the good life generally, focusing on good actions rather than specific ends. It differs from scientific knowledge and art.
Chapter 6 - 6:
Scientific knowledge is about universal truths from first principles, while intuitive reason grasps these foundational principles. They complement each other in understanding truths.
Chapter 6 - 7:
Wisdom combines intuitive reason with scientific knowledge. Philosophic wisdom seeks universal truths, while practical wisdom focuses on human goods and actions.
Chapter 6 - 8:
Political and practical wisdom differ in scope. Political wisdom addresses societal laws, while practical wisdom deals with individual and collective good. Youth may lack practical wisdom due to limited experience.
Chapter 6 - 9:
Deliberation involves specific consideration for practical success, aiming at the right means and ends. It is distinct from mere conjecture or opinion, requiring correct reasoning.
Chapter 6 - 10:
Understanding involves judgment and evaluation, connecting with practical wisdom. It assesses the validity of opinions and aligns with practical wisdom in judging what should be done.
Chapter 6 - 11:
Judgment involves discerning what is equitable and correct. It converges with practical wisdom and understanding, supported by intuitive reason and experience for evaluating specifics and fundamentals.
Chapter 6 - 12:
Practical wisdom guides moral actions and complements moral virtue, helping achieve noble goals. It does not directly produce happiness but aligns with virtue to guide right actions.
Chapter 6 - 13:
Natural virtue differs from true virtue, akin to cleverness. Practical wisdom refines natural virtues into moral virtues, ensuring actions align with moral goodness. True virtue integrates practical wisdom.
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Chapter 6 - 1:
To determine the intermediate state in character, we must follow the right rule. This rule guides us to find the mean between excess and defect. However, knowing this isn’t enough; we need to identify the specific right rule and standard that determines this mean. Just as in medicine we need specific prescriptions, in moral virtues, we must understand what defines the intermediate state and how to apply it effectively. Without such knowledge, a person would lack the practical wisdom necessary for proper moral guidance.
Chapter 6 - 2:
The virtue of something relates to its proper function. In the soul, sensation, reason, and desire control actions. Sensation alone does not initiate action. Moral virtue involves choice, which is a deliberate desire guided by correct reasoning. Practical intellect involves both correct reasoning and right desire. Choice, the origin of action, depends on both intellect and character. Since actions depend on future possibilities, choice involves deliberation and cannot concern the past. Thus, choice combines desire with reason, forming the basis of action.
Chapter 6 - 3:
The soul possesses truth through art, scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, and intuitive reason. Scientific knowledge is understanding what is necessary and unchangeable. It involves demonstration and follows from first principles, acquired through induction or syllogism. Thus, scientific knowledge is the ability to demonstrate truths from known principles. It’s a state of understanding where starting points are clear, leading to a comprehensive grasp of necessary truths.
Chapter 6 - 4:
The capacity to act and to make are distinct. Architecture is an art, a reasoned capacity to create something variable, not necessarily present by nature. Art involves making, not acting, and is concerned with creating, not necessarily with actions driven by necessity. Art's focus is on creating something that might be otherwise, involving true reasoning. Lack of art indicates a false reasoning about making. Therefore, art is a reasoned state concerned with making, distinguishing it from actions.
Chapter 6 - 5:
Practical wisdom involves deliberating about what is good for life, not just specific aspects like health or strength. It requires evaluating what contributes to the good life generally. Unlike scientific knowledge or art, practical wisdom involves true and reasoned action in variable contexts. Practical wisdom does not aim at a specific end but at good actions. It’s different from art and science, and involves the ability to make good decisions about human goods, rather than abstract principles.
Chapter 6 - 6:
Scientific knowledge pertains to universal and necessary truths derived from first principles. These principles themselves cannot be scientifically known, as they are foundational. Intuitive reason, which grasps these first principles, differs from scientific knowledge and other forms of wisdom. Scientific knowledge involves demonstration, while intuitive reason is necessary for understanding foundational principles. Hence, intuitive reason grasps what is necessary and unchangeable, filling the gap left by other forms of knowledge.
Chapter 6 - 7:
Wisdom combines intuitive reason with scientific knowledge of the highest objects. While art-specific wisdom applies to particular fields, general wisdom involves a broader understanding of fundamental truths. Philosophic wisdom, different from practical wisdom, seeks the highest truths and involves scientific knowledge and intuitive reason. Practical wisdom addresses human goods and deliberative actions, while philosophic wisdom pertains to universal and divine principles. This distinction highlights that wisdom in general includes comprehensive knowledge and understanding, beyond specific expertise.
Chapter 6 - 8:
Political and practical wisdom are linked but differ in essence. Political wisdom involves action and deliberation, related to specific decrees, while practical wisdom pertains to individual knowledge. Practical wisdom encompasses household management, legislation, and politics, with a focus on individual and collective good. Political wisdom is broader, dealing with societal laws and action. Youth lack practical wisdom due to limited experience, though they may excel in abstract fields like mathematics. Practical wisdom differs from scientific knowledge, focusing on immediate particulars rather than abstract principles. Hence, practical wisdom requires experience and intuitive reasoning.
Chapter 6 - 9:
Deliberation is distinct from inquiry; it involves specific consideration. Excellence in deliberation is not scientific knowledge, skill in conjecture, or mere opinion. It requires reasoning and correctness, aiming for practical success rather than abstract truth. Correct deliberation involves achieving the right end through proper means. Deliberation must address what is expedient and successful, whether generally or in specific contexts. Practical wisdom involves correct deliberation towards achieving good ends. Deliberation excellence involves both the means and the goal, distinguishing it from mere calculation or conjecture.
Chapter 6 - 10:
Understanding differs from opinion and scientific knowledge. It concerns judgment and evaluation, not merely knowing or acquiring practical wisdom. Understanding involves exercising the faculty of opinion to assess and judge. It aligns with practical wisdom in judging what ought to be done. Practical wisdom commands actions, while understanding judges the validity of opinions. Understanding applies to practical wisdom by evaluating judgments about practical matters. Hence, understanding is about grasping scientific truths and evaluating judgments, connecting with practical wisdom through judgment and discernment.
Chapter 6 - 11:
Judgment involves discerning what is equitable and correct. Sympathetic judgment correctly discriminates the equitable, and accurate judgment aligns with truth. Judgement, understanding, and practical wisdom converge on evaluating particulars and ultimates. These faculties deal with specific, variable facts. Intuitive reason supports judgments about both first principles and particulars, forming the basis for demonstrations and practical reasonings. Experience and intuitive reason guide judgment and practical wisdom. Therefore, natural endowments like judgment and understanding are crucial for practical wisdom, developed over time and experience.
Chapter 6 - 12:
Practical wisdom's utility lies in guiding moral and noble actions. It aids in achieving good, though it doesn’t produce happiness directly. Practical wisdom complements moral virtue, guiding actions towards noble ends. Unlike arts like medicine, practical wisdom shapes the character to perform virtuous acts. Practical wisdom helps in achieving the good but doesn’t replace the need for virtue. It is integral to acting rightly and achieving noble goals, aligning with virtue and moral goodness.
Chapter 6 - 13:
Natural virtue differs from virtue in the strict sense, akin to cleverness and practical wisdom. Natural dispositions are innate but need reason to become true virtue. Practical wisdom refines natural virtues into moral virtues, as seen in Socrates' views. Virtues in the strict sense require practical wisdom, which provides the right rule for virtuous actions. Practical wisdom ensures that actions align with moral virtues. Thus, true virtue integrates practical wisdom, confirming that moral virtue and practical wisdom are interdependent and complementary.
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` tag with the class `A-Numbered_5`. - The `href` attribute is set to match the `id` of the chapter. 2. **Link Text Content**: - The text content in each cell is wrapped in an `` tag with the class `Metaphysics`. - The `href` attribute matches the chapter number. 3. **Consistency and Functionality**: - All `id` attributes in the chapter numbers are formatted correctly. - The links are consistent and point to the correct chapters.Here's the HTML table formatted according to your specifications: ```html Here is the table with the requested edits applied: ```html
Chapter 6 - 1:
Virtue is an intermediate state, determined by the right rule.
Chapter 6 - 2:
Virtue involves aligning desire and reasoning with correct choice-making.
Chapter 6 - 3:
Scientific knowledge involves demonstrating universal truths through induction and syllogism.
Chapter 6 - 4:
Art involves creating variable things; not identical with making.
Chapter 6 - 5:
Practical wisdom is a reasoned state of acting for human goods.
Chapter 6 - 6:
Intuitive reason grasps first principles; not covered by other knowledge.
Chapter 6 - 7:
Wisdom combines intuitive reason and scientific knowledge of highest objects.
Chapter 6 - 8:
Political and Practical Wisdom
Chapter 6 - 9:
Deliberation and Excellence
Chapter 6 - 10:
Understanding and Practical Wisdom
Chapter 6 - 11:
Judgment and Sympathetic Understanding
Chapter 6 - 12:
Utility and Virtue
Chapter 6 - 13:
Natural Virtue and Practical Wisdom
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Chapter 1 - 7-1:
To begin anew, we should consider three moral states to avoid: vice, incontinence, and brutishness. Virtue and continence are the opposites of vice and incontinence, respectively. Brutishness, however, is best countered by a form of superhuman virtue, akin to divine or heroic excellence. Such divine virtue is beyond the ordinary human realm of virtue and vice. Gods, in this framework, possess a state that surpasses virtue, while brutishness represents a lower, non-virtuous state. Rare among humans, brutishness is usually found in barbarians or those affected by disease or deformity, unlike superhuman virtue which is exceptionally rare.
Chapter 2 - 7-2:
Socrates argued that incontinence is impossible for those with true knowledge, claiming that if one knows what is best, they cannot act against it. However, this contradicts observable behavior. Socrates believed incontinence stems from ignorance rather than knowledge. Some accept that knowledge is paramount but argue that the incontinent person has merely weak opinions, not true knowledge. Practical wisdom should prevent incontinence, but it is problematic to reconcile practical wisdom with acting basely. The argument continues with considerations of whether practical wisdom or mere opinion influences behavior, and the idea that incontinence might involve false opinions.
Chapter 3 - 7-3:
To address incontinence, we must first explore if the incontinent act knowingly. The incontinent person may act under a state of passion, which affects their knowledge similarly to being drunk or mad. This involves two types of knowledge: universal and particular. Knowledge of universal truths does not always translate to particular actions, as passions can override this knowledge. This results in the person acting against their better judgment due to an overpowering appetite or emotion. Thus, incontinence involves acting against what one knows to be right under the influence of strong passions.
Chapter 4 - 7-4:
We need to determine if incontinence is universal or specific. Incontinence typically pertains to bodily pleasures like food and sex, which are necessary or desirable. Excess in these areas is labeled as incontinence specifically in relation to these pleasures, rather than generally. Those who are incontinent concerning bodily pleasures, but not other areas, are more commonly considered simply incontinent. The self-indulgent person, who pursues pleasure excessively, is also seen as incontinent. The distinction lies in whether one pursues pleasure or avoids pain by choice or against judgment, and whether the pleasures pursued are of a noble or base nature.
Chapter 5:
Pleasures can be inherently pleasant, or made so by circumstances. Some are naturally pleasant, while others become so due to physical injury, bad nature, or habits. For instance, some primitive tribes enjoy raw or human flesh, or exhibit brutish behaviors like Phalaris’s acts. States of character resulting from diseases or habits, such as hair-plucking or sexual perversions, differ from natural incontinence. Natural incontinence is not the same as brutishness or morbid conditions. A person exhibiting such states is not simply incontinent but may act in ways analogously similar to incontinence.
Chapter 6:
Incontinence related to anger is less disgraceful than appetite-related incontinence. Anger, although impulsive, can be guided by reason and argument. It reacts to perceived insults with a drive for revenge, while appetite responds to immediate pleasure. Anger is more excusable because it aligns with natural reactions, unlike appetite-driven excess. People are more forgiving of anger-induced actions compared to those driven by appetite, which can lead to more calculated and deceitful behaviors. Thus, appetite-induced incontinence is more disgraceful and considered vice-like, while anger-induced incontinence is seen as less severe.
Chapter 7:
Pleasures and pains can lead to various states of self-indulgence or temperance. Excessive indulgence in pleasures or avoidance of pain can lead to self-indulgence, while a balanced approach indicates temperance. People who avoid bodily pains by choice differ from those who suffer due to their nature. Self-indulgent individuals are more prone to regret because they follow excessive desires. Incontinence can be seen as a form of softness compared to the more controlled endurance, with self-indulgence being more severe than incontinence. The distinction lies in the ability to resist or conquer desires.
Chapter 8:
Self-indulgent individuals are less likely to repent compared to incontinent ones, who are prone to regret their actions. Incontinence is intermittent, similar to a recurring illness, while vice is a more permanent state. Vice involves conscious wrongdoing, while incontinence reflects a failure to adhere to reason due to overpowering passions. Incontinent individuals, unlike those with fixed vices, can potentially be cured since they recognize their moral failures. Self-indulgence represents a deeper, more ingrained flaw compared to the temporary lapses of incontinence.
Chapter 9:
A continent person follows the right choice consistently, whereas an incontinent person abandons good choices. Some individuals stick to any choice, while others adhere to the right choice. Strong-headed individuals, who resist persuasion, are similar to continent people but differ in their stubbornness towards arguments rather than appetites. Those who fail to maintain resolutions may not be incontinent if their failure stems from noble desires. The continuum between self-indulgence and incontinence involves varying responses to pleasure, with the continent person maintaining consistency regardless of their level of delight.
Chapter 10:
Incontinence involves failing to follow reason due to overpowering emotions, while self-indulgence is a persistent state of moral weakness. Continent individuals adhere to rational choices, while incontinent ones struggle with conflicting desires. Those who resist tempt ations successfully are considered continent, while those overwhelmed by them are incontinent. The difference between incontinence and self-indulgence lies in their permanence and the nature of the emotions involved. Continent individuals are better at maintaining their moral standards compared to those who frequently succumb to their desires.
Chapter 11:
The study of pleasure and pain pertains to political philosophy, defining what is considered good or bad. Some argue that no pleasure is inherently good, while others believe some pleasures are good but not all. Arguments against pleasure as a good include: pleasure being a process, temperate individuals avoiding pleasure, and pleasures hindering thought. The counterarguments state that pleasure can be good if it aligns with natural states and activities, and that pleasurable activities are not always detrimental. The distinction lies in whether pleasure is a process or an activity of a natural state.
Chapter 12:
Pleasure may be good or bad based on context and individual states. Good may be defined differently for each person and situation. Pleasures that restore natural states are incidental and not purely pleasant. While some pleasures arise from bodily deficiencies, others, like contemplation, are genuinely fulfilling. The idea that pleasure is merely a process is flawed; it should be seen as activity. The argument that pleasure is inherently bad due to some unhealthy pleasures is countered by the idea that not all pleasures are harmful, and even thinking can sometimes be detrimental.
Chapter 13:
Pain is universally considered bad, leading to the conclusion that pleasure is inherently good. If some pleasures are bad, it does not negate that the chief good could be a form of pleasure. Happiness, associated with pleasure, requires both internal and external goods. The pursuit of pleasure by all beings suggests it may be the chief good. Not all pleasures are the same; people pursue pleasure differently based on their nature. The argument that pleasure isn’t necessary for a good life overlooks that pleasure contributes to happiness, which requires unimpeded activity.
Chapter 14:
Bodily pleasures are often seen as less worthy than noble pleasures. Excessive pursuit of bodily pleasures is criticized, while necessary pleasures are questioned. Pleasure is pursued to counteract pain, but not all pleasures are inherently good; some are incidentally good or even harmful. The pursuit of pleasure varies, and temperance is valued over mere indulgence. Controlling and understanding pleasure and pain contribute to a more stable and fulfilling life, contrasting the instability caused by excessive pursuit of transient pleasures.
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Chapter 1:
There are three moral states: vice, incontinence, brutishness; virtues oppose.
Chapter 2:
Socrates argues knowledge prevents incontinence; ignorance causes irrational actions.
Chapter 3:
Incontinence differs by objects and attitudes; opinions versus knowledge explained.
Chapter 4:
Incontinence is context-specific; affects bodily pleasures and honor differently.
Chapter 5:
Pleasures and pains are categorized; incontinence in excess of choices.
Chapter 6:
Anger-induced incontinence is less disgraceful than appetite-driven incontinence.
Chapter 7:
Pleasures and pains lead to self-indulgence or temperance, differing states.
Chapter 8:
Self-indulgent people lack repentance; incontinence is intermittent, vice permanent.
Chapter 9:
Continents choose right consistently; incontinents abandon good choices often.
Chapter 10:
Incontinence is emotional failure; self-indulgence is persistent moral weakness.
Chapter 11:
Pleasure and pain are examined in political philosophy; pleasure’s value debated.
Chapter 12:
Pleasure can be good or bad; context and state matter.
Chapter 13:
Pain’s badness supports pleasure’s goodness; pleasure may be chief good.
Chapter 14:
Bodily pleasures versus noble ones; excessive pursuit leads to issues.
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Chapter 1:
A discussion of friendship is natural; it implies virtue and is crucial for living well. Friends are essential; without them, even wealth and power lose value. Friends offer opportunities for beneficence and help in guarding prosperity. They provide refuge in misfortune, aid in avoiding errors, and stimulate noble actions. Friendship is observed across species, showing its universal importance. It holds states together, and lawgivers prioritize it over justice. Friendship fosters unity and reduces factionalism. It’s praised as noble and linked to being good, enhancing one's life.
Chapter 2:
Friendship is debated; some see it as similarity, others as opposites. Euripides and Heraclitus discuss physical causes of friendship, while Empedocles contrasts them. The inquiry here focuses on human character: can friendship exist between wicked people? Is there one type of friendship or multiple kinds? Previous discussions suggest different species of friendship, dependent on degrees of virtue and character. This chapter examines the nature of friendship and whether it can exist between individuals of varying moral standing.
Chapter 3:
Friendship types depend on the object of love: good, pleasant, or useful. People love what is good or what seems good. Love can be for oneself or for others. True friendship involves mutual recognition and goodwill. It’s different from love for lifeless objects, where no reciprocal goodwill exists. Friendships require mutual recognition and a shared wish for each other’s good, distinguishing them from mere goodwill.
Chapter 4:
Friendship types align with the things loved: utility, pleasure, or virtue. Friendships based on utility or pleasure are incidental, dissolving if the benefit or pleasure ceases. Friendships for utility are common among old people, while young people seek pleasure. Perfect friendship, found in virtuous individuals, is enduring because it is based on goodness. Such friendships are rare and require time and familiarity to develop.
Chapter 5:
Friendship involves living together and mutual benefits, but distance doesn’t always break it. Absence might lead to forgetting, as seen in "out of sight, out of mind". Sour or old individuals struggle to make friends. Friendship is characterized by shared time and activities, making those who live together true friends. The truest friendship involves good people who are desirable for both goodness and pleasantness.
Chapter 6:
Friendships between sour or elderly individuals are less common. They don’t easily form bonds because they don’t delight in each other or enjoy spending time together. Friendship requires mutual enjoyment and presence, which sour or elderly individuals may lack. However, they may still bear goodwill and offer aid, though they don't necessarily qualify as friends due to the absence of these vital aspects.
Chapter 7:
True friendship, like deep love, cannot be extensive; one cannot have perfect friendships with many. Genuine friendship requires significant familiarity and personal connection. Although many people can be pleasant or useful, deep friendship demands more, and it is challenging to please or be pleased by many individuals simultaneously.
Chapter 8:
Friendship for pleasure involves mutual delight and is akin to youthful friendships where generosity is prominent. Utility-based friendships are less about mutual pleasure and more about practical benefits. Those who are happy prefer pleasant friends over useful ones, as pleasure sustains them better than mere utility.
Chapter 9:
Friendships often involve inequality, such as between rulers and subjects or parents and children. These relationships differ in nature and love should be proportional to merit. True friendship requires some level of equality, though exact equality isn't always necessary or possible, especially in cases of great disparity.
Chapter 10:
Constitutional forms include monarchy, aristocracy, and timocracy. Monarchy is ideal but can degrade into tyranny, where rulers act for personal gain. Aristocracy can shift to oligarchy, while timocracy may devolve into democracy. Households reflect these forms; for example, paternal rule resembles monarchy, while rule by masters or unequal partners can be tyrannical or oligarchic.
Chapter 11:
Friendships in different constitutions involve varying degrees of justice and benefits. A king’s friendship with subjects includes excess benefits, similar to parental care. Superiority defines these relationships: kings over subjects, ancestors over descendants, and fathers over children. Such friendships imply merit-based justice, with benefits and duties proportionate to one's role. In timocracy, equality among citizens ensures balanced friendship. In tyrannies, friendship is minimal due to lack of common ground and justice. Democracies have greater friendship as citizens are more equal and share common interests, fostering stronger bonds.
Chapter 12:
Friendships of kindred and comrades differ from mere associative friendships. Kindred friendships rely on parental bonds, where parents love children as extensions of themselves, and children reciprocate over time. Such bonds strengthen with shared upbringing and age similarity. Friendships among siblings are akin to comrades due to shared upbringing and education. Marital friendships combine utility, pleasure, and virtue, with children serving as a bond. Friendship in marriage involves mutual help and is rooted in both emotional and practical aspects, though children strengthen this bond.
Chapter 13:
Friendships vary by equality or superiority. Equals share mutual respect, while unequals adjust their expectations based on superiority or inferiority. Complaints are common in utility-based friendships, where individuals feel shortchanged. Virtuous friendships, however, involve goodwill without complaints, focusing on the giver’s intent. Utility-based friendships measure return based on the receiver’s benefit, while virtue-based ones consider the giver’s purpose. Complaints arise when relationships are dissolved without matching the initial type of friendship, whether moral or legal, impacting the perceived fairness of the exchange.
Chapter 14:
In friendships of superiority, each party expects different returns. The superior expects more honor, while the inferior anticipates practical benefits. This dynamic mirrors constitutional arrangements, where public benefits and honors are distributed based on contributions. Unequal relationships should balance honor and gain: the superior gets honor, the inferior benefits. In constitutions, contributions affect honors and wealth distribution. Individuals repay what they can, recognizing they can’t fully match their debt. Such relationships emphasize honor and gratitude, acknowledging that complete repayment is often unattainable.
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Chapter 1:
Friendship implies virtue, essential for living well, and valued prosperity.
Chapter 2:
Debates exist on friendship’s nature: similarity, opposites, or virtue.
Chapter 3:
Friendship types: based on good, pleasure, or utility.
Chapter 4:
Friendship based on utility, pleasure, or virtue; virtue endures.
Chapter 5:
Friendship requires proximity; absence might cause forgetting; goodness endures.
Chapter 6:
Friendship forms less easily between sour or elderly individuals due to temperament.
Chapter 7:
True friendship is rare; deep connections with many are impossible.
Chapter 8:
Friendships for pleasure involve mutual delight, while utility-based friendships focus on practical benefits.
Chapter 9:
Friendships often involve inequality; love should be proportional to merit.
Chapter 10:
Constitutions include monarchy, aristocracy, and timocracy, each with potential deviations.
Chapter 11:
Friendship in various constitutions involves justice, benefits, and superiority dynamics.
Chapter 12:
Kindred friendships are rooted in parental bonds and shared upbringing.
Chapter 13:
Friendships vary by equality or superiority, impacting expectations and complaints.
Chapter 14:
Superior friendships involve honor, inferiors expect practical benefits and assistance.
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9 - 1:
In dissimilar friendships, proportion maintains equality. For instance, craftsmen receive payment in money, a common measure. In romantic relationships, if love is unreciprocated or the qualities expected are not met, the relationship may dissolve. The key issue arises when one party's expectations differ from the other's. Proportional return is essential, and it’s just for the recipient to determine the worth of the service or gift. Discrepancies in perceived value and actual benefit can lead to dissatisfaction and disputes, reflecting the complexity in valuing and fulfilling agreements in friendships and services.
9 - 2:
Deciding preferences in service and gratitude can be complex. Whether to prioritize a father, a friend, or a good man varies based on circumstances. Generally, one should repay benefits rather than merely obliging friends, especially when loans or significant services are involved. If a gift is noble or necessary, it may warrant preference over other obligations. Adjusting returns based on the nature of the gift and the recipient's worth is crucial, as fairness involves balancing personal relationships with practical considerations and expectations.
9 - 3:
Friendships based on utility or pleasure may end if those attributes change. Complaints arise if one pretends to love for character but values utility or pleasure. If a friend becomes worse, breaking off the friendship is reasonable. If a friend improves vastly, maintaining the relationship might be difficult. Friendships should be evaluated based on enduring qualities, and changes in virtue or character can necessitate reevaluating the relationship. Fairness and previous bonds should influence decisions, especially when dealing with significant moral differences.
9 - 4:
Friendly relations mirror self-relations. Friendship involves wishing good for the friend as one does for oneself, sharing joys and sorrows. Good men wish themselves well and find pleasure in their own company. In contrast, wicked individuals are divided internally and do not enjoy their own company. They may seek companionship to escape self-loathing. True friendship aligns with self-love and virtue, whereas those lacking internal harmony struggle with self-love and friendship, emphasizing the importance of moral integrity in forming lasting relationships.
9 - 5:
Goodwill differs from friendship; it’s a form of friendly feeling but lacks the depth and mutual involvement of true friendship. Goodwill can be sudden and superficial, as seen in competitors. It is an initial stage that might lead to friendship, similar to how physical attraction precedes love. True friendship requires more than goodwill; it demands intimacy and shared commitment. Goodwill is a precursor but not a substitute for the deeper, active engagement that characterizes genuine friendship.
Chapter 6:
Unanimity means agreeing on what is to their interest, not merely having the same opinions. A city is unanimous when all agree on beneficial actions and work together for shared goals. Disagreement happens when parties want different outcomes, leading to faction rather than unanimity. True unanimity is when all parties agree on actions and their implementation, reflecting political friendship focused on mutual interests and shared goals. Unanimity is rooted in aligning on important matters and successfully achieving common objectives, rather than just having similar opinions.
Chapter 7:
Benefactors often love those they help more than the helped love them, seen as paradoxical. Benefactors, unlike creditors, form a genuine bond with recipients, valuing their own contributions. This deeper affection is rooted in the intrinsic value of creation and existence, reflecting love for one’s handiwork. While debtors wish for creditors' absence, benefactors appreciate their contributions as they manifest their own values and efforts. The bond stems from valuing existence and activity, with benefactors loving their work more than the recipients do.
Chapter 8:
The debate on self-love versus loving others questions whether one should love oneself more or others. Critics argue that self-lovers are selfish, focusing solely on personal gain. However, true self-love involves pursuing noble actions, aligning with virtue and reason. This self-love prioritizes the noblest aspects of life, benefiting oneself and others. The good man loves himself by acting virtuously, while the wicked man harms himself and others. Ultimately, loving oneself in a virtuous manner aligns with promoting noble actions and mutual benefits.
Chapter 9:
The necessity of friends for the happy person is debated. Some argue that a self-sufficient, supremely happy person needs no friends, having all goods. However, friends are seen as valuable, enhancing one's life and activity. Happiness is linked to living actively with others, not in solitude. Friends help maintain continuous, pleasurable activity and provide support in virtue. Virtuous friends are naturally desirable, contributing to one’s overall happiness and active engagement, reinforcing that even the supremely happy need friends to fully enjoy life’s virtues.
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Chapter 1:
Friendship implies virtue, essential for living well, and valued prosperity.
Chapter 2:
Debates exist on friendship’s nature: similarity, opposites, or virtue.
Chapter 3:
Friendship types: based on good, pleasure, or utility.
Chapter 4:
Friendship based on utility, pleasure, or virtue; virtue endures.
Chapter 5:
Friendship requires proximity; absence might cause forgetting; goodness endures.
Chapter 6:
Unanimity in a city means agreement on actions and interests.
Chapter 7:
Benefactors love those they help more than beneficiaries appreciate them.
Chapter 8:
One should love themselves most, reflecting their virtues and desires.
Chapter 9:
A happy man needs friends to share and enjoy life.
Here’s the table with the appropriate HTML formatting: ```html
Chapter 1:
Friendship implies virtue, essential for living well, and valued prosperity.
Chapter 2:
Debates exist on friendship’s nature: similarity, opposites, or virtue.
Chapter 3:
Friendship types: based on good, pleasure, or utility.
Chapter 4:
Friendship based on utility, pleasure, or virtue; virtue endures.
Chapter 5:
Friendship requires proximity; absence might cause forgetting; goodness endures.
Chapter 6:
Unanimity in a city means agreement on actions and interests.
Chapter 7:
Benefactors love those they help more than beneficiaries appreciate them.
Chapter 8:
One should love themselves most, reflecting their virtues and desires.
Chapter 9:
A happy man needs friends to share and enjoy life.
Chapter 10 - 1:
Pleasure is closely tied to human nature, guiding education through pleasure and pain. Enjoying and disliking the right things impacts virtue and happiness. Pleasure’s role in life is disputed: some view it as good, others as bad. Critics argue pleasure is aimed at even by those who denounce it. Arguments about pleasure should align with facts, not merely feelings.
Chapter 10 - 2:
Eudoxus saw pleasure as the chief good since everything aims at it. He argued pleasure, unlike pain, is inherently desirable. Plato countered, claiming the good cannot be enhanced by adding pleasure. This suggests pleasure isn't the ultimate good, as it does not meet the criteria of being fundamentally desirable on its own.
Chapter 10 - 3:
Pleasure is not necessarily a good just because it is pleasant. If pleasure admits of degrees, so might virtues. The comparison of pleasure to qualities like health suggests it might not be indeterminate. Some pleasures are not linked to replenishment or pain but are still valuable and distinct based on their sources.
Chapter 10 - 4:
Pleasure is complete in itself and does not constitute movement or coming into being. Unlike movement, which requires time and stages, pleasure is whole and immediate. Thus, pleasure is fundamentally different from movement, completing activities without being a process or transition.
Chapter 10 - 5:
Pleasures vary by the activities they complete. Different activities, like those involving thought or senses, are completed by specific pleasures. Pleasures enhance and are tied to their respective activities. Distractions from other pleasures can hinder one’s focus on their current activity.
Chapter 10 - 6:
We have discussed virtues, forms of friendship, and pleasures. Now, let's outline happiness, the ultimate end of human nature. Happiness isn't a disposition—one can be unhappy while sleeping or enduring misfortunes. It must be an activity desirable in itself, like virtuous actions, which are good for their own sake. Pleasant amusements are chosen for their own sake but lead to neglect. Happiness lies in virtuous activities, not in amusements or leisure. To amuse oneself to work seems silly. Hence, happiness isn’t found in amusement but in virtuous activity, which is more fulfilling and self-sufficient.
Chapter 10 - 7:
If happiness is an activity in accordance with virtue, it should align with the highest virtue, which is reason. The activity of reason, particularly contemplation, aligns with perfect happiness. This activity is continuous and pleasurable, as philosophical wisdom is both the best and most continuous activity. Contemplative activity, being self-sufficient and most pleasant for its own sake, represents complete happiness. While gods are thought to be happiest, their happiness is not tied to practical virtues but to contemplation, which aligns with the best aspect of human nature. Therefore, contemplative activity represents the highest form of happiness.
Chapter 10 - 8:
Secondary happiness comes from a life of other virtues, which align with our human nature. Virtues like justice and bravery are human and arise from our bodily nature. While practical wisdom connects with moral virtues, the highest virtue is more about reason. Virtues tied to bodily needs, like money or power, are less central than those linked to reason. Contemplative activity requires less external support, reflecting the divine aspect of human nature. Thus, a life in accordance with reason and contemplation is the highest form of happiness, surpassing practical virtues that require external goods.
Chapter 10 - 9:
If we've covered virtues, friendship, and pleasure, should we conclude? Merely knowing virtue is insufficient; we must practice it. Arguments alone don't make one virtuous; character must be shaped by practice. Some believe virtue comes from nature, others from habit or teaching. Nature's role is divine, while teaching affects the cultivated soul. Passion often resists argument; true virtue involves a pre-existing kinship to goodness. Proper upbringing and laws are crucial for developing virtue from a young age. Thus, practical engagement with virtue and right upbringing are essential for achieving true goodness and happiness.
Here's the formatted table with linked chapters: ```html
Chapter 1:
Friendship implies virtue, essential for living well, and valued prosperity.
Chapter 2:
Debates exist on friendship’s nature: similarity, opposites, or virtue.
Chapter 3:
Friendship types: based on good, pleasure, or utility.
Chapter 4:
Friendship based on utility, pleasure, or virtue; virtue endures.
Chapter 5:
Friendship requires proximity; absence might cause forgetting; goodness endures.
Chapter 6:
Unanimity in a city means agreement on actions and interests.
Chapter 7:
Benefactors love those they help more than beneficiaries appreciate them.
Chapter 8:
One should love themselves most, reflecting their virtues and desires.
Chapter 9:
A happy man needs friends to share and enjoy life.
Chapter 10 - 1:
Pleasure is crucial for virtue, influencing choices and happiness.
Chapter 10 - 2:
Eudoxus argued pleasure is the good because all things aim.
Chapter 10 - 3:
Pleasure's value varies; it's not always consistent or a good.
Chapter 10 - 4:
Pleasure is complete and whole; not a movement or process.
Chapter 10 - 5:
Pleasures differ by activity; each completes and intensifies specific activities.
Chapter 10 - 6:
Happiness is activity, not merely amusement; it’s self-sufficient, virtuous.
Chapter 10 - 7:
Happiness involves activity of the highest virtue: contemplative, continuous, pure.
Chapter 10 - 8:
Life with virtue, practical wisdom, and external goods; moderation helps.
Chapter 10 - 9:
Arguments alone can’t make us good; practical training and habits are essential.
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