PhysicsHere is the table with the requested formatting and links applied: ```html
Chapter 6:
Principles cannot be infinite, as this would make Being unknowable. A finite number is sufficient. Contraries are not alone as principles; a third substratum is needed. Different theorists propose varying elements (water, fire, or intermediates). The number of elements should be three, not more, to ensure coherence.
Chapter 7:
To explain becoming, we note that things can change from one state to another, with both simple and complex transitions. Each process involves a substratum, which persists, and a form that changes. Principles may be two (contraries) or three (including substratum), showing that change involves both subject and form.
Chapter 8:
Early thinkers err by denying becoming from non-being or claiming only Being exists. They misunderstood by not distinguishing between qualified and unqualified senses of becoming. We argue that things can come from privation (non-being) in a qualified sense and that principles should be understood in terms of potentiality and actuality.
Chapter 9:
Some philosophers incorrectly identify all principles with not-being. They overlook the necessary distinction between matter (which has potential) and privation (which is pure non-being). True principles should include both a substantive aspect and a negative one, recognizing the complex interplay between form, substance, and privation.

2

 

Here's how you can apply the edits to your table following the instructions: ```html
Chapter 1:
Some things exist by nature, like animals and plants, having inherent principles of motion and rest. Unlike artificial objects, which lack intrinsic change, natural things have their own source of movement or stasis. Nature is a principle, not a mere attribute, and always implies a substance.
Chapter 2:
The distinction between physicist and mathematician lies in their focus. Mathematicians study properties separable from motion, while physicists consider attributes related to physical bodies. Nature includes both form and matter, and physics investigates both. Arts imitate nature, involving both form and matter, with physicists focusing on matter's essence.
Chapter 3:
Causes have four types: material (what something is made of), formal (its essence), efficient (source of change), and final (purpose). Multiple causes can apply to one thing, such as a sculptor and bronze being causes of a statue. Causes can be proper or incidental, potential or actual.
Chapter 4:
Understanding causation involves recognizing the nature and number of causes. Distinctions include proper and incidental causes, potential versus actual, and generic versus particular causes. Causes operate simultaneously with their effects or separately. Seeking precise causes is crucial, assigning effects to their appropriate causes and understanding relative powers.
Chapter 5:
Nature’s dual aspects—form and matter—require examination. Mathematicians and physicists differ in their focus: form versus matter. Arts and nature both involve form and matter, with form often seen as primary. Nature’s process of growth and fulfillment highlights the importance of form in defining what a thing is.
Chapter 6:
Spontaneity refers to events caused by external factors, not intentional actions, and differs from chance, which involves deliberate intention. While spontaneity can occur in inanimate objects and animals, chance pertains to agents capable of moral action. Thus, spontaneity lacks intention, whereas chance includes deliberation.
Chapter 7:
The four causes are matter, form, mover, and purpose. The physicist should consider all these causes to fully understand an effect. While matter and form often coincide, some causes are external and involve deliberate intention. Physics encompasses causes of motion, focusing on matter, form, and moving agents.
Chapter 8:
Nature operates for a purpose, unlike mere chance. Although some natural phenomena appear coincidental, they generally result from a purposeful process. Nature, like art, aims towards an end, and mistakes in nature, like in art, reveal deviations from the intended purpose, underscoring that purpose is intrinsic to nature.
Chapter 9:
Necessity in production refers to material causes required for an end. Unlike mathematical necessity, which follows from definitions, natural necessity involves material requirements. In both nature and artifacts, the end defines the matter. Necessity is thus related to the purpose, rather than being an independent determinant of existence.
Here is the table with the edits applied according to the instructions provided: ```html
Chapter 1:
Nature distinguishes from artificial; things by nature change internally.
Chapter 2:
Mathematics and physics differ; astronomy mixes elements of both.
Chapter 3:
Four causes: material, form, primary source, end or purpose.
Chapter 4:
Causes are categorized into material, formal, efficient, and final.
Chapter 5:
Different causes: particular or generic, actual or potential.
Chapter 6:
Chance affects moral actions; spontaneity affects inanimate objects and animals.
Chapter 7:
Four causes: matter, form, mover, end; physics studies them all.
Chapter 8:
Nature acts purposefully; chance events do not imply purpose.
Chapter 9:
Necessity in nature relates to matter; purpose determines the end.
Here is the table with the appropriate edits applied: ```html
3 - 10:
Nature means ‘motion and change’; understanding motion is essential. Motion involves continuous things, and infinity appears in the continuous. Place, void, and time are considered necessary for motion. We need to examine these aspects as they relate to our study. Motion can exist as fulfillment, potential, or both. Relative terms are used for excess, defect, and movement. Motion always relates to substance, quantity, quality, or place. Different types of motion exist based on these attributes. Fulfillment of potential is motion, such as building or aging. The same entity can be both potential and real.
3 - 20:
Motion's definition is challenging; it's hard to categorize otherwise. Some equate motion with ‘inequality’ or ‘non-being’, but not fitting. Motion is indefinite, not merely potential or actual. The mover is also moved, defining motion by contact. The mover's role is to act and cause change. Motion and being moved are linked, but not identical. Teaching and learning are similar but not the same. Actualization in one does not fully define the other. Different attributes may share actualization but differ in definition.
3 - 30:
Motion's definition involves both the mover and the moved. One actuality exists in both, similar to intervals or steep inclines. Agency and patiency are different; one acts, the other is acted upon. Differentiating these concepts is complex; one actualization doesn't imply multiple simultaneous changes. Teaching and learning illustrate different types of motion, but they share common actualization. Distinguishing between types of motion clarifies their definitions, like alteration or building.
3 - 40:
The science of nature addresses spatial magnitudes, motion, and time. Infinite and finite apply to these categories, not always to qualities. Physics must explore the infinite and its nature. Pythagoreans and Plato view the infinite as a self-subsistent principle. Infinite is considered a property of substances or elements by physicists. Anaxagoras and Democritus offer differing views on the infinite. The infinite is essential, being uncreatable, indestructible, and encompassing all. Belief in the infinite arises from time, magnitude division, and mathematical notions. Infinite is presumed due to its unending nature and vast scope.
Chapter 5:
The infinite cannot be a separable substance or attribute since it must be indivisible. If indivisible, it contradicts being infinite. It cannot be a substance, as any part taken would be infinite. The infinite must be without parts and indivisible, making it incompatible with actual infinite substances.
Chapter 6:
The infinite cannot be a sensible body since every body has a specific place and magnitude. Whether compound or simple, an infinite body would contradict principles of balance and existence. Bodies are finite or part of finite elements, and an infinite body cannot be properly located or unified.
Chapter 7:
The infinite exists potentially, not actually. Magnitude by addition or division is not infinitely actual but potential. Infinity exists in division and addition, where the infinite is always potentially present but not fully realized. Actual infinite bodies are not possible; infinity pertains to processes, not substances.
Here is the table with the requested edits applied: ```html
3 - 10:
Nature involves motion and change; infinity appears in continuous things.
3 - 20:
Motion’s definition is complex; mover and moved are linked.
3 - 30:
Motion involves both mover and moved; agency and patiency differ.
3 - 40:
Science of nature explores infinite properties; infinite is essential.
Chapter 5:
The infinite cannot be an actual substance; it’s indivisible or not infinite.
Chapter 6:
Infinite bodies cannot exist; every sensible body must be finite.
Chapter 7:
Infinite exists in potential terms; actual infinities are impossible.

4

 

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4 - 1:
A physicist must understand Place, alongside the infinite. Place implies that existing things occupy somewhere; motion is fundamentally change of place. Understanding Place involves challenges with no prior solutions. Place is inferred from mutual replacement (e.g., water turning into air) and the behavior of natural elements (e.g., fire rising, earth sinking). Place is more than mere space or void; it has intrinsic properties.
4 - 2:
Place is often seen as the limit or form defining each body, yet it cannot be merely matter or form. It must be separable from the body, unlike matter or form, which are integral. Place is not part of the body or its attributes but serves as a container. Plato's view equates matter and space, but place cannot be just matter or form.
4 - 3:
Place can be thought of in various ways: as parts in a whole, whole in parts, species in genus, or form in matter. A thing cannot be in itself as it would imply two things being in the same entity, which is impossible. Place cannot be matter or form but must be distinct, as matter and form cannot exist independently of the contained thing.
4 - 4:
Place is what contains something without being part of it, being equal in extent to the contained object, and separable. It is essential to understand place as it relates to motion and variation. Place surrounds objects, differing when continuous or separate. It cannot merely be shape, matter, or boundary but an extension related to the object's extent.
4 - 5:
If a body is contained by another, it is in place. Water, without a container, will have parts moved differently. Some things are potentially or actually in place; others are per se or indirectly in place. Place doesn't need to grow with the body, nor is it a corporeal interval.
Chapter 6:
The investigation into the void mirrors debates about place. Proponents of the void argue it as a sort of place that can be either ‘full’ or ‘empty.’ Critics challenge this by demonstrating the presence of air but not disproving the concept of an interval or void separating bodies.
Chapter 7:
Those arguing for the void suggest that motion and increase depend on its existence, as seen in observations of compression and expansion. They believe the void enables change in size and facilitates movement, contrasting with those who argue against it by showing motion through mediums.
Chapter 8:
Refuting the existence of the void involves challenging its conceptual basis. It is argued that void cannot be a condition for movement, as movement occurs naturally in bodies without requiring a separate void. Thus, movement and compression can happen without a distinct void.
Chapter 9:
Void cannot be the condition of locomotion or movement in place. The void, if it existed, would not provide a basis for movement since bodies cannot move into or through an actual void. The arguments against the void claim it cannot facilitate natural movement or space.
Chapter 10:
The void, if it exists, should exhibit properties of motion that contradict its own nature. Movement through the void would imply equal velocity for all bodies, which is not observed. Therefore, the void as a concept fails to account for variations in movement and density.
Chapter 11:
Time is perceived through change and movement; if no change is noticed, time seems nonexistent. Time is tied to movement and is not independent of it. The notion of ‘before’ and ‘after’ is essential in defining time, which measures motion and change but is not movement itself.
Chapter 12:
Time is a measure of motion, not motion itself. It is continuous and divisible, like a line, but differs from the concept of number. Time is described as long or short and is related to motion. It measures both the motion and its extent, not being fast or slow.
Chapter 13:
The ‘now’ connects past and future, acting as a limit and division of time. It is always changing in reference to division but constant as a link. The ‘now’ has a dual nature: it divides and unites time, but its essence as a boundary is not fixed.
Chapter 14:
Time must be related to the present ‘now’ and is measured by it. The ‘now’ connects past and future moments. Time can be described in relation to specific instances but is always continuous. Events and periods are defined relative to the ‘now,’ indicating a structured continuity.
Here is the table with the requested edits applied: ```html
Chapter 1:
The physicist must know place and its existence and nature. Motion, defined as change of place, necessitates understanding place.
Chapter 2:
Place's existence is evident from mutual replacement of bodies. The place where water was now contains air.
Chapter 3:
Elements like fire and earth suggest place has influence and potency. Objects have attributes based on position and nature.
Chapter 4:
Place must be distinct from bodies, not their form or matter. It must exist independently from the things within it.
Chapter 5:
Place cannot be element or form; it's not an existent body. It is not directly associated with causation or motion.
Chapter 6:
Observations support void’s existence through body compression and expansion.
Chapter 7:
Heaviness and lightness characterize bodies; void lacks these qualities.
Chapter 8:
Bodies can’t move into void; movement doesn’t need void.
Chapter 9:
Void doesn’t exist; movement isn’t influenced by void.
Chapter 10:
Displacement shows void’s practical impossibility, challenging its theoretical existence.
Chapter 11:
Time is not independent of movement and change; it is marked by intervals of 'before' and 'after' as we perceive movement and change.
Chapter 12:
Time is not described as fast or slow, but in terms of duration and quantity; it measures motion and is not directly related to speed.
Chapter 13:
The 'now' connects past and future, serving as both a limit and a link in time, but it is always changing as it divides and unites temporal moments.
Chapter 14:
A thing that exists in time is measured by time, which is a measure of motion and rest, reflecting the nature of things that change or remain static.

5

 

Here is how you would apply the instructions to your table: ```html
Chapter 1:
Everything that changes does so in one of three ways: (1) accidentally, as when a musical person walks; (2) when a part of it changes, such as a body healing due to an eye healing; (3) directly, as when a physician heals or a hand strikes. Motion involves a mover, the moved, time, and the goal of motion. Motion is in the movable, not in the form, with three kinds of movers and motions: accidental, partial, and direct.
Chapter 2:
Substance has no motion as it has no contrary. Motion cannot exist in relations or in the agent and patient context. Motion of motion leads to an infinite regress, proving it's impossible. For motion to occur, it must be within Quality, Quantity, or Place. Motion in Quality is called alteration, in Quantity is increase or decrease, and in Place is locomotion. The term 'immovable' applies to things incapable of motion, hard to move, or naturally at rest.
Chapter 3:
Terms such as 'together,' 'apart,' 'in contact,' 'between,' 'in succession,' 'contiguous,' and 'continuous' describe spatial relationships. Things are together when in one place and apart when in different places. Contact occurs when extremities are together. 'Between' implies three things in a change process. Continuity implies mutual contact forming unity. Succession is the first analytical order, followed by contact and continuity. Continuity belongs to things that naturally form a unity.
Chapter 4:
Motion can be one generically, specifically, or numerically, involving the mover, the moved, and the time. Continuous motion must be one and uninterrupted. Regular motion is one, while irregular motion, though continuous, is less unified.
Chapter 5:
Contrary motions involve moving from or to opposing states, like health to disease. Changes to and from contraries are not contrary motions. Motion from one contrary to another is genuinely contrary, like falling ill versus recovering health.
Chapter 6:
Motion has contrary rest states, e.g., local motion and local rest. States of rest and their opposites relate to their natural or unnatural motions. Motion's contrariety is best found in another motion rather than rest.
Here is the table with the requested edits applied: ```html
Chapter 1:
Changes are accidental, partial, or direct; motion involves movers and goals.
Chapter 2:
Motion exists in Quality, Quantity, Place; not Substance or Relation.
Chapter 3:
Together, apart, contact, between, succession, contiguous, continuous describe spatial relationships.
Chapter 4:
Motion is one generically, specifically, or numerically; involves mover, moved, time.
Chapter 5:
Contrary motions move from or to opposing states, like health.
Chapter 6:
Motion has contrary rest states; contrariety found in other motions.

6

 

Here is the table with the requested edits applied: ```html
Chapter 1:
Continuous entities' extremities are one; indivisibles can't compose continuous entities like lines or points. If continuous entities were made of points, the points would either be continuous or in contact, neither of which is possible. Therefore, continuous entities must be divisible into divisible parts, not indivisibles.
Chapter 2:
Magnitudes are divisible into infinitely divisible parts. The quicker object traverses greater distances in less time, demonstrating continuity in time and motion. This relationship shows that continuous magnitudes and time are intertwined, as both are infinitely divisible and maintain their continuity through consistent divisions.
Chapter 3:
The present is indivisible, marking the past's end and the future's start. It is a limit of both times and cannot be divided. Motion or rest cannot exist within the present, as it lacks the continuity necessary for such states, emphasizing the present's unique, indivisible nature.
Chapter 4:
Everything that changes must be divisible. Motion is divisible by time and the motions of parts. Divisions of time, motion, and being-in-motion correspond, showing continuous divisibility. This applies to all things, whether essentially or accidentally divisible, highlighting the inherent divisibility of changing entities.
Chapter 5:
Change involves moving from one state to another. At the moment of change, the entity must be in the new state. The completion of change must occur in an indivisible moment, while the process of change has no primary starting moment, being infinitely divisible.
Chapter 6:
Everything that changes does so over time, implying infinite divisibility. Motion and rest cannot exist in a present moment. Change must have occurred before and will continue, showing an infinite sequence. This applies to becoming, perishing, and all continuous magnitudes and times.
Chapter 7:
Finite motion cannot occur in infinite time. Uniform or varying velocity traverses a finite distance in finite time. An infinite magnitude cannot traverse a finite distance, and vice versa. Infinite motion is impossible in finite time, confirming the finitude of motion and time.
Chapter 8:
Motion and rest occur in time. Coming to a standstill occupies time, implying motion. There is no primary time for being at rest or in motion. Continuous entities have no primary part, emphasizing motion and rest's continuous nature.
Chapter 9:
Zeno's paradoxes, like the flying arrow, rely on indivisible moments, which are false. Motion occurs in divisible time. Zeno’s arguments are fallacious, such as the Achilles paradox and the argument about rows of bodies. Continuous motion cannot be composed of indivisible moments.
Chapter 10:
Indivisibles cannot be in motion independently, only accidentally within moving bodies. Change cannot occur in indivisibles. Motion and time are continuous and divisible. No process of change is infinite; all changes have limits. Continuous motion implies finite time and distance.
Here is the table with the requested edits applied: ```html
Chapter 1:
Continuous things' extremities are one; indivisibles can't compose continuous entities like lines or points.
Chapter 2:
Magnitudes are divisible; quicker things traverse greater magnitudes in less time.
Chapter 3:
The present is indivisible, marking the past's end and the future's start.
Chapter 4:
Changing entities are divisible by time and their parts' motions.
Chapter 5:
Change completes in an indivisible moment; process infinitely divisible.
Chapter 6:
Change over time implies infinite divisibility, no first stage.
Chapter 7:
Finite motion can't occur in infinite time; motion is finite.
Chapter 8:
Motion and rest occupy time; no primary part exists.
Chapter 9:
Zeno's paradoxes are false; motion occurs in divisible time.
Chapter 10:
Indivisibles can't move independently; change requires continuous divisibility.
Here is the table with the requested edits applied: ```html
Chapter 1:
Continuous things' extremities are one; indivisibles can't compose continuous entities like lines or points.
Chapter 2:
Magnitudes are divisible; quicker things traverse greater magnitudes in less time.
Chapter 3:
The present is indivisible, marking the past's end and the future's start.
Chapter 4:
Changing entities are divisible by time and their parts' motions.
Chapter 5:
Change completes in an indivisible moment; process infinitely divisible.
Chapter 6:
Change over time implies infinite divisibility, no first stage.
Chapter 7:
Finite motion can't occur in infinite time; motion is finite.
Chapter 8:
Motion and rest occupy time; no primary part exists.
Chapter 9:
Zeno's paradoxes are false; motion occurs in divisible time.
Chapter 10:
Indivisibles can't move independently; change requires continuous divisibility.

7

 

Here is the table with the requested edits applied: ```html
Chapter 1:
Everything in motion must be moved by something else, directly or indirectly. Motion must be divisible. If one part is at rest, the whole must be at rest. Infinite motion in a finite time is impossible, necessitating a first mover and a series that must end.
Chapter 2:
Motion types—local, qualitative, and quantitative—each require specific movers. In locomotion, the mover and moved are always together. All motion types reduce to pulling, pushing, carrying, or twirling. Every motion involves direct contact, proving there’s nothing intermediate between mover and moved.
Chapter 3:
Alteration is caused by sensible things, evident from material changes and the soul’s affections. Excellence and defect in body or soul are not alterations but perfections or deteriorations. Acquiring knowledge isn't alteration but settling into a natural state. Alteration occurs in the sensitive part of the soul.
Chapter 4:
Not all motions are commensurable. Different motions (e.g., circular, straight) can’t always be compared equally. Terms like 'quick' or 'much' can be equivocal. Motion's differentiation shows genus is not unity but contains latent plurality, revealing differences in species or specific attributes.
Chapter 5:
Motion involves distance, time, and proportion. A given force moves a weight over a distance in time. Half the force doesn’t always move half the weight proportionately. Combining forces moves combined weights equally. Alteration and increase follow similar proportional rules, with variations in time and effect.
Here is the table with the requested edits applied: ```html
Chapter 1:
Everything in motion must be moved by something else, directly or indirectly.
Chapter 2:
There are three kinds of motion: local, qualitative, and quantitative, each with its specific mover.
Chapter 3:
Alteration is caused by sensible things, evident from material changes and the soul’s affections.
Chapter 4:
Not all motions are commensurable; different motions (e.g., circular, straight) can't always be compared equally.
Chapter 5:
Motion involves distance, time, and proportion; different forces act on weights and distances variably.

8

 

Here is the table with the requested edits applied: ```html
Chapter 1:
Motion must be initiated by something else, either external or internal. An infinite series of movers is impossible, requiring a first mover to start motion. This principle applies universally, demonstrating that motion always stems from a preceding cause, establishing the necessity of a prime mover.
Chapter 2:
Motion can be local, qualitative, or quantitative, each requiring a specific mover. Locomotion involves direct contact between mover and moved, showing no intermediate exists. Different forms of locomotion, such as pushing or pulling, all demonstrate the principle of direct interaction between the mover and the moved.
Chapter 3:
Alteration is caused by sensible things and affects both animate and inanimate objects. Excellence and defect are not alterations but rather perfections or deteriorations. Acquiring knowledge is not alteration but settling into a natural state. Sensory experiences illustrate how alterations occur in the sensitive part of the soul.
Chapter 4:
Different types of motion are not always commensurable. Terms like 'quick' or 'much' can be equivocal. Motion's differentiation shows genus is not unity but contains latent plurality, revealing differences in species or specific attributes. Commensurability depends on the specific nature of the motions and their subjects.
Chapter 5:
Motion involves distance, time, and proportion. A force moves a weight over a distance in time, following proportional rules. Combining forces moves combined weights equally. Alteration and increase follow similar proportional rules, with variations in time and effect, demonstrating the complexity of motion and its causes.
Chapter 6:
An eternal, unmoved mover is necessary for continuous motion. This mover must not change and must move other things without itself being moved. This first mover causes continuous motion, ensuring that there is always some motion in the universe, as motion cannot spontaneously start or stop.
Chapter 7:
Primary motion is continuous and is identified as locomotion. Of the three types of motion (magnitude, affection, place), locomotion is primary because it can be continuous. Continuous motion requires a mover that imparts unchanging motion, establishing locomotion as fundamental.
Chapter 8:
Rotatory motion is identified as the only continuous and infinite motion. Rectilinear motion involves stops and starts, making it non-continuous. Circular motion, however, has no such interruptions, allowing it to be infinite and continuous, driven by an unmoved mover.
Chapter 9:
Rotatory motion is primary and continuous, making it superior to rectilinear motion. Unlike rectilinear motion, which involves starting and stopping, rotatory motion remains unbroken. It is a perfect, eternal motion that reflects the unchanging nature of the first mover.
Chapter 10:
The first unmoved mover must be without parts or magnitude. A finite mover cannot cause infinite motion, and an infinite magnitude is impossible. Thus, the primary mover must be indivisible and non-material, ensuring it can impart eternal motion without being moved itself.
Here is the table with the requested edits applied: ```html
Chapter 1:
Motion needs a prime mover, demonstrating an infinite series' impossibility.
Chapter 2:
Different locomotions require direct interaction between mover and moved.
Chapter 3:
Alteration is caused by sensible things, affecting animate and inanimate objects.
Chapter 4:
Motion's commensurability depends on the specific nature and subjects.
Chapter 5:
Motion involves proportional rules of distance, time, and force.
Chapter 6:
Motion requires an unmoved, eternal first mover, not subject to change.
Chapter 7:
Continuous motion must be primary and is linked to locomotion.
Chapter 8:
Rotatory motion is the only possible continuous and infinite motion.
Chapter 9:
Rotation is the primary locomotion, more complete and eternal.
Chapter 10:
The first unmoved mover must be without parts and magnitude.
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