Quintilian 35 - 100 65
Institutes of Oratory
 
1 About Me 8
2 Education
3 Philosophy
4 Politics
5 News
6 Travel
7 Sports
8 Funding
 
 
 
 
Page Data
Menu 1 Pages .58 Time :29
Menu 2 Pages 28 Time 23:20
Body Pages 1,290 Time 18:00
Menu to Body 4% 1/46
Chapters 109
Pages per chapter 11.8
 
1 12 110.3 1:31:55
1 Capacities of boys, nurses, parents, slaves, and poedagogia. Learning Greek and Latin. Proper age for beginning to learn. Proper method of teaching children. Learning the alphabet & writing.  Learning to read, of subjects for writing, learning by heart, improving pronunciation. 11.9 9:55
2 Public & private education; public education to be preferred; alleged corruption of morals in public schools; equal corruption at home.  Reply to the objection that a pupil receives less attention from a master in a school than from a domestic tutor.  Emulation, friendship, incitements to masters & pupils, & other advantages of public education. 9.6 8
3 Disposition & abilities of a pupil to be ascertained. Precociousness not desirable. 
Management of pupils. Relaxation & play. Corporal punishment. 4.4 3:40
4 Grammar. Letters & derivations of words. Changes in words. Parts of speech. Nouns & verbs. 4.4 3:40
5 Necessity of correctness in speaking and writing. Single words. Choice of words. Barbarisms. Barbarisms in poets and other writers. Faults in pronunciation. On the aspiration. The accents. On ending a word with an acute accent. Legitimate accentuation. On the solecism. Different kinds of solecisms. No dual number in Latin. Solecisms in various parts of speech. Figures of speech. On foreign words. Greek words. Compound words. Words proper, metaphorical, common, new. 19.5 16:15
6 Of language. Analogy. Departures from it. Etymology. Abuses of it. Old words. Authority. Custom.  12.8 10:40
7  Of orthography. Distinction of words of doubtful signification. Composition with prepositions. On the letter k. Orthography subservient to custom; antique spelling. Difference between spelling and pronunciation. Necessity of judgment. Quintilian defends his remarks on this subject. 7.6 6:20
8 Of reading. Authors to be read, Greek and Latin. Duty of the grammarian. Of lectures on historical reading. 6 5
9 Commencement of composition. aesop's fables. Sentences, chrioe, ethologioe. Narratives from the poets. 1.9 1:35
10 Of other studies preliminary to that of rhetoric. Necessity of them. Authority of the ancients in favor of learning music. Union of music with grammar. Utility of music to the orator. What sort of music to be studied. Utility of geometry. Geometrica. proof. Astronomy; examples of the benefit attending a knowledge of it. 14.7 12:15
11  Instruction to be received from the actor. He should correct faults of pronunciation. He should give directions as to look and gesture. Passages from plays should be recited by the pupil. Passages also from speeches. Exercises of the palaestra to be practised. 5.3 4:25
12 No fear to be entertained lest boys should be engaged in too many studies, if judgment be used; examples of the number of things to which the human mind can attend at once. Boys endure study with spirit and patience. Abundance of time for all necessary acquirements. Unreasonable pretexts for not pursuing study. 6.4 5:20
2 21 100.4 1:23:40
1 Boys are not put under the professor of rhetoric early enough; reasons why they should begin to receive instruction from him at an earlier age. The professions of the grammarian and teacher of rhetoric should be in some degree united.  3.9 3:15
2  Choice of teacher. How the teacher should conduct himself towards his pupils. How the pupils should behave. Some additional observations.  4.1 3:25
3 A pupil should be put under an eminent teacher at first, not under an inferior one. Mistakes of parents as to this point. The best teacher can teach little things best, as well as great ones. The pupils of eminent teachers will afford better examples to each other. 3.7 3:05
4 Elementary exercises. Narratives, or statements of facts. Exuberance in early compositions better than sterility. A teacher should not be without imagination, or too much given to find fault with his pupil's attempts. The pupil's compositions should be written with great care. Exercises in confirmation and refutation. In commendation and censure of remarkable men. Commonplaces. Theses. Reasons. Written preparations for pleadings. Praise and censure of particular laws. Declamations on fictitious subjects a later invention. 12.7 10:35
5 Advantages of reading history and speeches. On what points in them the professor of rhetoric should lecture. Faulty composition may sometimes be read, to exercise the pupil's judgment. Usefulness of this exercise. Best authors to be read at an early age. The pupil should be cautious of imitating very ancient or very modern writers.  6.8 5:40
6  In composition, the pupil should have but moderate assistance, not too much or too little. 1.9 1:35
7 Pupils should not always declaim their own compositions, but sometimes passages from eminent writers. 1.5 1:15
8 Variety of talent and disposition in pupils requires variety of treatment. How far an inclination for any particular line of study should be encouraged and cultivated. 4.3 3:35
9 Pupils should regard their tutors as intellectual parents.  .8 :40
10  Remarks on declamations. Injudiciousnees in the choice of subjects has been an obstruction to improvement in eloquence. On what sort of subjects pupils may be permitted to declaim. What alterations should be made in the common practice. 4 :20
11 Some think instruction in oratory unnecessary. Boasts and practices of the ignorant. Some study only parts of their speeches; want of connection in their matter.  2.1 1:45
12 Why the ignorant often seem to speak with more force than the learned. They attack and are less afraid of failure. But they cannot choose judiciously, or prove with effect. Their thoughts sometimes striking. Apparent disadvantages of learned polish. Unlearned speakers often vigorous in delivery. Occasionally too much admired by teachers of oratory. 3.6 3
13 Quintilian does not give rules from which there is no departure; pleaders must act according to the requisitions of their subjects. What an orator has chiefly to keep in view, and how far rules should be observed. 5.4 4:30
14 Of the term rhetoric or oratory. Heads under which Quintilian considers the art of oratory. 1.8 1:30
15 What rhetoric is. To call it the power of persuading is to give an insufficient definition of it. To call it the power of persuading by speech is not sufficient. Other definitions. That of Gorgias in Plato; that of Plato or Socrates in the Phaedrus. That of Cornelius Celsus. Other definitions more approved by Quintilian. Quintilian's own definition. 11.2 9:20
16 Oratory said by some to be a pernicious art, because it may be perverted to bad ends. We might say the same of other things that are allowed to be beneficial. Its excellences. The abundant return that it makes for cultivation. 4.7 3:55
17 Oratory is manifestly an art. Yet some have denied that it is and said that its power is wholly from nature. Examples from other arts. Every one that speaks is not an orator. Opinion of Aristotle. Other charges against oratory, that it has no peculiar subject or matter, and that it sometimes deceives. Refutation of these charges. Unfairly objected to it that it has no proper end. Not pernicious because it sometimes misleads. Another objection, that it may be exerted on either side of a question, and that it contradicts itself; answered. Oratory is sometimes ignorant of the truth of what it asserts; but the same is the case with other arts and sciences. Confirmation of its being an art. 13 10:50
18 Arts or sciences are of three kinds; rhetoric is a practical art or science. Partakes of the nature of arts of other kinds.  1.5 1:15
19 Nature and art; nature contributes more to oratory, in students of moderate ability, than art; in those of greater talent, art is of more avail; an example. 1.2 1
20 Whether rhetoric be a virtue, as some call it. Proofs of this according to the philosophers. Other proofs. 3.7 3:05
21 Opinions as to the subject of rhetoric. That of Quintilian, which agrees with those of Plato and Cicero. Objections to it noticed. No dispute between rhetoric and philosophy about their respective subjects. The orator not obliged to know everything. He will often speak better on arts than the artists themselves. The opinion of Quintilian supported by those of other authors.  7 5:50
3 11 104.6 1:27:10
1 Quintilian proposes to consider the various branches and precept of oratory more fully than they are generally set forth in treatises on the art, a part of his work more desirable for students than agreeable to them. Diversities of opinions and methods. Various writers on the art; the Greeks. Followers of Hermagoras, Apollodorus, Theodorus. The Romans. Quintilian will give his own opinion on matters as they occur. 6.6 5:30
2 Origin of oratory. Nature and art. Objection to Cicero's notion. 1.3 1:05
3 Divisions of the art of Oratory. Various opinions respecting them. Cicero's not always the same. Opinions of some Greek writers. Of the order of the division or parts. Whether they should be called parts, or works, or elements.  4.4 3:40
4 Whether there are three sorts of oratory, or more. Quintilian adheres to the old opinion that there are but three; his reasons. Opinions of Anaximenes, Plato, Isocrate. Quintilian's own method. He does not assign particular subjects to each kind. 4.4 3:40
5  Division into things and words; other divisions. Questions concerning what is written and what is not written. Definite and indefinite questions. Species of indefinite ones. Questions on general subjects not useless. Definition of a cause. 6 5
6 Of the status or position of a cause. What it is. From whom the position proceeds, the accuser or defendant. How many positions there are; the ten categories of Aristotle. Others make nine, others seven. As to the number of positions, some make one only. Others two, as Archidemus, Pamphilus, Apollodorus, Theodorus, Posidonius, Cornelius Celsus. Another mode of making two positions. Most authors make three, as Cicero, Patrocles, Marcus Antonius Virginius. Athenaeus, Caecilius, and Theon make four. The quadripartite methods of Aristotle and Cicero. Some have made five, six, seven, eight positions. Distinction of status rationales, quoestiones legales. Cicero speaks of a status negotialis. Hermagoras first introduced exception. Legal questions; Albutius. Quintilian departs in some degree from the method which he formerly adopted. His opinion of exception; remarks upon it. In every cause there are three points to be ascertained. A fourfold division, useful to learners. These four points included under two genera, the rationale and the legale. Resemblances in the genus legale spring from the three points above-mentioned. In every simple cause there is but one position. In complex causes there are several positions, either of the same or of different kinds; examples.  35.7 29:45
7  Of panegyric or laudatory eloquence; not wholly distinct from practical discussion. An orator does not always speak on doubtful points. Panegyric sometimes requires proof and defense, and very frequently amplification. Praise of the gods. Praise of men more varied. Men extolled for personal endowments and fortunate circumstances. For mental qualifications. For memorials which they leave of themselves. In censure the ease is reversed. On praise of the living. It makes a difference where a panegyric is delivered. Advantage may be taken by the orator of the proximity of certain virtues to certain vices. Praise of cities, places, public works. What position most prevailed in this department of oratory. 9.3 7:45
8 Deliberative oratory not confined to questions of utility. Whether nothing is useful but what is honorable. Deliberative oratory not concerned wholly with the position of quality. What kind of exordium requisite in it. Statement of facts. The passions to be moved. Whether it solely concerns affairs of government. That a thing can be done, is either certain or uncertain. The three topics of persuasion. Some do not distinguish topics from divisions of topics. The pleasing, the useful, and the honorable. Use of examples. How things that are honorable may be recommended, and sometimes such as are at variance with honor. Authority of the speaker. Prosopopeiae. In the schools, deliberative subjects have a great resemblance to controversies. An error into which declaimers fall. Advantage of reading history. 21.6 18
9 Judicial oratory, the departments of it often injudiciously increased; the proper number is five. The order to be observed in speaking and writing.  2.9 2:25
10 A cause rests either on one point of controversy, or on several; on points of the same or of different kinds. Comparison. We must first settle the kind of cause; what points are to be considered next.  2.1 1:45
11 Hermagoras's method of proceeding; the question. The mode of defense. The point for decision. The ground or substance of the cause. The question and the point for decision may be conjoined or separate, according to the nature of the cause. Opinions of Cicero. Hermagoras too fond of nice subdivisions. Method of Theodorus. Conclusion. 8.8 7:20
4 5 90.2 1:15:10
Introduction The grandsons of the sister of Domitian committed to the tuition of Quintilian; a new motive for care in composing his work. He proceeds to speak of the exordium of a speech, the statement of facts the proof, the refutation of adverse allegations, and the peroration. 2.4 0
1  Etymology of the word proem. An erroneous practice in the schools and in the forum. Object of the proem or exordium. How the good will and attention of the judge may be gained by allusion to different characters concerned in the cause. Farther observations on the same subject. Difference between the exordium and the conclusion. Matters connected with the characters and the cause to be considered. Solicitude to be shown by the pleader; brevity to be promised; accurate division of matter to be made. To conciliate the judge must be the pleader's constant object throughout his speech. Five kinds of causes. Some make two purposes of a proem, proposition and insinuation, the latter more easy for the advocate than for his client. An unnecessary rule of the Apollodoreans. Points to be regarded in the exordium. The speaker's memory must not fail him in it. Its length must be proportioned to the cause. Whether apostrophe, and other figures of speech, may be used in it. Whether a formal exordium is always necessary. Mode of transition to the statement of facts.  25.9 21:35
2 Of the statement of facts; some make too nice distinctions respecting it. A formal statement not always necessary. Those are mistaken who suppose that a statement is never necessary on the part of an aroused person who denies the charge. What the judge already knows may sometimes be stated. The statement need not always immediately follow the exordium. The practice of the schools injudiciously transferred to the forum. The statements should be clear, brief, and credible. Of clearness. Of brevity. Of credibility. The statement of facts should prepare the judge for the proof of them. Certain qualities have injudiciously been made peculiar to the statement. A ridiculous direction that the statement should be omitted in a cause which is unfavourable to us. Difficult points must be variously managed, according to the nature of the case. In a conjectural cause we must make a statement, but with art and care. We must sometimes divide our statement, and invert the order of occurrences. Of fictitious statements. Complexion of a statement. How we must act if the facts be partly for us and partly against us. Apostrophe and other figures absurdly excluded from the statement. The statement should be embellished with every grace of language. Of authority in the pleader. Of repetition. Of the commencement and conclusion of the statement.  43.7 36:25
3 Of digressions or excursions immediately after the statement. Not always unreasonable. Some preparation often necessary before proceeding to proof. Digressions may be made in any part of a speech, but those in the middle should be short. 5.2 4:20
4  Of propositions preparatory to proof; not always necessary. Sometimes very useful. Various kinds of propositions, and remarks on them. 3.3 2:45
5 Partition of our matter generally useful. When it should be omitted. Examples from Cicero. As to states of conjecture and quality. Artifices that may be used. Utility of partition, and the proper qualities of it. 8.7 7:15
5 14 128.7 1:47:15
Introduction Some rhetoricians have thought that the only duty of an orator is to teach; others have called this his chief duty. The necessity for this book. 1.3 1:05
1  Inartificial proofs. Eloquence not inefficient in regard to them. 1 :50
2 Previous judgments. The authority of those who deliver them to be considered. Similitude in cases; how to be refuted.  1.8 1:30
3 Public report. .3 :15
4 Evidence exacted by torture. .8 :40
5 Refutation of written testimony.  .7 :35
6 On offering to take an oath, and receiving that of the opposite party. Arguments on the subject. Judgment of the experienced respecting it. 2.3 1:55
7  Written evidence; how to be refuted. Modes of proceeding with regard to witnesses that appear in person. An intimate knowledge of the cause necessary. How voluntary witnesses should be produced. Caution requisite in respect to them. How a pleader must act with regard to a witness whom he knows to be adverse or favourable to the accused. How he must act in regard to one whose disposition he does not know. Of the interrogation of witnesses. Of the collision between written and oral testimony. Of supernatural testimony. 12.6 10:30
8 Artificial proofs too much neglected. There are certain particulars common to all kinds of proofs. 2.3 1:55
9  Difference of signs, indications, or circumstantial evidence, from proofs. Of conclusive signs or indications. Inconclusive signs are of weight when supported by others. Of mere appearances. Of prognostics.  4.7 3:55
10 Of the different names given to arguments among the Greeks and Latins. Various significations of the word argument. In every cause there must be something that does not require proof. Of credibilities. Of sources from which arguments are drawn. From the character of individuals. From circumstances, as motives, place, time, manner. Opportunities and means. Arguments from definition. Remarks on Cicero's method; argument and definition assisted by division. Arguments from commencement, increase, and event. From dissimilitude, opposition, consequentiality. From causes and effects. From comparison. Too many subdivisions under this head. Arguments from supposition. Precepts not to be followed too superstitiously; examples. An orator must take care what he proposes to be proved, an example. Utility of rules. Necessity and advantages of study and practice. 41 34:10
11  Of examples and instances. Of the efficiency, and various species, of examples. Of examples from the fables of the poets. From the fables of aesop, and proverbs. Comparison. Caution necessary with respect to it. Too much subdivision in it. Comparison of points of law. Analogy. Authority. Authority of the gods. Of the judge, and of the adverse party, 4Examples and authority not to be numbered among inartificial proof, 44.  15.5 12:55
12 How far we may use doubtful grounds of argument. Some arguments to be urged in a body, some singly. Some to be carefully supported, and referred to particular points in our case. Not to be too numerous, Arguments from the characters of persons. In what order arguments should be advanced. Quintilian states summarily what others have given at greater length. Argument too much neglected in the exercises of the schools. 8.2 6:50
13 Refutation twofold. Why it is more difficult to defend than to accuse. Deprecation not to be adopted without some ground of defense. Nothing to be gained by silence in regard to matters that cannot be defended. We may attack some of our adversary's arguments in a body, some singly. What arguments may be easily refuted. What arguments of our adversary may be turned to our advantage. Many will fall under conjecture, definition, quality. Some of the adversary's arguments may be treated as unworthy of notice. Precedents, which he assumes to be applicable to his case we must endeavor to prove inapplicable. We may repeat the statements of the adversary so as to weaken them. We may sometimes expose the whole charge, sometimes particular parts of it. How we make arguments common to both sides adverse to us; how discrepancies in the pleading of the adversary are to be exposed. Some faults easily shown. Not to neglect arguments of our adversary, and not to be too anxious to refute them all. How far we should spare our adversary personally. Some pleaders, in endeavoring to expose their adversaries, give occasion against themselves. Sometimes, however, we may represent that there are contradictions in his statements. A pleader ought to appear confident of the justice of his cause. Order which we must observe in supporting our own arguments and refuting those of the opposite party. We must support our proofs and refutations by the power of eloquence. Foolish dispute between Theodorus and Apollodorus. 22.2 18:30
14 Of the enthymeme and its parts. Of the epicheirema and its parts. Not always of the same form. The epicheirema of the orators is the syllogism of the philosophers. All the parts of it not always necessary to be specified. Three modes of opposing this form of argument. How the enthymeme differs from the syllogism. We must not crowd our speech with rhetorical forms of argument. We must not leave our arguments unembellished. 12.4 10:20
6 5 87.3 1:12:45
Introduction Quintilian laments that his son whose improvement, in conjunction with that of the sons of Marcellus and Caesar, he had had in view in the composition of this work, had been carried off by death. He had previously lost, during the composition of another work, a younger son, as well as his wife. Abilities of which his children gave indications. His grief; he intreats indulgence if, in consequence of it, he pursues his work with less spirit. 6.3 5:15
1 Peroration of a speech; the objects of it; some think that it should consist wholly of recapitulation. Appeals to the feelings may be made by the accuser and the advocate alike. What the exordium and the peroration have in common, and in what respects they differ. The accuser excites the feelings either by showing the heinousness of the charge which he makes, or the pitiable condition of the party for whom he seeks redress. What qualities excite feeling in favor of an accused person. Solicitation for pity may have great effect, but should not be long. Modes of exciting pity. How persons who are introduced to move pity at the conclusion of a speech, should behave themselves. No orator must attempt to draw tears from the judges unless he be a man of great ability. It is the part of the peroration to dispel compassionate emotions, as well as to excite them. Perorations sometimes of a very mild character. Appeals to the feelings may be made in other parts of a speech as well as in the peroration19.5 16:15
2  Necessity of studying how to work on the minds of the judges. This department of oratory requires great ability. Of πάθος (pathos) and ἦθος (ēthos). If we would move others, we must feel moved ourselves. Of presenting images to the imagination of our hearers. Pupils should be exercised in this in the schools. 13.4 11:10
3 Of the power of exciting laughter in an audience. There was little of it in Demosthenes; perhaps a superabundance of it in Cicero. Causes of laughter not sufficiently explained. Is of great effect. Depends far more on nature and favourable circumstances than on art. No instructions given in exciting laughter. Various names for jocularity or wit. Depends partly on matter, partly on words; subjects of it. Laughter may be excited by some act, or look, or gesture. What is becoming to the orator. What to be avoided by him. Topics for jesting, and modes of it. Ambiguity in words. The best jests are taken from things, not from words; of similarity. Of dissimilarity. From all forms of argument arise occasions for jesting. Jests in the form of tropes and figures. Of jocular refutation. Of eluding a charge; of pretended confession. Some kinds of jests are beneath an orator. Of deceiving expectation. Of jocular imitation. Of attributing thoughts to ourselves or others; and of irony. The least offensive jokes are the best. Quotations from poets, proverbs, and anecdotes. Apparent absurdities. Domitius Marsus confounds politeness with humour. His distinctions. 35.2 29:20
4 Remarks on altercation. Too much neglected by some pleaders. Qualifications requisite for success in it; acuteness, knowledge of the case, good temper, attention to the main question. Further observations. We may dissemble our strength, in order to mislead our adversary. Disposition of the judge to be observed. The student should exercise himself in this department. Order of proofs is important. 8 6:40
5 Judgment and sagacity; their importance. Examples from Demosthenes. From Cicero. Conclusion of the book. 3.9 3:25
7 10 101.7 1:24:45
Introduction Arrangement necessary to be studied. But no general rules can be given with respect to it. 1.8 1:30
1 Definition of arrangement. Must be varied according to the nature of causes. How Quintilian used to study and contemplate causes. The best order for arguments. How we may reply to a single accusation. Or to several. How we may omit or neglect some points. Further remarks on the consideration of a cause. We must proceed by degrees to the most important points. Quintilian used to increase the points in his own favor by division. Invention assisted by division. Which party should speak first, is not a matter for great consideration. How the more intrinsic points in a cause are to be discovered is shown by a subject for declamation in the schools. 23 19:10
2 Conjecture relates to fact and intention, and to three divisions of time. The question may regard the fact and the agent at the same time, or the fact only, or the agent only. Concerning both together. Concerning the fact only. Concerning the agent; anticategoria. Comparison managed in several ways. Conjecture sometimes twofold. Proof from persons. From motives and causes. Intentions, opportunities, place, time. Consideration whether the accused had the power to do the act with which he is charged. Whether he did it. Other considerations in different causes. Error carried from the schools into the forum.  22.5 18:45
3 Of definition; it has something in common with conjecture and quality. Various reasons why it is used. Three species of it. Other diversities, more suited to philosophical discussions than to the business of the orator. We must beware of defining too subtilely. Method in definition. How a definition is overthrown. A general definition may be adapted to our own cause. Some concluding remarks. 12.6 10:30
4 Consideration of quality may have regard to more points than one in any matter. The strongest kind of defense is when the accused says that they deed laid to his charge was blameless. We may defend an act by extrinsic aids. Another mode of proceeding is to transfer the guilt to another. We may consider whether the weight of the charge can be extenuated. Deprecation. Questions about rewards. Considerations of quality admit the highest efforts of the orator. Causes which Virginius puts under this head. Other species of causes.  16.7 13:55
5 Questions as to legality of proceedings. As to particular points of law. 2 1:40
6 Questions about writing, and the intention of the writer, either regard both these points, or one only. Arguments against the letter in writings. In favor of it. General questions under this head.  4.5 3:45
7 Of contradictory laws. Right is either admitted or doubtful. Contradictory points in the same law. 3.8 3:10
8 Of syllogism; intimately connected with definition. Determines by inference what is uncertain in the letter of any writing. Or even what is not expressed in the writing. 3.2 2:40
9 Ambiguity in words. Words divided. Compounded. Ambiguity of words in connection with one another. Some remarks on ambiguity. 4.6 3:50
10 Affinity between different states. Some precepts with regard to causes can be given only when the causes themselves are stated. Impossible to give instruction on every particular point. Many things the student must teach himself, and must depend for success on his own efforts.  6.1 5:05
8 6 96.5 1:20:25
Introduction A plain and simple method of teaching to be preferred. Recapitulation of the precepts given in the preceding parts of the work. Style and delivery require more ability and study than other parts of oratory. Excellence in them attained by study and art. Yet a speaker may be too solicitous about his language. Necessity of practice. We must not always be striving for something greater and higher. 10.5 8:45
1 Style depends on the judicious choice of words, and the judicious combination of them. Necessity of studying to speak pure Latin. 1.1 :55
2 Propriety of words; words are proper in more than one sense. A word may not be exactly proper, is not always to be condemned as improper. Some words may be proper, and yet have not oratorical merit. The excellence of significancy. Concerning obscurity. Arises from the use of unusual words, or from faulty composition. From circumlocution. From desire for brevity. Perspicuity the chief excellence of language.  8.2 6:50
3 Of ornament of style; fondness for it in orators. It is however of service in gaining the attention of an audience. What sort of ornament should be studied; some faults border on excellences. Ornament must be varied according to the nature of the subject. Ornament from the choice of words. Some words are used rather from necessity than because they are approved. Common words sometimes most effective. Of the use of old words. The moderns cautious in forming new words. Unbecoming expressions to be avoided. The grace of a speaker's style depends partly on the language he uses, and partly on his mode of delivery. Suitableness of style. Various faults of style; τὸ κακέμφατον (cacemphaton). Meanness. Dimunition, tautology, uniformity, verbosity, superfluity of polish. Affectation, ungraceful arrangement of words or matter, inelegant use of figures, injudicious mixture of different styles. Excellence of clear and vivid description. To attain it nature must be studied and imitated. Assisted by similes. But care must be taken that the similes themselves be lucid. Further observations on similes. Representation. Emphasis. Various modes of adorning and giving effect to language. 29.4 24:30
4 Of amplification and diminution; things are exaggerated or extenuated by the terms applied to them. Modes of augmentation. By comparison. By reasoning and inference. By an accumulation of terms or particulars. Modes of extenuation are similar. Hyperbole. 10.6 8:50
5  Of striking thoughts. Of the modes of introducing them. Various kinds and origins of them. How they may be faulty. Those are in error who study them too much, as well as those who utterly neglect them. Transition to tropes. 11.6 9:40
6 Of tropes; much disputation about them. Metaphor. Three motives for the use of metaphor. Four modes in which it is applied. Objections to its frequent use; faults committed in regard to it. Of synecdoche. Metonymy. Antonomasia. Onomatopoeia. Catachresis. Metalepsis. Ἐπίθετον (Epitheton). Allegory. Irony. Applications of allegory. Derision; circumlocution. Hyperbaton. Hyperbole, its excellences and faults. 23.9 19:55
9 4 139.9 1:56:35
1 Of figures often confounded with tropes. Difference between them. Name not of great importance. The word Figure is taken by some in a more extended, by others in a more confined sense. Two kinds of figures, those of thought and those of words. Of figures of thought. Some make them too numerous. Quotation from Cicero's de Oratore. Another from Cicero's Orator. 14.9 12:25
2 Quintilian makes figures less numerous than Cicero and some other writers. Of interrogation. Of prolepsis or anticipation. Doubt. Communication or pretense of consultation with the audience. Permission. Modes of simulation. Of personification. Pretended writings, and parodies. Other fictions of persons. Apostrophe. Vivid or representative narration and description. Irony. Aposiopesis. Of imitation of other persons' manner, and some other figures. Emphasis. Of figuratae controversiae, causes in which figurative language is adopted. Such language is used when it is unsafe to speak plainly. When respect for some person puts a restraint on the speaker. Or where a fairer opportunity for speaking is sought. Comparison. Other figures mentioned by different writers.  38.8 32:20
3 Of verbal figures; are either grammatical or rhetorical, lying either in the words themselves or in the collocation of them. Use and prevalence of figures. Figures in gender of nouns. In verbs. In number. One part of speech put for another. Change in tenses and other particulars. Some figures sanctioned by antiquity. Some derived from the Greek. Some formed by addition or retrenchment. Changes in degrees of comparison. Other changes. Parenthesis and apostrophe. Effect of figures on the hearer. Emphatical repetition of words. Epanodos or regression. Polyptoton and metabole. Ploce; artful reiteration of words. Employment of several words nearly in the same sense. Pleonasm. Accumulation of different words and phrases. Asyndeton and polysyndeton. Climax. Of figures formed by retrenchment of words; words left to be understood from the context. Synezeugmenon. Paradiastole. Paronomasia, various examples of it. Parison, homoeoteleuton, homoeoptoton, isocolon. Antitheton. Some writers too much devoted to multiplying and distinguishing figures; examples. An orator should employ figures moderately and judiciously. 36.9 30:45
4 Of composition, or cultivation of style; authority of Cicero acknowledged. Attention to composition too much discouraged by some authors. In everything the powers of nature should be cultivated to the utmost. Union of power with grace. Excellence of style serves not only to please but to convince the hearer. This may be proved by altering the arrangement of words and phrases in elegant composition. Style not neglected by the ancients. Prose may be more or less compact and studied. Particulars that require attention in it. Of order. Of junctions of words, and of hiatus. Of junctions of consonants and vowels and the repetition of syllables. Of members and commas. Of numbers or rhythm. Difference between rhythm and meter. Of feet in prose; a remark of Cicero. How far number or rhythm should be studied in prose. Oratorical numbers or rhythm. Attention to numbers most requisite at the beginnings and ends of periods. What regard to be paid to the middle parts. Of the occurrence of verses, or parts of verses, in prose. Everything that sounds like meter should be avoided. Of feet. All kinds of feet must enter into prose composition. Are varied by union and division. The force and influence of particular feet. Of the closing feet of periods. Of the fourth paeon. A speaker must not be too solicitous about his measures. The ear must judge; many things cannot be taught by rule. Of commata. Of a period, and its members. What kinds of sentences are eligible for particular parts of speeches, and for particular subjects. What feet should prevail in certain sorts of composition. Composition and delivery must be alike varied to suit different subjects. A rough and forcible style preferable to the smooth and nerveless. Concluding remarks.  47.7 39:45
1 Of reading for improvement. We have to acquire matter and words. Facility in speaking is attained by exercise in it, and by reading, hearing, and writing. Advantages of hearing and reading. What authors should be read, and how. Improvement from reading speeches on both sides of a question. We are not to think even the greatest authors infallible, yet we must not be hasty in finding fault with them. Of reading poets. Historians. Philosophers. Some benefit to be gained from the perusal of almost all authors. General observations respecting ancient and modern writers. Homer. Hesiod. Antimachus. Panyasis, Apollonius Rhodius. Aratus, Theocritus. Pisander, Nicander, Tyrtaeus, and others. Of the elegiac poets, Callimachus, Philetas, Archilochus. Of the lyric poets; Pindar. Stesichorus. Alcaeus. Simonides. Of the old comedy, Aristophanes, Eupolis, Cratinus. Of tragedy, aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides. Menander, Philemon. Of history; Thucydides, Herodotus, Theopompus, and others. Of orators; Demosthenes, aeschines, Lysias, Isocrates, Demetrius Phalereus. Of the philosophers; Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, Theophrastus. Of the Roman poets, Virgil, Lucretius, Varro, Ennius, Ovid, and others. Flattery of Domitian. Of Tibullus, Propertius, Ovid, Lucilius, Horace, Persius, Catullus, and others. Latin writers of Tragedy. Of Comedy. Of History. Of Latin Orators; Cicero, Asinius, Pollio, Messala, and others. Of Latin writers on Philosophy, especially Seneca.  41.4 34:30
2  Imitation; necessity of it, and remarks upon it. Not every quality, even in eminent authors, is to be imitated; necessity of judgment in the choice of models for imitation. We are not to imitate one author only. Not to imitate style only. 9.4 7:50
3 Writing; utility of it. How and what we should write; necessity of correction. Judicious exercise requisite. Objections to dictation. A retired place desirable for composition; of writing at night. But retirement cannot always be secured, and we must do our best in the circumstances in which we find ourselves. Further remarks. 11.3 9:25
4 Observations on correction; we must not indulge in it too much. 1.6 1:20
5 What sort of composition we should practice; of translating Greek into Latin. Of putting the writing of eminent authors into other words. Of theses, common-places, declamations, and other species of composition and exercise. Cases for declamation should be as similar as possible to real cases. 8.4 7
6 Of thought and premeditation. 2.8 2:20
7 Ability of speaking extempore; necessity for it. How it is to be acquired. How we must guard against losing it. 12.1 10:05
11 3 117.1 1:37:35
1 Of speaking with propriety; in different causes. In different parts of the same cause. The orator's chief consideration is, what is becoming. What is becoming is generally found in union with what is expedient. Vanity and self-applause always unbecoming in an orator. Whether Cicero is chargeable with this fault. But an orator may sometimes express confidence. Yet not so as to declare that his judgment must be infallible. Other faults in orators noticed. Different kinds of orator are suited to different speakers. An orator should also adapt his style to the characters of those for whom he pleads. He must also vary it to suit those to whom he addresses himself. He must also have regard to time and place. To the nature of the cause. To the characters of those to whom he is opposed. How he may sometimes avoid offending those against whom he speaks. How the judge may be conciliated. How an orator may notice points in which he is conscious that he himself, or his party, is vulnerable. How he may touch on delicate subjects. How he may soften his language in an attack on any one. Excess in every respect to be avoided. Different kinds of oratory find favor with different audiences.  34.1 28:25
2 Memory; necessity of cultivating it. Its nature, and remarkable powers. Simonides was the first that taught an art of memory. What method of assisting the memory has been tried by orators. Its insufficiency for fixing a written or premeditated speech in the mind. A more simple method recommended. The greatest of all aids to the memory is exercise. Whether an orator should write his speeches, and learn them by heart word for word. Remarkable examples of power of memory. 18 15
3  Delivery; the effect of it, and qualifications necessary to excellence in it. Some have asserted that the study of delivery is useless. Of the voice, its natural excellences and defects. Care that should be taken of the voice. Exercise of it necessary. Of pronunciation and delivery; pronunciation should be clear. Distinct. Graceful and agreeable. Of equality and variety in the tone of the voice. Of the management of the breath. Of falling into a singing tone. Of appropriate pronunciation and delivery. Of gesture. Of decorum. Of the countenance. Of the management of other parts of the body. Of imitation; must not be in excess. Of certain common gestures and attitudes of the hands and fingers. Of faulty and unbecoming gestures. Of habits in which many speakers indulge. Of dress, and the management of the toga. An orator must adapt his delivery to his subject, and to the characters of those before whom he speaks; various remarks on decorum in speaking. But everything cannot be taught, and an orator must consult his own powers and qualifications. 63.8 53:10
Introduction Importance of the remaining portion of the work. Quintilian goes farther than Cicero in forming the Orator. 1.9 1:35
1 A great orator must be a good man, according to Cato's definition. A bad man cannot be a consummate orator, as he is deficient in wisdom. The mind of a bad man is too much distracted with cares and remorse. A bad man will not speak with the same authority and effect on virtue and morality as a good man. Objections to this opinion answered. A bad man may doubtless speak with great force, but he would make nearer approaches to perfect eloquence if he were good man. Yet we must be able to conceive arguments on either side of a question. A good man may sometimes be justified in misleading those whom he addresses, for the attainment of some good object. 16.5 13:45
2 An orator must study to maintain a high moral character. Tendencies to virtue implanted by nature may be strengthened by cultivation. Division of philosophy into three parts, natural, moral, and dialectic; remarks on the last kind. On moral philosophy. On natural philosophy. Observations on the different sects of philosophers; an orator need not attach himself to any sect in particular, but may be content with learning what is good wherever it is to be found. 11.1 9:15
3 Proofs that a knowledge of the civil law is necessary to an orator.  4.4 3:40
4 The mind of an orator must be stored with examples and precedents. .8 :40
5 Necessity of firmness and presence of mind to an orator. Natural advantages to be cultivated.  2.8 2:20
6 At what age an orator should begin to plead in public. 3.2 2:40
7 What sort of causes an orator should chiefly undertake. What remuneration he may reasonably receive for his services. 4.6 3:50
8 The orator must study a cause well before he ventures to plead it; he must examine all documents connected with it, and thoroughly weigh the statements of his client. 5.4 4:30
9 Applause not to be too eagerly sought. Invectives to be but sparingly introduced into a speech. How far an orator should prepare himself by writing his speech; he must qualify himself to reply extempore to objections that may be suddenly started.  6.8 5:40
10 Of different styles of oratory; comparison of the varieties in eloquence with those in painting and sculpture. Characters of several Latin orators. Merits of Cicero. Styles of the Attic, Asiatic, and Rhodian orators. Remarks on the true merits of Attic eloquence, and on those who injudiciously affected it. The Romans were excelled by the Greeks only in delivery; cause of the inferiority of the Romans in this respect. The Romans exhorted to cultivate force of thought and brilliancy of language. Folly of those who would reject all ornament. Whether a difference should be made in the styles of speaking and writing. Of the simple, grand, and florid styles. Many varieties and mixtures of these styles. Of corrupt taste in eloquence. A good style may be acquired by study and practice; but we must carry no fancied excellence to excess.  26.8 22:20
     
0
Introduction

Dedication
To Trypho, eminent book seller in Rome.

Preface
The object and intention of the work, § 1-To whom dedicated, Unauthorized publications under the name of Quintilian, The professions of the rhetorician and philosopher were formerly united, 9-The perfect orator, 1Partition of the work, 22Further observations on teaching and speaking, 23-27.

 
1 12 110.3
1 - 1 Capacities of boys, nurses, parents, slaves, and poedagogia.
Learning Greek and Latin. Proper age for beginning to learn.
Proper method of teaching children. Learning the alphabet & writing.
Learning to read, of subjects for writing, learning by heart, improving pronunciation.

LET a father, then, as soon as his son is born, conceive first of all the best possible hopes of him, for he will thus grow the more solicitous about his improvement from the very beginning. It is a complaint without foundation that "to very few people is granted the faculty of comprehending what is imparted to them, and that most, through dullness of understanding, lose their labor and their time." On the contrary, you will find the greater number of men both ready in conceiving and quick in learning, since such quickness is natural to man. As birds are born to fly, horses to run, and wild beasts to show fierceness, so to us peculiarly belong activity and sagacity of understanding; hence the origin of the mind is thought to be from heaven. But dull and unteachable persons are no more produced in the course of nature than are persons marked by monstrosity and deformities, such are certainly but few. It will be a proof of this assertion that among boys, good promise is shown in the far greater number; and if it passes off in the progress of time, it is manifest that it was not natural ability, but care, that was wanting. But one surpasses another, you will say, in ability. I grant that this is true, but only so far as to accomplish more or less; there is no one who has not gained something by study. Let him who is convinced of this truth, bestow, as soon as he becomes a parent, the most vigilant possible care on cherishing the hopes of a future orator.

Before all things, let the talk of the child's nurses not be ungrammatical. Chrysippus wished them, if possible, to be women of some knowledge; at any rate he would have the best chosen, as far as circumstances would allow. To their morals, doubtless, attention is first to be paid, but let them also speak with propriety. It is they that the child will hear first; it is their words that he will try to form by imitation. We are by nature most tenacious of what we have imbibed in our infant years, as the flavor with which you scent vessels when new remains in them, nor can the colors of wool, for which its plain whiteness has been exchanged, be effaced. Those very habits, which are of a more objectionable nature, adhere with the greater tenacity, for good ones are easily changed for the worse, but when will you change bad ones into good? Let the child not be accustomed, therefore, even while he is yet an infant, to phraseology which must be unlearned.

In parents I should wish that there should be as much learning as possible. Nor do I speak, indeed, merely of fathers, for we have heard that Cornelia, the mother of the Gracchi (whose very learned writing in her letters has come down to posterity), contributed greatly to their eloquence; the daughter of Laelius is said to have exhibited her father's elegance in her conversation; and the oration of the daughter of Quintus Hortensius, delivered before the Triumviri, is read not merely as an honor to her sex. Nor let those parents, who have not had the fortune to get learning themselves, bestow the less care on the instruction of their children, but let them, on this very account, be more solicitous as to other particulars.

Of the boys, among whom he who is destined to this prospect is to be educated, the same may be said as concerning nurses.

Of paedagogi this further may be said, that they should either be men of acknowledged learning, which I should wish to be the first object, or that they should be conscious of their want of learning; for none are more pernicious than those who, having gone some little beyond the first elements, clothe themselves in a mistaken persuasion of their own knowledge. Since they disdain to yield to those who are skilled in teaching and, growing imperious, and sometimes fierce, in a certain right, as it were, of exercising their authority (with which that sort of men are generally puffed up), they teach only their own folly. Nor is their misconduct less prejudicial to the manners of their pupils; for Leonides, the tutor of Alexander, as is related by Diogenes of Babylon, tinctured him with certain bad habits, which adhered to him, from his childish education, even when he was grown up and become the greatest of kings.

If I seem to my reader to require a great deal, let him consider that it is an orator that is to be educated, an arduous task even when nothing is deficient for the formation of his character; and that more and more difficult labours yet remain. There is need of constant study, the most excellent teachers, and a variety of mental exercises. 1The best of rules, therefore, are to be laid down, and if any one shall refuse to observe them, the fault will lie not in the method, but in the man.

If, however, it should not be the good fortune of children to have such nurses as I should wish, let them at least have one attentive paedagogus, not unskilled in language, who, if anything is spoken incorrectly by the nurse in the presence of his pupil, may at once correct it and not let it settle in his mind. But let it be understood that what I prescribed at first is the right course, and this only a remedy.

1I prefer that a boy should begin with the Greek language, because he will acquire the Latin in general use, even though we tried to prevent him, and because, at the same time, he ought first to be instructed in Greek learning, from which ours is derived. 1Yet I should not wish this rule to be so superstitiously observed that he should for a long time speak or learn only Greek, as is the custom with most people; for hence arise many faults of pronunciation, which is viciously adapted to foreign sounds, and also of language, in which when Greek idioms have become inherent by constant usage, they keep their place most pertinaciously even when we speak a different tongue. 1The study of Latin ought, therefore, to follow at no long interval, and soon after to keep pace with the Greek; thus it will happen that when we have begun to attend to both tongues with equal care, neither will impede the other.

1Some have thought that boys, as long as they are under seven years of age, should not be set to learn, because that is the earliest age that can understand what is taught, and endure the labor of learning. Of which opinion a great many writers say that Hesiod was, at least such writers as lived before Aristophanes the grammarian, for he was the first to deny that the Hypothecae, in which this opinion is found, was the work of that poet. 1But other writers likewise, among whom is Erastothenes, have given the same advice. Those, however, advise better, who, like Chrysippus, think that no part of a child's life should be exempt from tuition; for Chrysippus, though he has allowed three years to the nurses, is of opinion that the minds of children may be imbued with excellent instruction even by them. 1And why should not that age, which is now confessedly subject to moral influence, be under the influence of learning? I am not indeed ignorant that during the whole time of which I am speaking, scarcely as much can be done as one year may afterwards accomplish. Yet those who are of the opinion which I have mentioned appear, with regard to this part of life, to have spared not so much the learners as the teachers. 1What else, after they are able to speak, will children do better, for they must do something? Or why should we despise the gain, how little so ever it be, previous to the age of seven years? For certainly, small as may be the proficiency which an earlier age exhibits, the child will yet learn something greater during the very year in which he would have been learning something less. 1This advancement, extended through each year, is a profit on the whole, and whatever is gained in infancy is an acquisition to youth. The same rule should be prescribed as to the following years, so that what every boy has to learn, he may not be too late in beginning to learn. Let us not then lose even the earliest period of life, and so much the less, as the elements of learning depend on the memory alone, which not only exists in children, but is at that time of life even most tenacious.

20. Yet I am not so unacquainted with differences of age as to think that we should urge those of tender years severely or exact a full complement of work from them. For it will be necessary, above all things, to take care lest the child should conceive a dislike to the application which he cannot yet love, and continue to dread the bitterness which he has once tasted, even beyond the years of infancy. Let his instruction be an amusement to him; let him be questioned and praised; let him never feel pleased that he does not know a thing; and sometimes, if he is unwilling to learn, let another be taught before him, of whom he may be envious. Let him strive for victory now and then, and generally suppose that he gains it; and let his powers be called forth by rewards such as that age prizes.

2We are giving small instructions, while professing to educate an orator. But even studies have their infancy, and as the rearing of the very strongest bodies commenced with milk and the cradle, so he, who was to be the most eloquent of men, once uttered cries, tried to speak at first with a stuttering voice, and hesitated at the shapes of the letters. Nor, if it is impossible to learn a thing completely, is it therefore unnecessary to learn it at all. 2If no one blames a father who thinks that these matters are not to be neglected in regard to his son, why should he be blamed who communicates to the public what he would practice to advantage in his own house? And this is so much more the case, as younger minds more easily take in small things. And as bodies cannot be formed to certain flexures of the limbs unless while they are tender, so even strength itself makes our minds likewise more unyielding to most things. 2Would Philip, king of Macedonia, have wished the first principles of learning to be communicated to his son Alexander by Aristotle, the greatest philosopher of that age, or would Aristotle have undertaken that office if they had not both thought that the first rudiments of instruction are best treated by the most accomplished teacher and have an influence on the whole course? 2Let us suppose, then, that Alexander were committed to me, and laid in my lap, an infant worthy of so much solicitude (though every man thinks his own son worthy of similar solicitude), should I be ashamed, even in teaching him his very letters, to point out some compendious methods of instruction?

For that which I see practiced in regard to most children by no means pleases me, namely, that they learn the names and order of the letters before they learn their shapes. 2This method hinders their recognition of them, as, while they follow their memory that takes the lead, they do not fix their attention on the forms of the letters. This is the reason why teachers, even when they appear to have fixed them sufficiently in the minds of children, in the straight order in which they are usually first written, make them go over them again the contrary way, and confuse them by variously changing the arrangement, until their pupils know them by their shape, not by their place. It will be best for children therefore, to be taught the appearances and names of the letters at once, as they are taught those of men. 2But that which is hurtful with regard to letters, will be no impediment with regard to syllables. I do not disapprove, however, the practice, which is well known, of giving children, for the sake of stimulating them to learn, ivory figures of letters to play with, or whatever else can be invented, in which that infantine age may take delight, and which may be pleasing to handle, look at, or name.

2But as soon as the child shall have begun to trace the forms of the letters, it will not be improper that they should be cut for him, as exactly as possible, on a board, that his stylus may be guided along them as along grooves, for he will then make no mistakes, as on wax (since he will be kept in by the edge on each side, and will be unable to stray beyond the boundary). By following these sure traces rapidly and frequently, he will form his hand and not require the assistance of a person to guide his hand with his own hand placed over it. 2The accomplishment of writing well and expeditiously, which is commonly disregarded by people of quality, is by no means an indifferent matter. Writing itself is the principal thing in our studies, and by it alone sure proficiency, resting on the deepest roots, is secured. A too slow way of writing retards thought, and a rude and confused hand cannot be read; and hence follows another task, that of reading off what is to be copied from the writing. 2At all times, therefore, and in all places, and especially in writing private and familiar letters, it will be a source of pleusure to us not to have neglected even this acquirement.

30. For learning syllables there is no short way. They must all be learned throughout, nor are the most difficult of them, as is the general practice, to be postponed, that children may be at a loss, forsooth, in writing words. 3Moreover, we must not even trust to the first learning by heart; it will be better to have syllables repeated and to impress them long upon the memory; and in reading too, not to hurry on, in order to make it continuous or quick, until the clear and certain connection of the letters become familiar, without at least any necessity to stop for recollection. Let the pupil then begin to form words from syllables and to join phrases together from words. 3It is incredible how much retardation is caused to reading by haste; for hence arise hesitation, interruption, and repetition, as children attempt more than they can manage; and then, after making mistakes, they become distrustful even of what they know. 3Let reading, therefore, be at first sure, then continuous, and for a long time slow, until, by exercise, a correct quickness is gained. 3For to look to the right, as everybody teaches, and to look forward, depends not merely on rule, but on habit, since, while the child is looking to what follows, he has to pronounce what goes before, and, what is very difficult, the direction of his thoughts must be divided, so that one duty may be discharged with his voice, and another with his eyes.

When the child shall have begun, as is the practice, to write words, it will cause no regret if we take care that he may not waste his efforts on common words, and such as perpetually occur. 3For he may readily learn the explanations of obscure terms, which the Greeks call γλώσσαι (glosses), while some other occupation is before him, and acquire, amidst his first rudiments, a knowledge of that which would afterwards demand a special time for it. Since, too, we are still attending to small matters, I would express a wish that even the lines that are set him for his imitation in writing should not contain useless sentences, but such as convey some moral instruction. 3The remembrance of such admonitions will attend him to old age and will be of use even for the formation of his character. It is possible for him, also, to learn the sayings of eminent men, and select passages, chiefly from the poets (for the reading of poets is more pleasing to the young), in his play-time. Memory (as I shall show in its proper place) is most necessary to an orator and is eminently strengthened and nourished by exercise; and, at the age of which we are now speaking, and which cannot, as yet, produce anything of itself, it is almost the only faculty that can be improved by the aid of teachers. 3It will not be improper, however, to require of boys of this age (in order that their pronunciation may be fuller and their speech more distinct) to roll forth, as rapidly as possible, certain words and lines of studied difficulty, composed of several syllables, and those roughly clashing together, and, as it were, rugged-sounding; the Greeks call them χαλινοί (chalinoi). This may seem a trifling matter to mention, but when it is neglected, many faults of pronunciation, unless they are removed in the years of youth, are fixed by incorrigible ill habit for the rest of life.

 
1 - 2 Public & private education; public education to be preferred; alleged corruption of morals in public schools; equal corruption at home. Reply to the objection that a pupil receives less attention from a master in a school than from a domestic tutor. Emulation, friendship, incitements to masters & pupils, & other advantages of public education.

BUT let us suppose that the child now gradually increases in size, leaves the lap, and applies himself to learning in earnest. In this place, accordingly, must be considered the question whether it is more advantageous to confine the learner at home and within the walls of a private house, or to commit him to the large numbers of a school and, as it were, to public teachers. The latter mode, I observe, has had the sanction of those by whom the polity of the most eminent states was settled, as well as that of the most illustrious authors.

Yet it is not to be concealed that there are some, who from certain notions of their own, disapprove of this almost public mode of instruction. These persons appear to be swayed chiefly by two reasons: one, that they take better precautions for the morals of the young by avoiding a concourse of human beings of that age which is most prone to vice (from which cause I wish it were falsely asserted that provocations to immoral conduct arise); the other, that whoever may be the teacher, he is likely to bestow his time more liberally on one pupil than if he has to divide it among several. The first reason indeed deserves great consideration, for if it were certain that schools, though advantageous to studies, are pernicious to morals, a virtuous course of life would seem to me preferable to one even of the most distinguished eloquence. But in my opinion, the two are combined and inseparable; I am convinced that no one can be an orator who is not a good man, and even if anyone could, I should be unwilling that he should be. On this point, therefore, I shall speak first.

People think that morals are corrupted in schools; indeed they are at times corrupted, but such may be the case even at home. Many proofs of this fact may be adduced; proofs of character having been vitiated, as well as preserved, with the utmost purity under both modes of education. It is the disposition of the individual pupil, and the care taken of him, that make the whole difference. Suppose that his mind be prone to vice, suppose that there be neglect in forming and guarding his morals in early youth. Seclusion would afford no less opportunity for immorality than publicity, for the private tutor may be himself of bad character, nor is intercourse with vicious slaves at all safer than that with immodest free-born youths. But if his disposition is good, and if there is not a blind and indolent negligence on the part of his parents, it will be possible for them to select a tutor of irreproachable character (a matter to which the utmost attention is paid by sensible parents) and to fix on a course of instruction of the very strictest kind. They may at the same time place at the elbow of their son some influential friend or faithful freedman whose constant attendance may improve even those of whom apprehensions may be entertained.

The remedy for this object of fear is easy. Would that we ourselves did not corrupt the morals of our children! We enervate their very infancy with luxuries. That delicacy of education which we call fondness weakens all the powers, both of body and mind. What luxury will he not covet in his manhood who crawls about on purple! He cannot yet articulate his first words, but he already distinguishes scarlet and wants his purple. We form the palate of children before we form their pronunciation. They grow up in sedan chairs; if they touch the ground, they hang by the hands of attendants supporting them on each side. We are delighted if they utter anything immodest. We hear from them with a smile and a kiss expressions which would not be tolerated even from the effeminate youths of Alexandria. Nor is this wonderful. We have taught them; they have heard such language from ourselves. They see our mistresses, our male objects of affection; every dining room rings with impure songs; things shameful to be told are objects of sight. From such practices springs habit, and afterwards nature. The unfortunate children learn these vices before they know that they are vices. Hence, rendered effeminate and luxurious, they do not imbibe immorality from schools, but carry it themselves into schools.

But, it is said, one tutor will have more time for one pupil. First of all, however, nothing prevents that one pupil, whoever he may be, from being the same with him who is taught in the school. But if the two objects cannot be united, I should still prefer the daylight of an honorable seminary to darkness and solitude, for every eminent teacher delights in a large concourse of pupils and thinks himself worthy of a still more numerous auditory. But inferior teachers, from a consciousness of their inability, do not disdain to fasten on single pupils and to discharge the duty, as it were, of paedagogi. 1But supposing that either interest, or friendship, or money, should secure to any parent a domestic tutor of the highest learning, and in every respect unrivalled, will he, however, spend the whole day on one pupil? Or can the application of any pupil be so constant as not to be sometimes wearied, like the sight of the eyes, by continued direction to one object, especially as study requires the far greater portion of time to be solitary. 1For the tutor does not stand by the pupil while he is writing, or learning by heart, or thinking; and when he is engaged in any of those exercises, the company of any person whatsoever is a hindrance to him. Nor does every kind of reading require at all times a praelector or interpreter, for if such were the case, when would the knowledge of so many authors be gained? Therefore, the time during which the work, as it were, may be laid out for the whole day is but short. 1Thus the instructions which are to be given to each may reach to many. Most of them, indeed, are of such a nature that they may be communicated to all at once with the same exertion of the voice. I say nothing of the topics and declamations of rhetoricians, at which, certainly, whatever be the number of the audience, each will still carry off the whole. 1For the voice of the teacher is not like a meal, which will not suffice for more than a certain number, but like the sun, which diffuses the same portion of light and heat to all. If a grammarian, too, discourses on the art of speaking, solves questions, explains matters of history, or illustrates poems, as many as shall hear him will profit by his instructions. 1But, it may be said, number is an obstacle to correction and explanation. Suppose that this is a disadvantage in a number (for what in general satisfies us in every respect?); we will soon compare that disadvantage with other advantages.

Yet I would not wish a boy to be sent to a place where he will be neglected. Nor should a good master encumber himself with a greater number of scholars than he can manage. It is to be a chief object with us, also, that the master may be in every way our kind friend and may have regard in his teaching, not so much to duty, as to affection. Thus we shall never be confounded with the multitude. 1Nor will any master, who is in the slightest degree tinctured with literature, fail particularly to cherish that pupil in whom he shall observe application and genius, even for his own honor. But even if great schools ought to be avoided (a position to which I cannot assent, if numbers flock to a master on account of his merit), the rule is not to be carried so far that schools should be avoided altogether. It is one thing to shun schools, and another to choose from them.

1If I have now refuted the objections which are made to schools, let me next state what opinions I myself entertain. 1First of all, let him who is to be an orator and who must live amidst the greatest publicity and in the full daylight of public affairs, accustom himself, from his boyhood, not to be abashed at the sight of men, nor pine in a solitary and, as it were, recluse way of life. The mind requires to be constantly excited and roused, while in such retirement it either languishes and contracts rust, as it were, in the shade, or, on the other hand, becomes swollen with empty conceit, since he who compares himself to no one else will necessarily attribute too much to his own powers. 1Besides, when his acquirements are to be displayed in public, he is blinded at the light of the sun and stumbles at every new object, as having learned in solitude that which is to be done in public. 20. I say nothing of friendships formed at school, which remain in full force even to old age, as if cemented with a certain religious obligation, for to have been initiated in the same studies is a not less sacred bond than to have been initiated in the same sacred rites. That sense, too, which is called common sense, where shall a young man learn when he has separated himself from society, which is natural not to men only, but even to dumb animals? 2Add to this, that at home, he can learn only what is taught himself; at school, even what is taught others. 2He will daily hear many things commended, many things corrected. The idleness of a fellow student, when reproved, will be a warning to him; the industry of anyone, when commended, will be a stimulus. Emulation will be excited by praise, and he will think it a disgrace to yield to his equals in age and an honor to surpass his seniors. All these matters excite the mind, and though ambition itself is a vice, it is often the parent of virtues.

2I remember a practice that was observed by my masters, not without advantage. Having divided the boys into classes, they assigned them their order in speaking in conformity to the abilities of each, and thus each stood in the higher place to declaim according as he appeared to excel in proficiency. 2Judgments were pronounced on the performances, and great was the strife among us for distinction, but to take the lead of the class was by far the greatest honor. Nor was sentence given on our merits only once; the 30th day brought the vanquished an opportunity of contending again. Thus, he who was most successful did not relax his efforts, while uneasiness incited the unsuccessful to retrieve his honor. 2I should be inclined to maintain, as far as I can form a judgment from what I conceive in my own mind, that this method furnished stronger incitements to the study of eloquence than the exhortations of preceptors, the watchfulness of paedagogi, or the wishes of parents. 2But as emulation is of use to those who have made some advancement in learning, so, to those who are but beginning and are still of tender age, to imitate their schoolfellows is more pleasant than to imitate their master, for the very reason that it is easier. They who are learning the first rudiments will scarcely dare to exalt themselves to the hope of attaining that eloquence which they regard as the highest; they will rather fix on what is nearest to them, as vines attached to trees gain the top by taking hold of the lower branches first. 2This is an observation of such truth that it is the care even of the master himself, when he has to instruct minds that are still unformed, not (if he prefer at least the useful to the showy) to overburden the weakness of his scholars, but to moderate his strength and to let himself down to the capacity of the learner. 2For as narrow-necked vessels reject a great quantity of the liquid that is poured upon them, but are filled by that which flows or is poured into them by degrees, so it is for us to ascertain how much the minds of boys can receive, since what is too much for their grasp of intellect will not enter their minds, as not being sufficiently expanded to admit it. 2It is of advantage, therefore, for a boy to have schoolfellows whom he may first imitate and afterwards try to surpass. Thus will he gradually conceive hope of higher excellence.

To these observations I shall add that masters themselves, when they have but one pupil at a time with them, cannot feel the same degree of energy and spirit in addressing him as when they are excited by a large number of hearers. 30. Eloquence depends in a great degree on the state of the mind, which must conceive images of objects and transform itself, so to speak, to the nature of the things of which we discourse. Besides, the more noble and lofty a mind is, by the more powerful springs, as it were, is it moved. Accordingly, it is both strengthened by praise and enlarged by effort, and filled with joy at achieving something great. 3But a certain secret disdain is felt at lowering the power of eloquence, acquired by so much labor, to one auditor, and the teacher is ashamed to raise his style above the level of ordinary conversation. Let anyone imagine, indeed, the air of a man haranguing, or the voice of one entreating, the gesture, the pronunciation, the agitation of mind and body, the exertion, and, to mention nothing else, the fatigue, while he has but one auditor. Would not he seem to be affected with something like madness? There would be no eloquence in the world if we were to speak only with one person at a time.

 
1 - 3 Disposition & abilities of a pupil to be ascertained. Precociousness not desirable.
Management of pupils. Relaxation & play. Corporal punishment.

LET him that is skilled in teaching ascertain first of all, when a boy is entrusted to him, his ability and disposition. The chief symptom of ability in children is memory, the excellence of which is twofold: to receive with ease and retain with fidelity. The next symptom is imitation, for that is an indication of a teachable disposition, but with this provision: that it express merely what it is taught, and not a person's manner or walk, for instance, or whatever may be remarkable for deformity. The boy who shall make it his aim to raise a laugh by his love of mimicry, will afford me no hope of good capacity. For he who is possessed of great talent will be well disposed, else I should think it not at all worse to be of a dull, than of a bad, disposition. But he who is honorably inclined will be very different from the stupid or idle. Such a pupil as I would have will easily learn what is taught him and will ask questions about some things, but will still rather follow than run on before. That precocious sort of talent scarcely ever comes to good fruit. Such are those who do little things easily and, impelled by impudence, show at once all that they can accomplish in such matters. But they succeed only in what is ready to their hand; they string words together, uttering them with an intrepid countenance, not in the least discouraged by bashfulness, and do little, but do it readily. There is no real power behind, or any that rests on deeply fixed roots, but they are like seeds which have been scattered on the surface of the ground and shoot up prematurely, like grass that resembles corn and grows yellow, with empty ears, before the time of harvest. Their efforts give pleasure, as compared with their years, but their progress comes to a stand, and our wonder diminishes.

When a tutor has observed these indications, let him next consider how the mind of his pupil is to be managed. Some boys are indolent unless you stimulate them; some are indignant at being commanded; fear restrains some and unnerves others; continued labor forms some; with others, hasty efforts succeed better. Let the boy be given to me whom praise stimulates, whom honor delights, who weeps when he is unsuccessful. His powers must be cultivated under the influence of ambition; reproach will sting him to the quick; honor will incite him; and in such a boy I shall never be apprehensive of indifference.

Yet some relaxation is to be allowed to all; not only because there is nothing that can bear perpetual labor (and even those things that are without sense and life are unbent by alternate rest, as it were, in order that they may preserve their vigor), but because application to learning depends on the will, which cannot be forced. Boys, accordingly, when reinvigorated and refreshed, bring more sprightliness to their learning and a more determined spirit, which for the most part spurns compulsion. Nor will play in boys displease me; it is also a sign of vivacity, and I cannot expect that he who is always dull and spiritless will be of an eager disposition in his studies, when he is indifferent even to that excitement which is natural to his age. 1There must, however, be bounds set to relaxation, lest the refusal of it beget an aversion to study, or too much indulgence in it a habit of idleness. There are some kinds of amusement, too, not unserviceable for sharpening the wits of boys, as when they contend with each other by proposing all sorts of questions in turn. 1In their plays, also, their moral dispositions show themselves more plainly, supposing that there is no age so tender that it may not readily learn what is right and wrong. The tender age may best be formed at a time when it is ignorant of dissimulation and most willingly submits to instructors, for you may break, sooner than mend, that which has hardened into deformity. 1Therefore, a child is to be admonished, as early as possible, that he must do nothing too eagerly, nothing dishonestly, nothing without self-control, and we must always keep in mind the maxim of Virgil, Adeo in teneris consuescere multum est, "of so much importance is the acquirement of habit in the young."

1But that boys should suffer corporal punishment, though it be a received custom, and Chrysippus makes no objection to it, I by no means approve; first, because it is a disgrace and a punishment for slaves, and in reality (as will be evident if you imagine the age changed) an affront; secondly, because, if a boy's disposition be so abject as not to be amended by reproof, he will be hardened, like the worst of slaves, even to stripes; and lastly, because, if one who regularly exacts his tasks be with him, there will not be the least need of any such chastisement. 1At present, the negligence of paedagogi seems to be made amends for in such a way that boys are not obliged to do what is right, but are punished whenever they have not done it. Besides, after you have coerced a boy with stripes, how will you treat him when he becomes a young man, to whom such terror cannot be held out, and by whom more difficult studies must be pursued? 1Add to these considerations that many things unpleasant to be mentioned, and likely afterwards to cause shame, often happen to boys while being whipped, under the influence of pain or fear. Such shame enervates and depresses the mind, and makes them shun people's sight and feel a constant uneasiness. 1If, moreover, there has been too little care in choosing governors and tutors of reputable character, I am ashamed to say how scandalously unworthy men may abuse their privilege of punishing, and what opportunity also the terror of the unhappy children may sometimes accord to others. I will not dwell upon this point; what is already understood is more than enough. It will be sufficient, therefore, to intimate that no man should be allowed too much authority over an age so weak and so unable to resist ill treatment.

1I will now proceed to show in what studies he who is to be so trained that he may become an orator must be instructed, and which of them must be commenced at each particular period of youth.

 
1 - 4 Grammar. Letters & derivations of words. Changes in words. Parts of speech. Nouns & verbs.

IN regard to the boy who has attained facility in reading and writing, the next object is instruction from the grammarians. Nor is it of importance whether I speak of the Greek or Latin grammarian, though I am inclined to think that the Greek should take the precedence. Both have the same method. This profession, then, distinguished as it is, most compendiously, into two parts, the art of speaking correctly, and the illustration of the poets, carries more beneath the surface than it shows on its front. For not only is the art of writing combined with that of speaking, but correct reading also precedes illustration, and with all these is joined the exercise of judgment, which the old grammarians, indeed, used with such severity that they not only allowed themselves to distinguish certain verses with a particular mark of censure and to remove, as spurious, certain books which had been inscribed with false titles, from their sets, but even brought some authors within their canon and excluded others altogether from classification. Nor is it sufficient to have read the poets only; every class of writers must be studied, not simply for matter, but for words, which often receive their authority from writers. Nor can grammar be complete without a knowledge of music, since the grammarian has to speak of meter and rhythm; nor, if he is ignorant of astronomy, can he understand the poets, who, to say nothing of other matters, so often allude to the rising and setting of the stars in marking the seasons; nor must he be unacquainted with philosophy, both on account of numbers of passages, in almost all poems, drawn from the most abstruse subtleties of physical investigation, and also on account of Empedocles among the Greeks, and Varro and Lucretius among the Latins, who have committed the precepts of philosophy to verse. The grammarian has also need of no small portion of eloquence that he may speak aptly and fluently on each of those subjects which are here mentioned. Those, therefore, are by no means to be regarded who deride this science as trifling and empty, for unless it lays a sure foundation for the future orator, whatever superstructure you raise will fall; it is a science which is necessary to the young, pleasing to the old, and an agreeable companion in retirement. Of all departments of learning, it alone has more service than show.

Let no man, therefore, look down on the elements of grammar as small matters, not because it requires great labor to distinguish consonants from vowels and to divide them into the proper number of semivowels and mutes, but because, to those entering the recesses, as it were, of this temple there will appear much subtlety on points, which may not only sharpen the wits of boys, but may exercise even the deepest erudition and knowledge. Is it in the power of every ear to distinguish accurately the sounds of letters? No more, assuredly, than to distinguish the sounds of musical strings. But all grammarians will at least descend to the discussion of such curious points as these: whether any necessary letters be wanting to us, not indeed when we write Greek, for then we borrow two letters from the Greeks, but, properly, in Latin: as in these words, servus and vulgus, the Aeolic digamma is required; and there is a certain sound of a letter between u and i, for we do not pronounce optimum like opimum; in here, too, neither e nor i is distinctly heard: whether, again, other letters are redundant (besides the mark of aspiration, which, if it be necessary, requires also a contrary mark), as k, which is itself the mark of certain names, and q (similar to which in sound and shape, except that q is slightly warped by our writers, koppa now remains among the Greeks, though only in the list of numbers), as well as x, the last of our letters, which indeed we might have done without, if we had not sought it. With regard to vowels, too, it is the business of the grammarian to see whether custom has taken any for consonants, since iam is written as tam, and uos as cos. But vowels which are joined, as vowels, make either one long vowel, as the ancients wrote, who used the doubling of them instead of the circumflex accent, or two; though perhaps some one may suppose that a syllable may be formed even of three vowels; but this cannot be the case, unless some of them do the duty of consonants. 1The grammarian will also inquire how two vowels only have the power of uniting with each other, when none of the consonants can break any letter but another consonant. But the letter i unites with itself; for coniicit is from iacit, and so does u, as vulgus and servus are now written. Let the grammarian also know that Cicero was inclined to write aiio and Maiia with a double i, and, if this be done, the one i will be joined to the other as a consonant. 1Let the boy, therefore, learn what is peculiar in letters, what is common, and what relationship each has to each, and let him not wonder why scabellum is formed from scamnum, or why bipennis, an axe with an edge each way, is formed from pinna, which means something sharp, that he may not follow the error of those, who, because they think that this word is from two wings, would have the wings of birds called pinnae.

1Nor let him know those changes only which declension and prepositions introduce, as secat secuit, cadit excidit, caedit excīdit, calcat exculcat; (so lotus from lavare, whence also inlotus, and there are a thousand other similar derivations); but also what alterations have taken place, even in nominative cases, through lapse of time, for as Valesii and Fusii have passed into Valerii and Furii, so arbos, labos, vapos, as well as clamos and lases have had their day. 1This very letter s, too, which has been excluded from these words, has itself, in some other words, succeeded to the place of another letter, for instead of mersare and pulsare, they once said mertare and pultare. They also said fordeum and faedus, using, instead of the aspiration, a letter similar to vau; for the Greeks, on the other hand, are accustomed to aspirate, whence Cicero, in his oration for Fundanius, laughs at a witness who could not sound the first letter of that name. 1But we have also, at times, admitted b into the place of other letters, whence Burrus and Bruges, and Belena. The same letter moreover has made bellum out of duellum, whence some have ventured to call the Duellii, Bellii. Why need I speak of stlocus and stlites? 16.Why need I mention that there is a certain relationship of the letter t to d? Hence it is far from surprising if, on the old buildings of our city and well-known temples, is read Alexanter and Cassantra. Why should I specify that o and u are interchanged? Hecoba and notrix, Culchides and Pulyxena, were used, and, that this may not be noticed in Greek words only, dederont and probaveront. So Ὀδυσσεύς (Odusseús), whom the Aeolians made Ὀλισσέα (Olisseus), was turned into Ulysses. 1Was not e, too, put in the place of i, as Menerva, leber, magester, and Diiove and Veiove for Diiovi and Veiovi? But it is enough for me to point to the subject; for I do not teach, but admonish those who are to teach. The attention of the learner will then be transferred to syllables, on which I shall make a few remarks under the head of orthography.

He, whom this matter shall concern, will then understand how many parts of speech there are and what they are, though as to their number, writers are by no means agreed. 1For the more ancient, among whom were Aristotle and Theodectes, said that there were only verbs, nouns, and convinctions, because, that is to say, they judged that the force of language was in verbs, and the matter of it in nouns (since the one is what we speak, and the other that of which we speak), and that the union of words lay in convinctions, which, I know, are by most writers called conjunctions, but the other term seems to be a more exact translation of συνδεσμός (syndesmos). 1By the philosophers, and chiefly the Stoics, the number was gradually increased; to the convinctions were first added articles, then prepositions; to nouns was added the appellation, next the pronoun, and afterwards the participle, partaking of the nature of the verb; to verbs themselves were joined adverbs. Our language does not require articles, and they are therefore divided among other parts of speech. To the parts of speech already mentioned was added the interjection. 20. Other writers, however, certainly of competent judgment, have made eight parts of speech, as Aristarchus and Palaemon in our own day, who have included the vocable, or appellation, under the name or noun, as if a species of it. But those who make the noun one, and the vocable another, reckon nine. But there were some, nevertheless, who even distinguished the vocable from the appellation, so that the vocable should signify any substance manifest to the sight and touch, as a house, a bed; the appellation, that to which one or both of these properties should be wanting, as the wind, heaven, God, virtue. They added also the asseveration, as heu, "alas!" and the attrectation, as fasceatim, "in bundles," distinctions which are not approved by me. 2Whether προσηγορία (prosēgoria) should be translated by vocable or appellation, and whether it should be comprehended under the noun or not, are questions on which, as being of little importance, I leave it free to others to form an opinion.

2Let boys in the first place learn to decline nouns and conjugate verbs, for otherwise they will never arrive at the understanding of what is to follow. This admonition would be superfluous to give were it not that most teachers, through ostentatious haste, begin where they ought to end, and, while they wish to show off their pupils in matters of greater display, retard their progress by attempting to shorten the road. 2But if a teacher has sufficient learning and (what is often found not less wanting) be willing to teach what he has learned, he will not be content with stating that there are three genders in nouns, and specifying what nouns have two or all the three genders. 2Nor shall I hastily deem that tutor diligent who shall have shown that there are irregular nouns, called epicene, in which both genders are implied under one, or nouns, which under a feminine termination, signify males or, with a neuter termination, denote females; as Muroena and Glycerium. 2A penetrating and acute teacher will search into a thousand origins of names; derivations which have produced the names Rufus, "red," and Longus, "long," from personal peculiarities; (among which will be some of rather obscure etymology, as Sulla, Burrhus, Galba, Plancus, Pansa, Scaurus, and others of the same kind); some also from accidents of birth, as Agrippa, Opiter, Cordus, Posthumus; some from occurrences after birth, as Vopiscus; while others as Cotta, Scipio, Laenas, Seranus, spring from various causes. 2We may also find people, places, and many other things among the origins of names. That sort of names among slaves, which was taken from their masters, whence Marcipores and Publipores, has fallen into disuse. Let the tutor consider also whether there is not among the Greeks ground for a sixth case, and among us even for a seventh; for when I say hasta percussi, "I have struck with a spear," I do not express the sense of an ablative case, nor, if I say the same thing in Greek, that of a dative.

2As to verbs, who is so ignorant as not to know their kinds, qualities, persons, and numbers? Those things belong to the reading school and to the lower departments of instruction. But such points as are not determined by inflection will puzzle some people, for it may be doubted, as to certain words, whether they are participles or nouns formed from the verb, as lectus, sapiens. 2Some verbs look like nouns, as fraudator, nutritor. Is not the verb in Itur in antiquam silvam of a peculiar nature, for what beginning of it can you find? Fletur is similar to it. We understand the passive sometimes in one way, as,

Panditur interea domus omnipotentis Olympi;
sometimes in another, as,

Totis
Usque adeò turbatur agris.

There is also a third way, as urbs habitatur, whence likewise campus curritur, mare navigatur. 2Pransus also and potus have a different signification from that which their form indicates. I need hardly add that many verbs do not go through the whole course of conjugation. Some, too, undergo a change, as fero in the preterperfect; some are expressed only in the form of the third person, as licet, piget; and some bear resemblance to nouns passing into adverbs, for, as we say noctu and diu, so we say dictu and factu, since these words are indeed participial, though not like dicto and facto.

 
1 - 5 Necessity of correctness in speaking and writing, § 1. On single words, 3. Choice of words, 4. Barbarisms, 5-10. Barbarisms in poets and other writers, 11-17. Faults in pronunciation, 118. On the aspiration, 19-21. The accents, 22-24. On ending a word with an acute accent, 25-30. Legitimate accentuation, 31-33. On the solecism, 34-37. Different kinds of solecisms, 38-41. No dual number in Latin, 42-44. Solecisms in various parts of speech, 45-51. Figures of speech, 52-54. On foreign words, 55-57. Greek words, 58-64. Compound words, 65-70. Words proper, metaphorical, common, new, 772.

SINCE all language has three kinds of excellence, to be correct, perspicuous, and elegant (for to speak with propriety, which is its highest quality, most writers include under elegance), and the same number of faults, which are the opposites of the excellences just mentioned, let the grammarian consider well the rules for correctness which constitute the first part of grammar. These rules are required to be observed, verbis aut singulis aut pluribus, in regard to one or more words. The word verbum I wish to be here understood in a general sense, for it has two significations: the one, which includes all words of which language is composed, as in the verse of Horace,

Verbaque provisam rem non invita sequentur,
"And words, not unwilling, will follow provided matter"; the other, under which is comprehended only one part of speech, as lego, scribo. To avoid this ambiguity, some have preferred the terms voces, dictiones, locutiones. Words, considered singly, are either our own, or foreign, simple or compound, proper or metaphorical, in common use or newly invented.

A word taken singly is more often objectionable than faultless, for however we may express anything with propriety, elegance, and sublimity, none of these qualities arise from anything but the connection and order of the discourse, since we commend single words merely as being well suited to the matter. The only good quality which can be remarked in them is their vocalitas, so to speak, called εὐφωνία (euphony). This depends upon selection, when, of two words which have the same signification and are of equal force, we make choice of the one that has the better sound.

First of all, let the offensiveness of barbarisms and solecisms be put away. But as these faults are sometimes excused, either from custom, or authority, or perhaps from their nearness to beauties (for it is often difficult to distinguish faults from figures of speech), let the grammarian, that so uncertain a subject of observation may deceive no one, give his earnest attention to that nice discrimination of which we shall speak more fully in the part where we shall have to treat of figures of speech. Meanwhile, let an offense committed in regard to a single word be called a barbarism.

But some one may stop me with the remark, what is there here worthy of the promise of so great a work? Or who does not know that barbarisms are committed, some in writing, others in speaking? (because what is written incorrectly must also be spoken incorrectly, though he who speaks incorrectly may not necessarily make mistakes in writing). The first sort is caused by addition, curtailment, substitution, or transposition; the second by separation or confusion of syllables, aspiration, or other faults of sound. But though these may be small matters, boys are still to be taught, and we put grammarians in mind of their duty. If any one of them, however, shall not be sufficiently accomplished, but shall have just entered the vestibule of the art, he will have to confine himself within those rules which are published in the little manuals of professors. The more learned will add many other instructions, the very first of which will be this, that we understand barbarisms as being of several kinds. One, with reference to country, such as is committed when a person inserts an African or Spanish term in Latin composition, as when the iron ring with which wheels are bound is called canthus, though Persius uses this as a received word; as when Catullus got the word ploxenum, "a box," on the banks of the Po; and in the speech of Labienus (if it be not rather the speech of Cornelius Gallus), the word casnar, "a parasite," is brought from Gaul against Pollio; as to mastruca, "a shaggy garment," which is a Sardinian word, Cicero has used it purposely in jest. Another kind of barbarism is that which we regard as proceeding from the natural disposition, when he, by whom anything has been uttered insolently or threateningly or cruelly, is said to have spoken like a barbarian. The third kind of barbarism is that of which examples are everywhere abundant and which every one can form for himself, by adding a letter or syllable to any word he pleases, or taking one away, or substituting one for another, or putting one in a place where it is not right for it to be. 1But some grammarians, to make a show of learning, are accustomed, for the most part, to take examples of these from the poets and find fault with the authors whom they interpret. A boy ought to know, however, that such forms of speech, in writers of poetry, are considered as deserving of excuse or even of praise, and learners must be taught less common instances. 1Thus Tinca of Placentia (if we believe Hortensius, who finds fault with him) was guilty of two barbarisms in one word, saying precula instead of pergula; first, by the change of a letter, putting c for g, and secondly, by transposition, placing r before the preceding e. But Ennius, when committing a like double fault, by saying Metoeo Fufetioeo, is defended on the ground of poetic licence. 1In prose, too, there are certain received changes, for Cicero speaks of an army of Canopitae, though the people of the city call it Canobus; and many writers have authorized Trasumennus for Tarsumennus, although there is a transposition in it. Other words suffer similar treatment; for if assentior, "I assent," be thought the proper way of spelling that word, Sisenna has said assentio, and many have followed him on analogy; or, if assentio be deemed the right method, the other form, assentior, is supported by common practice. 1Yet the prim and dull teacher will suppose that there is either curtailment in the one case or addition in the other. I need hardly add that some forms, which taken singly, are doubtless faulty, are used in composition without blame. 1For dua, tre, and pondo, are barbarisms of discordant gender; yet the compounds duapondo, "two pounds," and trepondo, "three pounds," have been used by everybody down to our own times, and Messala maintains that they are used with propriety. 1It may perhaps seem absurd to say that a barbarism, which is incorrectness in a single word, may be committed in number and gender, like a solecism; yet scala, "stairs," and scopa, "a broom," in the singular, and hordea, "barley," and mulsa, "mead," in the plural, as they are attended with no change, withdrawal, or addition of letters, are objectionable only because plurals are expressed in the singular, and singulars in the plural; and those who have used gladia, "swords," have committed a fault in gender. 1But this point, too, I am satisfied with merely noticing, that I myself may not appear to have added another question to a branch of study already perplexed through the fault of certain obstinate grammarians.

Faults which are committed in speaking require more sagacity in criticizing them, because examples of them cannot be given from writing except when they have occurred in verses, as the division of the diphthong in Europaï, and the irregularity of the opposite kind, which the Greeks call συναίρεσιν (synaeresis) and ἐπισυναλοιφήν (episynaloiphē), and we conflexio, "combination," as in the verse in Publius Varro,

Quum te flagranti dejectum fulmine Phaeton;
18.For if it were prose, it would be possible to enunciate those letters by their proper syllables. Those peculiarities, also, which occur in quantity, whether when a short syllable is made long, as in Ītaliam fato profugus, or when a long one is made short, as in Unĭus ob noxam et furias, you would not remark except in verse; and even in verse they are not to be regarded as faults. 1Those which are committed in sound are judged only by the ear; as to the aspirate, whether it be added or retrenched in variation from common practice, it may be a question with us whether it be a fault in writing, if h indeed be a letter and not merely a mark, as to which point opinion has often changed with time. 20. The ancients used it very sparingly even before vowels, as they said aedos and ircos, and it was long afterwards withheld from conjunction with consonants, as in Graccas and triumpus. But suddenly an excessive use of it became prevalent, so that choronae, chenturiones, praechones, are still to be seen in certain inscriptions, on which practice there is a well-known epigram of Catullus. 2Hence there remain, even to our times, vehementer, conprehendere, and mihi. Among the ancient writers, also, especially those of tragedy, we find in old copies mehe for me.

2Still more difficult is the marking of faults in respect to the tenores, "tones" (which I find called by the old writers tonores, as if, forsooth, the word were derived from the Greeks who call them τόνους (tonos)), or accents, which the Greeks call προσῳδίας (prosodiai) when the acute is put for the grave, or the grave for the acute; as if, in the word Camillus, the first syllable should receive the acute accent; 2or if the grave is put for the circumflex, as when the first syllable of Cethegus has the acute, for thus the quantity of the middle syllable is altered; or if the circumflex is put for the grave, as when the second syllable is circumflexed in Appi, by contracting which from two syllables into one, and then circumflexing it, people commit two errors. 2But this happens far more frequently in Greek words, as Atreus, which, when I was young, the most learned old men used to pronounce with an acute on the first syllable, so that the second was necessarily grave, as was also that of Tereus and Nereus. Such have been the rules respecting accents. 2But I am quite aware that certain learned men, and some grammarians also, teach and speak in such a manner as to terminate a word at times with an acute sound, for the sake of preserving certain distinctions in words, as in circum in these lines,

Quae circum litora, circum
Piscosos scopulos,
lest, if they make the second syllable in circum grave, a circus might seem to be meant, not a circuit. 2Quantum and quale, also, when asking a question, they conclude with a grave accent; when making a comparison, with an acute; this is a practice, however, which they observe almost only in adverbs and pronouns, in other words they follow the old custom. 2To me it appears to make a difference that in these phrases we join the words, for when I say circum litora, I enunciate the words as one, without making any distinction between them; thus one syllable only, as in a single word, is acute. The same is the case in this hemistich,

Trojae qui primus ab oris.
2It sometimes happens, too, that the law of the meter alters the accent: as,

Pecudes, pictaeque volucres;
For I shall pronounce volucres with an acute on the middle syllable, because, though it be short by nature, it is long by position, that it may not form an iambus, which a heroic verse does not admit. 2But these words, taken separately, will not vary from the rule, or if custom shall triumph, the old law of the language will be abolished. The observation of which law is more difficult among the Greeks (because they have several modes of speaking, which they call dialects, and because what is wrong in one is sometimes right in another). But among us, the principle of accentuation is very simple. 30. For in every word the acuted syllable is confined within the number of three syllables, whether those three be the only syllables in the word or the three last; and of these, the acuted syllable is either the next, or next but one, to the last. Of the three syllables of which I am speaking, moreover, the middle one will be long, acute, or circumflex; a short syllable in that position will, of course, have a grave sound and will accordingly acute the one that stands before it, that is, the third from the end. 3But in every word there is an acute syllable, though never more than one; nor is that one ever the last, and consequently in dissyllables it is the first. Besides, there is never in the same word one syllable circumflexed and another acuted, for the same syllable that is circumflexed is also acuted; neither of the two, therefore, will terminate a Latin word. Those words, however, which consist but of one syllable will be either acuted or circumflexed that there may be no word without an acute.

3In sounds also occur those faults of utterance and pronunciation, of which specimens cannot be given in writing; the Greeks, who are more happy in inventing names, call them iotacisms, lambdacisms, ἰσχνότητες (ischnotētes), and πλατείασμοι (plateiasmoi); as also κοιλοστομία (koilostomia), when the voice is heard, as it were, in the depths of the throat. 3There are also certain peculiar and inexpressible sounds, for which we sometimes find fault with whole nations. All the incorrectnesses, then, which we have mentioned above, being removed, there will result that which is called ὀρθοέπαι (orthoepia), that is, a correct and clear utterance of words with an agreeableness of sound; for so may a right pronunciation be termed.

3All other faults arise out of more words than one; among these faults is the solecism, though about this also there has been controversy. For even those who admit that it lies in the composition of words, yet contend that, because it may be corrected by the amendment of a single word, it is the incorrectness of a word and not a fault in composition; 3since, whether amarae corticis or medio cortice constitutes a fault in gender (to neither of which do I object, Virgil being the author of both; but let us suppose that one of the two is incorrect), the alteration of one word, in which the fault lay, produces correctness of phraseology, so that we have amari corticis or mediâ cortice. This is a manifest misrepresentation, for neither of the words is wrong, taken separately, but the fault lies in them when put together, and it is a fault therefore of phrase. 3It is, however, a question of greater sagacity whether a solecism can be committed in a single word, as if a man, calling one person to him, should say venite, or, sending several away from him, should say abi, or discede; or, moreover, when an answer does not agree with the question, as if to a person saying quem vides? you should reply ego. Some also think that the same fault is committed in gesture when one thing is signified by the voice and another by a nod or by the hand. 3With this opinion I do not altogether agree, nor do I altogether dissent from it, for I allow that a solecism may occur in one word, but not unless there be something having the force of another word to which the incorrect word may be referred. A solecism arises from the union of things by which something is signified or some intention manifested, and, that I may avoid all cavilling, it sometimes occurs in one word, but never in a word by itself.

3But under how many, and what forms, the solecism occurs, is not sufficiently agreed. Those who speak of it most fully make the nature of it fourfold, like that of the barbarism, so that it may be committed by addition (as nam enim, de susum, in Alexandriam); by retrenchment (as Ambulo viam, Aegypto venio, ne hoc fecit); 3by transposition, by which the order of words is confused (as, Quoque ego, Enim hoc voluit, Autem non habuit). Whether igitur, placed at the beginning of a phrase, ought to be included may be a matter of dispute, because I see that eminent authors have been of opposite opinions as to the practice, it being common among some, while it is never found in others. 40. These three sorts of irregularity some distinguish from the solecism, and call a fault of addition "a pleonasm," of retrenchment "an ellipsis," of inversion "an anastrophe," and allege that if these fall under the head of solecism, the hyperbaton may be included under the same title. 4Substitution is without dispute when one thing is put for another; it is an irregularity which we find affecting all the parts of speech, but most frequently the verb, because it has most modifications. Accordingly, under the head of substitution, occur solecisms in gender, tense, persons, moods, (or states or qualities, if any one wish that they should be so called), being six, or, as some will have it, eight in number (since into however many forms you distinguish each of the parts of speech of which mention has just been made, there will be so many sorts of errors liable to be committed), as well as in numbers, of which we have the singular and plural, the Greeks also the dual. 4There have, indeed, been some who assigned us also a dual, scripsere, legere, a termination which was merely a softening for the sake of avoiding roughness of sound, as, among the old writers, male merere for male mereris. What they call the dual consists in that one sort of termination only, whereas among the Greeks it is found not only through almost the whole system of the verb, but also in nouns, though even so the use of it is very rare. 4But in no one of our authors is this distinction of ending to be discovered; on the contrary, the phrases, Devenere locos and Conticuere omnes and Consedere duces show us plainly that no one of them refers to two persons only; dixere, too, though Antonius Rufus gives it as an example of the contrary, the crier pronounces concerning more advocates than two. 4Does not Livy, also, near the beginning of his first book, say, Tenuere arcem Sabini, and a little afterwards, In adversum Romani subiere? But whom shall I follow in preference to Cicero, who, in his Orator, says, "I do not object to scripsere, though I consider scripserunt to be preferable"?

4In appellative and other nouns, likewise, the solecism shows itself in regard to gender and to number, but especially to case. Whichsoever of those three shall be put in the place of another, the error may be placed under this head, as also incorrectnesses in the use of comparatives and superlatives, as well as cases in which the patronymic is put for the possessive or the contrary. 4As to a fault committed in regard to quantity, such as magnum peculiolum, there will be some who will think it a solecism, because a diminution is used instead of the integral word, but for my own part, I doubt whether I should not rather call it a misapplication of a word, for it is a departure from the signification. The impropriety of a solecism is not an error as to the sense of a word, but in the junction of words. 4In respect to the participle, errors are committed in gender and case, as in the noun; in tense, as in the verb; and in number, as in both. The pronoun, also, has gender, number, and case, all of which admit mistakes of this kind. 4Solecisms are committed, too, and in great numbers, as to parts of speech, but it is not enough merely to remark this generally, lest the pupil should think a solecism committed only where one part of speech is put for another, as a verb where there ought to have been a noun, or an adverb where there ought to have been a pronoun, and the like. 4For there are some nouns cognate, as they say, that is, of the same kind, in regard to which he who shall use another species than that which he ought to use, will be guilty of no less an error than if he were to use a word of another genus. 50. Thus an and aut are both conjunctions, yet you would be incorrect in asking, hic, aut ille, sit? Ne and non are both adverbs, yet he who should say non feceris for ne feceris would fall into a similar error, since the one is an adverb of denying, the other of forbidding. I will add another example: intro and intus are both adverbs of place, yet eo intus and intro sum are solecisms. 5The same faults may be committed in regard to the different sorts of pronouns, interjections, and prepositions. The discordant collocation of preceding and following words, also, in a sentence of one clause, is a solecism.

5There are expressions, however, which have the appearance of solecisms and yet cannot be called faulty, as tragoedia Thyestes, ludi Floralia, and Megalesia, for though these modes of expression have fallen into disuse in later times, there was never any variation from them among the ancients. They shall therefore be called figures, which are more common among the poets, but allowable also to writers and speakers in prose. 5But a figure will generally have something right for its basis, as I shall show in that part of my work which I just before promised. Yet what is now called a figure will not be free from the fault of solecism, if it be used by any one unknowingly. 5Of the same sort, though, as I have already said, they have nothing of figure, are names with a feminine termination which males have, and those with a masculine termination which females have. But of the solecism I shall say no more, for I have not undertaken to write a treatise on grammar, though, as grammar met me in my road, I was unwilling to pass it without paying my respects to it.

5In continuation, that I may follow the course which I prescribed to myself, let me repeat that words are either Latin or foreign. Foreign words, like men, and like many of our institutions, have come to us, I might almost say, from all nations. 5I say nothing of the Tuscans, Sabines, and Praenestines, for though Lucilius attacks Vectius for using their dialect, as Pollio discovers Patavinity in Livy, I would consider every part of Italy as Roman. 5Many Gallic words have prevailed among us, as rheda, "a chariot," and petorritum, "a four-wheeled carriage," of which, however, Cicero uses one, and Horace the other. Mappa, "a napkin," too, a term much used in the circus, the Carthaginians claim as theirs; and gurdus, a word which the common people use for foolish, had, I have heard, its origin in Spain. 5But this division of mine is intended to refer chiefly to the Greek language, for it is from thence that the Roman language is, in a very great degree, derived, and we use even pure Greek words where our own fail, as they also sometimes borrow from us. Hence arises the question, whether it is proper that foreign words should be declined with cases in the same way as our own. 5If you meet with a grammarian who is a lover of the ancients, he will say that there should be no departure from the Latin method, because, as there is in our language an ablative case, which the Greeks have not, it is by no means becoming for us to use one case of our own and five Greek cases. 60. And he would also praise the merit of those who studied to increase the resources of the Latin language, and asserted that they need not introduce foreign practices; under the influence of which notion they said Castorem, with the middle syllable long, because such was the case with all our nouns whose nominative case ends in the same letters as Castor; and they retained the practice, moreover, of saying Palaemo, Telamo, and Plato (for so Cicero also called him), because they found no Latin word that terminated with the letters -o and -n. 6Nor did they willingly allow masculine Greek nouns to end in as in the nominative case, and accordingly, we read in Caelius, Pelia Cincinnatus; in Messala, Bene fecit Euthia; in Cicero, Hermagora; so that we need not wonder that the forms Aenea and Anchisa were used by most of the old writers: for, said they, if those words were written as Maecenas, Suffenas, Asprenas, they would end in the genitive case, not with the letter -e, but with the syllable -tis. 6Hence, to Olympus and tyrannus they gave an acuted middle syllable because our language does not permit the first syllable of a word, if short, to have an acute accent when two long syllables follow. 6Thus the genitive had the forms Achilli and Ulixi, and many others similar. The modern grammarians have now made it a practice rather to give Greek declensions to Greek nouns, a practice which cannot, however, always be observed. For myself, I prefer following the Latin method, as far as propriety allows, for I would not now say Calypsonem, like Junonem, though Caius Caesar, following the older writers, uses this mode of declining. 6But custom has prevailed over authority. In other words, which may be declined without impropriety in either way, he who shall prefer to use the Greek form will speak, not indeed like a Roman, but without incurring blame.

6Simple words are what they are in their first position, that is, in their own nature. Compound words are either formed by subjoining words to prepositions, as innocens (care being taken that there be not two prepositions inconsistent with each other, as imperterritus, otherwise two may be at times joined together, as incompositus, reconditus, and, a word which Cicero uses, subabsurdum); or they coalesce, as it were, from two bodies into one, as maleficus. 6For to form words out of three constituent parts, I should certainly not grant to our language; though Cicero says that capsis is compounded of cape si vis, and some are found to maintain that Lupercalia also consists of three parts of speech, luere per caprum. 6As to solitaurilia, it is now believed that it is for suovetaurilia, and such indeed is the sacrifice, as it is described also in Homer. But these words are constructed, not so much of three words, as of parts of three words. Pacuvius, however, appears to have formed compounds, most inelegantly of a preposition and two other words:

Nerei
Repandirostrum, incurvicervicum pecus,
"The broad-nosed, crook-necked flock of Nereus." 68.Compounds, however, are formed either of two entire Latin words, as superfui, subterfugi (though it is a question whether these are indeed formed of entire words), of an entire and incomplete word, as malevolus; of an incomplete and entire word, as noctivagus; of two incomplete words, as pedissequus; of a Latin and a foreign word, as biclinium; of a foreign and a Latin word, as epitogium and Anticato; or of two foreign words, as epirhedium, for though the preposition epi- is Greek, and rheda Gallic, and though neither the Greek nor the Gaul uses the compound, yet the Romans have formed their word of the two foreign words. 6Frequently, too, the union causes a change in the prepositions, as abstulit, aufugit, amisit, though the preposition is merely ab-, and coit, the preposition being con-; and so ignavi, erepti, and similar compounds. 70. But the composition of words in general is better suited to the Greeks; with us it is less successful, though I do not think that this results from the nature of the lauguage; but we look with more favor on foreign compounds, and, accordingly, while we admire the Greek κυρταύχενα (kurtauchena), we hardly defend incurvicervicum from derision.

7Words are proper when they signify that to which they were first applied; metaphorical, when they have one signification by nature, and another in the place in which they are used. Common words we use with greater safety; new ones we do not form without some danger; for if they are well received, they add but little merit to our style, and, if rejected, they turn to jokes against us. 7Yet we must make attempts; for, as Cicero says, even words which have seemed harsh at first, become softened by use.

As to the onomatopoeia, it is by no means granted to our language; for, if we should venture to produce anything like those justly admired Greek expressions λίγξε βιός (linxe bios), "the bow twanged," and σίζε ὀψθαλμός siz ophthalmos, "the eye hissed," who would endure it? We should not even dare to say balare, "to bleat" or hinnire, "to neigh," unless those words were supported by the sanction of antiquity.

 
1 - 6 Of language, § 1-3. Analogy, 4-11. Departures from it, 12-27. Etymology 28-33. Abuses of it, 34-38. Old words, 39-41. Authority, 42. Custom, 43-45.

BY speakers, as well as writers, there are certain rules to be observed. Language is based on reason, antiquity, authority, custom. It is analogy, and sometimes etymology, that affords the chief support to reason. A certain majesty, and, if I may so express myself, religion, graces the antique. 2.Authority is commonly sought in orators or historians. As to the poets, the obligation of the meter excuses their phraseology, unless, when the measure of the feet offers no impediment to the choice of either of two expressions, they fancifully prefer one to the other, as in the following phrases: Imo de stirpe recisum, Aeriae quo congessere palumbes, Silice in nuda, and the like. Since the judgment of men eminent in eloquence is in place of reason, then even error is without dishonor in following illustrious guides. 3.Custom, however, is the surest preceptor in speaking, and we must use phraseology, like money, which has the public stamp.

But all these particulars require great judgment, especially analogy, which, translating it closely from Greek into Latin, people have called proportion. What it requires is that a writer or speaker should compare whatever is at all doubtful with something similar concerning which there is no doubt, so as to prove the uncertain by the certain. This is done in two ways: by a comparison of similar words, in respect chiefly to their last syllables (for which reason the words that have but one syllable are said not to be accountable to analogy), and by looking to diminutives. Comparison in nouns shows either their gender or their declension; their gender, as when it is inquired whether funis be masculine or feminine, panis may be an object of comparison with it; their declension as, if it should be a subject of doubt whether we should say hac domu or hac domo, and domuum or domorum, domus, anus, manus may be compared with each other. The formation of diminutives shows only the gender of words, as (that I may take the same word for an example) funiculus proves that funis is masculine. There is also similar reason for comparison in verbs; as if any one, following the old writers, should pronounce fervere with the middle syllable short, he would be convicted of speaking incorrectly, since all verbs which end with the letters -eo in the indicative mood, when they have assumed the letter -e in the middle syllables in the infinitive, have it necessarily long, as prandeo, pendeo, spondeo, prandēre, pendēre, spondēre. But those which have -o only in the indicative, when they end with the same letter -e in the infinitive, shorten it, as lego, dico, curro, legĕre, dicĕre, currĕre; although there occurs in Lucilius,

Fervit aqua et fervet; fervit nunc, fervet ad annum.

The water boils and will boil; it boils now, and will boil for a year.
9.But with all respect to a man of such eminent learning, if he thinks fervit similar to currit and legit, fervo will be a word like curro and lego, a word which has never been heard by me. But this is not a just comparison, for servit is like fervit, and he that follows this analogy must say fervire as well as servire. The present indicative also is sometimes discovered from the other moods and tenses. For I remember that some people who had blamed me for using the word pepigi were convinced by me of their error; they had allowed, indeed, that the best authors had used pepigi, but denied that analogy permitted its use, since the present indicative paciscor, as it had the form of a passive verb, made in the perfect tense pactus sum. 1But I, besides adducing the authority of orators and historians, maintained that pepigi was also supported by analogy; for, as we read in the Twelve Fables, ni ita pagunt, I found cadunt similar to pagunt, whence the present indicative, though it had fallen into disuse through time, was evidently pago, like cado, and it was therefore certain that we say pepigi like cecidi. 1But we must remember that the course of analogy cannot be traced through all the parts of speech, as it is in many cases at variance with itself. Learned men, indeed, endeavor to justify some departures from it, as when it is remarked how much lepus and lupus, though of similar terminations in the nominative, differ in their cases and numbers, they reply that they are not of the same sort, since lepus is epicene, and lupus masculine; yet Varro, in the book in which he relates the origin of the city of Rome, uses lupus as feminine, following Ennius and Fabius Pictor. 1But those same grammarians, when they are asked why aper makes apri, and pater patris, assert that the first is declined absolutely, and the second with reference to something; and, besides, as both are derived from the Greek, they recur to the rule that πατρός (patros) gives patris, and κάπρου (kaprou) apri. 1But how will they escape from the fact that nouns, which end with the letters -u and -s in the nominative singular, never, even though feminine, end with the syllable -ris in the genitive, yet that Venus makes Veneris; and that, though nouns ending in -es have various endings in the genitive, yet their genitive never ends in that same syllable -ris, when, nevertheless, Ceres obliges us to say Cereris? 1And what shall I say of those parts of speech, which, though all of similar commencement, proceed with different inflections, as Alba makes Albani and Albenses, and Volo has volui and volavi? For analogy itself admits that verbs which end with the letter -o in the first person singular are variously formed in the perfect, as cado makes cecidi; spondeo makes spopondi; pingo makes pinxi; lego legi; pono posui; frango fregi; and laudo laudavi. 1Since analogy was not sent down from heaven, when men were first made, to give them rules for speaking, but was discovered after men had begun to speak and after it was observed how each word in speaking terminated, it is not therefore founded on reason, but on example. Nor is it a law for speaking, but the mere result of observation, so that nothing but custom has been the origin of analogy. 1Yet some people adhere to it with a most unpleasantly perverse attachment to exactness, so that they will say audaciter in preference to audacter, though all orators adopt the latter, and emicavit instead of emicuit, and conire instead of coire. Such persons we may allow to say audivisse, and scivisse, tribunale, and faciliter; let them also have their frugalis, instead of frugi, for how else can frugalitas be formed? 1Let them also prove that centum millia nummum and fidem Deum are two solecisms, since they err in both case and number; for we were ignorant of this and were not merely complying with custom and convenience, as in most cases, of which Cicero treats nobly, as of everything else, in his De Oratore. 1Augustus, too, in his letters written to Caius Caesar, corrects him for preferring to say calidum rather than caldum, not because calidum is not Latin, but because it is unpleasing, and, as he has himself expressed it by a Greek word, περίεργον (periergon). 20. All this indeed they consider as mere ὀρθοέπειαν (orthopeia), which I by no means set aside, for what is so necessary as correctness of speech? I think that we ought to adhere to it as far as possible and to make persevering resistance against innovators; but to retain words that are obsolete and disused is a species of impertinence and puerile ostentation in little things. 2Let the extremely learned man, who has saluted you without an aspirate and with the second syllable lengthened (for the verb, he will say, is avēte) say also calefacere and conservavisse rather than what we say, and with these let him join face, dice, and the like. 2His way is the right way; who will deny it? But a smoother and more beaten road is close by the side of it. There is nothing, however, with which I am more offended than that these men, led away by oblique cases, permit themselves, I do not say not to find, but even to alter nominative cases, as when ebur and robur, so spoken and written by the greatest authors, are made to change the vowel of the second syllable into -o, because their genitives are roboris and eboris, and because sulpur and guttur preserve the vowel -u in the genitive. For which reason also jecur and femur have raised disputes. 2This change of theirs is no less audacious than if they were to substitute the letter -o for -u in the genitive case of sulpur and guttur, because eboris and roboris are formed with -o. Consider the example of Antonius Gnipho, who acknowledges that robur and ebur are proper words, and even marmur, but would have the plurals of them to be robura, ebura, marmura. 2But if they had paid attention to the affinity of letters, they would have understood that roboris is as fairly formed from robur as militis, limitis, from miles, limes, or judicis, vindicis, from judex, vindex, and would have observed some other forms to which I have adverted above. 2Do not similar nominative cases, as I remarked, diverge into very dissimilar forms in the oblique cases, as Virgo, Juno; fusus, lusus; cuspis, puppis; and a thousand others? It happens, too, that some nouns are not used in the plural, others not in the singular; some are indeclinable; some depart altogether from the form of their nominatives, as Jupiter. 2The same peculiarity happens in verbs, as fero, tuli, of which the preterperfect is found and nothing more. Nor is it of much importance whether those unused parts are actually not in existence or whether they are too harsh to be used, for what, for example, will progenies make in the genitive singular, or what will spes make in the genitive plural? Or how will quire and ruere form themselves in the perfect passive or in the passive participles? 2It is needless to advert to other words, when it is even uncertain whether senatus makes senatus senatui, or senati senato. It appears to me, therefore, to have been not unhappily remarked that it is one thing to speak Latin and another to speak grammar. Of analogy I have now said enough, and more than enough.

28.Etymology, which inquires into the origin of words, is called by Cicero notatio, because its designation in Aristotle is σύμβολον (symbolon), that is, nota; for to a literal rendering of etymology, which would be veriloquium ("word for word"), Cicero himself, who formed that word, is averse. There are some, who looking rather to the meaning of the word, call it "origination." 2This part of grammar is sometimes of the utmost use; as often, indeed, as the matter, concerning which there is any dispute, stands in need of interpretation; as when Marcus Caelius would prove that he was a homo frugi, "a frugal man," not because he was temperate (for on that point he could not speak falsely), but because he was profitable to many, that is fructuosus, from whence, he said, was derived frugality. A place is accordingly assigned to etymology in definitions. 30. Sometimes, also, it endeavors to distinguish barbarous from polite words, as when a question arises whether Sicily should be called Triquetra or Triquedra, and whether we should say meridies or medidies, and similar questions concerning other words which yield to custom. 3But it carries with it much learning, whether we employ it in treating of words sprung from the Greek, which are very numerous, especially those inflected according to the Aeolic dialect to which our language has most similitude, or in inquiring, from our knowledge of ancient history, into the names of men, places, nations, and cities. Whence come the names of the Bruti, Publicolae, Pici; why we say Latium, Italia, Beneventum; and what is our reason for using the terms Capitol, Quirinal hill, and Argiletum.

would now allude also to those minuter points on which the greatest lovers of etymology weary themselves: men who bring back to their true derivation, by various and manifold arts, words that have become a little distorted, shortening or lengthening, adding, taking away, or interchanging letters or syllables. In this pursuit, through weakness or judgment, they run into the most contemptible absurdities. Let consul be (I make no objection) from "consulting" or from "judging," for the ancients called consulere "judicare," whence still remains the phrase rogat boni consulas, that is, bonum judices. 3Let it be old age that has given a name to the senate, for the senators are fathers; let rex, rector, and abundance of other words be indisputably from rego; nor would I dispute the ordinary derivation of tegula, regula, and other words similar to them; let classis, also, be from calare, "to call together," and let lepus be for levipes, and vulpes for volipes. 3But shall we also allow words to be derived from contraries, as lucus, "a grove," from luceo, "to shine," because, being thick with shade, parum lucet, it does not shine? As ludus, "a school," from ludo, "to play," because it is as far as possible from play? As Ditis, "Pluto," from dives, "rich," because he is by no means rich? Or shall we allow homo, "man," to be from humus, "the ground," because he was sprung from the ground, as if all animals had not the same origin, or as if the first men had given a name to the ground before they gave one to themselves? Shall we allow verba, "words," to be from aer verberatus, "beaten air?" 3Let us go on and we shall get so far that stella, "a star," will be believed to be luminis stilla, "a drop of light," the author of which derivation, an eminent man in literature, it would be ungenerous for me to name in regard to a point on which he is censured by me. 3But those who have recorded such etymologies in books have themselves set their names to them; and Caius Granius thought himself extremely clever for saying that caelibes, "bachelors," was the same as caelites, "inhabitants of heaven," because they are alike free from a most heavy burden, resting his derivation, too, on an argument from the Greek, for he affirmed that ἠιθέους (ēitheoi) was used in the same sense. Nor does Modestus yield to him in imagination, for he says that because Saturn cut off the genitalia of Caelus, men who have no wives are therefore called caelibes. 3Lucius Aelius declares that pituita, "phlegm," is so called quia petat vitam, because "it aims at life." But who may not be pardoned after Varro, who wished to persuade Cicero (for it was to him that he wrote this), that ager, "a field," is so called because in eo agatur aliquid, "something is done in it," and that graculos, "jackdaws," are so named because they fly gregatim, "in flocks," though it is evident that the one is derived from the Greek and the other from the cries of the birds themselves? 38.But of such importance was it to Varro to derive that merula, "a blackbird," he declared, was so named because it flies alone, as if mera volans. Some have not hesitated to apply to etymology for the origin of every name or word; deducing Longus and Rufus, as I remarked, from personal peculiarities; strepere and murmurare from particular sounds; with which they join, also, certain derivatives, as velox, "swift," deduced from velocitas, "swiftness," and the greater number of compounds (as being similar to them), which, doubtless, have their origin from something, but demand no exercise of ingenuity for which, indeed, except on doubtful points, there is no opportunity in these investigations.

3Words derived from antiquity have not only illustrious patrons, but also confer on style a certain majesty not unattended with pleasure, for they have the authority of age and, as they have been disused for a time, bring with them a charm similar to that of novelty. 40. But there is need of moderation in the use of them, in order that they may not occur too frequently nor show themselves too manifestly since nothing is more detestable than affectation; nor should they be taken from a remote and already forgotten age, as are topper, "quickly," antigerio, "very much," exanclare, "to draw out," prosapia, "a race," and the verses of the Salii, which are scarcely understood by the priests themselves. 4Those verses, however, religion forbids to be changed, and we must use what has been consecrated; but how faulty is speeeh, of which the greatest virtue is perspicuity, if it needs an interpreter! Consequently, as the oldest of new words will be the best, so the newest of old words will be the best.

4The case is similar with regard to authority, for though he may seem to commit no fault who uses those words which the greatest writers have handed down to him, yet it is of much importance for him to consider, not only what words they used, but how far they gave a sanction to them. No one would now tolerate from us tuburchinabundus, "devouring," or lurchinabundus, "voracious," though Cato was the father of them; nor would people endure lodices, "blankets," in the masculine gender, though that gender pleases Pollio; nor gladiola for "little swords," though Messala has used it; nor parricidatus, "parricide," which was thought scarcely endurable in Caelius; nor would Calvus induce me to use collos, "necks"; all which words, indeed, those authors themselves would not now use.

4There remains, therefore, custom, for it would be almost ridiculous to prefer the language which men have spoken rather than that which they now speak. What else, indeed, is old language, but the old manner of speaking? But even for following custom judgment is necessary, and we must settle, in the first place, what that is which we call custom. 4If custom be merely termed that which the greater number do, it will furnish a most dangerous rule, not only for language, but, what is of greater importance, for life. For where is there so much virtue that what is right can please the majority? As, therefore, to pluck out hairs, to cut the hair of the head in a succession of rings, and to drink to excess in the bath, whatever country those practices may have invaded, will not become the custom, because no one of them is undeserving of censure. Though we bathe and clip our hair, and take our meals together according to custom, so, in speaking, it is not whatever has become a vicious practice with many that is to be received as a rule of language. 4For, not to mention how the ignorant commonly speak, we know that whole theaters and all the crowd of the circus have frequently uttered barbarous exclamations. Custom in speaking, therefore, I shall call the agreement of the educated, as I call custom in living the agreement of the good.

 
1 - 7 Of orthography, § Distinction of words of doubtful signification, 2-Composition with prepositions, 7-On the letter k, Orthography subservient to custom; antique spelling,11-2Difference between spelling and pronunciation, 22Necessity of judgment, 30-3Quintilian defends his remarks on this subject, 33-3

SINCE we have mentioned what rules are to be followed in speaking, we must now specify what are to be observed by writers. What the Greeks call ὀρθογραφία (orthographia), we may call the art of writing correctly, an art which does not consist in knowing of what letters every syllable is composed (for this study is beneath the profession even of the grammarian), but exercises its whole subtilty, in my opinion, on dubious points. As it is the greatest of folly to place a mark on all long syllables, since most of them are apparent from the very nature of the word that is written, yet it is at times necessary to mark them, as when the same letter gives sometimes one sense and sometimes another, according as it is short or long; thus malus is distinguished by a mark to show whether it means "a tree" or "a bad man;" palus, too, signifies one thing when its first syllable is long, and another when its second is so; and when the same letter is short in the nominative and long in the ablative, we have generally to be informed by this mark which quantity we are to adopt.

Grammarians have in like manner thought that the following distinction should be observed: namely, that we should write the preposition ex, if the word specto was compounded with it, with the addition of -s in the second syllable, exspecto; if pecto, without the -s. It has been a distinction, also, observed by many, that ad, when it was a preposition, should take the letter -d, but when a conjunction, the letter -t; and that cum, if it signified time, should be written with a -q and two -u's following, but if it meant accompaniment, with a -c. Some other things were even more trifling than these, as that quicquid should have a -c for the fourth letter, lest we should seem to ask a double question, and that we should write quotidie, not cotidie, to show that it was for quot diebus. But these notions have already passed away among other puerilities.

It is, however, a question in writing prepositions whether it is proper to observe the sound which they make when joined to another word, or that which they make when separate, as for instance when I pronounce the word obtinuit, for our method of writing requires that the second letter should be -b, while the ear catches rather the sound of -p; or when I say immunis, for the letter -n, which the composition of the word requires, is influenced by the sound of the following syllable and changed into another -m. It is also to be observed, in dividing compound words, whether you ought to attach the middle consonant to the first or to the second syllable; for aruspex, as its latter part is from spectare, will assign the letter -s to the third syllable; abstemius, as it is formed of abstinentia temeti, "abstinence from wine," will leave the -s to the first syllable. As to -k, I think it should not be used in any words, except those which it denotes of itself, so that it may be put alone. This remark I have not omitted to make because there are some who think -k necessary when -a follows; though there is the letter -c, which suits itself to all vowels.

1But orthography submits to custom and has therefore frequently been altered. I say nothing of those ancient times when there were fewer letters and when their shapes were different from these of ours, and their natures also different, as that of -o among the Greeks, which was sometimes long and sometimes short, and -as among us was sometimes put for the syllable which it expresses by its mere name. 1I say nothing also of -d, among the ancient Latins, being added as the last letter to a great number of words, as is apparent from the rostral pillar erected to Calus Duellius in the forum; nor do I speak of -g being used in the same manner, as on the pulvinar of the Sun, which is worshipped near the temple of Romulus, is read vesperug, which we take for vesperugo. 1Nor is it necessary to say anything here of the interchange of letters, of which I have spoken above, for perhaps as they wrote they also spoke.

1It was for a long time a very common custom not to double the semivowels, while, on the other hand, even down to the time of Accius and later, they wrote, as I have remarked, long syllables with two vowels. 1Still longer continued the practice of using -e and -i together, joining them in the same manner as the Greeks in the diphthong -ei. This practice was adopted for a distinction in cases and numbers, as Lucilius admonishes us:

Jam pueri venere: E postremum facito, atque I,
Ut puerei plures fiant;
and afterwards,

Mendaci furique addes E, quum dare furei
Jusseris.
16.However this addition of -e is both superfluous, since -i has the nature of a long as well as of a short letter, and also sometimes inconvenient; for in those words which have -e immediately before the last syllable, and end with -i long, we should use, if we adopted that method, a double -e, as aureei, argenteei, and the like; and this would be extremely embarrassing to those who are being taught to read. 1This happens also among the Greeks by the addition of the letter -i, which they not only write at the end of dative cases, but sometimes even in the middle of a word, as ΛΗΙΣΤΗΙ (LĒISTĒI), because etymology, in making a division of the word into three syllables, requires that letter. 1The diphthong -ae, for the second letter of which we now substitute -e, our ancestors expressed with a varied pronunciation, by -a and -i, some using it in all cases like the Greeks, others only in the singular when they had to form a genitive or dative case. Whence Virgil, a great lover of antiquity, has inserted in his verses pictai vestis and aquai, but in the plural number of such nouns they use -e, as Syllae, Galbae. 1There is on this point also a precept of Lucilius, which, as it is expressed in a great number of verses, whoever is incredulous about it may seek in his ninth book. 20. I may mention, too, that in the time of Cicero and some what later, the letter -s, as often as it occurred between two long vowels or followed a long vowel, was doubled, as caussae, cassus, divissiones, for that both he and Virgil wrote in this way, their own hands show. 2But those of a somewhat earlier period wrote the word jussi, which we express with two -s's, with only one. That optimus, maximus, should take -i as their middle letter which among the ancients was -u, is said to have been brought about by an inscription to Caius Caesar. 2The word here we now end with the letter -e; but I still find in the books of the old comic writers Heri ad me venit, which same mode of spelling is found in the letters of Augustus, which he wrote or corrected with his own hand. 2Did not Cato the Censor, also, for dicam and faciam, write dicem and faciem? And did he not observe the same method in other verbs which terminate in a similar way? This is indeed manifest from his old writings and is remarked by Messala in his book on the letter -s. 24.Sibe and quase occur in the writings of many authors, but whether the authors themselves intended them to be written thus, I do not know. That Livy spelled them in that way, I learn from Pedianus, who himself imitated Livy; we end those words with the letter -i.

2Why need I allude to vortices and vorsus and other similar words, in which Scipio Africanus is said to have first changed the second letter into -e? 2Our tutors wrote ceruum and seruum with the letters -u and -o, ceruom, seruom, in order that the same two vowels, following each other, might not coalesce and be confounded in the same sound; they are now written with two -u's on the principle which I have stated, though in neither way is the word which we conceive exactly expressed. Nor was it without advantage that Claudius introduced the Aeolic letter for such cases. 2It is an improvement of the present day that we spell cui with the three letters which I have just written; for in this word, when we were boys, they used, making a very offensive sound, qu and oi, only that it might be distinguished from qui.

2What shall I say, too, of words that are written otherwise than they are pronounced? Gaius is spelled with the letter -c, which, inverted, means a woman; for that women were called Caiae, as well as men Caii, appears even from our nuptial ceremonies. 2Nor does Gneius assume that letter, in designating a praenomen, with which it is sounded. We read, too, columna and consules with the letter -n omitted, and Sabura, when it is designated by three letters, takes -c as the third. There are many other peculiarities of this kind, but I fear that those which I have noticed have exceeded the limits of so unimportant a subject.

30. On all such points let the grammarian use his own judgment, for in this department it ought to be of the greatest authority. For myself, I think that all words (unless custom has ordered otherwise) should be written in conformity with their sound. 3For this is the use of letters, to preserve words, and to restore them, like a deposit, to readers; and they ought, therefore, to express exactly what we are to say.

3These are the most important points as to speaking and writing correctly. The other two departments, those of speaking with significancy and elegance, I do not indeed take away from the grammarians, but as the duties of the rhetorician remain for me to explain, I reserve them for a more important part of my work.

3Yet the reflection recurs to me that some will regard those matters of which I have just treated as extremely trifling and even as impediments to the accomplishment of anything greater. Nor do I myself think that we ought to descend to extreme solicitude and puerile disputations about them; I even consider that the mind may be weakened and contracted by being fixed upon them. 3But no part of grammar will be hurtful, except what is superfluous. Was Cicero the less of an orator because he was most attentive to the study of grammar and because, as appears from his letters, he was a rigid exactor, on all occasions, of correct language from his son? Did the writings of Julius Caesar On Analogy diminish the vigor of his intellect? Or was Messala less elegant as a writer because he devoted whole books, not merely to single words, but even to single letters? These studies are injurious not to those who pass through them, but to those who dwell immoderately upon them.

 
1 - 8 Of reading, § 1-4. Authors to be read, Greek and Latin, 4-12. Duty of the grammarian, 13-17. Of lectures on historical reading, 18-21.

READING remains to be considered. Only practice can teach a boy to know when to take breath, where to divide a verse, where the sense is concluded, where it begins, when the voice is to be raised or lowered, what is to be uttered with any particular inflection of sound, or what is to be pronounced with greater slowness or rapidity, with greater animation or gentleness than other passages. There is but one direction, therefore, which I have to give in this part of my work, namely, that he may be able to do all this successfully, let him understand what he reads.

Let his mode of reading, however, be, above all, manly, uniting gravity with a certain degree of sweetness. Let not his reading of the poets be like that of prose, for it is verse, and the poets say that they sing. Yet let it not degenerate into sing-song or be rendered effeminate with unnatural softness, as is now the practice among most readers; on which sort of reading we hear that Caius Caesar, while he was still under age, observed happily to some one that was practicing it, "If you are singing, you sing badly; if you pretend to read, you nevertheless sing." Nor would I have prosopopeiae pronounced, as some would wish them, after the manner of actors, though I think there should be a certain alteration of the voice by which they may be distinguished from those passages in which the poet speaks in his own person.

Other points demand much admonition to be given on them, and care is to be taken, above all things, that tender minds, which will imbibe deeply whatever has entered them while rude and ignorant of everything, may learn not only what is eloquent, but, still more, what is morally good. It has accordingly been an excellent custom that reading should commence with Homer and Virgil, although to understand their merits, there is need of maturer judgment. But for the acquisition of judgment there is abundance of time, for they will not be read once only. In the meantime, let the mind of the pupil be exalted with the sublimity of the heroic verse, conceive ardor from the magnitude of the subjects, and be imbued with the noblest sentiments. The reading of tragedies is beneficial; the lyric poets nourish the mind, provided that you select from them not merely authors, but portions of their works; for the Greeks are licentious in many of their writings, and I should be loath to interpret Horace in certain passages. As to elegy, at least that which treats of love, and hendecasyllables, and poems in which there are portions of Sotadic verses (for concerning Sotadic verses themselves no precept need even be mentioned) let them be altogether kept away, if it be possible; if not, let them at least be reserved for the greater strength of mature age. Of comedy, which may contribute very much to eloquence, as it extends to all sorts of characters and passions, I will state a little further on, in the proper place, the good which I think it may do to boys; when their morals are out of danger, it will be among the subjects to be chiefly read. It is of Menander that I speak, though I would not set aside other comic writers, for the Latin authors, too, will confer some benefit. But those writings should be the subjects of lectures for boys, which may best nourish the mind and enlarge the thinking powers; for reading other books, which relate merely to erudition, advanced life will afford sufficient time.

The old Latin authors, however, will be of great use, though most of them, indeed, were stronger in genius than in art. Above all they will supply a copia verborum, while in their tragedies may be found a weightiness of thought, and in their comedies elegance, and something as it were of Atticism. There will be seen in them, too, a more careful regard to regularity of structure than in most of the moderns, who have considered that the merit of every kind of composition lies solely in the thoughts. Purity, certainly, and that I may so express myself, manliness, is to be gained from them, since we ourselves have fallen into all the vices of refinement, even in our manner of speaking. Let us, moreover, trust to the practice of the greatest orators, who have recourse to the poems of the ancients, as well for the support of their arguments, as for the adornment of their eloquence. 1For in Cicero, most of all, and frequently, also, in Asinius and others nearest to his times, we see verses of Ennius, Accius, Pacuvius, Lucilius, Terence, Caecilius, and other poets, introduced with the best effect, not only for showing the learning of the speakers, but for giving pleasure to the hearers, whose ears find in the charms of poetry a relief from the want of elegance in forensic pleading. 1To this is to be added no mean advantage, as the speakers confirm what they have stated by the sentiments of the poets, as by so many testimonies. But those first observations of mine have reference rather to boys, the latter to more advanced students, for the love of letters and the benefit of reading are bounded not by the time spent at school, but by the extent of life.

1In lecturing on the poets, the grammarian must attend also to minor points, so that after taking a verse to pieces, he may require the parts of speech to be specified, and the peculiarities of the feet, which are necessary to be known, not merely for writing poetry, but even for prose composition. He may also distinguish what words are barbarous, or misapplied, or used contrary to the rules of the language. 1Not that the poets may thus be disparaged (to whom, as they are commonly forced to obey the meter, so much indulgence is granted, that even solecisms are designated by other names in poetry, for we call them, as I have remarked, metaplasms, schematisms, and schemata, and give to necessity the praise of merit), but that the tutor may instruct the pupil in figurative terms and exercise his memory. 1It is likewise useful, among the first rudiments of instruction, to show in how many senses each word may be understood. About glossemata, too, that is, words not in general use, no small attention is requisite in the grammatical profession. 1With still greater care, however, let him teach all kinds of tropes from which not only poetry, but even prose, receives the greatest ornament, as well as the two sorts of schemata or figures, called figures of speech and figures of thought. My observations on these figures, as well as those on tropes, I put off to that portion of my work in which I shall have to speak of the embellishments of composition. 1But let the tutor, above all things, impress upon the minds of his pupils what merit there is in a just disposition of parts, and a becoming treatment of subjects; what is well suited to each character; what is to be commended in the thoughts, and what in the words; where diffuseness is appropriate, and where contraction.

1To these duties will be added explanations of historical points, which must be sufficiently minute, but not carried into superfluous disquisitions; for it will suffice to lecture on facts which are generally admitted, or which are at least related by eminent authors. To examine, indeed, what all writers, even the most contemptible, have ever related is a proof either of extravagant laboriousness or of useless ostentation, and chains and overloads the mind, which might give its attention to other things with more advantage. 1For he who makes researches into all sorts of writings, even such as are unworthy to be read, is capable of giving his time even to old women's tales. Yet the writings of grammarians are full of noxious matters of this kind, scarcely known even to the very men who wrote them. 20. Since it is known to have happened to Didymus, than whom no man wrote more books, that, when he denied a certain story as unworthy of belief, his own book containing it was laid before him. 2This occurs chiefly in fabulous stories, descending even to what is ridiculous, and sometimes licentious; whence every unprincipled grammarian has the liberty of inventing many of his comments, so that he may lie with safety concerning whole books and authors, as it may occur to him, for writers that never existed cannot be produced against him. In the better known class of authors they are often exposed by the curious. Hence it shall be accounted by me among the merits of a grammarian to be ignorant of some things.

 
1 - 9 Commencement of composition, § 1. aesop's fables, 2. Sentences, chrioe, ethologioe 4. Narratives from the poets, 5.
1. TWO of the departments which this profession undertakes have now been concluded, namely, the art of speaking correctly, and the explanation of authors, of which they call the one methodicē and the other historicē. Let us add, however, to the business of the grammarian some rudiments of the art of speaking in which they may initiate their pupils while still too young for the teacher of rhetoric. 2. Let boys learn, then, to relate orally the fables of Aesop, which follow next after the nurse's stories, in plain language, not rising at all above mediocrity, and afterwards to express the same simplicity in writing. Let them learn, too, to take to pieces the verses of the poets and then to express them in different words, and afterwards to represent them, somewhat boldly, in a paraphrase, in which it is allowable to abbreviate or embellish certain parts, provided that the sense of the poet be preserved. 3. He who shall successfully perform this exercise, which is difficult even for accomplished professors, will be able to learn anything. Let sentences, also, and chriae and ethologies, be written by the learner, with the occasions of the sayings added according to the grammarians, because these depend upon reading. The nature of all these is similar, but their form different, because a sentence is a general proposition; ethology is confined to certain persons. 4. Of chriae several sorts are specified: one similar to a sentence, which is introduced with a simple statement, He said, or He was accustomed to say: another, which includes its subject in an answer: He, being asked, or, when this remark was made to him, replied; a third, not unlike the second, commences, When some one had not said, but done, something5. Even in the acts of people, some think that there is a chria, as, Crates, having met with an ignorant boy, beat his tutor: and there is another sort, almost like this, which, however, they do not venture to call by the same name, but term it a χρειῶδες (chriades); as, "Milo, having been accustomed to carry the same calf every day, ended by carrying a bull." In all these forms the declension is conducted through the same cases, and a reason may be given as well for acts as for sayings. Stories told by the poets should, I think, be treated by boys, not with a view to eloquence, but for the purpose of increasing their knowledge. By abandoning other exercises of greater toil and ardor, Latin teachers of rhetoric have rendered them the necessary work of teachers of grammar. The Greek rhetoricians have better understood the weight and measure of their duties.
 
1 - 10 Of other studies preliminary to that of rhetoric, § 1. Necessity of them, 2-8. Authority of the ancients in favor of learning music, 9-16. Union of music with grammar, 17-21. Utility of music to the orator, 22-30. What sort of music to be studied, 31-33. Utility of geometry, 34-37. Geometrica. proof, 38-45. Astronomy; examples of the benefit attending a knowledge of it, 46-49.

1. THESE remarks I have made, as briefly as I could, upon grammar, not so as to examine and speak of everything, which would be an infinite task, but merely of the most essential points. I shall now add some concise observations on the other departments of study, in which I think that boys should he initiated before they are committed to the teacher of rhetoric, in order that that circle of instruction which the Greeks call ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία (enkyklios paideia) may be completed.

2. For about the same age, the study of other accomplishments must be commenced; concerning which, as they are themselves arts and cannot be complete without the art of oratory, but are nevertheless insufficient of themselves to form an orator, it is made a question whether they are necessary to this art. 3. Of what service is it, say some people, for pleading a cause or pronouncing a legal opinion to know how equilateral triangles may be erected upon a given line? Or how will he who has marked the sounds of the lyre by their names and intervals defend an accused person or direct consultations the better on that account? 4. They may perhaps reckon, also, the many speakers, effective in every way in the forum, who have never attended a geometrician and who know nothing of musicians except by the common pleasure of listening to them. To these observers I answer in the first place (what Cicero also frequently remarks in his book De oratore, addressed to Brutus) that it is not such an orator as is or has been that is to be formed by us, but that we have conceived in our mind an idea of the perfect orator, an orator deficient in no point whatever. 5. For when the philosophers would form their wise man, who is to be perfect in every respect, and, as they say, a kind of mortal god, they not only believe that he should be instructed in a general knowledge of divine and human things, but conduct him through a course of questions which are certainly little, if you consider them merely in themselves (as, sometimes, through studied subtleties of argument) not because questions about horns or crocodiles can form a wise man, but because a wise man ought never to be in error even in the least matters. 6. In like manner, it is not the geometrician or the musician or the other studies which I shall add to theirs, that will make the perfect orator (who ought to be a wise man), yet these accomplishments will contribute to his perfection. We see an antidote, for example, and other medicines to heal diseases and wounds, compounded of many and sometimes opposite ingredients, from the various qualities of which results that single compound, which resembles none of them, yet takes its peculiar virtues from them all. 7. Mute insects, too, compose the exquisite flavor of honey, inimitable by human reason, of various sorts of flowers and juices. Shall we wonder that eloquence, nothing more excellent than which the providence of the gods has given to men, requires the aid of many arts, which, even though they may not appear or put themselves forward in the course of a speech, yet contribute to it a secret power and are silently felt? 8."People have been eloquent," some one may say, "without these arts"; but I want a perfect orator. "They contribute little assistance," another may observe, but that to which even little shall be wanting will not be a whole, and it will be agreed that perfection is a whole, of which though the hope may be on a distant height, as it were, yet it is for us to suggest every means of attaining it, that something more, at least, may thus be done. But why should our courage fail us? Nature does not forbid the formation of a perfect orator, and it is disgraceful to despair of what is possible.

9. For myself, I could be quite satisfied with the judgment of the ancients; for who is ignorant that music (to speak of that science first) enjoyed, in the days of antiquity, so much not only of cultivation, but of reverence, that those who were musicians were deemed also prophets and sages. Not to mention others, such as Orpheus and Linus, both of whom are transmitted to the memory of posterity as having been descended from the gods, and the one, because he soothed the rude and barbarous minds of men by the wonderful effect of his strains, as having drawn after him not only wild beasts, but even rocks and woods. 10. Timagenes declares that music was the most ancient of sciences connected with literature, an opinion to which the most celebrated poets give their support, according to whom the praises of gods and heroes used to be sung to the lyre at royal banquets. Does not Virgil's Iopas, too, sing errantem lunam solisque labores, "the wandering moon, and labors of the sun"; the illustrious poet thus plainly asserting that music is united with the knowledge of divine things? 11.If this position be granted, music will be necessary also for the orator, for as I observed, this part of learning, which, after being neglected by orators, has been taken up by the philosophers, was a portion of our business, and without the knowledge of such subjects, there can be no perfect eloquence.

12. Nor can any one doubt that men eminently renowned for wisdom have been cultivators of music, when Pythagoras and those who followed him spread abroad the notion, which they doubtless received from antiquity, that the world itself was constructed in conformity with the laws of music, which the lyre afterwards imitated. 13. Nor were they content, moreover, with that concord of discordant elements, which they call ἁρμονία (harmonia), but attributed even sound to the celestial motions; for Plato, not only in certain other passages, but especially in his Timaeus, cannot even be understood except by those who have thoroughly imbibed the principles of this part of learning. What shall I say, too, of the philosophers in general, whose founder, Socrates himself, was not ashamed, even in his old age, to learn to play on the lyre? 14. It is related that the greatest generals used to play on the harp and flute, and that the troops of the Lacedaemonians were excited with musical notes. What other effect, indeed, do horns and trumpets produce in our legions, since the louder is the concert of their sounds, so much greater is the glory of the Romans than that of other nations in war? 15. It was not without reason, therefore, that Plato thought music necessary for a man who would be qualified for engaging in government, and whom the Greeks call πολιτικός (politikos). Even the chiefs of that sect which appears to some extremely austere, and to others extremely harsh, were inclined to think that some of the wise might bestow a portion of their attention on this study. Lycurgus, also, the maker of most severe laws for the Lacedaemonians, approved of the study of music. 16. Nature herself, indeed, seems to have given music to us as a benefit, to enable us to endure labors with greater facility, for musical sounds cheer even the rower; and it is not only in those works in which the efforts of many, while some pleasing voice leads them, conspire together that music is of avail, but the toil even of people at work by themselves finds itself soothed by song, however rude. 17. I appear, however, to be making a eulogy on this finest of arts rather than connecting it with the orator. Let us pass lightly over the fact, then, that grammar and music were once united; since Archytas and Aristoxenus, indeed, thought grammar comprehended under music. That they themselves were teachers of both arts, not only Sophron shows (a writer, it is true, only of mimes, but one whom Plato so highly valued, that he is said to have had his books under his head when he was dying), but also Eupolis, whose Prodamus teaches both music and grammar, and Maricas, that is to say, Hyperbolus, confesses that he knows nothing of music but letters. 18. Aristophanes, also, in more than one of his comedies, shows that boys were accustomed to be thus instructed in times of old. In the Hypobolimaeus of Menander, an old man, laying before a father, who is claiming a son from him, an account as it were of the expenses that he had bestowed upon his education, says that he has paid a great deal to musicians and geometers. 19. Hence too it was customary at banquets that the lyre should be handed round after the meal, and Themistocles, on confessing that he knew not how to play, "was accounted," to use the words of Cicero, "but imperfectly educated." 20. Among the Romans, likewise, it was usual to introduce lyres and flutes at feasts. The verses of the Salii also have their tune, and these customs, as they were all established by Numa, prove that not even by those who seem to have been rude and given to war was the cultivation of music neglected, as far as that age admitted it. 21. It passed at length, indeed, into a proverb among the Gauls, that the uneducated had no commerce either with the Muses or the Graces.

22. But let us consider what peculiar advantage he who is to be an orator may expect from music. Music has two kinds of measures, the one in the sounds of the voice, the other in the motions of the body, for in both a certain due regulation is required. Aristoxenus the musician divides all that belongs to the voice into ῥυθμόν (rhythmos), "rhythm," and μέλος (melos) "melody in measure," of which the one consists in modulation, the other in singing and tunes. Are not all these qualifications, then, necessary to the orator, the one of which relates to gesture, the second to the collocation of words, and the third to the inflections of the voice, which in speaking are extremely numerous? 23. Such is undoubtedly the case unless we suppose, perchance, that a regular structure and smooth combination of words is requisite only in poems and songs, and is superfluous in making a speech; or that composition and modulation are not to be varied in speaking, as in music, according to the nature of the subject. 24. Music, however, by means of the tone and modulation of the voice, expresses sublime thoughts with grandeur, pleasant ones with sweetness, and ordinary ones with calmness, and sympathizes in its whole art with the feelings attendant on what is espressed. 25. In oratory, accordingly, the raising, lowering, or other inflection of the voice tends to move the feelings of the bearers. We try to excite the indignation of the judges in one modulation of phrase and voice (that I may again use the same term), and their pity in another, for we see that minds are affected in different ways even by musical instruments, though no words cannot be uttered by them.

26. A graceful and becoming motion of the body, also, which the Greeks call εὐρυθμία (eurhythmia), is necessary and cannot be sought from any other art than music; a qualification on which no small part of oratory depends, and for treating on which a peculiar portion of our work is set apart. 27.If an orator shall pay extreme attention to his voice, what is so properly the business of music? But neither is this department of my work to be anticipated, so that we must confine ourselves, in the mean time, to the single example of Caius Gracchus, the most eminent orator of his time, behind whom, when he spoke in public, a musician used to stand and give, with a pitch-pipe, which the Greeks call a tonarion, the tones in which his voice was to be exerted. 28. To this he attended even in his most turbulent harangues, both when he frightened the patricians and after he began to fear them.

For the sake of the less learned, and those, as they say, "of a duller muse," I would wish to remove all doubt of the utility of music. 29. They will allow, assuredly, that the poets should be read by him who would be an orator, but are they, then, to be read without a knowledge of music? If any one is so blind of intellect, however, as to hesitate about the reading of other poets, he will doubtless admit that those should be read who have written poems for the lyre. 30. On these matters I should have to enlarge more fully, if I recommended this as a new study, but since it has been perpetuated from the most ancient times, even from those of Chiron and Achilles to our own (among all, at least, who have not been averse to a regular course of mental discipline), I must not proceed to make the point doubtful by anxiety to defend it. 31. I consider it sufficiently apparent, however, from the very examples which I have now given, what music pleases me and to what extent. Yet I think that I ought to declare more expressly that that sort of music is not recommended by me, which, prevailing at present in the theatres and being of an effeminate character, languishing with lascivious notes, has in a great degree destroyed whatever manliness was left among us, but instead those strains in which the praises of heroes were sung, and which heroes themselves sung. I also do not recommend the sounds of psalteries and languishing lutes, which ought to be shunned even by modest females, but rather the knowledge of the principles of the art, which is of the highest efficacy in exciting and allaying the passions. 32. For Pythagoras, as we have heard, calmed a party of young men, when urged by their passions to offer violence to a respectable family, by requesting the female musician who was playing to them to change her strain to a spondaic measure. Chrysippus also assigns a peculiar tune for the lullaby of nurses, which is used with children. 33. There is also a subject for declamation in the schools, not unartfully invented, in which it is supposed that a flute-player, who had played a Phrygian tune to a priest while he was sacrificing, is accused, after the priest has been driven to madness, and has thrown himself over a precipice, of having been the cause of his death. If such causes have to be pleaded by an orator and cannot be pleaded without a knowledge of music, how can even the most prejudiced forbear to admit that this art is necessary to our profession?

34. As to geometry, people admit that some attention to it is of advantage in tender years, for they allow that the thinking powers are excited, and the intellect sharpened by it, and that a quickness of perception is thence produced. But they fancy that it is not, like other sciences, profitable after it has been acquired, but only whilst it is being studied. 35. Such is the common opinion respecting it. But it is not without reason that the greatest men have bestowed extreme attention on this science, for as geometry is divided between numbers and figures, the knowledge of numbers, assuredly, is necessary not only to an orator, but to every one who has been initiated even in the rudiments of learning. In pleading causes, it is very often in request; when the speaker, if he hesitates, I do not say about the amount of a calculation, but if he even betray, by any uncertain or awkward movement of his fingers, a want of confidence in his calculations, is thought to be but imperfectly accomplished in his art. 36. The knowledge of linear figures, too, is frequently required in causes; for lawsuits occur concerning boundaries and measures. But geometry has a still greater connection with the art of oratory.

37. Order, in the first place, is necessary in geometry, and is it not also necessary in eloquence? Geometry proves what follows from what precedes, what is unknown from what is known, and do we not draw similar conclusions in speaking? Does not the well-known mode of deduction from a number of proposed questions consist almost wholly in syllogisms? Accordingly you may find more persons to say that geometry is allied to logic than that it is allied to rhetoric. 38. But even an orator, though rarely, will yet at times prove logically, for he will use syllogisms if his subject shall require them and will of necessity use the enthymeme, which is a rhetorical syllogism. Besides, of all proofs, the strongest are what are called geometrical demonstrations, and what does oratory make its object more indisputably than proof?

39.Geometry often, moreover, by demonstration, proves what is apparently true to be false. This is also done with respect to numbers, by means of certain figures which they call pseudographs, and at which we were accustomed to play when we were boys. But there are other questions of a higher nature. For who would not believe the asserter of the following proposition: "Of whatever places the boundary lines measure the same length, of those places the areas also, which are contained by those lines, must necessarily be equal?" 40. But this proposition is fallacious, for it makes a vast difference what figure the boundary lines may form, and historians, who have thought that the dimensions of islands are sufficiently indicated by the space traversed in sailing round them, have been justly censured by geometricians. 41. For the nearer to perfection any figure is, the greater is its capacity, and if the boundary line, accordingly, shall form a circle, which of all plane figures is the most perfect, it will embrace a larger area than if it shall form a square of equal circumference. Squares, again, contain more than triangles of equal circuit, and triangles themselves contain more when their sides are equal than when they are unequal. 42. Some other examples may perhaps be too obscure, but let us take an instance most easy of comprehension even to the ignorant. There is scarcely any man who does not know that the dimensions of an acre extend two hundred and forty feet in length, and the half of that number in breadth; and it is easy to calculate what its circumference is and how much ground it contains. 43. A figure of a hundred and eighty feet on each side, however, has the same periphery, but a much larger area contained within its four sides. If any one thinks it too much trouble to make the calculation, he may learn the same truth by means of smaller numbers. Ten feet, on each side of a square, will give forth for the circumference, and a hundred for the area; but if there were fifteen feet on each side, and five at each end, they would, with the same circuit, deduct a fourth part from the area inclosed. 44. If, again, nineteen feet be extended in parallel lines, only one foot apart, they will contain no more squares than those along which the parallels shall be drawn, and yet the periphery will be of the same extent as that which encloses a hundred. Thus the further you depart from the form of a square, the greater will be the loss to the area. 45. It may therefore happen even that a smaller area may be inclosed by a greater periphery than a larger one. Such is the case in plane figures, for on hills and in valleys, it is evident even to the untaught that there is more ground than sky.

46. Need I add that geometry raises itself still higher, so as even to ascertain the system of the world? When it demonstrates, by calculations, the regular and appointed movements of the celestial bodies, we learn that in that system, there is nothing unordained or fortuitous, a branch of knowledge which may be sometimes of use to the orator. 47. When Pericles freed the Athenians from fear, at the time that they were alarmed by an eclipse of the sun, by explaining to them the causes of the phenomenon; or when Sulpicius Gallus, in the army of Paulus Aemilius, made a speech on an eclipse of the moon, that the minds of the soldiers might not be terrified as by a supernatural prodigy, do they not, respectively, appear to have discharged the duty of an orator? 48. Had Nicias been possessed of such knowledge in Sicily, he would not have been confounded with similar terror and have given over to destruction the finest of the Athenian armies. Dion, we know, when he went to overthrow the tyranny of Dionysius, was not deterred by a similar phenomenon. 49. Though the utility of geometry in war, however, be put out of the question, though we do not dwell upon the fact that Archimedes alone protracted the siege of Syracuse to a great extent, it is sufficient, assuredly, to establish what I assert: that numbers of questions, which it is difficult to solve by any other method, such as those about the mode of dividing, about division to infinity, and about the rate of progressions, are accustomed to be solved by those geometrical demonstrations. If an orator has to speak (as the next book will show) on all subjects, no man, assuredly, can become a perfect orator without a knowledge of geometry.

 
1 - 11 Instruction to be received from the actor, § 1-3. He should correct faults of pronunciation, 4-8. He should give directions as to look and gesture, 9-11. Passages from plays should be recited by the pupil, 113. Passages also from speeches, 14. Exercises of the palaestra to be practised, 15-19.

SOME TIME is also to be devoted to the actor, but only so far as the future orator requires the art of delivery, for I do not wish the boy whom I educate for this pursuit either to be broken to the shrillness of a woman's voice or to repeat the tremulous tones of an old man's. Neither let him imitate the vices of the drunkard nor adapt himself to the baseness of the slave; nor let him learn to display the feelings of love, or avarice, or fear: acquirements which are not at all necessary to the orator and which corrupt the mind, especially while it is yet tender and uninformed in early youth, for frequent imitation settles into habit. 3.It is not even every gesture or motion that is to be adopted from the actor, for though the orator ought to regulate both to a certain degree, yet he will be far from appearing in a theatrical character and will exhibit nothing extravagant either in his looks, or the movements of his hands, or his walk. If there is any art used by speakers in these points, the first object of it should be that it may not appear to be art.

What is then the duty of the teacher as to these particulars? Let him in the first place correct faults of pronunciation, if there be any, so that the words of the learner may be fully expressed and that every letter may be uttered with its proper sound. For we find inconvenience from the too great weakness or too great fullness of the sound of some letters. Some, as if too harsh for us, we utter but imperfectly or change them for others not altogether dissimilar, but, as it were, smoother. Thus lambda takes the place of rho, in which even Demosthenes found difficulty (the nature of both which letters is the same also with us), and when -c, and similarly -g, are wanting in full force, they are softened down into -t and -d. Those niceties about the letter -s, such a master will not even tolerate; nor will he allow his pupil's words to sound in his throat or to rumble as from emptiness of the mouth; 7.nor will he (what is utterly at variance with purity of speaking) permit him to overlay the simple sound of a word with a fuller sort of pronunciation, which the Greeks call καταπεπλασμένον (katapeplasmenon): a term by which the sound of flutes is also designated, when, after the holes are stopped through which they sound the shrill notes, they give forth a bass sound through the direct outlet only.

The teacher will he cautious, likewise, that concluding syllables be not lost; that his pupil's speech be all of a similar character; that whenever he has to raise his voice, the effort may be that of his lungs, and not of his head; and that his gesture may be suited to his voice, and his looks to his gesture. He will have to take care, also, that the face of his pupil, while speaking, look straight forward; that his lips be not distorted; that no opening of the mouth immoderately distend his jaws; and that his face be not turned up, or his eyes cast down too much or his head inclined to either side. The face offends in various ways: I have seen many speakers whose eye-brows were raised at every effort of the voice; those of others I have seen contracted; and those of some even disagreeing, as they turned up one towards the top of the head, while with the other the eye itself was almost concealed. 11.To all these matters, as we shall hereafter show, a vast deal of importance is to be attached, for nothing can please which is unbecoming.

1The actor will also be required to teach how a narrative should be delivered, with what authority persuasion should be enforced, with what force anger may show itself, and what tone of voice is adapted to excite pity. This instruction he will give with the best effect, if he select particular passages from plays, such as are most adapted for this object, that is, such as most resemble pleadings. 1The repetition of these passages will not only be most beneficial to pronunciation, but also highly efficient in fostering eloquence. 1Such may be the pupil's studies while immaturity of age will not admit of anything higher. But as soon as it shall be proper for him to read orations and when he shall be able to perceive their beauties, then, I would say, let some attentive and skillful tutor attend him who may not only form his style by reading, but oblige him to learn select portions of speeches by heart and to deliver them standing, with a loud voice, and exactly as he will have to plead so that he may consequently exercise by pronunciation both his voice and memory.

1Nor do I think that those orators are to be blamed who have devoted some time even to the masters in the palaestra. I do not speak of those by whom part of life is spent among oil and the rest over wine, and who have oppressed the powers of the mind by excessive attention to the body (such characters I should wish to be as far off as possible from the pupil that I am training). 1But the same name is given to those by whom gesture and motion are formed, so that the arms may be properly extended, that the action of the hands may not be ungraceful or unseemly, that the attitude may not be unbecoming, that there may be no awkwardness in advancing the feet, and that the head and eyes may not be at variance with the turn of the rest of the body. 1For no one will deny that all such particulars form a part of delivery or will separate delivery itself from oratory; and, assuredly, the orator must not disdain to learn what he must practise, especially when this chironomia, which is, as is expressed by the word itself, the law of gesture, had its origin even in the heroic ages and was approved by the most eminent men of Greece, even by Socrates himself. It was also regarded by Plato as a part of the qualifications of a public man and was not omitted by Chrysippus in the directions which he wrote concerning the education of children. 1The Lacedaemonians, we have heard, had among their exercises a certain kind of dance as contributing to qualify men for war. Nor was dancing thought a disgrace to the ancient Romans, as the dance which continues to the present day, under the sanction and in the religious rites of the priests, is a proof, as is also the remark of Crassus in the third book of Cicero's De Oratore, where he recommends that an orator should adopt a bold and manly action of body, not learned from the theater and the player, but from the camp or even from the palaestra. Observation of this discipline has descended without censure even to our time. 1By me, however, it will not be continued beyond the years of boyhood, nor in them long, for I do not wish the gesture of an orator to be formed to resemble that of a dancer, but I would have some influence from such juvenile exercises left, so that the gracefuless communicated to us while we were learning may secretly attend us when we are not thinking of our movements.

 
1 - 12 No fear to be entertained lest boys should be engaged in too many studies, if judgment be used; examples of the number of things to which the human mind can attend at once, § 1-7. Boys endure study with spirit and patience, 8-11. Abundance of time for all necessary acquirements, 12-15. Unreasonable pretexts for not pursuing study, 16-19.

IT is a common question whether, supposing all these things are to be learned, they can all be taught and acquired at the same time, for some deny that this is possible, as the mind must be confused and wearied by so many studies of different tendency for which neither the understanding, nor the body, nor time itself, can suffice. Even though mature age may endure such labor, it is said, that of childhood ought not to be thus burdened.

But these reasoners do not understand how great the power of the human mind is, that mind which is so busy and active and which directs its attention, so to speak, to every quarter so that it cannot even confine itself to do only one thing, but bestows its force upon several, not merely in the same day, but at the same moment. Do not players on the harp, for example, exert their memory and attend to the sound of their voice and the various inflections of it, while at the same time they strike part of the strings with their right hand and pull, stop, or let loose others with their left, while not even their foot is idle, but beats time to their playing, all these acts being done simultaneously? Do not we advocates, when surprised by a sudden necessity to plead, say one thing while we are thinking of what is to follow, and while at the very same moment, the invention of arguments, the choice of words, the arrangement of matter, gesture, delivery, look, and attitude are necessarily objects of our attention? If all these considerations of so varied a nature are forced, as by a single effort, before our mental vision, why may we not divide the hours of the day among different kinds of study, especially as variety itself refreshes and recruits the mind, while on the contrary, nothing is more annoying than to continue at one uniform labor? Accordingly writing is relieved by reading, and the tedium of reading itself is relieved by changes of subject. However many things we may have done, we are yet to a certain degree fresh for that which we are going to begin. Who, on the contrary, would not be stupified if he were to listen to the same teacher of any art, whatever it might be, through the whole day? But by change a person will be recruited, as is the case with respect to food, by varieties of which the stomach is re-invigorated and is fed with several sorts less unsatisfactorily than with one. 6.Or let those objectors tell me what other mode there is of learning. Ought we to attend to the teacher of grammar only, and then to the teacher of geometry only, and cease to think, during the second course, of what we learned in the first? Should we then transfer ourselves to the musician, our previous studies being still allowed to escape us? Or while we are studying Latin, ought we to pay no attention to Greek? Or to make an end of my questions at once, ought we to do nothing but what comes last before us? Why, then, do we not give similar counsel to husbandmen, that they should not cultivate at the same time their fields and their vineyards, their olives and other trees, and that they should not bestow attention at once on their meadows, their cattle, their gardens, and their bee-hives? Why do we ourselves devote some portion of our time to our public business, some to the wants of our friends, some to our domestic accounts, some to the care of our persons, and some to our pleasures, any one of which occupations would weary us, if we pursued it without intermission? So much more easy is it to do many things one after the other, than to do one thing for a long time.

That boys will be unable to bear the fatigue of many studies is by no means to be apprehended, for no age suffers less from fatigue. This may perhaps appear strange, but we may prove it by experience. For minds, before they are hardened are more ready to learn, as is proved by the fact that children, within two years after they can fairly pronounce words, speak almost the whole language, though no one incites them to learn; but for how many years does the Latin tongue resist the efforts of our purchased slaves! You may well understand, if you attempt to teach a grown up person to read, that those who do everything in their own art with excellence are not without reason called παιδομαθεῖς (paidomatheis), that is, "instructed from boyhood." The temper of boys is better able to bear labor than that of men, for as neither the falls of children, with which they are so often thrown on the ground, nor their crawling on hands and knees, nor, soon after, constant play and running all day hither and thither, inconvenience their bodies so much as those of adults, because they are of little weight and no burden to themselves, so their minds likewise, I conceive, suffer less from fatigue, because they exert themselves with less effort and do not apply to study by putting any force upon themselves, but merely yield themselves to others to be formed. 1Moreover, in addition to the other pliancy of that age, they follow their teachers, as it were, with greater confidence and do not set themselves to measure what they have already done. Consideration about labor is as yet unknown to them, and as we ourselves have frequently experienced, toil has less effect upon the powers than thought.

1Nor will they ever, indeed, have more disposable time, because all improvement at this age is from hearing. When the pupil shall retire by himself to write, when he shall produce and compose from his own mind, he will then either not have leisure, or will want inclination, to commence such exercises as I have specified. 1Since the teacher of grammar, therefore, cannot occupy the whole day, and indeed ought not to do so, lest he should disgust the mind of his pupil, to what studies can we better devote his fragmentary intervals, so to term them, of time? 1For I would not wish the pupil to be worn out in these exercises, nor do I desire that he should sing or accompany songs with musical notes or descend to the minutest investigations of geometry. Nor would I make him like an actor in delivery or like a dancing master in gesture, though if I did require all such qualifications, there would still be abundance of time, for the immature part of life, which is devoted to learning, is long, and I am not speaking of slow intellects. 1Why did Plato, let me ask, excel in all these branches of knowledge which I think necessary to be acquired by him who would be an orator? He did so, because, not being satisfied with the instruction which Athens could afford, or with the science of the Pythagoreans, to whom he had sailed in Italy, he went also to the priests of Egypt and learned their mysteries.

1We shroud our own indolence under the pretext of difficulty, for we have no real love of our work; nor is eloquence ever sought by us, because it is the most honorable and noble of attainments or for its own sake; but we apply ourselves to labor only with mean views and for sordid gain. 1Plenty of orators may speak in the forum, with my permission, and acquire riches also, without such accomplishments as I recommend; only may every trader in contemptible merchandise be richer than they, and may the public crier make greater profit by his voice! I would not wish to have even for a reader of this work a man who would compute what returns his studies will bring him. 1But he who shall have conceived, as with a divine power of imagination, the very idea itself of genuine oratory, and who shall keep before his eyes true eloquence, the queen, as an eminent poet calls her, of the world, and shall seek his gain, not from the pay that he receives for his pleadings, but from his own mind, and from contemplation and knowledge, a gain which is enduring and independent of fortune, will easily prevail upon himself to devote the time which others spend at shows, in the Campus Martius, at dice, or in idle talk, to say nothing of sleep and the prolongation of banquets, to the studies of geometry and music. How much more pleasure will he secure from such pursuits than from unintellectual gratifications! 1For divine providence has granted this favor to mankind, that the more honorable occupations are also the more pleasing. But the very pleasure of these reflections has carried me too far. Let what I have said, therefore, suffice concerning the studies in which a boy is to be instructed before he enters on more important occupations. The next book will commence, as it were, a new subject and enter on the duties of the teacher of rhetoric.

 
2 21 100.4
2 - 1 Boys are not put under the professor of rhetoric early enough; reasons why they should begin to receive instruction from him at an earlier age, § 1-3. The professions of the grammarian and teacher of rhetoric should be in some degree united, 4-13.

IT has been a prevalent custom (which daily gains ground more and more) for pupils to be sent to the teachers of eloquence, to the Latin teachers always, and to the Greeks sometimes at a more advanced age than reason requires. Of this practice there are two causes: that the rhetoricians, especially our own, have relinquished a part of their duties, and that the grammarians have appropriated what does not belong to them. The rhetoricians think it their business merely to declaim and to teach the art and practice of declaiming, confining themselves, too, to deliberative and judicial subjects (for others they despise as beneath their profession), while the grammarians, on their part, do not deem it sufficient to have taken what has been left them (on which account also gratitude should be accorded them), but encroach even upon prosopopeiae and suasory speeches, in which even the very greatest efforts of eloquence are displayed. Hence, accordingly, it has happened that what was the first business of the one art has become the last of the other and that boys of an age to be employed in higher departments of study remain sunk in the lower school and practise rhetoric under the grammarian. Thus, what is eminently ridiculous, a youth seems unfit to be sent to a teacher of declamation until he already knows how to declaim.

Let us assign each of these professions its due limits. Let grammar (which, turning it into a Latin word, they have called literatura, "literature") know its own boundaries, especially as it is so far advanced beyond the humility indicated by its name, to which humility the early grammarians restricted themselves. Though weak at its source, yet having gained strength from the poets and historians, grammar now flows on in a full channel; since, besides the art of speaking correctly, which would otherwise be far from a comprehensive art, it has engrossed the study of almost all the highest departments of learning. And let not rhetoric, to which the power of eloquence has given its name, decline its own duties or rejoice that the task belonging to itself is appropriated by another, for while it neglects its duties, it is almost expelled from its domain. I would not deny, indeed, that some of those who profess grammar may make such progress in knowledge as to be able to teach the principles of oratory; but when they do so, they will be discharging the duties of a rhetorician, and not their own.

We make it also a subject of inquiry when a boy may be considered ripe for learning what rhetoric teaches. In which inquiry it is not to be considered of what age a boy is, but what progress he has already made in his studies. That I may not make a long discussion, I think that the question when a boy ought to be sent to the teacher of rhetoric is best decided by the answer, when he shall be qualified. But this very point depends upon the preceding subject of consideration, for if the office of the grammarian is extended even to suasory speeches, the necessity for the rhetorician will come later. If the rhetorician, however, does not shrink from the earliest duties of his profession, his attention is required even from the time when the pupil begins narrations and produces his little exercises in praising and blaming. Do we not know that it was a kind of exercise among the ancients, suitable for improvement in eloquence, for pupils to speak on theses, commonplaces, and other questions (without embracing particular circumstances or persons), on which causes, as well real as imaginary, depend? Hence it is evident how dishonorably the profession of rhetoric has abandoned that department which it held originally and for a long time solely. But what is there among those exercises of which I have just now spoken that does not relate both to other matters peculiar to rhetoricians and, indisputably, to the sort of causes pleaded in courts of justice? Have we not to make statements of facts in the forum? I know not whether that department of rhetoric is not most of all in request there. 1Are not eulogy and invective often introduced in those disputations? Do not commonplaces, as well those which are levelled against vice (such as were composed, we read, by Cicero), as those in which questions are discussed generally (such as were published by Quintus Hortensius, as "Ought we to trust to light proofs?" "for witnesses" and "against witnesses?") mix themselves with the inmost substance of causes? 1These weapons are in some degree to be prepared that we may use them whenever circumstances require. He who shall suppose that these matters do not concern the orator will think that a statue is not begun when its limbs are cast. Nor let any one blame this haste of mine (as some will consider it) on the supposition that I think the pupil who is to be committed to the professor of rhetoric is to be altogether withdrawn from the teachers of grammar. 1To these also their proper time shall be allowed, nor need there be any fear that the boy will he overburdened with the lessons of two masters. His labor will not be increased, but that which was confounded under one master will be divided, and each tutor will thus be more efficient in his own province. This method, to which the Greeks still adhere, has been disregarded by the Latin rhetoricians and, indeed, with some appearance of excuse, as there have been others to take their duty.

 
2 - 2 Choice of teacher, § 1-4. How the teacher should conduct himself towards his pupils, 5-8. How the pupils should behave, 9-13. Some additional observations, 115.

AS SOON therefore as a boy shall have attained such proficiency in his studies as to be able to comprehend what we have called the first precepts of the teachers of rhetoric, he must be put under the professors of that art.

Of these professors the morals must first be ascertained, a point of which I proceed to treat in this part of my work, not because I do not think that the same examination is to be made, and with the utmost care, in regard also to other teachers (as indeed I have shown in the preceding book), but because the very age of the pupils makes attention to the matter still more necessary. For boys are consigned to these professors when almost grown up and continue their studies under them even after they are become men. Greater care must in consequence be adopted with regard to them in order that the purity of the master may secure their more tender years from corruption and that his authority deter their bolder age from licentiousness. Nor is it enough that he give, in himself, an example of the strictest morality, unless he regulate also, by severity of discipline, the conduct of those who come to receive his instructions.

Let him adopt, then, above all things, the feelings of a parent towards his pupils and consider that he succeeds to the place of those by whom the children were entrusted to him. Let him neither have vices in himself, nor tolerate them in others. Let his austerity not be stern, nor his affability too easy, lest dislike arise from the one or contempt from the other. Let him discourse frequently on what is honorable and good, for the oftener he admonishes, the more seldom will he have to chastise. Let him not be of an angry temper and yet not a conniver at what ought to be corrected. Let him be plain in his mode of teaching and patient of labor, but rather diligent in exacting tasks than fond of giving them of excessive length. Let him reply readily to those who put questions to him and question of his own accord those who do not. In commending the exercises of his pupils, let him be neither niggardly nor lavish, for the one quality begets dislike of labor and the other self-complacency. In amending what requires correction, let him not be harsh and, least of all, not reproachful, for that very circumstance that some tutors blame as if they hated deters many young men from their proposed course of study. Let him every day say something, and even much, which, when the pupils hear, they may carry away with them, for though he may point out to them in their course of reading plenty of examples for their imitation, yet the living voice, as it is called, feeds the mind more nutritiously, and especially the voice of the teacher, whom his pupils, if they are but rightly instructed, both love and reverence. How much more readily we imitate those whom we like can scarcely be expressed.

The liberty of standing up and showing exultation in giving applause, as is done under most teachers, is by no means to be allowed to boys, for the approbation even of young men, when they listen to others, ought to be but temperate. Hence it will result that the pupil will depend on the judgment of the master and will think that he has expressed properly whatever shall have been approved by him. But that most mischievous politeness, as it is now termed, which is shown by students in their praise of each other's compositions, whatever be their merits, is not only unbecoming and theatrical and foreign to strictly regulated schools, but even a most destructive enemy to study, for care and toil may well appear superfluous when praise is ready for whatever the pupils have produced. 1Those therefore who listen, as well as he who speaks, ought to watch the countenance of the master, for they will thus discern what is to be approved and what to be condemned; and thus power will be gained from composition, and judgment from being heard. 1But now, eager and ready, they not only start up at every period, but dart forward and cry out with indecorous transports. The compliment is repaid in kind, and upon such applause depends the fortune of a declamation, and hence result vanity and self-conceit, insomuch that being elated with the tumultuous approbation of their class-fellows, they are inclined, if they receive but little praise from the master, to form an ill opinion of him. 1But let masters, also, desire to be heard themselves with attention and modesty, for the master ought not to speak to suit the taste of his pupils, but the pupils to suit that of the master. If possible, moreover, his attention should be directed to observe what each pupil commends in his speeches, and for what reason; and he may then rejoice that what he says will give pleasure, not more on his own account than on that of his pupils who judge with correctness.

1That mere boys should sit mixed with young men, I do not approve; for though such a man as ought to preside over their studies and conduct may keep even the eldest of his pupils under control, yet the more tender ought to be separate from the more mature, and they should all be kept free, not merely from the guilt of licentiousness, but even from the suspicion of it. 1This point I thought proper briefly to notice; that the master and his school should be clear of gross vice, I do not suppose it necessary to intimate. And if there is any father who would not shrink from flagrant vice in choosing a tutor for his son, let him be assured that all other rules which I am endeavoring to lay down for the benefit of youth are, when this consideration is disregarded, useless to him.

 
2 - 3 A pupil should be put under an eminent teacher at first, not under an inferior one, § 1-Mistakes of parents as to this point, The best teacher can teach little things best, as well as great ones, 5-The pupils of eminent teachers will afford better examples to each other, 10-1

NOR is the opinion of those to be passed in silence who, even when they think boys fit for the professor of rhetoric, imagine that he is not at once to be consigned to the most eminent, but detain him for some time under inferior teachers with the notion that moderate ability in a master is not only better adapted for beginning instruction in art, but easier for comprehension and imitation, as well as less disdainful of undertaking the trouble of the elements. On this head I think no long labor necessary to show how much better it is to be imbued with the best instructions and how much difficulty is attendant on eradicating faults which have once gained ground, as double duty falls on succeeding masters, and the task indeed of unteaching is heavier and more important than that of teaching at first. Accordingly, they say that Timotheus, a famous instructor in playing the flute, was accustomed to ask as much more pay from those whom another had taught as from those who presented themselves to him in a state of ignorance. The mistakes committed in the matter, however, are two: one, that people think inferior teachers sufficient for a time, and, from having an easily satisfied appetite, are content with their instructions (such supineness, though deserving of reprehension, would yet be in some degree endurable if teachers of that class taught only worse, and not less), the other, which is even more common, that people imagine that those who have attained eminent qualifications for speaking will not descend to inferior matters and that this is sometimes the case because they disdain to bestow attention on minuter points, and sometimes because they cannot give instruction in them. For my part, I do not consider him, who is unwilling to teach little things, in the number of preceptors; but I argue that the ablest teachers can teach little things best, if they will; first, because it is likely that he who excels others in eloquence has gained the most accurate knowledge of the means by which men attain eloquence; secondly, because method, which, with the best qualified instructors, is always plainest is of great efficacy in teaching; and lastly, because no man rises to such a height in greater things that lesser fade entirely from his view. Unless indeed we believe that though Phidias made a Jupiter statue at Olympia well, another might have wrought, in better style than he, the accessories to the decoration of the work; or that an orator may not know how to speak; or that an eminent physician may be unable to cure trifling ailments.

Is there not then, it may be asked, a certain height of eloquence too elevated for the immaturity of boyhood to comprehend it? I readily confess that there is, but the eloquent professor must also be a man of sense, not ignorant of teaching and lowering himself to the capacity of the learner, as any fast walker, if he should happen to walk with a child, would give him his hand, relax his pace, and not go on quicker than his companion could follow. What shall be said, too, if it generally happens that instructions given by the most learned are far more easy to be understood and more perspicuous than those of others? For perspicuity is the chief virtue of eloquence, and the less ability a man has, the more he tries to raise and swell himself out, as those of short stature exalt themselves on tip-toe, and the weak use most threats. As to those whose style is inflated, displaying a vitiated taste, and who are fond of sounding words, or faulty from any other mode of vicious affectation, I am convinced that they labor under the fault not of strength, but of weakness, as bodies are swollen not with health, but with disease, and as men who have erred from the straight road generally make stoppages. Accordingly, the less able a teacher is, the more obscure will he be.

It has not escaped my memory that I said in the preceding book (when I observed that education in schools was preferable to that at home) that pupils commencing their studies, or but little advanced in them, devote themselves more readily to imitate their school-fellows than their master, such imitation being more easy to them. This remark may be understood by some in such a sense that the opinion which I now advocate may appear inconsistently with that which I advanced before. 1But such inconsistency will be far from me, for what I then said is the very best of reasons why a boy should be consigned to the best possible instructor, because even the pupils under him, being better taught than those under inferior masters, will either speak in such a manner as it may not be objectionable to imitate or, if they commit any faults, will be immediately corrected, whereas the less learned teacher will perhaps praise even what is wrong and cause it by his judgment to recommend itself to those who listen to it. 1Let a master therefore be excellent as well in eloquence as in morals, one who, like Homer's Phoenix, may teach his pupil at once to speak and to act.

 
2 - 4 Elementary exercises, § 1. Narratives, or statements of facts 2-4. Exuberance in early compositions better than sterility, 4-8. A teacher should not be without imagination, or too much given to find fault with his pupil's attempts, 8-14. The pupil's compositions should be written with great care, 15-17. Exercises in confirmation and refutation, 119. In commendation and censure of remarkable men, 20-21. Commonplaces, 22-23. Theses, 225. Reasons, 26. Written preparations for pleadings, 27-32. Praise and censure of particular laws, 33-40. Declamations on fictitious subjects a later invention, 442.

I SHALL now proceed to state what I conceive to be the first duties of rhetoricians in giving instruction to their pupils, putting off for a while the consideration of what is alone called, in common language, the art of rhetoric; for to me it appears most eligible to commence with that to which the pupil has learned something similar under the grammarians.

Since of narrations (besides that which we use in pleadings) we understand that there are three kinds: the fable, which is the subject of tragedies and poems, and which is remote, not merely from truth, but from the appearance of truth; the argumentum, which comedies represent and which, though false, has a resemblance to truth; and the history, in which is contained a relation of facts. Since we have consigned poetic narratives to the grammarians, let the commencement of study under the rhetorician be the historical form, a kind of narrative which, as it has more of truth, has also more of substance. What appears to me the best method of narrating, I will show when I treat of the judicial part of pleading. In the meantime it will suffice to intimate that it ought not to be dry and jejune (for what necessity would there be to bestow so much pains upon study if it were thought sufficient to state facts without dress or decoration?), nor ought it to be erratic and wantonly adorned with far-fetched descriptions, in which many speakers indulge with an emulation of poetic licence. Both these kinds of narrative are faulty, yet that which springs from poverty is worse than that which comes from exuberance.

From boys, perfection of style can neither be required nor expected, but the fertile genius, fond of noble efforts and conceiving at times a more than reasonable degree of ardor, is greatly to be preferred. Nor, if there be something of exuberance in a pupil of that age, would it at all displease me. I would even have it an object with teachers themselves to nourish minds that are still tender with more indulgence and to allow them to be satiated, as it were, with the milk of more liberal studies. The body, which mature age may afterwards nerve, may for a time be somewhat plumper than seems desirable. Hence there is hope of strength, while a child that has the outline of all his limbs exact commonly portends weakness in subsequent years. Let that age be daring, invent much, and delight in what it invents, though it be often not sufficiently severe and correct. The remedy for exuberance is easy; barrenness is incurable by any labor. That temper in boys will afford me little hope in which mental effort is prematurely restrained by judgment. I like what is produced to be extremely copious, profuse even beyond the limits of propriety. Years will greatly reduce superfluity; judgment will smooth away much of it; something will be worn off, as it were, by use, if there be but metal from which something may be hewn and polished off, and such metal there will be, if we do not make the plate too thin at first, so that deep cutting may break it. That I hold such opinions concerning this age, he will be less likely to wonder who shall have read what Cicero says: "I wish fecundity in a young man to give itself full scope."

Above all, therefore, and especially for boys, a dry master is to be avoided no less than a dry soil, void of all moisture, for plants that are still tender. Under the influence of such a tutor, they at once become dwarfish, looking as it were towards the ground, and daring to aspire to nothing above everyday talk. To them, leanness is in place of health and weakness instead of judgment; and while they think it sufficient to be free from fault, they fall into the fault of being free from all merit. Let not even maturity itself, therefore, come too fast; let not the must, while yet in the vat, become mellow, for so it will bear years and be improved by age.

Nor is it improper for me, moreover, to offer this admonition: that the powers of boys sometimes sink under too great severity in correction; for they despond and grieve and at last hate their work, and, what is most prejudicial, while they fear every thing, they cease to attempt any thing. 1There is a similar conviction in the minds of the cultivators of trees in the country, who think that the knife must not be applied to tender shoots, as they appear to shrink from the steel and to be unable as yet to bear an incision. 1A teacher ought therefore to be as agreeable as possible, that remedies which are rough in their own nature, may be rendered soothing by gentleness of hand; he ought to praise some parts of his pupils' performances, to tolerate some, and to alter others, giving his reasons why the alterations are made, and also to make some passages clearer by adding something of his own. It will also be of service too, at times, for the master to dictate whole subjects himself which the pupil may imitate and admire for the present as his own. 1But if a boy's composition were so faulty as not to admit of correction, I have found him benefited whenever I told him to write on the same subject again, after it had received fresh treatment from me, observing that "he could do still better," since study is cheered by nothing more than hope. 1Different ages, however, are to be corrected in different ways, and work is to be required and amended according to the degree of the pupil's abilities. I used to say to boys when they attempted anything extravagant or verbose, that "I was satisfied with it for the present, but that a time would come when I should not allow them to produce compositions of such a character." Thus they were satisfied with their abilities, and yet not led to form a wrong judgment.

1But that I may return to the point from which I digressed, I should wish narrations to be composed with the utmost possible care, for as it is of service to boys at an early age, when their speech is but just commenced, to repeat what they have heard in order to improve their faculty of speaking (let them accordingly be made, and with very good reason, to go over their story again, and to pursue it from the middle, either backwards or forwards; but let this be done only while they are still at the knees of their teacher, and, as they can do nothing else, are beginning to connect words and things that they may thus strengthen their memory), so when they shall have attained the command of pure and correct language, extemporary garrulity, without waiting for thought or scarcely taking time to rise, is the offspring of mere ostentatious boastfulness. 1Hence arises empty exultation in ignorant parents, and in their children contempt of application, want of all modesty, a habit of speaking in the worst style, the practice of all kinds of faults, and what has often been fatal even to great proficiency, an arrogant conceit of their own abilities. 1There will be a proper time for acquiring facility of speech, nor will that part of my subject be lightly passed over by me, but in the mean time it will be sufficient if a boy with all his care and with the utmost application of which that age is capable can write something tolerable. To this practice, let him accustom himself and make it natural to him. He only will succeed in attaining the eminence at which we aim, or the point next below it, who shall learn to speak correctly before he learns to speak rapidly.

1To narrations is added, not without advantage, the task of refuting and confirming them, which is called anaskeuē and kataskeuē. This may be done not only with regard to fabulous subjects and such as are related in poetry, but with regard even to records in our own annals; as if it be inquired whether it is credible that a crow settled upon the head of Valerius when he was fighting, to annoy the face and eyes of his Gallic enemy with his beak and wings, there will be ample matter for discussion on both sides of the question; 1as there will also be concerning the serpent, of which Scipio is said to have been born, as well as about the wolf of Romulus, and the Egeria of Numa. As to the histories of the Greeks, there is generally licence in them similar to that of the poets. Questions are often wont to arise, too, concerning the time or place at which a thing is said to have been done, sometimes even about a person, as Livy, for instance, is frequently in doubt, and other historians differ one from another.

20. The pupil will then proceed by degrees to higher efforts to praise illustrious characters and censure the immoral, an exercise of manifold advantage, for the mind is thus employed about a multiplicity and variety of matters; the understanding is formed by the contemplation of good and evil. Hence is acquired, too, an extensive knowledge of things in general, and the pupil is soon furnished with examples which are of great weight in every kind of causes and which he will use as occasion requires. 2Next succeeds exercise in comparison, which of two characters is the better or the worse, which, though it is managed in a similar way, yet both doubles the topics and treats not only of the nature but of the degrees of virtues and of vices. But on the management of praise and the contrary, as it is the third part of rhetoric, I shall give directions in the proper place.

2Commonplaces (I speak of those in which, without specifying persons, it is usual to declaim against vices themselves, as against those of the adulterer, the gamester, the licentious person) are of the very nature of speeches on trials and, if you add the name of an accused party, are real accusations. These, however, are usually altered from their treatment as general subjects to something specific, as when the subject of a declamation is a blind adulterer, a poor gamester, or a licentious old man. 2Sometimes, also, they have their use in a defense, for we occasionally speak in favor of luxury or licentiousness, and a procurer or parasite is sometimes defended in such a way that we advocate, not the person, but the vice.

2Theses, which are drawn from the comparison of things, as whether a country or city life is more desirable, and whether the merit of a lawyer or a soldier is the greater, are eminently proper and copious subjects for exercise in speaking and contribute greatly to improvement, both in the province of persuasion and in discussions on trials. The latter of the two subjects just mentioned is handled with great copiousness by Cicero in his pleading for Muraena. 2Such theses as the following, whether a man ought to marry, and whether political offices should be sought, belong almost wholly to the deliberative species, for if persons be but added, they will be suasory.

2My teachers were accustomed to prepare us for conjectural causes by a kind of exercise far from useless, and very pleasant to us, in which they desired us to investigate and show why Venus among the Lacedaemonians was represented armed; why Cupid was thought to be a boy, winged and armed with arrows and a torch, and questions of a similar nature, in which we endeavored to ascertain the intention, about which there is so often a question in controversies. This may be regarded as a sort of chria.

2That such questions as those about witnesses, whether we ought always to believe them, and concerning arguments, whether we ought to put any trust in trifling ones, belong to forensic pleading is so manifest that some speakers, not undistinguished in civil offices, have kept them ready in writing and have carefully committed them to memory, so that whenever opportunity should offer, their extemporary speeches might be decorated with them, as with ornaments fitted into them. 2By which practice (for I cannot delay to express my judgment on the point) they appeared to me to confess great weakness in themselves. For what can such men produce appropriate to particular causes of which the aspect is perpetually varied and new? How can they reply to questions propounded by the opposite party? How can they at once meet objections or interrogate a witness, when, even on topics of the commonest kind, such as are handled in most causes, they are unable to pursue the most ordinary thoughts in any words but those which they have long before prepared? 2When they say the same things in various pleadings, their cold meat, as it were, served up over and over again, must either create loathing in the speakers themselves, or their unhappy household furniture, which, as among the ambitious poor, is worn out by being used for several different purposes, must, when detected so often by the memory of their hearers, cause a feeling of shame in them, 30. especially as there is scarcely any commonplace so common which can incorporate well with any pleading unless it be bound by some link to the peculiar question under consideration, and which will not show that it is not so much inserted as attached, 3either because it is unlike the rest, or because it is very frequently borrowed without reason, not because it is wanted, but because it is ready, as some speakers, for the sake of sentiment, introduce the most verbose commonplaces, whereas it is from the subject itself that sentiments ought to arise. 3Such remarks are ornamental and useful if they spring from the question, but every remark, however beautiful, unless it tends to gain the cause, is certainly superfluous and sometimes even noxious. But this digression has been sufficiently prolonged.

3The praise or censure of laws requires more mature powers, such as may almost suffice for the very highest efforts. Whether this exercise partakes more of the nature of deliberative or controversial oratory is a point that varies according to the custom and right of particular nations. Among the Greeks the proposer of laws was called to plead before the judge; among the Romans it was customary to recommend or disparage a law before the public assembly. In either case, however, few arguments, and those almost certain, are advanced, for there are but three kinds of laws relating to sacred, public, or private rights. 3This division has regard chiefly to the commendation of a law, as when the speaker extols it by a kind of gradation, because it is a law, because it is public, because it is made to promote the worship of the gods. 3Points about which questions usually arise are common to all laws, for a doubt may be started, either concerning the right of him who proposes the law (as concerning that of Publius Clodius who was accused of not having been properly created tribune) or concerning the validity of the proposal itself, a doubt which may refer to a variety of matters, as for instance, whether the proposal has been published on three market days or whether the law may be said to have been proposed, or to be proposed, on an improper day, or contrary to protests, or to the auspices, or in any other way at variance with legitimate proceedings, or whether it be opposed to any law still in force. 3But such considerations do not enter into these early exercises, which are without any allusion to persons, times, or particular causes. Other points, whether treated in real or fictitious discussions, are much the same, for the fault of any law must be either in words or in matter. 3As to words, it is questioned whether they be sufficiently expressive, whether there is any ambiguity in them, as to matter, whether the law is consistent with itself, or whether it ought to have reference to past time or to individuals. But the most common inquiry is whether it be proper or expedient. 3Nor am I ignorant that of this inquiry many divisions are made by most professors; but I, under the term proper, include consistency with justice, piety, religion, and other similar virtues. The consideration of justice, however, is usually discussed with reference to more than one point; for a question may either be raised about the subject of the law, as whether it be deserving of punishment or reward or about the measure of reward or punishment, to which an objection may be taken as well for being too great as too little. 3Expediency, also, is sometimes determined by the nature of the measure, sometimes by the circumstances of the time. As to some laws, it becomes a question whether they can be enforced. Nor ought students to be ignorant that laws are sometimes censured wholly, sometimes partly, as examples of both are afforded us in highly celebrated orations. 40. Nor does it escape my recollection that there are laws which are not proposed for perpetuity, but with regard to temporary honors or commands, such as the Manilian law, about which there is an oration of Cicero. But concerning these no directions can be given in this place, for they depend upon the peculiar nature of the subjects on which the discussion is raised and not on any general consideration.

4On such subjects did the ancients, for the most part, exercise the faculty of eloquence, borrowing their mode of argument, however, from the logicians. To speak on fictitious cases, in imitation of pleadings in the forum or in public councils, is generally allowed to have become a practice among the Greeks, about the time of Demetrius Phalereus. 4Whether that sort of exercise was invented by him, I have not succeeded in discovering (as I have acknowledged also in another book); nor do those who affirm most positively that he did invent it rest their opinion on any writer of good authority, but that the Latin teachers of eloquence commenced this practice towards the end of the life of Lucius Crassus, Cicero tells us; the most eminent of these teachers was Plotius.

 
2 - 5 Advantages of reading history and speeches, § 1-3. On what points in them the professor of rhetoric should lecture, 4-9. Faulty composition may sometimes be read, to exercise the pupil's judgment, 10-13. Usefulness of this exercise, 14-17. Best authors to be read at an early age, 18-20. The pupil should be cautious of imitating very ancient or very modern writers, 21-26.

BUT of the proper mode of declaiming I shall speak a little further on; meanwhile, as we are treating of the first rudiments of rhetoric, I should not omit, I think, to observe how much the professor would contribute to the advancement of his pupils, if, as the explanation of the poets is required from teachers of grammar, so he, in like manner, would exercise the pupils under his care in the reading of history and even still more in that of speeches, a practice which I myself have adopted in the case of a few pupils, whose age required it, and whose parents thought it would be serviceable to them. But though I then deemed it an excellent method, two circumstances were obstructions to the practice of it: that long custom had established a different mode of teaching and that they were mostly full-grown youths, who did not require that exercise, that were forming themselves on my model. But though I should make a new discovery ever so late, I should not be ashamed to recommend it for the future. I know, however, that this is now done among the Greeks, but chiefly by assistant-masters, since the time would seem hardly sufficient, if the professors were always to lecture to each pupil as he read. Such lecturing, indeed, as is given that boys may follow the writing of an author easily and distinctly with their eyes and such even as explains the meaning of every word, at all uncommon, that occurs, is to be regarded as far below the profession of a teacher of rhetoric.

But to point out the beauties of authors, and, if occasion ever present itself, their faults, is eminently consistent with that profession and engagement by which he offers himself to the public as a master of eloquence, especially as I do not require such toil from teachers, that they should call their pupils to their lap, and labor at the reading of whatever book each of them may fancy. For to me it seems easier as well as far more advantageous that the master, after calling for silence, should appoint some one pupil to read (and it will be best that this duty should be imposed on them by turns) that they may thus accustom themselves to clear pronunciation; and then, after explaining the cause for which the oration was composed (for so that which is said will be better understood), that he should leave nothing unnoticed which is important to be remarked, either in the thought or the language; that he should observe what method is adopted in the exordium for conciliating the judge; what clearness, brevity, and apparent sincerity is displayed in the statement of facts; what design there is in certain passages and what well concealed artifice (for that is the only true art in pleading which cannot be perceived except by a skilful pleader); what judgment appears in the division of the matter; how subtle and urgent is the argumentation; with what force the speaker excites, with what amenity he soothes; what severity is shown in his invectives, what urbanity in his jests; how he commands the feelings, forces a way into the understanding, and makes the opinions of the judges coincide with what he asserts. In regard to the style, too, he should notice any expression that is peculiarly appropriate, elegant, or sublime; when the amplification deserves praise; what quality is opposed to it, what phrases are happily metaphorical, what figures of speech are used, what part of the composition is smooth and polished, and yet manly and vigorous.

Nor is it without advantage, indeed, that inelegant and faulty speeches, yet such as many, from depravity of taste, would admire, should be read before boys and that it should be shown how many expressions in them are inappropriate, obscure, tumid, low, mean, affected, or effeminate; expressions which, however, are not only extolled by many readers, but what is worse, are extolled for the very reason that they are vicious, 1for straight-forward language, naturally expressed, seems to some of us to have nothing of genius; but whatever departs, in any way, from the common course, we admire as something exquisite, as with some persons, more regard is shown for figures that are distorted and in any respect monstrous than for such as have lost none of the advantages of ordinary conformation. 1Some, too, who are attracted by appearance think that there is more beauty in men who are depilated and smooth, who dress their locks, hot from the curling-irons, with pins, and who are radiant with a complexion not their own, than unsophisticated nature can give, as if beauty of person could be thought to spring from corruption of manners.

1Nor will the preceptor be under the obligation merely to teach these things, but frequently to ask questions upon them and try the judgment of his pupils. Thus, carelessness will not come upon them while they listen, nor will the instructions that shall be given fail to enter their ears; and they will at the same time be conducted to the end which is sought in this exercise, namely that they themselves may conceive and understand. For what object have we in teaching them, but that they may not always require to be taught?

1I will venture to say that this sort of diligent exercise will contribute more to the improvement of students than all the treatises of all the rhetoricians that ever wrote, which doubtless, however, are of considerable use, but their scope is more general; and how indeed can they go into all kinds of questions that arise almost every day? 1So, though certain general precepts are given in the military art, it will yet be of far more advantage to know what plan any leader has adopted wisely or imprudently and in what place or at what time, for in almost every art precepts are of much less avail than practical experiments. 1Shall a teacher declaim that he may be a model to his hearers, and will not Cicero and Demosthenes, if read, profit them more? Shall a pupil, if he commits faults in declaiming, be corrected before the rest, and will it not be more serviceable to him to correct the speech of another? Indisputably, and even more agreeable, for every one prefers that others' faults should be blamed rather than his own. 1Nor are there wanting more arguments for me to offer; but the advantage of this plan can escape the observation of no one; and I wish that there may not be so much unwillingness to adopt it as there will be pleasure in having adopted it.

1If this method be followed, there will remain a question not very difficult to answer, which is, what authors ought to be read by beginners? Some have recommended inferior writers, as they thought them easier of comprehension; others have advocated the more florid kind of writers as being better adapted to nourish the minds of the young. For my part, I would have the best authors commenced at once and read always; but I would choose the clearest in style and most intelligible, recommending Livy, for instance, to be read by boys rather than Sallust, who, however, is the greater historian, but to understand him there is need of some proficiency. 20. Cicero, as it seems to me, is agreeable even to beginners, and sufficiently intelligible, may not only profit, but even be loved; and next to Cicero (as Livy advises), such authors as most resemble Cicero.

2There are two points in style on which I think that the greatest caution should be used in respect to boys: one is that no master, from being too much an admirer of antiquity, should allow them to harden, as it were, in the reading of the Gracchi, Cato, and other like authors, for they would thus become uncouth and dry since they cannot, as yet, understand their force of thought; and content with adopting their style, which at the time it was written was doubtless excellent, but is quite unsuitable to our day, they will appear to themselves to resemble those eminent men. 2The other point, which is the opposite of the former, is, lest, being captivated with the flowers of modern affectation, they should be so seduced by a corrupt kind of pleasure as to love that luscious manner of writing which is the more agreeable to the minds of youth in proportion as it has more affinity with them. 2When their taste is formed, however, and out of danger of being corrupted, I should recommend them to read not only the ancients (from whom if a solid and manly force of thought be adopted, while the rust of a rude age is cleared off, our present style will receive additional grace), but also the writers of the present day, in whom there is much merit. 2For nature has not condemned us to stupidity, but we ourselves have changed our mode of speaking and have indulged our fancies more than we ought; and thus the ancients did not excel us so much in genius as in severity of manner. It will be possible, therefore, to select from the moderns many qualities for imitation, but care must be taken that they be not contaminated with other qualities with which they are mixed. Yet that there have been recently, and are now, many writers whom we may imitate entirely, I would not only allow (for why should I not?) but even affirm. 2But who they are it is not for everybody to decide. We may even err with greater safety in regard to the ancients, and I would therefore defer the reading of the moderns, that imitation may not go before judgment.

 
2 - 6 In composition, the pupil should have but moderate assistance, not too much or too little.

THERE has been also a diversity of practice among teachers in the following respect. Some of them, not confining themselves to giving directions as to the division of any subject which they assigned their pupils for declamation, developed it more fully by speaking on it themselves and amplified it not only with proofs but with appeals to the feelings. Others, giving merely the first outlines, expatiated, after the declamations were composed, on whatever points each pupil had omitted and polished some passages with no less care than they would have used if they themselves had been rising to speak in public.

Both methods are beneficial, and, therefore, for my own part, I give no distinction to either of them above the other, but, if it should be necessary to follow only one of the two, it will be of greater service to point out the right way at first than to recall those who have gone astray from their errors; first, because to the subsequent emendation they merely listen, but the preliminary division they carry to their meditation and their composition; and, secondly, because they more willingly attend to one who gives directions than to one who finds faults. Whatever pupils, too, are of a high spirit are apt, especially in the present state of manners, to be angry at admonition and offer silent resistance to it. Not that faults are therefore to be less openly corrected, for regard is to be had to the other pupils, who will think that whatever the master has not amended is right. But both methods should be united and used as occasion may require. To beginners should be given matter designed, as it were, beforehand in proportion to the abilities of each. But when they shall appear to have formed themselves sufficiently on their model, a few brief directions may be given them, following which, they may advance by their own strength without any support. It is proper that they should sometimes be left to themselves, lest, from the bad habit of being always led by the efforts of others, they should lose all capacity of attempting and producing anything for themselves. But when they seem to judge pretty accurately of what ought to be said, the labor of the teacher is almost at an end, though should they still commit errors, they must be again put under a guide. Something of this kind we see birds practice, which divide food collected in their beaks among their tender and helpless young ones, but when they seem sufficiently grown, teach them, by degrees, to venture out of the nest and flutter round their place of abode, themselves leading the way, and at last leave their strength, when properly tried, to the open sky and their own self-confidence.

 
2 - 7 Pupils should not always declaim their own compositions, but sometimes passages from eminent writers.

ONE change, I think, should certainly be made in what is customary with regard to the age of which we are speaking. Pupils should not be obliged to learn by heart what they have composed and to repeat it, as is usual, on a certain day, a task which it is fathers that principally exact, thinking that their children then only study when they repeat frequent declamations, whereas proficiency depends chiefly on the diligent cultivation of style. For though I would wish boys to compose and to spend much time in that employment, yet, as to learning by heart, I would rather recommend for that purpose select passages from orations or histories, or any other sort of writings deserving of such attention. The memory will thus be more efficiently exercised in mastering what is another's than what is their own; and those who shall have been practiced in this more difficult kind of labor will fix in their minds, without trouble, what they themselves have composed, as being more familiar to them; they will also accustom themselves to the best compositions, and they will always have in their memory something which they may imitate and will, even without being aware, reproduce that fashion of style which they have deeply impressed upon their minds. They will have at command, moreover, an abundance of the best words, phrases, and figures, not sought for the occasion, but offering themselves spontaneously, as it were, from a store treasured within them. To this is added the power of quoting the happy expressions of any author,which is agreeable in common conversation and useful in pleading, for phrases which are not coined for the sake of the cause in hand have the greater weight and often gain us more applause than if they were our own.

Yet pupils should sometimes be permitted to recite what they themselves have written that they may reap the full reward of their labor from that kind of applause which is most desired. This permission will most properly be granted when they have produced something more polished than ordinary, that they may thus be presented with some return for their study and rejoice that they have deserved to recite their composition.

 
2 - 8 Variety of talent and disposition in pupils requires variety of treatment, § 1-5. How far an inclination for any particular line of study should be encouraged and cultivated, 6-15.

IT is generally, and not without reason, regarded as an excellent quality in a master to observe accurately the differences of ability in those whom he has undertaken to instruct and to ascertain in what direction the nature of each particularly inclines him, for there is in talent an incredible variety, nor are the forms of the mind fewer than those of the body. This may be understood even from orators themselves, who differ so much from each other in their style of speaking that no one is like another, though most of them have set themselves to imitate those whom they admired. It has also been thought advantageous by most teachers to instruct each pupil in such a manner as to cherish by learning the good qualities inherited from nature, so that the powers may be assisted in their progress towards the object to which they chiefly direct themselves. As a master of palaestric exercises, when he enters a gymnasium full of boys, is able, after trying their strength and comprehension in every possible way, to decide for what kind of exercise each ought to be trained, so a teacher of eloquence, they say, when he has clearly observed which boy's genius delights most in a concise and polished manner of speaking and which in a spirited, or grave, or smooth, or rough, or brilliant, or elegant one, will so accommodate his instructions to each that he will be advanced in that department in which he shows most ability, because nature attains far greater power when seconded by culture, and he that is led contrary to nature cannot make due progress in the studies for which he is unfit and makes those talents for the exercise of which he seemed born weaker by neglecting to cultivate them.

This opinion seems to me (for to him that follows reason there is free exercise of judgment even in opposition to received persuasions) just only in part. To distinguish peculiarities of talent is absolutely necessary, and to make choice of particular studies to suit them is what no man would discountenance. For one youth will be fitter for the study of history than another, one will be qualified for writing poetry, another for the study of law, and some perhaps fit only to be sent into the fields. The teacher of rhetoric will decide in accordance with these peculiarities, just as the master of the palaestra will make one of his pupils a runner, another a boxer, another a wrestler, or fit him for any other of the exercises that are practiced at the sacred games.

But he who is destined for public speaking must strive to excel not merely in one accomplishment, but in all the accomplishments that are requisite for that art, even though some of them may seem too difficult for him when he is learning them, for instruction would be altogether superfluous if the natural state of the mind were sufficient. If a pupil that is vitiated in taste and turgid in his style, as many are, is put under our care, shall we allow him to go on in his own way? Him that is dry and jejune in his manner shall we not nourish and, as it were, clothe? For if it be necessary to prune something away from certain pupils, why should it not be allowable to add something to others? Yet I would not fight against nature, for I do not think that any good quality which is innate should be detracted, but that whatever is inactive or deficient should be invigorated or supplied. Was that famous teacher Isocrates, whose writings are not stronger proofs that he spoke well than his scholars that he taught well, inclined, when he formed such an opinion of Ephorus and Theopompus as to say that "the one wanted the rein and the other the spur," to think that the slowness in the duller, and the ardor in the more impetuous were to be fostered by education? On the contrary, he thought that the qualities of each ought to be mixed with those of the other. 1We must so far accommodate ourselves, however, to feeble intellects that they may be trained only to that to which nature invites them, for thus they will do with more success the only thing which they can do. But if richer material fall into our hands from which we justly conceive hopes of a true orator, no rhetorical excellence must be left unstudied. 1For though such a genius be more inclined, as indeed it must be, to the exercise of certain powers, yet it will not be inverse to that of others and will render them, by study, equal to those in which it naturally excelled; just as the skillful trainer in bodily exercise (that I may adhere to my former illustration) will not, if he undertakes to form a pancratiast, teach him to strike with his fist or his heel only, or instruct him merely in wrestling, or only in certain artifices of wrestling, but will practice him in everything pertaining to the pancratiastic art.

There may perhaps be some pupil unequal to some of these exercises. He must then apply chiefly to that in which he can succeed. 1For two things are especially to be avoided: one, to attempt what cannot be accomplished, and the other, to divert a pupil from what he does well to something else for which he is less qualified. But if he be capable of instruction, the tutor, like Nicostratus whom we, when young, knew at an advanced age, will bring to bear upon him every art of instruction alike and render him invincible, as Nicostratus was in wrestling and boxing, for success in both of which contests he was crowned on the same day. 1How much more must such training, indeed, be pursued by the teacher of the future orator! For it is not enough that he should speak concisely, or artfully, or vehemently, any more than for a singing master to excel in acute, or middle, or grave tones only, or even in particular subdivisions of them since eloquence is, like a harp, not perfect unless, with all its strings stretched, it be in unison from the highest to the lowest note.

 
2 - 9 Pupils should regard their tutors as intellectual parents.
HAVING spoken thus fully concerning the duties of teachers, I give pupils, for the present, only this one admonition: that they are to love their tutors not less than their studies and to regard them as parents, not indeed of their bodies, but of their minds. 2. Such affection contributes greatly to improvement, for pupils under its influence will not only listen with pleasure, but will believe what is taught them and will desire to resemble their instructors. They will come together in assembling for school, with pleasure and cheerfulness; they will not be angry when corrected and will be delighted when praised; and they will strive, by their devotion to study, to become as dear as possible to the master. 3.For as it is the duty of preceptors to teach, so it is that of pupils to show themselves teachable; neither of these duties, else, will be of avail without the other. And as the generation of man is effected by both parents, and as you will in vain scatter seed unless the furrowed ground, previously softened, cherish it so, neither can eloquence come to its growth unless by mutual agreement between him who communicates and him who receives.
 
2 - 10 Remarks on declamations, § 1, 2. Injudiciousnees in the choice of subjects has been an obstruction to improvement in eloquence, 3-5. On what sort of subjects pupils may be permitted to declaim, 6-8. What alterations should be made in the common practice, 9-15.

WHEN the pupil has been well instructed and sufficiently exercised in these preliminary studies, which are not in themselves inconsiderable but members and portions, as it were, of higher branches of learning, the time will have nearly arrived for entering on deliberative and judicial subjects. But before I proceed to speak of those matters, I must say a few words on the art of declamation, which, though the most recently invented of all exercises, is indeed by far the most useful. For it comprehends within itself all those exercises of which I have been treating and presents us with a very close resemblance to reality; and it has been so much adopted, accordingly, that it is thought by many sufficient of itself to form oratory since no excellence in continued speaking can be specified which is not found in this prelude to speaking. The practice, however, has so degenerated through the fault of the teachers that the license and ignorance of declaimers have been among the chief causes that have corrupted eloquence. But of that which is good by nature we may surely make a good use. Let therefore the subjects themselves, which shall be imagined, be as like as possible to truth; and let declamations to the utmost extent that is practicable imitate those pleadings for which they were introduced as a preparation. For as to magicians, and the pestilence, and oracles, and step-mothers more cruel than those of tragedy, and other subjects more imaginary than these, we shall in vain seek them among sponsions and interdicts. What, then, it may be said, shall we never suffer students to handle such topics as are above belief and (to say the truth) poetical, so that they may expatiate and exult in their subject and swell forth as it were into full body? It would indeed be best not to suffer them; but at least let not the subjects, if grand and turgid, appear also to him who regards them with severe judgment, foolish and ridiculous, so that if we must grant the use of such topics. Let the declaimer swell himself occasionally to the full, provided he understands that as four-footed animals, when they have been blown with green fodder, are cured by losing blood and thus return to food suited to maintain their strength, so must his turgidity be diminished and whatever corrupt humors he has contracted be discharged if he wishes to be healthy and strong; for otherwise, his empty swelling will be hampered at the first attempt at any real pleading.

Those, assuredly, who think that the whole exercise of declaiming is altogether different from forensic pleading, do not see even the reason for which that exercise was instituted. For if it is no preparation for the forum, it is merely like theatrical ostentation or insane raving. To what purpose is it to instruct a judge who has no existence? To state a case that all know to be fictitious? To bring proofs of a point on which no man will pronounce sentence? This indeed is nothing more than trifling; but how ridiculous is it to excite our feelings and to work upon an audience with anger and sorrow unless we are preparing ourselves by imitations of battle for serious contests and a regular field? Will there then be no difference, it may be asked, between the mode of speaking at the bar and mere exercise in declamation? I answer that if we speak for the sake of improvement, there will be no difference. I wish, too, that it were made a part of the exercise to use names; that causes more complicated, and requiring longer pleadings, were invented; that we were less afraid of words in daily use; and that we were in the habit of mingling jests with our declamation; all which points, however we may have been practiced in the schools in other respects, find us novices at the bar.

But even if a declamation be composed merely for display, we ought surely to exert our voice in some degree to please the audience. For even in those oratorical compositions, which are doubtless based in some degree upon truth, but are adapted to please the multitude (such as are the panegyrics which we read and all that epideictic kind of eloquence), it is allowable to use great elegance, and not only to acknowledge the efforts of art (which ought generally to be concealed in forensic pleadings), but to display it to those who are called together for the purpose of witnessing it. 1Declamation, therefore, as it is an imitation of real pleadings and deliberations, ought closely to resemble reality, but, as it carries with it something of ostentation, to clothe itself in a certain elegance. 1Such is the practice of actors who do not pronounce exactly as we speak in common conversation, for such pronunciation would be devoid of art; nor do they depart far from nature, as by such a fault imitation would be destroyed; but they exalt the simplicity of familiar discourse with a certain scenic grace.

1However, some inconveniences will attend us from the nature of the subjects which we have imagined, especially as many particulars in them are left uncertain, which we settle as suits our purpose, as age, fortune, children, parents, strength, laws, and manners of cities; and other things of a similar kind. 1Sometimes, too, we draw arguments from the very faults of the imaginary causes. But on each of these points we shall speak in its proper place. For though the whole object of the work intended by us has regard to the formation of an orator, yet, lest students may think anything wanting we shall not omit, in passing, whatever may occur that fairly relates to the teaching of the schools.

 
2 - 11 Some think instruction in oratory unnecessary, § 1, 2. Boasts and practices of the ignorant, 3-5. Some study only parts of their speeches; want of connection in their matter, 6-7.

FROM this point, then, I am to enter upon that portion of the art with which those who have omitted the preceding portions usually commence. I see, however, that some will oppose me at the very threshold, men who think that eloquence has no need of rules of this kind, and who, satisfied with their own natural ability, and the common methods of teaching and exercise in the schools, even ridicule my diligence, following the example of certain professors of great reputation. It was one of those characters, I believe, who being asked what a figure and what a thought was, answered that "he did not know, but that, if it had any relation to his subject, it would be found in his declamation." Another of them replied to a person who asked him "whether he was a follower of Theodorus or Apollodorus," "I am a prizefighter." Nor could he indeed have escaped an avowal of his ignorance with greater wit. But such men, as they have attained eminent repute through the goodness of their natural powers and have uttered many things even worthy of remembrance, have had very many imitators that resemble them in negligence, but very few that approach them in ability. They make it their boast that they speak from impulse and merely exert their natural powers, and say that there is no need of proofs or arrangement in fictitious subjects, but only of grand thoughts, to hear which the auditory will be crowded, and of which the best are the offspring of venturesomeness. In meditation, also, as they use no method they either wait, often for some days, looking at the ceiling for some great thought that may spontaneously present itself, or exciting themselves with inarticulate sounds, as with a trumpet, they adapt the wildest gestures of body, not to the utterance, but to the excogitation of words.

Some, before they have conceived any thoughts, fix upon certain heads, under which something eloquent is to be introduced; but, after modulating their words to themselves, aloud and for a long time, they desert their proposed arrangement from despairing of the possibility of forming any connection, and then turn to one train of ideas, and again to another, all equally common and hackneyed. Those, however, who seem to have most method do not bestow their efforts on fictitious causes, but on common topics, in which they do not direct their view to any certain object, but throw out detached thoughts as they occur to them. Hence it happens that their speech, being unconnected and made up of different pieces, cannot hang together, but is like the notebooks of boys, in which they enter promiscuously whatever has been commended in the declamations of others. Yet they sometimes strike out fine sentiments and good thoughts (for so indeed they are accustomed to boast), but barbarians and slaves do the same, and if this be sufficient, there is no art at all in eloquence.

 
2 - 12 Why the ignorant often seem to speak with more force than the learned, § 1-3. They attack and are less afraid of failure, 5. But they cannot choose judiciously, or prove with effect, 6. Their thoughts sometimes striking, 7. Apparent disadvantages of learned polish, 8. Unlearned speakers often vigorous in delivery, 10. Occasionally too much admired by teachers of oratory, 112.

I MUST not forbear to acknowledge, however, that people in general adopt the notion that the unlearned appear to speak with more force than the learned. But this opinion has its origin chiefly in the mistake of those who judge erroneously and who think that what has no art has the more energy, just as if they should conceive it a greater proof of strength to break through a door than to open it, to rupture a knot than to untie it, to drag an animal than to lead it. By such persons a gladiator, who rushes to battle without any knowledge of arms, and a wrestler, who struggles with the whole force of his body to effect that which he has once attempted, is called so much the braver, though the latter is often laid prostrate by his own strength, and the other, however violent his assault, is withstood by a gentle turn of his adversary's wrist.

But there are some things concerning this point that very naturally deceive the unskilful; for division, though it is of great consequence in pleadings, diminishes the appearance of strength; what is rough is imagined more bulky than what is polished; and objects when scattered are thought more numerous than when they are ranged in order.

There is also a certain affinity between particular excellences and faults, in consequence of which a railer passes for a free speaker, a rash for a bold one, a prolix for a copious one. But an ignorant pleader rails too openly and too frequently, to the peril of the party whose cause he has undertaken and often to his own. Yet this practice attracts the notice of people to him, because they readily listen to what they would not themselves utter.

Such a speaker, too, is far from avoiding that venturesomeness which lies in mere expression and makes desperate efforts, whence it may happen that he who is always seeking something extravagant may sometimes find something great; but it happens only seldom, and does not compensate for undoubted faults.

It is on this account that unlearned speakers seem sometimes to have greater copiousness of language, because they pour forth every thing, while the learned use selection and moderation. Besides, unlearned pleaders seldom adhere to the object of proving what they have asserted; by this means they avoid what appears to judges of bad taste the dryness of questions and arguments, and seek nothing else but matter in which they may please the ears of the court with senseless gratifications.

Their fine sentiments themselves, too, at which alone they aim, are more striking when all around them is poor and mean, as lights are most brilliant, not amidst shades as Cicero says, but amidst utter darkness. Let such speakers therefore be called as ingenious as the world pleases, provided it be granted that a man of real eloquence would receive the praise given to them as an insult.

Still it must be allowed that learning does take away something, as the file takes something from rough metal, the whetstone from blunt instruments, and age from wine; but it takes away what is faulty, and that which learning has polished is less only because it is better.

But such pleaders try by their delivery to gain the reputation of speaking with energy, for they bawl on every occasion and bellow out everything with uplifted hand, as they call it, raging like madmen with incessant action, panting and swaggering, and with every kind of gesture and movement of the head. To clap the hands together, to stamp the foot on the ground, to strike the thigh, the breast, and the forehead with the hand, makes a wonderful impression on an audience of the lower order, while the polished speaker, as he knows how to temper, to vary, and to arrange the several parts of his speech, so in delivery he knows how to adapt his action to every variety of complexion in what he utters; and, if any rule appears to him deserving of constant attention, it would be that he should prefer always to be and to seem modest. But the other sort of speakers call that force which ought rather to be called violence.

1But we may at times see not only pleaders, but what is far more disgraceful, teachers, who, after having had some short practice in speaking, abandon all method and indulge in every kind of irregularity as inclination prompts them, and call those who have paid more regard to learning than themselves foolish, lifeless, timid, weak, and whatever other epithet of reproach occurs to them. 1Let me then congratulate them as having become eloquent without labor, without method, without study; but let me, as I have long withdrawn from the duties of teaching and of speaking in the forum, because I thought it most honorable to terminate my career while my services were still desired, console my leisure in meditating and composing precepts which I trust will be of use to young men of ability and which, I am sure, are a pleasure to myself.

 
2 - 13 Quintilian does not give rules from which there is no departure; pleaders must act according to the requisitions of their subjects, § 1-7. What an orator has chiefly to keep in view, and how far rules should be observed, 8-17.

BUT let no man require from me such a system of precepts as is laid down by most authors of books of rules, a system in which I should have to make certain laws, fixed by immutable necessity, for all students of eloquence, commencing with the prooemium and what must be the character of it, saying that the statement of facts must come next, and what rule must be observed in stating them; that after this must come the proposition, or as some have preferred to call it, the excursion, and then that there must be a certain order of questions; adding also other precepts, which some speakers observe as if it were unlawful to do otherwise, and as if they were acting under orders; for rhetoric would be a very easy and small matter if it could be included in one short body of rules, but rules must generally be altered to suit the nature of each individual case, the time, the occasion, and necessity itself; consequently, one great quality in an orator is discretion, because he must turn his thoughts in various directions according to the different bearings of his subject. What if you should direct a general that whenever he draws up his troops for battle, he must range his front in line, extend his wings to the right and left, and station his cavalry to defend his flanks? Such a method will perhaps be the best, as often as it is practicable, but it will be subject to alteration from the nature of the ground, if a hill come in the way, if a river interpose, if obstruction be caused by declivities, woods or any other obstacles; the character of the enemy, too, may make a change necessary, or the nature of the contest in which he has to engage; and he will have to fight, sometimes with his troops in extended line, sometimes in the form of wedges, and to employ, sometimes his auxiliaries, and sometimes his own legions, and sometimes it will be of advantage to turn his back in pretended flight. In like manner, whether an exordium be necessary or superfluous, whether it should be short or long, whether it should be wholly addressed to the judge, or, by the aid of some figure of speech, directed occasionally to others, whether the statement of facts should be concise or copious, continuous or broken, in the order of events or in any other, the nature of the causes themselves must show. The case is the same with regard to the order of examination, since in the same cause, one question may often be of advantage to one side and another question to the other, to be asked first; for the precepts of oratory are not established by laws or public decrees, but whatever is contained in them was discovered by expediency. Yet I shall not deny that it is in general of service to attend to rules, or I should not write any; but if expediency shall suggest any thing at variance with them, we shall have to follow it, deserting the authority of teachers.

For my part I shall, above all things,

Direct, enjoin, and o'er and o'er repeat,
that an orator, in all his pleadings, should keep two things in view: what is becoming and what is expedient; but it is frequently expedient and sometimes becoming to make some deviations from the regular and settled order, as, in statues and pictures, we see the dress, look, and attitude varied. In a statue, exactly upright, there is but very little gracefulness, for the face will look straight forward, the arms hang down, the feet will be joined, and the whole figure, from top to toe, will be rigidity itself; but a gentle bend, or to use the expression, motion of the body, gives a certain animation to figures. Accordingly, the hands are not always placed in the same position, and a thousand varieties are given to the countenance. Some figures are in a running or rushing posture, some are seated or reclining, some are uncovered, and others veiled, some partake of both conditions. What is more distorted and elaborate than the Discobolus of Myron? Yet if any one should find fault with that figure for not being upright, would he not prove himself void of all understanding of the art in which the very novelty and difficulty of the execution is what is most deserving of praise? 1Such graces and charms rhetorical figures afford, both such as are in the thoughts and such as lie in words, for they depart in some degree from the right line and exhibit the merit of deviation from common practice. 1The whole face is generally represented in a painting, yet Apelles painted the figure of Antigonus with only one side of his face towards the spectator, that its disfigurement from the loss of an eye might be concealed. Are not some things, in like manner, to be concealed in speaking, whether it may be because they ought not to be told or because they cannot be expressed as they deserve? 1It was in this way that Timanthes, a painter, I believe, of Cythnus, acted in the picture by which he carried off the prize from Colotes of Teium; for when, at the sacrifice of Iphigenia, he had represented Calchas looking sorrowful, Ulysses more sorrowful, and had given to Menelaus the utmost grief that his art could depict, not knowing, as his power of representing feeling was exhausted, how he could fitly paint the countenance of the father, he threw a veil over his head and left his grief to be estimated by the spectator from his own heart. 1To this device is not the remark of Sallust somewhat similar, "For I think it better to say nothing concerning Carthage, than to say but little"? For these reasons it has always been customary with me to bind myself as little as possible to rules which the Greeks call katholika, and which we, translating the word as well as we can, term universalia or perpetualia, "general" or "constant," for rules are rarely found of such a nature that they may not be shaken in some part or wholly overthrown.

But of rules I shall speak more fully and of each in its own place. 1In the meantime, I would not have young men think themselves sufficiently accomplished if they have learned by art some one of those little books on rhetoric, which are commonly handed about, and fancy that they are thus safe under the decrees of theory. The art of speaking depends on great labor, constant study, varied exercise, repeated trials, the deepest sagacity, and the readiest judgment. 1But it is assisted by rules, provided that they point out a fair road and not one single wheel-rut, from which he who thinks it unlawful to decline must be contented with the slow progress of those who walk on ropes. Accordingly, we often quit the main road (which has been formed perhaps by the labor of an army), being attracted by a shorter path, or if bridges, broken down by torrents, have intersected the direct way, we are compelled to go round about. And if the gate is stopped up by flames, we shall have to force a way through the wall. 1The work of eloquence is extensive and of infinite variety presenting something new almost daily; nor will all that is possible ever have been said of it. But I will endeavor to set forth the precepts that have been transmitted to us, considering, at the same time, which of them are the most valuable, whether anything in them seems likely to be changed for the better, and whether any additions may be made to them, or anything taken from them.

 
2 - 14 Of the term rhetoric or oratory, § 1-4. Heads under which Quintilian considers the art of oratory, 5.

SOME who have translated ῥητορικὴ (rhētorikē) from Greek into Latin have called it ars oratoria and oratrix. I would not deprive those writers of their due praise for endeavoring to add to the copiousness of the Latin language, but all Greek words do not obey our will in attempting to render them from the Greek, as all our words, in like manner, do not obey that of the Greeks when they try to express something of ours in their own tongue. This translation is no less harsh than the essentia and entia of Flavius, for the Greek οὐσία (onsia): nor is it indeed exact, for oratoria will be taken in the same sense as elocutoria, oratrix as elocutrix, but the word rhētorikē, of which we are speaking, is the same sort of word as eloquentia, and it is doubtless used in two senses by the Greeks. In one acceptation, it is an adjective, ars rhetorica, as navis piratica: in the other a substantive, like philosophia or amicitia. We wish it now to have the signification of a substantive, just as γραμματικὴ (grammatikē) is rendered by the substantive literatura, not by literatrix, which would be similar to oratrix, nor by literatoria, which would be similar to oratoria; but for the word rhētorikē, no equivalent Latin word has heen found. Let us not, however, dispute about the use of it, especially as we must adopt many other Greek words, for if I may use the terms physicus, musicus, geometres, I shall offer no unseemly violence to them by attempting to turn them into Latin. Since Cicero himself uses a Greek title for the books which he first wrote upon the art, we certainly need be under no apprehension of appearing to have rashly trusted the greatest of orators as to the name of his own art.

Rhetoric, then, (for we shall henceforth use this term without dread of sarcastic objections) will be best divided, in my opinion, in such a manner that we may speak first of the art, next of the artist, and then of the work. The art will be that which ought to be attained by study and is the knowledge how to speak well. The artificer is he who has thoroughly acquired the art, that is, the orator, whose business is to speak well. The work is what is achieved by the artificer, that is, good speaking. All these are to be considered under special heads, but of the particulars that are to follow, I shall speak in their several places; at present I shall proceed to consider what is to be said on the first general head.

 
2 - 15 What rhetoric is, § 1, 2. To call it the power of persuading is to give an insufficient definition of it, 3-9. To call it the power of persuading by speech is not sufficient, 11. Other definitions, 12-23. That of Gorgias in Plato; that of Plato or Socrates in the Phaedrus, 24-31. That of Cornelius Celsus, 32. Other definitions more approved by Quintilian, 33-37. Quintilian's own definition, 38.

FIRST of all, then, we have to consider what rhetoric is. It is, indeed, defined in various ways, but its definition gives rise chiefly to two considerations, for the dispute is, in general, either concerning the quality of the thing itself or concerning the comprehension of the terms in which it is defined. The first and chief difference of opinion on the subject is that some think it possible even for bad men to have the name of orators, while others (to whose opinion I attach myself) maintain that the name and the art of which we are speaking can be conceded only to good men.

Of those who separate the talent of speaking from the greater and more desirable praise of a good life, some have called rhetoric merely a power; some a science but not a virtue; some a habit, some an art, but having nothing in common with science and virtue; some even an abuse of art, that is, a κακοτεχνία (kakotechnia). All these have generally supposed that the business of oratory lies either in persuading or in speaking in a manner adapted to persuade, for such art may be attained by one who is far from being a good man. The most common definition therefore is that oratory is the power of persuading. What I call a power, some call a faculty and others a talent, but that this discrepancy may be attended with no ambiguity, I mean by "power" δύναμις (dynamis). This opinion had its origin from Isocrates, if the treatise on the art which is in circulation under his name is really his. That rhetorician, though he had none of the feelings of those who defame the business of the orator, gives too rash a definition of the art when he says, "That rhetoric is the "worker of persuasion," πειθοῦς δημιουργός (peithous dēmiourgos), for I shall not allow myself to use the peculiar term that Ennius applies to Marcus Cethegus, suadae medulla, "marrow of persuasion." In Plato too, Gorgias, in the dialogue inscribed with his name, says almost the same thing, but Plato wishes it to be received as the opinion of Gorgias, not as his own. Cicero, in several passages of his writings, has said that the duty of an orator is to speak in a way adapted to persuade. In his books on rhetoric also, but with which, doubtless, he was not satisfied, he makes the end of eloquence to be persuasion.

But money, likewise, has the power of persuasion, as do interest, and the authority and dignity of a speaker, and even his very look, unaccompanied by language, when either the remembrance of the services of any individual, or a pitiable appearance, or beauty of person, draws forth an opinion. Thus when Antonius, in his defense of Manius Aquilius, exhibited on his breast, by tearing his client's robe, the scars of the wounds he had received for his country, he did not trust to the power of his eloquence, but applied force, as it were, to the eyes of the Roman people, who, it was thought, were chiefly induced by the sight to acquit the accused. That Servius Galba escaped merely through the pity which he excited, when he not only produced his own little children before the assembly, but carried round in his hands the son of Sulpicius Gallus, is testified, not only by the records of others, but by the speech of Cato. Phryne too, people think, was freed from peril, not by the pleading of Hyperides, though it was admirable, but by the exposure of her figure, which, otherwise most striking, he had uncovered by opening her robe. If, then, all such things persuade, the definition of which we have spoken is not satisfactory.

Those, accordingly, have appeared to themselves more exact, who, though they have the same general opinion as to rhetoric, have pronounced it to be the power of persuading by speaking. This definition Gorgias gives, in the dialogue which we have just mentioned, being forced to do so, as it were, by Socrates. Theodectes, if the treatise on rhetoric which is inscribed with his name is his (or it may rather, perhaps, as has been supposed, be the work of Aristotle), does not dissent from Gorgias, for it is asserted in that book that the object of oratory is to lead men by speaking to that which the speaker wishes. 1But not even this definition is sufficiently comprehensive, for not only the orator, but others, such as harlots, flatterers, and seducers, persuade or lead to that which they wish, by speaking. But the orator, on the contrary, does not always persuade, so that sometimes this is not his peculiar object; sometimes it is an object common to him with others who are very different from orators. 1Yet Apollodorus varies but little from this definition, as he says that the first and supreme object of judicial pleading is to persuade the judge and to lead him to whatever opinion the speaker may wish, for he thus subjects the orater to the power of fortune, so that if he does not succeed in persuading, he cannot retain the name of an orator. 1Some, on the other hand, detach themselves from all considerations as to the event, as Aristotle, who says that oratory is the power of finding out whatever can persuade in speaking. But this definition has not only the fault of which we have just spoken, but the additional one of comprehending nothing but invention, which without elocution cannot constitute oratory. 1To Hermagoras, who says that the object of oratory is to speak persuasively, and to others who express themselves to the same purpose, though not in the same words, but tell us that the object of oratory is to say all that ought to be said in order to persuade, a sufficient answer was given when we showed that to persuade is not the business of the orator only.

1Various other opinions have been added to these, for some have thought that oratory may be employed about all subjects, others only about political affairs, but which of these notions is nearer to truth, I shall inquire in that part of my work which will be devoted to the question. 1Aristotle seems to have put everything in the power of oratory when he says that it is the power of saying on every subject whatever can be found to persuade; and such is the case with Patrocles, who indeed does not add on every subject, but as he makes no exception, shows that his idea is the same, for he calls oratory the power of finding whatever is persuasive in speaking, both which definitions embrace invention alone. Theodorus, in order to avoid this defect, decides oratory to be the power of discovering and expressing, with elegance, whatever is credible on any subject whatever. 1But while one who is not an orator may find out what is credible as well as what is persuasive, he, by adding on any subject whatever, grants more than the preceding makers of definitions and allows the title of a most honorable art to those who may persuade even to crime. 1Gorgias, in Plato, calls himself a master of persuasion in courts of justice and other assemblies, and says that he treats both of what is just and what is unjust; and Socrates allows him the art of persuading, but not of teaching.

1Those who have not granted all subjects to the orator have made distinctions in their definitions, as they were necessitated, with more anxiety and verbosity. One of these is Ariston, a disciple of Critolaus the Peripatetic, whose definition of oratory is that it is the science of discovering and expressing what ought to be said on political affairs, in language adapted to persuade the people. 20. Because he is a Peripatetic, he considers oratory a science, not a virtue, like the Stoics, but in adding "adapted to persuade the people," he throws dishonor on the art of oratory, as if he thought it unsuited to persuade the learned. But of all who think that the orator is to discourse only on political questions, it may be said, once for all, that many duties of the orator are set aside by them, for instance, all laudatory speaking, which is the third part of oratory. 2Theodorus of Gadara (to proceed with those who have thought oratory an art, not a virtue) defines more cautiously, for he says (let me borrow the words of those who have translated his phraseology from the Greek) that oratory is an art that discovers, judges, and enunciates with suitable eloquence, according to the measure of that which may be found adapted to persuading, in any subject connected with political affairs. 2Cornelius Celsus, in like manner, says that the object of oratory is to speak persuasively on doubtful and political matters. To these definitions there are some, not very dissimilar, given by others, such as this: "Oratory is the power of judging and discoursing on such civil questions as are submitted to it, with a certain persuasiveness, a certain action of the body, and a certain mode of delivering what it expresses." 2There are a thousand other definitions, but either similar or composed of similar elements, which we shall notice when we come to treat upon the subjects of oratory.

Some have thought it neither a power, nor a science, nor an art; Critolaus calls it the practice of speaking (for such is the meaning of the word τριβή (tribē)), Athenaeus, the art of deceiving. 2But most writers, satisfied with reading a few passages from Plato's Gorgias, unskilfully extracted by their predecessors (for they neither consult the whole of that dialogue, nor any of the other writings of Plato), have fallen into a very grave error, supposing that that philosopher entertained such an opinion as to think that oratory was not an art, but a certain skilfulness in flattering and pleasing. 2As he says in another place, the simulation of one part of polity, and the fourth sort of flattery, for he assigns two parts of polity to the body, medicine, and, as they interpret it, exercise, and two to the mind, law and justice, and then calls the art of cooks the flattery or simulation of medicine, and the art of dealers in slaves the simulation of the effects of exercise, as they produce a false complection by paint and the appearance of strength by unsolid fat; the simulation of legal science he calls sophistry and that of justice rhetoric. 2All this is indeed expressed in that dialogue and uttered by Socrates, under whose person Plato seems to intimate what he thinks, but some of his dialogues were composed merely to refute those who argued on the other side and are called ἐλεγκτικοί "elenctic"; others were written to teach and are called δογματικοί "dogmatic". 2But Socrates, or Plato, thought that sort of oratory which was then practised to be of a dogmatic character, for he speaks of it as being "according to the manner in which you manage public affairs," and understands oratory of a sincere and honorable nature.

The dispute with Gorgias is accordingly thus terminated: "It is therefore necessary that the orator be a just man and that the just man should wish to do just things." 2When this has been said, Gorgias is silent, but Polus resumes the subject, who, from the ardor of youth, is somewhat inconsiderate, and in reply to whom the remarks on simulation and flattery are made. Callicles, who is even more vehement, speaks next, but is reduced to the conclusion that "he who would be a true orator must be a just man and must know what is just." It is therefore evident that oratory was not considered by Plato an evil, but that he thought true oratory could not be attained by any but a just and good man. 2In the Phaedrus he sets forth still more clearly that the art cannot be fully acquired without a knowledge of justice, an opinion to which I also assent. Would Plato, if he had held any other sentiments, have written the Defense of Socrates, and the eulogy of those who fell in defense of their country, compositions which are certainly work for the orator? 30. But he has even inveighed against that class of men who used their abilities in speaking for bad ends. Socrates also thought the speech which Lysias had written for him when accused improper for him to use, though it was a general practice at that time to compose for parties, appearing before the judges, speeches which they themselves might deliver; and thus an elusion of the law by which one man was not allowed to speak for another was effected. 3By Plato, also, those who separated oratory from justice and preferred what is probable to what is true, were thought no proper teachers of the art, for so he signifies, too, in his Phaedrus. 3Cornelius Celsus, moreover, may be thought to have been of the same opinion with those to whom I have just referred, for his words are the orator aims only at the semblance of truth; and he adds, a little after, not purity of conscience, but the victory of his client, is the reward of the pleader. Were such assertions true, it would become only the worst of men to give such pernicious weapons to the most mischievous of characters and to aid dishonesty with precepts, but let those who hold this opinion consider what ground they have for it.

3Let me, for my part, as I have undertaken to form a perfect orator whom I would have, above all, to be a good man, return to those who have better thoughts of the art. Some have pronounced oratory to be indentical with civil polity. Cicero calls it a part of civil polity, and a knowledge of civil polity, he thinks, is nothing less than wisdom itself. Some have made it a part of philosophy, among whom is Isocrates. 3With this character of it, the definition that oratory is the science of speaking well agrees excellently, for it embraces all the virtues of oratory at once and includes also the character of the true orator, as he cannot speak well unless he be a good man. 3To the same purpose is the definition of Chrysippus derived from Cleanthes, the science of speaking properly. There are more definitions in the same philosopher, but they relate rather to other questions. A definition framed in these terms, to persuade to what is necessary, would convey the same notion except that it makes the art depend on the result. 3Areus defines oratory well, saying that it is to speak according to the excellence of speech. Those also exclude bad men from oratory who consider it as the knowledge of civil duties, since they deem such knowledge virtue, but they confine it within too narrow bounds and to political questions. Albutius, no obscure professor or author, allows that it is the art of speaking well, but errs in giving it limitations, adding on political questions and with probability, of both which restrictions I have already disposed; those, too, are men of good intention who consider it the business of oratory to think and speak rightly.

3These are almost all the most celebrated definitions and those about which there is the most controversy. To discuss all would neither be much to the purpose nor would be in my power, since a foolish desire, as I think, has prevailed among the writers of treatises on rhetoric to define nothing in the same terms that another had already used, a vain-glorious practice which shall be far from me. 3For I shall say not what I shall invent, but what I shall approve, as, for instance, that oratory is the art of speaking well, since when the best definition is found, he who seeks for another must seek for a worse.

This being admitted, it is evident at the same time what object, what highest and ultimate end, oratory has, that object or end which is called τέλος (telos) and to which every art tends, for if oratory be the art of speaking well, its object and ultimate end must be to speak well.

 
2 - 16 Oratory said by some to be a pernicious art, because it may be perverted to bad ends, § 1-4. We might say the same of other things that are allowed to be beneficial, 6. Its excellences, 7-16. The abundant return that it makes for cultivation, 17-19.

NEXT comes the question whether oratory is useful, for some are accustomed to declaim violently against it and, what is most ungenerous, to make use of the power of oratory to lay accusations against oratory. They say that eloquence is that which saves the wicked from punishment, by the dishonesty of which the innocent are at times condemned, by which deliberations are influenced to the worse, by which not only popular seditions and tumults, but even inexpiable wars are excited, and of which the efficacy is the greatest when it exerts itself for falsehood against truth. Even to Socrates, the comic writers make it a reproach that he taught how to make the worse reason appear the better, and Plato on his part says that Tisias and Gorgias professed the same art. To these they add examples from Greek and Roman history and give a list of persons who, by exerting such eloquence as was mischievous, not only to individuals but to communities, have disturbed or overthrown the constitutions of whole states, asserting that eloquence on that account was banished from the state of Lacedaemon, and that even at Athens, where the orator was forbidden to move the passions, the powers of eloquence were in a manner curtailed.

Under such a mode of reasoning, neither will generals, nor magistrates, nor medicine, nor even wisdom itself, be of any utility, for Flaminius was a general, and the Gracchi, Saturnini, and Glauciae were magistrates; in the hands of physicians poisons have been found, and among those who abuse the name of philosophers have been occasionally detected the most horrible crimes. We must reject food, for it has often given rise to ill health; we must never go under roofs, for they sometimes fall upon those who dwell beneath them; a sword must not be forged for a soldier, for a robber may use the same weapon. Who does not know that fire and water, without which life cannot exist, and (that I may not confine myself to things of earth) that the sun and moon, the chief of the celestial luminaries, sometimes produce hurtful effects?

Will it be denied, however, that the blind Appius, by the force of his eloquence, broke off a dishonorable treaty of peace about to be concluded with Pyrrhus? Was not the divine eloquence of Cicero, in opposition to the agrarian laws, even popular? Did it not quell the daring of Catiline and gain, in the toga, the honor of thanksgivings, the highest that is given to generals victorious in the field? Does not oratory often free the alarmed minds of soldiers from fear and persuade them, when they are going to face so many perils in battle, that glory is better than life? Nor indeed would the Lacedaemonians and Athenians influence me more than the people of Rome, among whom the highest respect has always been paid to orators. Nor do I think that founders of cities would have induced their unsettled multitudes to form themselves into communities by any other means than by the influence of the art of speaking; nor would legislators, without the utmost power of oratory have prevailed on men to bind themselves to submit to the dominion of law. Even the very rules for the conduct of life, beautiful as they are by nature, have yet greater power in forming the mind when the radiance of eloquence illumines the beauty of the precepts. Though the weapons of eloquence, therefore, have effect in both directions, it is not just that that should be accounted an evil which we may use to a good purpose.

1But these points may perhaps be left to the consideration of those who think that the substance of eloquence lies in the power to persuade. But if eloquence be the art of speaking well (the definition which I adopt), so that a true orator must be, above all, a good man, it must assuredly be acknowledged that it is a useful art. 1In truth, the sovereign deity, the parent of all things, the architect of the world, has distinguished man from other beings, such at least as were to be mortal, by nothing more than by the faculty of speech 1Bodily frames superior in size, in strength, in firmness, in endurance, in activity, we see among dumb creatures and observe, too, that they have less need than we have of external assistance. To walk, to feed themselves, to swim over water, they learn in less time than we can, from nature herself, without the aid of any other teacher. 1Most of them, also, are equipped against cold by the produce of their own bodies, weapons for their defense are born with them, and their food lies before their faces; to supply all which wants mankind have the greatest difficulty. The divinity has therefore given us reason, superior to all other qualities, and appointed us to be sharers of it with the immortal gods. 1But reason could neither profit us so much, nor manifest itself so plainly within us, if we could not express by speech what we have conceived in our minds, a faculty which we see wanting in other animals far more than, to a certain degree, understanding and reflection. 1For to contrive habitations, to construct nests, to bring up their young, to hatch them, to lay up provision for the winter, to produce works inimitable by us (as those of wax and honey) is perhaps a proof of some portion of reason; but as they who do such things are without the faculty of speech, they are called dumb and irrational. 1Even to men to whom speech has been denied, of how little avail is divine reason! If, therefore we have received from the gods nothing more valuable than speech, what can we consider more deserving of cultivation and exercise? Or in what can we more strongly desire to be superior to other men than in that by which man himself is superior to other animals, especially as in no kind of exertion does labor more plentifully bring its reward? 1This will be so much the more evident if we reflect from what origin, and to what extent, the art of eloquence has advanced and how far it may still be improved. 1For not to mention how beneficial it is and how becoming in a man of virtue, to defend his friends, to direct a senate or people by his counsels, or to lead an army to whatever enterprise he may desire, is it not extremely honorable to attain, by the common understanding and words which all men use, so high a degree of esteem and glory as to appear not to speak or plead, but as was the case with Pericles, to hurl forth lightning and thunder?

 
2 - 17 Oratory is manifestly an art, § 1-4. Yet some have denied that it is and said that its power is wholly from nature, 6-8. Examples from other arts, 10. Every one that speaks is not an orator, 11-13. Opinion of Aristotle, 14. Other charges against oratory, that it has no peculiar subject or matter, and that it sometimes deceives, 15-18. Refutation of these charges, 19-21. Unfairly objected to it that it has no proper end, 22-26. Not pernicious because it sometimes misleads, 27-29. Another objection, that it may be exerted on either side of a question, and that it contradicts itself; answered, 30-36. Oratory is sometimes ignorant of the truth of what it asserts; but the same is the case with other arts and sciences, 36-40. Confirmation of its being an art, 41-43.

THERE would be no end if I should allow myself to expatiate and indulge my inclination on this head. Let us proceed, therefore, to the question that follows, whether oratory be an art. That it is an art, every one of those who have given rules about eloquence has been so far from doubting, that it is shown by the very titles of their books that they are written on the oratorical art. Cicero also says that what is called oratory is artificial eloquence. Not only orators have claimed this distinction for themselves (since they may be thought, perhaps, to have given their profession something more than its due), but the philosophers, the Stoics, and most of the Peripatetics agree with them. For myself, I confess that I was in some doubt whether I should look upon this part of the inquiry as necessary to be considered, for who is so destitute, I will not say of learning, but of the common understanding of mankind, as to imagine that the work of building, or weaving, or molding vessels out of clay, is an art, but that oratory, the greatest and noblest of works, has attained such a height of excellence without being an art? Those, indeed, who have maintained the contrary opinion I suppose not so much to have believed what they advanced as to have been desirous of exercising their powers on a subject of difficulty, like Polycrates, when he eulogized Busiris and Clytaemnestra. He is said also to have written the speech that was delivered against Socrates, nor would that indeed have been inconsistent with his other compositions.

Some will have oratory to be a natural talent, though they do not deny that it may be assisted by art. Thus Antonius, in Cicero's De Oratore, says that oratory is an effect of observation, not an art; but this is not advanced that we may receive it as true, but that the character of Antonius, an orator who tried to conceal the art that he used, may be supported. But Lysias seems to have really entertained this opinion, for which the argument is that the ignorant, barbarians, and slaves, when they speak for themselves, say something that resembles an exordium; they state facts, prove, refute, and (adopting the form of a peroration) deprecate. The supporters of this notion also avail themselves of certain quibbles upon words, that nothing that proceeds from art was before art, but that mankind have always been able to speak for themselves and against others; that teachers of the art appeared only in later times, and first of all about the age of Tisias and Corax; that oratory was therefore before art and is consequently not an art. As to the period, indeed, in which the teaching of oratory commenced, I am not anxious to inquire. We find Phoenix, however, in Homer as an instructor, not only in acting but in speaking, as well as several other orators; we see all the varieties of eloquence in the three generals and contests in eloquence proposed among the young men, and among the figures on the shield of Achilles are represented both lawsuits and pleaders. It would even be sufficient for me to observe that everything which art has brought to perfection had its origin in nature, else, from the number of the arts must be excluded medicine, which resulted from the observation of what was beneficial or detrimental to health and which, as some think, consists wholly in experiments, for somebody had, doubtless, bound up a wound before the dressing of wounds became an art and had allayed fever by repose and abstinence, not because he saw the reason of such regimen, but because the malady itself drove him to it. Else, too, architecture must not be considered an art, for the first generation of men built cottages without art; nor music, since singing and dancing, to some sort of tune, are practiced among all nations. 1So, if any kind of speaking whatever is to be called oratory, I will admit that oratory existed before it was an art; but if every one that speaks is not an orator, and if men in early times did not speak as orators, our reasoners must confess that an orator is formed by art and did not exist before art. This being admitted, another argument which they use is set aside, namely, that that has no concern with art which a man who has not learned it can do, but that men who have not learned oratory can make speeches. 1To support this argument, they observe that Demades, a waterman, and Aeschines, an actor, were orators, but they are mistaken, for he who has not learned to be an orator cannot properly be called one, and it may be more justly said that those men learned late in life than that they never learned at all, though Aeschines, indeed, had some introduction to learning in his youth, as his father was a teacher; nor is it certain that Demades did not learn, and he might, by constant practice in speaking, which is the most efficient mode of learning, have made himself master of all the power of language that he ever possessed. 1But we may safely say that he would have been a better speaker if he had learned, for he never ventured to write out his speeches for publication, though we know that he produced considerable effect in delivering them.

1Aristotle, for the sake of investigation, as is usual with him, has conceived, with his peculiar subtlety, certain arguments at variance with my opinion in his Gryllus; but he has also written three books on the art of rhetoric, in the first of which he not only admits that it is an art, but allows it a connection with civil polity, as well as with logic. 1Critolaus and Athenodorus of Rhodes have advanced many arguments on the opposite side. Agnon, by the very title of his book in which he avows that he brings an accusation against rhetoric, has deprived himself of all claim to be trusted. As to Epicurus, who shrunk from all learning, I am not at all surprised at him.

1These reasoners say a great deal, but it is based upon few arguments; I shall therefore reply to the strongest of them in a very few words that the discussion may not be protracted to an infinite length. 1Their first argument is with regard to the subject or matter, "for all arts," they say, "have some subject," as is true, "but that oratory has no peculiar subject," an assertion which I shall subsequently prove to be false. 1The next argument is a more false charge, for "no art," they say, "acquiesces in false conclusions, since art cannot be founded but on perception, which is always true; but that oratory adopts false conclusions, and is, consequently, not an art." 1That oratory sometimes advances what is false instead of what is true, I will admit, but I shall not for that reason acknowledge that the speaker acquiesces in false conclusions, for it is one thing for a matter to appear in a certain light to a person himself and another for the person to make it appear in that light to others. A general often employs false representations, as did Hannibal, when, being hemmed in by Fabius, he tied faggots to the horns of oxen, and set them on fire, and driving the herd up the opposite hills in the night, presented to the enemy the appearance of a retiring army. But Hannibal merely deceived Fabius; he himself knew very well what the reality was. 20. Theopompus, the Lacedaemonian, when, on changing clothes with his wife, he escaped from prison in the disguise of a woman, came to no false conclusion concerning himself, though he conveyed a false notion to his guards. So the orator, whenever he puts what is false for what is true, knows that it is false and that he is stating it instead of truth; he adopts, therefore, no false conclusion himself, but merely misleads another. 2Cicero, when he threw a mist, as he boasts, over the eyes of the judges in the cause of Cluentius, was not himself deprived of sight; nor is a painter, when, by the power of his art, he makes us fancy that some objects stand out in a picture and others recede, unaware that the objects are all on a flat surface.

2But they allege also that "all arts have a certain definite end to which they are directed, but that in oratory there is sometimes no end at all, and at other times, the end which is professed is not attained." They speak falsely, however, in this respect likewise, for we have already shown that oratory has an end and have stated what that end is, an end which the true orator will always attain, for he will always speak well. 2The objection might, perhaps, hold good against those who think that the end of oratory is to persuade, but my orator and his art, as defined by me, do not depend upon the result; he indeed who speaks directs his efforts towards victory, but when he has spoken well, though he may not be victorious, he has attained the full end of his art. 2So a pilot is desirous to gain the port with his vessel in safety, but if he is carried away from it by a tempest, he will not be the less a pilot and will repeat the well-known saying, "May I but keep the helm right!" 2The physician makes the health of the patient his object, but if, through the violence of the disease, the intemperance of the sick person or any other circumstance, he does not effect his purpose, yet if he has done everything according to rule, he has not lost sight of the object of medicine. So it is the object of an orator to speak well, for his art, as we shall soon show still more clearly, consists in the act and not in the result. 2That other allegation, which is frequently made, must accordingly be false also, that an art knows when it has attained its end, but that oratory does not know, for every speaker is aware when he has spoken well.

They also charge oratory with having recourse to vicious means, which no true arts adopt, because it advances what is false and endeavors to excite the passions. 2But neither of those means is dishonorable when it is used from a good motive and, consequently, cannot be vicious. To tell a falsehood is sometimes allowed, even to a wise man; and the orator will be compelled to appeal to the feelings of the judges, if they cannot otherwise be induced to favor the right side. 2Unenlightened men sit as judges who must, at times, be deceived, that they may not err in their decisions. If indeed judges were wise men; if assemblies of the people, and every sort of public council, consisted of wise men; if envy, favor, prejudice, and false witnesses had no influence, there would be very little room for eloquence, which would be employed almost wholly to give pleasure. 2But as the minds of the hearers waver, and truth is exposed to so many obstructions, the orator must use artifice in his efforts and adopt such means as may promote his purpose, since he who has turned from the right way cannot be brought back to it but by another turning.

30. Some common sarcasms against oratory are drawn from the charge that orators speak on both sides of a question, hence the remarks that "no art contradicts itself, but that oratory contradicts itself"; that "no art destroys what it has itself done, but that this is the ease with what oratory does"; that "it teaches either what we ought to say or what we ought not to say, and that in the one ease, it cannot be an art because it teaches what is not to be said, and in the other, it cannot be an art because when it has taught what is to be said, it teaches also what is directly opposed to it." 3All these charges, it is evident, are applicable only to that species of oratory which is repudiated by a good man and by virtue herself, since, where the cause is unjust, there true oratory has no place, so that it can hardly happen, even in the most extraordinary case, that a real orator, that is, a good man, will speak on both sides. 3Yet, since it may happen, in the course of things, that just causes may, at times, lead two wise men to take different sides (for the Stoics think that wise men may even contend with one another, if reason leads them to do so), I will make some reply to the objections and in such a way that they shall be proved to be advanced groundlessly and directed only against such as allow the name of orator to speakers of bad character. 3For oratory does not contradict itself; one cause is matched against another cause, but not oratory against itself. If two men who have been taught the same accomplishment contend with one another, the accomplishment which they have been taught will not, on that account, be proved not to be an art, for if such were the case, there could be no art in arms, because gladiators, bred under the same master, are often matched together, nor would there be any art in piloting a ship, because in naval engagements, pilot is often opposed to pilot, nor in generalship, because general contends with general. 3Nor does oratory destroy what it has done, for the orator does not overthrow the argument advanced by himself, nor does oratory overthrow it, because by those who think that the end of oratory is to persuade, as well as by the two wise men whom, as I said before, some chance may have opposed to one another, it is probability that is sought; and if, of two things, one at length appears more probable than the other, the more probable is not opposed to that which previously appeared probable, for as that which is more white is not adverse to that which is less white, nor that which is more sweet contrary to that which is less sweet, so neither is that which is more probable contrary to that which is less probable. 3Nor does oratory ever teach what we ought not to say or that which is contrary to what we ought to say, but that which we ought to say in whatever cause we may take in hand. 3And truth, though generally, is not always to be defended, the public good sometimes requires that a falsehood should be supported.

In Cicero's second book, De Oratore, are also advanced the following objections: that art has place in things which are known, but that the pleading of an orator depends on opinion, not on knowledge, since he both addresses himself to those who do not know and sometimes says what he himself does not know. 3One of these points, whether the judges have a knowledge of what is addressed to them, has nothing to do with the art of the orator; to the other point, that art has place in things to which are known, I must give some answer. Oratory is the art of speaking well, and the orator knows how to speak well. 3But it is said he does not know whether what he says is true; neither do the philosophers, who say that fire, or water, or the four elements, or indivisible atoms are the principles from which all things had their origin, know that what they say is true; nor do those who calculate the distances of the stars, and the magnitudes of the sun and the earth, yet every one of them calls his system an art; but if their reasoning has such effect that they seem not to imagine, but from the force of their demonstrations, to know what they assert, similar reasoning may have a similar effect in the case of the orator. 3But, it is further urged, he does not know whether the cause which he advocates has truth on its side; nor, I answer, does the physician know whether the patient, who says that he has the headache, really has it, yet he will treat him on the assumption that his assertion is true, and medicine will surely be allowed to be an art. Need I add that oratory does not always purpose to say what is true, but does always purpose to say what is like truth? But the orator must know whether what he says is like truth or not. 40. Those who are unfavorable to oratory add that pleaders often defend, in certain causes, that which they have assailed in others, but this is the fault, not of the art, but of the person.

These are the principal charges that are brought against oratory. There are others of less moment, but drawn from the same sources.

4But that it is an art may be proved in a very few words, for whether, as Cleanthes maintained, an art is a power working its effects by a course, that is by method, no man will doubt that there is a certain course and method in oratory; or whether that definition, approved by almost everybody, that an art consists of perception consenting and cooperating to some end useful to life, be adopted also by us, we have already shown that everything to which this definition applies is to be found in oratory. 4Need I show that it depends on understanding and practice, like other arts? If logic be an art, as is generally admitted, oratory must certainly be an art, as it differs from logic rather in species than in genus. Nor must we omit to observe that in whatever pursuit one man may act according to a method, and another without regard to that method, that pursuit is an art; and that in whatever pursuit he who has learned succeeds better than he who has not learned, that pursuit is an art.

4But, in the pursuit of oratory, not only will the learned excel the unlearned, but the more learned will excel the less learned, otherwise there would not be so many rules in it or so many great men to teach it. This ought to be acknowledged by every one, and especially by me, who allow the attainment of oratory only to the man of virtue.

 
2 - 18 Arts or sciences are of three kinds; rhetoric is a practical art or science, § 1, 2. Partakes of the nature of arts of other kinds, 3-5.

BUT some arts consist merely in an insight into things, that is, knowledge of them and judgment concerning them, such as astronomy, which requires no act, but is confined to a mere understanding of the matters that form the subject of it, a sort of art which is called θεωρητική (theoretikē). Others consist of action, the object of which lies in the act and is fulfilled in it, leaving nothing produced from it, a sort of art which is called πρακτική (praktikē), as dancing. Others consist in production, which attain their end in the execution of the work which is submitted to the eye, a sort which we call ποητική (poetikē), as painting. We may pretty safely determine that oratory consists in act, for it accomplishes in the act all that it has to do. Such indeed has been the judgment pronounced upon it by everyone.

To me, however, it appears to partake greatly of the other sort of arts, for the subject of it may sometimes be restricted to contemplation, since there will be oratory in an orator even though he be silent, and if, either designedly or from being disabled by any accident, he has ceased to plead, he will not cease to be an orator more than a physician who has left off practice ceases to a physician. There is some enjoyment, and perhaps the greatest of all enjoyments, in retired meditation, and the pleasure derived from knowledge is pure when it is withdrawn from action, that is, from toil and enjoys the calm contemplation of itself. But oratory will also effect something similar to a productive art in written speeches and historical compositions, a kind of writing which we justly consider as allied to oratory. Yet if it must be classed as one of the three sorts of arts which I have mentioned, let it, as its performance consists chiefly in the mere act and as it is most frequently exhibited in act, be called an active or a practical art, for the one term is of the same signification as the other.

 
2 - 19 Nature and art; nature contributes more to oratory, in students of moderate ability, than art; in those of greater talent, art is of more avail; an example.
I AM aware that it is also a question whether nature or learning contributes most to oratory. This inquiry, however, has no concern with the subject of my work, for a perfect orator can be formed only with the aid of both, but I think it of great importance how far we consider that there is a question on the point. If you suppose either to be independent of the other, nature will be able to do much without learning, but learning will be of no avail without the assistance of nature. But if they be united in equal parts, I shall be inclined to think that when both are but moderate, the influence of nature is nevertheless the greater; but finished orators, I consider, owe more to learning than to nature. Thus the best husbandman cannot improve soil of no fertility, while from fertile ground something good will be produced even without the aid of the husbandman; yet if the husbandman bestows his labor on rich land, he will produce more effect than the goodness of the soil of itself. Had Praxiteles attempted to hew a statue out of a millstone, I should have preferred to it an unhewn block of Parian marble; but if that statuary had fashioned the marble, more value would have accrued to it from his workmanship than was in the marble itself. In a word, nature is the material for learning; the one forms, and the other is formed. Art can do nothing without material, which has its value even independent of art; but perfection of art is of more consequence than perfection of material.
 
2 - 20 Whether rhetoric be a virtue, as some call it, § 1-4. Proofs of this according to the philosophers, 6-7. Other proofs, 8-10.

IT is a question of a higher nature whether oratory is to be regarded as one of those indifferent arts, which deserve neither praise nor blame in themselves, but become useful or otherwise according to the characters of those who practise them, or whether it is, as many of the philosophers are of opinion, a positive virtue.

The way, indeed, in which many have proceeded and still proceed in the practice of speaking, I consider either as no art, ἀτεχνία (atechnia), as it is called (for I see numbers rushing to speak without rule or learning, just as impudence or hunger has prompted them), or as it were a bad art, which we term κακοτεχνία (kakotechnia), for I imagine that there have been many who have exerted, and that there are some who still exert, their talent in speaking to the injury of mankind. There is also a kind of ματαιοτεχνία (mataiotechnia), a vain imitation of art, which indeed has in itself neither good nor evil, but a mere frivolous exercise of skill, such as that of the man who sent grains of vetches, shot from a distance in succession, and without missing, through a needle, and whom Alexander, after witnessing his dexterity, is said to have presented with a bushel of vetches, which was indeed a most suitable reward for his performance.

To him I compare those who spend their time with great study and labor in the composition of declamations, which they strive to make as unlike as possible to anything that happens in real life.

But that oratory which I endeavor to teach, of which I conceive the idea in my mind, which is attainable only by a good I man and which alone is true oratory, must be regarded as a virtue. This is an opinion which the philosophers support by many subtle arguments, but which appears to me to be more clearly established by the simpler mode of proof which follows and which is peculiarly my own. What is said by the philosophers is this: If it is a quality of virtue to be consistent with itself as to what ought to be done and what ought not to be done (that quality, namely, which is called prudence), the same quality will have its office as to what ought to be said or not to be said. And if there are virtues, for the generation of which, even before we receive any instruction, certain principles and seeds are given us by nature (as for that of justice, of which some notion is manifested even in the most ignorant and the most barbarous), it is evident that we are so formed originally as to be able to speak for ourselves, though not indeed perfectly, yet in such a manner as to show that certain seeds of the faculty of eloquence are in us. But in those arts which have no connection with virtue there is not the same nature. As there are two kinds of speech, therefore, the continuous, which is called oratory, and the concise, which is termed logic (which Zeno thought so nearly connected that he compared the one to an open hand and the other to a clenched fist), if the art of disputation be a virtue, there will be no doubt of the virtue of that which is of so much more noble and expansive a nature.

But I wish the reader to understand this more fully and plainly from what is done by oratory, for how will an orator succeed in eulogy unless he has a clear knowledge of what is honorable and what is disgraceful? Or in persuasion, unless he understands what is advantageous? Or in judicial pleadings, unless he has a knowledge of justice? Does not oratory also demand fortitude, as the orator has often to speak in opposition to the turbulent threats of the populace, often with perilous defiance of powerful individuals and sometimes, as on the trial of Milo, amidst surrounding weapons of soldiers? So that if oratory be not a virtue, it cannot be perfect.

If, moreover, there is a sort of virtue in every species of animals in which it excels the rest, or the greater number, of other animals, as force in the lion and swiftness in the horse, and it is certain that man excels other animals in reason and speech, why should we not consider that the distinctive virtue of man lies as much in eloquence as in reason? Crassus in Cicero justly makes an assertion to this effect: "For eloquence," says he, "is one of the most eminent virtues," and Cicero himself, in his own character, both in his epistles to Brutus and in many other passages of his writings, calls eloquence a virtue. But it may be alleged, a vicious man will sometimes produce an exordium, a statement of facts, and a series of arguments in such a way that nothing shall be desired in them. So we may answer, a robber will fight with great bravery, yet fortitude will still be a virtue, and a dishonest slave will bear torments without a groan, yet endurance of pain will still merit its praise. Many other things of the same nature occur, but from different principles of action. Let what I have said, therefore, as to eloquence being a virtue, be sufficient, for of its usefulness I have treated above.

 
2 - 21 Opinions as to the subject of rhetoric, § 1-4. That of Quintilian, which agrees with those of Plato and Cicero, 6. Objections to it noticed, 7-11. No dispute between rhetoric and philosophy about their respective subjects, 113. The orator not obliged to know everything, 115. He will often speak better on arts than the artists themselves, 16-19. The opinion of Quintilian supported by those of other authors, 20-23.

AS to the material of oratory, some have said that it is speech, an opinion which Gorgias in Plato is represented as holding. If this be understood in such a way that a discourse, composed on any subject, is to be termed a speech, it is not the material, but the work, as the statue is the work of a statuary, for speeches, like statues, are produced by art. But if by this term we understand mere words, words are of no effect without matter. Some have said that the material of oratory is persuasive arguments, which indeed are part of its business and are the produce of art, but require material for their composition. Others say that its material is questions of civil administration, an opinion which is wrong, not as to the quality of the matter, but in the restriction attached, for such questions are the subject of oratory, but not the only subject. Some, as oratory is a virtue, say that the subject of it is the whole of human life. Others, as no part of human life is affected by every virtue, but most virtues are concerned only with particular portions of life (as justice, fortitude, and temperance are regarded as confined to their proper duties and their own limits), say that oratory is to be restricted to one special part, and assign to it the pragmatic department of ethics or that which relates to the transactions of civil life.

For my part, I consider, and not without authorities to support me, that the material of oratory is everything that may come before an orator for discussion. For Socrates in Plato seems to say to Gorgias that the matter of oratory is not in words but in things. In the Phaedrus, he plainly shows that oratory has place not only in judicial proceedings and political deliberations, but also in private and domestic matters. Hence it is manifest that this was the opinion of Plato himself. Cicero, too, in one passage, calls the material of oratory the topics which are submitted to it for discussion, but supposes that particular topics only are submitted to it. But in another passage, he gives his opinion that an orator has to speak upon all subjects, expressing himself in the following words: "The art of the orator, however, and his very profession of speaking well, seems to undertake and promise that he will speak elegantly and copiously on whatever subject may be proposed to him." In a third passage, also, he says: "But by an orator, whatever occurs in human life (since it is on human life that an orator's attention is to be fixed, as the matter that comes under his consideration) ought to have been examined, heard of, read, discussed, handled, and managed."

But this material of oratory, as we define it, that is, the subjects that come before it, some have at one time stigmatized as indefinite, at another as not belonging to oratory, and have called it, as thus characterized, an ars circumcurrens, an infinitely discursive art, as discoursing on any kind of subject. With those who make these observations I have no great quarrel, for they allow that oratory speaks on all matters, though they deny that it has any pecular material because its material is manifold. But though the material be manifold, it is not infinite, and other arts, of less consideration, deal with manifold material, as architecture, for instance, for it has to do with everything that is of use for building, and the art of engraving, which works with gold, silver, brass, and iron. As to sculpture, it extends itself, besides the metals which I have just named, to wood, ivory, marble, glass, and jewels. Nor will a topic cease to belong to the orator because the professor of another art may treat of it, for if I should ask what is the material of the statuary, the answer will be "brass," or if I should ask what is the material of the founder of vases, that is, the worker in the art which the Greeks call χαλκευτική (chalkeutikē), the reply would also be "brass," though vases differ very much from statues. 1Nor ought medicine to lose the name of an art because anointing and exercise are common to it with the palaestra or because a knowledge of the quality of meats is common to it with cookery.

1As to the objection which some make, that it is the business of philosophy to discourse of what is good, useful, and just, it makes nothing against me, for when they say a philosopher, they mean a good man; and why then should I be surprised that an orator, whom I consider to be also a good man, should discourse upon the same subjects? 1This is especially true when I have shown, in the preceding book, that philosophers have taken possession of this province because it was abandoned by the orators, a province which had always belonged to oratory, so that the philosophers are rather trespassing upon our ground. Since it is the business of logic, too, to discuss whatever comes before it, and logic is uncontinuous oratory, why may not the business of continuous oratory be thought the same?

14.It is a remark constantly made by some that an orator must be skilled in all arts if he is to speak upon all subjects. I might reply to this in the words of Cicero, in whom I find this passage: "In my opinion, no man can become a thoroughly accomplished orator unless he shall have attained a knowledge of every subject of importance and of all the liberal arts," but for my argument, it is sufficient that an orator be acquainted with the subject on which he has to speak. 1He has not a knowledge of all causes, and yet he ought to be able to speak upon all. On what causes, then, will he speak? On such as he has learned. The same will be the case also with regard to the arts and sciences; those on which he shall have to speak he will study for the occasion, and on those which he has studied he will speak.

1What then, it may be said, will not a builder speak of building, or a musician of music, better than an orator? Assuredly he will speak better, if the orator does not know what the subject of inquiry in the case before him, with regard to matters connected with those sciences. An ignorant and illiterate person, appearing before a court, will plead his own cause better than an orator who does not know what the subject of dispute is; but an orator will express what he has learned from the builder, or the musician, or from his client better than the person who has instructed him. 1But the builder will speak well on building, or the musician on music, if any point in those arts shall require to be established by his opinion. He will not be an orator, but he will perform his part like an orator, as when an unprofessional person binds up a wound, he will not be a surgeon, yet he will act as a surgeon.

1Do subjects of this kind never come to be mentioned in panegyrical, or deliberative, or judicial oratory? When it was under deliberation, whether a harbor should be constructed at Ostia, were not orators called to deliver opinions on the subject? Yet what was wanted was the professional knowledge of the architect. 1Does not the orator enter on the question whether discolorations and tumors of the body are symptoms of ill health or of poison? Yet such inquiries belong to the profession of medicine? Will an orator never have to speak of dimensions and numbers? Yet we may say that such matters belong to mathematics; for my part, I believe that any subject whatever may, by some chance, come under the cognizance of the orator. If a matter does not come under his cognizance, he will have no concern with it.

20. Thus I have justly said that the material of oratory is everything that is brought under its notice for discussion, an assertion which even our daily conversation supports, for whenever we have any subject on which to speak, we often signify by some prefatory remark that the matter is laid before us. 2So much was Gorgias of opinion that an orator must speak of everything that he allowed himself to be questioned, by the people in his lecture room, upon any subject on which any one of them chose to interrogate him. Hermagoras, also, by saying that "the matter of oratory lies in the cause and the questions connected with it," comprehends under it every subject that can possibly come before it for discussion. 2If indeed he supposed that the questions do not belong to oratory, he is of a different opinion from me, but if they do belong to oratory, I am supported by his authority, for there is no subject that may not form part of a cause or the questions connected with it. 2Aristotle, too, by making three kinds of oratory, the judicial, the deliberative, and the demonstrative, has put almost everything into the hands of the orator, for there is no subject that may not enter into one of the three kinds.

2An inquiry has been also started, though by a very few writers, concerning the instrument of oratory. The instrument I call that without which material cannot be fashioned and adapted to the object which we wish to effect. But I consider that it is not the art that requires the instrument, but the artificer. Professional knowledge needs no tool, as it may be complete though it produces nothing, but the artist must have his tool, as the engraver his graving-instrument, and the painter his pencils. I shall therefore reserve the consideration of this point for that part of my work in which I intend to speak of the orator.

 
3 11 104.6
3 - 1 Quintilian proposes to consider the various branches and precept of oratory more fully than they are generally set forth in treatises on the art, a part of his work more desirable for students than agreeable to them, § 1-4. Diversities of opinions and methods, 5-7. Various writers on the art; the Greeks, 8-15. Followers of Hermagoras, Apollodorus, Theodorus, 16-18. The Romans, 19-21. Quintilian will give his own opinion on matters as they occur, 22.

Since I have examined in the second book what oratory is and what is its object; since I have shown, as well as my abilities allowed, that it is an art, that it is useful, and that it is a virtue; and since I have put under its power every subject on which it may be necessary to speak, I shall now proceed to show whence it had its origin, of what parts it consists, and how every department of it is to be contemplated and treated. For most of the writers of books on the art have stopped even short of these limits, so that Apollodorus confined himself to judicial pleadings only.

Nor am I ignorant that those who are studious of oratory have desired to receive from me that part of my work, of which this book proceeds to treat, more anxiously than any other. It is a part which, though it will be the most difficult to myself, from the necessity of examining a vast diversity of opinions, will yet perhaps afford the least pleasure to my readers, since it admits merely of a dry exposition of rules. In other parts, I have endeavored to introduce some little embellishment, not with the view of displaying my own ability (since for that purpose, a subject of more fertility might have been chosen), but in order that by that means, I might more successfully attract youth to the study of those matters which I thought necessary for their improvement; for if being stimulated by some pleasure in the reading, they might more willingly learn the precepts of which I found that a bare and dry enumeration might be repulsive to their minds and offend their ears, especially as they are grown so delicate. It was with such a view that Lucretius said he put the precepts of philosophy into verse, for he uses, as is well known, the following simile

Ac veluti pueris absinthia tetra medentes
Quum dare conantur, prius oras pocula circum
Aspirant mellis dulci, flavoque liquore

And as physicians, when they attempt to give
bitter wormwood to children, first tinge the rim round the cup
with the sweet and yellow liquid of honey, etc.
But I fear that this book may be thought to contain very little honey and a great deal of wormwood, and may be more serviceable for instruction than agreeable. I am afraid, too, that it may find the less favor, as it will contain precepts not newly invented, for the most part, by me, but previously given by others. It may also meet with some who are of contrary opinions and who will be ready to assail it, because most authors, though they have directed their steps to the same point, have made different roads towards it, and each drawn his followers into his own. Their adherents, moreover, approve whatever path they have pursued, and you will not easily alter prepossessions that have been inculcated in youth, for every one would rather have learned than learn.

But there is, as will appear in the progress of the book, an infinite diversity of opinions among authors; some have added their own discoveries to what was previously rude and imperfect, and then others, that they might seem to produce something themselves, have even altered what was right. The first writer who, after those that the poets have mentioned, touched at all upon oratory, is said to have been Empedocles, and the most ancient composers of rules on the art were Corax and Tisias, natives of Sicily, to whom succeeded a native of the same island, Gorgias the Leontine, who, as is said, was a pupil of Empedocles. Gorgias, through the advantage of a very long life (for he lived a hundred and nine years), flourished as a contemporary with many rhetoricians and was thus a rival of those whom I have just named, surviving even the age of Socrates. At the same period with him lived Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, Prodicus of Ceos, Protagoras of Abdera (from whom Euathlus is said to have learned the art of oratory, on which he published a treatise, for ten thousand denarii), Hippias of Elis, and Alcidamus of Elaae, whom Plato calls Palamedes. 1There was also Antiphon (who was the first that wrote speeches and who, besides, composed a book of rules on rhetoric, and was thought to have pleaded his own cause on a trial with great ability), Polycrates, by whom I have said that a speech was written against Socrates, and Theodorus of Byzantium, one of those whom Plato calls λογοδαίδαλοι (logodaidaloi), "artificers in words." 1Of these, the first that treated general subjects were Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, and Thrasymachus. Cicero, in his Brutus, says that no composition having any rhetorical embellishment was written before the time of Pericles, but that some pieces of his were in circulation. For my part, I find nothing answerable to the fame of such eloquence as his and am therefore the less surprised that some should think that nothing was written by Pericles, but that the writings which were circulated under his name were written by others.

1To these succeeded many other rhetoricians, but the most famous of the pupils of Gorgias was Isocrates; though authors, indeed, are not agreed as to who was his master, I, however, trust to Aristotle on that point. 1From this time different roads, as it were, began to be formed; for the disciples of Isocrates were eminent in every department of learning and, when he was grown old (he lived to complete his ninety-eighth year), Aristotle began to teach the art of oratory in his afternoon lessons, frequently parodying, as is said, the well-known verse from the tragedy of Philoctetes, thus:

Α᾽σχρὸν σιωπᾶν, καὶ ᾽Ισοκράτην ἐᾶν λέγειν

(Aischron siôpan, kai Isokratên legein)

"It is disgraceful to be silent, and to allow Isocrates to speak."
A treatise on the art of oratory was published by each of them, but Aristotle made his to consist of several books. At the same time lived Theodectes, of whose work I have already spoken. 1Theophrastus, also, a disciple of Aristotle, wrote very carefully on rhetoric, and since that time, the philosophers, especially the leaders of the Stoics and Peripatetics, have paid even greater attention to the subject than the rhetoricians. 1Hermagoras then made, as it were, a way for himself, which most orators have followed, but Athenaeus appears to have been most nearly his equal and rival. Afterwards Apollonius Molon, Areus, Caecilius, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, wrote much upon the art. 1But the two that attracted most attention to themselves were Apollodorus of Pergamus, who was the teacher of Caesar Augustus at Apollonia, and Theodorus of Gadara, who preferred to be called a native of Rhodes and whose lectures Tiberius Caesar, when he retired into that island, is said to have constantly attended. 1These two rhetoricians taught different systems, and their followers were thence called Apollodoreans and Theodoreans, after the manner of those who devote themselves to certain sects in philosophy. But the doctrines of Apollodorus you may learn best from his disciples, of whom the most exact in delivering them in Latin was Caius Valgius, in Greek Atticus. Of Apollodorus himself, the only work on the art seems to have been that addressed to Matius, for the epistle written to Domitius does not acknowledge the other books attributed to him. The writings of Theodorus were more numerous, and there are some now living who have seen his disciple Hermagoras.

1The first among the Romans, as far as I know, that composed anything on this subject, was Marcus Cato the Censor, after whom Marcus Antonius made some attempt in it—it is the only writing that is extant of his and is in quite an unfinished state. Less celebrated writers followed, whose names, if occasion shall anywhere require, I will not forbear to mention. 20. But Marcus Tullius Cicero threw the greatest light, not only on eloquence itself, but also on its precepts, giving the only model of excellence among us in speaking and in teaching the art of speaking. After him, it would be most becoming to be silent, if he himself had not said that his books on rhetoric escaped from his hands when he was very young, and if he had not intentionally omitted, in his dialogues on oratory, those minor points on which most learners require instruction. 2Cornificius wrote much on the same subject, Stertinius something considerable, and Gallio the father a little. But Celsus and Laenas, who preceded Callio, and Vilginius, Pliny, and Tutilius in our own age, have written on the art with greater accuracy. There are also at this very time eminent writers on the same subject, who, if they had embraced every part of it, would have relieved me from my present task. But I forbear to mention the names of living authors; the due time for honoring them will arrive, for their merits will live in the memory of posterity, to whom the influence of envy will not reach.

2Yet, after so many great writers, I shall not hesitate to advance, on certain points, my own opinions, for I have not attached myself to any particular sect, as if I were affected with any spirit of superstition. As I bring together the observations of many authors, liberty must be allowed my readers to choose from them what they please, being myself content, wherever there is no room for showing ability, to deserve the praise due to carefulness.

 
3 - 2 Origin of oratory, § 2. Nature and art, 3. Objection to Cicero's notion, 4.

THE question, what is the origin of oratory, need not detain us long, for who can doubt that men, as soon as they were produced, received language from nature herself, the parent of all things (which was at least the commencement of oratory), and that utility brought improvement to it, and method and exercise perfection? Nor do I see why some should think that accuracy in speaking had its rise from the circumstance that those, who were brought into any danger by accusation, set themselves to speak with more than ordinary care for the purpose of defending themselves. This, even if a more honorable cause, is not necessarily the first, especially as accusation goes before defense, unless any person would say that a sword was forged by one who prepared steel for his own defense earlier than by one who designed it for the destruction of another.

It was therefore nature that gave origin to speech and observation that gave origin to art, for as, in regard to medicine, when people saw that some things were wholesome and others unwholesome, they established an art by observing their different properties, so, with respect to speaking, when they found some things useful and others useless, they marked them for imitation or avoidance. Other people added other things to the list according to their nature; these observations were confirmed by experience, and every one then taught what he knew. Cicero, indeed, has attributed the origin of eloquence to founders of cities and to legislators, in whom there certainly must have been some power of speaking, but why he should regard this as the very origin of oratory, I do not see. There are nations at this day without any fixed settlements, without cities, and without laws, and yet men who are born among them discharge the duties of ambassadors, make accusations and defenses, and think that one person speaks better than another.

 
3 - 3 Divisions of the art of Oratory, § 1-3. Various opinions respecting them, 5. Cicero's not always the same, 7. Opinions of some Greek writers, 9. Of the order of the division or parts, 10. Whether they should be called parts, or works, or elements, 11.

The whole art of oratory, as the most and greatest writers have taught, consists of five parts: invention, arrangement, expression, memory, and delivery or action (the last is designated by either of these terms). But every speech, by which any purpose is expressed, must of necessity consist of both matter and words; and, if it is short and included in one sentence, it may perhaps call for no further consideration. But a speech of greater length requires attention to a greater number of particulars, for it is not only of consequence what we say and how we say it, but also where we say it; there is need therefore also for arrangement. But we cannot say everything that our subject demands, nor everything in its proper place, without the assistance of memory, which will accordingly constitute a fourth part. And a delivery which is unbecoming either as to voice or gesture, vitiates and almost renders ineffectual all those other requisites of eloquence. To delivery therefore must necessarily be assigned the fifth place.

Nor are some writers, among whom is Albutius to be regarded, who admit only the first three parts, because memory, they say, and delivery (on which we shall give directions in the proper place), come from nature, not from art. Thracymachus, however, was of the same opinion as far as concerns delivery. To these some have added a sixth part, by subjoining judgment to invention, as it is our first business to invent, and then to judge. For my part, I do not consider that he who has not judged has invented, for a person is not said to have invented contradictory or foolish arguments, or such as are of equal value to himself and his adversary, but not to have avoided them. Cicero, indeed, in his Rhetorica, has included judgment under invention, but to me, judgment appears to be so mingled with the first three parts (for there can neither be arrangement nor expression without it), that I think even delivery greatly indebted to it. This I would the more boldly affirm, as Cicero, in his Partitiones Oratoriae, arrives at the same five divisions of which I have just spoken, for after first dividing oratory into two parts, invention and expression, he has put matter and arrangement under invention, and words and delivery under expression, and has then made memory a fifth part, having a common influence on all the rest, and being, as it were, the guardian of them. He also says, in his books De Oratore, that eloquence consists of five divisions, and the opinions expressed in these books, as they were written at a later period, may be regarded as more settled.

Those authors appear to me to have been not less desirous to introduce something new, who have added order after having previously specified arrangement, as if arrangement were anything else than the disposition of things in the best possible order. Dion has specified only invention and arrangement, but has made each of them of two kinds, relating to matter and to words, so that expression may be included under invention, and delivery under arrangement, to which parts a fifth, memory, must be added. The followers of Theodorus, for the most part, distinguish invention into two sorts, referring to matter and expression, and then add the three other parts. Hermagoras puts judgment, division, order, and whatever relates to expression, under economy, which, being a Greek term, taken from the care of domestic affairs and used in reference to this subject metaphorically, has no Latin equivalent.

There is also a question about the following point, namely, that, in settling the order of the parts, some have put memory after invention, some after arrangement. To me the fourth place seems most suitable for it, for we must not only retain in mind what we have imagined, in order to arrange it, and what we have arranged in order to express it, but we must also commit to memory what we have comprised in words, since it is in the memory that everything that enters into the composition of a speech is deposited.

1There have been also many writers inclined to think that these divisions should not be called parts of the art of oratory but duties of the orator, as it is the business of the orator to invent, arrange, express, etc. 1But if we coincide in this opinion, we shall leave nothing to art, for to speak well is the duty of the orator, yet skill in speaking well constitutes the art of oratory, or as others express their notions, it is the duty of the orator to persuade, yet the power of persuading lies in his art. Thus to invent arguments and arrange them are the duties of the orator, yet invention and arrangement may be thought peculiar parts of the art of oratory.

1It is a point, too, about which many have disputed, whether these are parts of the art of oratory or works of it, or (as Athenaeus thinks) elements of it, which the Greeks call στοιχεῖα (stoicheia). But no one can properly call them elements, for in that case, they will be merely first principles, as water, or fire, or matter, or indivisible atoms, are called the elements of the world; nor can they justly be named works, as they are not performed by others, but perform something themselves. 1They are therefore parts, for as oratory consists of them and as a whole consists of parts, it is impossible that those things of which the whole is composed can be anything else but parts of that whole. Those who have called them works appear to me to have been moved by this consideration, that they did not like, in making the other division of oratory, to adopt the same term, for the parts of oratory, they said, were the panegyrical, the deliberative, and the judicial. 1But if these are parts, they are parts of the matter rather than the art, for in each of them is included the whole of oratory, since no one of them can dispense with invention, arrangement, expression, memory, and delivery. Some, therefore, have thought it better to say that there are three kinds of oratory, but those whom Cicero has followed have given the most reasonable opinion, namely, that there are three kinds of subjects for oratory.

 
3 - 4 Whether there are three sorts of oratory, or more, § 1-3. Quintilian adheres to the old opinion that there are but three; his reasons, 4-8. Opinions of Anaximenes, Plato, Isocrates, 9-11. Quintilian's own method, 12-15. He does not assign particular subjects to each kind, 16.

BUT it is a question whether there are three or more. Certainly almost all writers, at least those of the highest authority among the ancients, have acquiesced in this tripartite distinction, following the opinion of Aristotle, who merely calls the deliberative by another name, concionalis, "suitable for addresses to public assemblies." But a feeble attempt was made at that time by some of the Greek writers, an attempt which has since been noticed by Cicero in his books De Oratore, and is now almost forced upon us by the greatest author of our own day, to make it appear that there are not only more kinds, but kinds almost innumerable. Indeed, if we distinguish praising and blaming in the third part of oratory, in what kind of oratory shall we be said to employ ourselves when we complain, console, appease, excite, alarm, encourage, direct, explain obscure expressions, narrate, entreat, offer thanks, congratulate, reproach, attack, describe, command, retract, express wishes or opinions, and speak in a thousand other ways? So that if I adhere to the opinion of the ancients, I must, as it were, ask pardon for doing so and must inquire by what considerations they were induced to confine a subject of such extent and variety within such narrow limits? Those who say that the ancients were in error suppose that they were led into it by the circumstance that they saw in their time orators exerting themselves for the most part in these three kinds only. For laudatory and vituperative speeches were then written; it was customary to pronounce funeral orations; and a vast deal of labor was bestowed on deliberative and judicial eloquence, so that the writers of books on the art included in them the kinds of eloquence most in use as the only kinds. But those who defend the ancients make three sorts of hearers: one, who assemble only to be gratified; a second, to listen to counsel; and a third, to form a judgment on the points in debate. For myself, while I am searching for all sorts of arguments in support of these various opinions, it occurs to me that we might make only two kinds of oratory, on this consideration, that all the business of an orator lies in causes either judicial or extrajudicial. Of matters in which decision is sought from the opinion of a judge, the nature is self-evident; those which are not referred to a judge have respect either to the past or to the future; the past we either praise or blame; and about the future we deliberate. We may also add, that all subjects on which an orator has to speak are either certain or doubtful. The certain he praises or blames, according to the opinion which he forms of them; of the doubtful, some are left free for ourselves to choose how to decide on them, and concerning these there must be deliberation. Some are left to the judgment of others, and concerning these there must be litigation.

Anaximenes admitted only the general divisions of judicial and deliberative, but said that there were seven species: those, namely, of exhorting and dissuading, of praising and blaming, of accusing and defending, and of examining, which he calls the exetastic sort. But it is easy to see that the first two of these species belong to the deliberative kind of oratory, the two following to the epideictic, and the last three to the judicial. I pass over Protagoras, who thinks that the only parts of oratory are those of interrogating, replying, commanding, and intreating, which he calls εὐχωιή (euchōlē). Plato, in his Sophistes, has added to the judicial and deliberative a third kind which he calls προσομιλητικόν (prosomiletikon), and which we may allow ourselves to call the sermocinatory sort, which is distinct from the oratory of the forum and suited to private discussions, and of which the nature is the same as that of dialectics or logic. 1Isocrates thought that praise and blame have a place in every kind of oratory.

To me it has appeared safest to follow the majority of writers, and so reason seems to direct. 1There is, then, as I said, one kind of oratory in which praise and blame are included, but which is called, from the better part of its office, the panegyrical; others, however, term it the demonstrative or epideictic (Both names are thought to be derived from the Greeks, who apply to those kinds the epithets ἐγκωμιαστικόν (enkōmiastikon) and ἐπιδεκτικό (epideiktikon). 1But the word epideiktikon seems to me to have the signification not so much of demonstration as of ostentation, and to differ very much from the term enkōmiastikon, for though it includes in it the laudatory kind of oratory, it does not consist in that kind alone. 1Would any one deny that panegyrical speeches are of the epideictic kind? Yet they take the suasory form and generally speak of the interests of Greece. So that there are, indeed, three kinds of oratory, but in each of them part is devoted to the subject-matter and part to display. But perhaps our countrymen, when they call a particular kind demonstrative, do not borrow the name from the Greeks, but are simply led by the consideration that praise and blame demonstrate what the exact nature of anything is. 1The second kind is the deliberative, and the third the judicial. Other species will fall under these genera, nor will there be found any one species in which we shall not have either to praise or to blame, to persuade or to dissuade, to enforce a charge or to repel one, while to conciliate, to state facts, to inform, to exaggerate, to extenuate, and to influence the judgment of the audience by exciting or allaying the passions are common to every sort of oratory.

1I could not agree even with those who, adopting, as I think, a division rather easy and specious than true, consider that the matter of panegyrical eloquence concerns what is honorable, that of deliberative what is expedient, and that of judicial what is just; all are supported, to a certain extent, by aid one from another, since in panegyric, justice and expediency are considered, and in deliberations, honor; and you will rarely find a judicial pleading into some part of which something of what I have just mentioned does not enter.

 
3 - 5 Division into things and words; other divisions, § 1-Questions concerning what is written and what is not written, Definite and indefinite questions, 5-Species of indefinite ones, 8-1Questions on general subjects not useless, 12-1Definition of a cause, 11

BUT every speech consists at once of that which is expressed and of that which expresses, that is, of matter and words. Ability in speaking is produced by nature, art, and practice, to which some add a fourth requisite, namely imitation, which I include under art. There are also three objects which an orator must accomplish: to inform, to move, to please. This is a clearer partition than that of those who divide the whole of oratory into what concerns things and passions, since both these will not always find a place in the subjects of which we shall have to treat. Some subjects are altogether unconnected with the pathetic, which, though it cannot make room for itself everywhere, yet, wherever it forces an entrance, produces a most powerful effect.

The most eminent authors are of opinion that there are some things in pleading that require proof and others that do not require it, and I agree with them. Some, however, as Celsus, think that an orator will not speak on any subject unless there be some question about it. But the majority of authors, as well as the general division of oratory into three kinds, are opposed to him, unless we say that to praise what is acknowledged to be honorable, and to blame what is admitted to be dishonorable is no part of an orator's business.

All writers admit, however, that questions depend on what is written or what is not written. Questions about something written concern legality, those about something not written concern fact. Hermagoras and those who follow him call the former kind legal questions, the latter rational questions, using the terms νομικόν (nomikon) and λογικόν (logikon). Those who make all questions relate to things and words are of the same opinion.

It is also agreed that questions are either indefinite or definite. The indefinite are those which, without regard to persons, time, place, and other such circumstances, are argued for or against. This sort of questions the Greeks call θέσεις (theseis); Cicero propositions; others "general questions relating to civil affairs"; others "questions suitable for philosophical discussion"; while Athenaeus makes them "parts of the cause to be decided." Cicero distinguishes them into questions relating to knowledge and to action, so that "Is the world governed by divine providence?" will be a question of knowledge, "Ought we to take part in the management of public affairs?" a question of action. The former kind he subdivides into three species: "whether a thing is," "what it is," and "of what nature it is," for all these points may be unknown. The latter kind he divides into two: "how we should obtain the thing in question" and "how we should use it."

Definite questions embrace particular circumstances, persons, times, and other things; they are called by the Greeks ὑποθέσεις (hypotheseis); by our countrymen, "causes." In these the whole inquiry seems to be about things and persons. The indefinite is always the more comprehensive, for from it comes the definite. To make this plainer by an example, the question "whether a man should marry" is indefinite, the question "whether Cato should marry" is definite, and may accordingly become the subject of a suasory speech. But even those which have no allusion to particular persons are generally referred to something, for "ought we to take a share in the government of our country?" is an abstract question, but "ought we to take a share in the government of it under a tyranny?" has reference to something definite. Yet here also there lies concealed, as it were, a person, for the word "tyranny" doubles the question, and there is a tacit consideration of time and quality; yet you cannot properly call the question a cause.

Those questions which I call indefinite are also called general, and if this be a proper term, definite questions will also be special. But in every special question is included the general, as being antecedent. In judicial causes, too, I know not whether whatever comes under the question of quality is not general: Milo killed Clodius: "He was in the right to kill a lier-in-wait": does not this question arise, "Whether it be right to kill a lier-in-wait?" In conjectural matters, also, are not these questions general, "was hatred, or covetousness, the cause of the crime? Ought we to trust to evidence extracted by torture? Ought greater credit to be given to witnesses or to arguments?" As to definitions, it is certain that everything comprehended in them is expressed generally.

1Some think that those questions which are limited to particular persons and causes may sometimes be called theses, if only put in a different way, so that, when "Orestes is accused," it is a cause, but when it is inquired "Was Orestes justly acquitted?" it is a thesis. Of this sort is also the question "Was Cato right in giving Marcia to Hortensius?" These writers distinguish a thesis from a cause by saying that a thesis has respect to what is theoretical, a cause to what is actually done, since in regard to a thesis, we dispute only with a view to abstract truth, but in a cause, we consider some particular act.

1Some, however, think that the consideration of general questions is useless to an orator, as it is of no profit for it to be proved, they say, that we ought to marry or that we should take part in the government of the state, if we are hindered from doing so by age or ill health. But we cannot make the same objection to all questions of the kind, as, for example, to these: whether virtue is the chief good, and whether the world is governed by divine providence. 1Moreover, in inquiries that relate to an individual, though it is not enough to consider the general question, yet we cannot arrive at the decision of the particular point without discussing the general question first. For how will Cato consider whether he himself ought to marry, unless it be first settled whether men ought to marry at all? Or how will it be inquired whether Cato ought to marry Marcia, if it be not previously decided whether Cato ought to take a wife? 1Yet there are books in circulation under the name of Hermagoras which support the opinion that I am opposing, but either the title is fictitious or it was another Hermagoras that wrote them. For how can they be the productions of the same Hermagoras who wrote so much and so admirably on this art, when, as is evident, even from Cicero's first book on rhetoric, he divided the subject matter of oratory into theses and causes? There, Cicero condemns this division, contending that the thesis is no concern of the orator's, and referring this kind of question wholly to the philosophers. 1But Cicero has relieved me from all shame at differing with him, as he not only censures those books himself, but also, in his Orator, in the books which he wrote De Oratore, and in his Topica, directs us to abstract the discussion from particular persons and occasions, because we can speak more fully on what is general than what is special, and because whatever is proved universally must also be proved particularly. 1As to the state of the question, it is the same with regard to every kind of thesis as with regard to causes. To this is added that there are some questions that concern matters absolutely, and others that refer to something particular; of the former kind is whether a man ought to marry; of the latter, whether an old man ought to marry; of the former kind, is whether a man be brave; of the latter, whether he be braver than another man.

1Apollodorus, to adopt the translation of his disciple Valgius, defines a cause thus: The cause is the matter having regard in all its parts to the question, or, the cause is the matter of which the question is the object. He then gives this definition of the matter: The matter is the combination of persons, places, times, motives, means, incidents, acts, instruments, sayings, things written and not written. 1For my part, I here understand by the "cause" what the Greeks call ὑποθέσις (hypothesis), by the "matter" what they term περίστασις (peristasis). But some writers have defined the cause itself in the same way as Apollodorus defines the matter. Isocrates says that a cause is a definite question relating to civil affairs, or a disputed point between a definite number of persons. Cicero speaks of it in these words: A cause is determined by reference to certain persons, places, times, actions, and events, depending for decision either on all or the majority of them.

 
3 - 6 Of the status or position of a cause, § 1-4. What it is, 5-12. From whom the position proceeds, the accuser or defendant, 13-21. How many positions there are; the ten categories of Aristotle, 22-24. Others make nine, others seven, 25-28. As to the number of positions, some make one only, 230. Others two, as Archidemus, Pamphilus, Apollodorus, Theodorus, Posidonius, Cornelius Celsus, 31-38. Another mode of making two positions, 40-43. Most authors make three, as Cicero, Patrocles, Marcus Antonius Virginius, 44-46. Athenaeus, Caecilius, and Theon make four, 45-48. The quadripartite methods of Aristotle and Cicero, 450. Some have made five, six, seven, eight positions, 51-54. Distinction of status rationales, quoestiones legales , 55-57. Cicero speaks of a status negotialis559. Hermagoras first introduced exception, 60.60. Legal questions; Albutius, 662. Quintilian departs in some degree from the method which he formerly adopted, 63-67. His opinion of exception; remarks upon it, 68-79. In every cause there are three points to be ascertained, 80-82. A fourfold division, useful to learners, 83-85. These four points included under two genera, the rationale and the legale887. Resemblances in the genus legale spring from the three points above-mentioned, 88-90. In every simple cause there is but one position, 91-93. In complex causes there are several positions, either of the same or of different kinds; examples, 94-104.

SINCE every cause, therefore, is comprehended in some status or position, I think that before I proceed to specify how the several kinds of causes are to be managed, I must consider that question which has reference to all of them alike, what is a position as well as whence it is drawn, and how many and what kinds of positions there are? Some have been of opinion, however, that all these questions concern only judicial matters; but, when I have treated of all the three kinds of oratory, the result will make their ignorance apparent. What I call the position, some term the "settlement"; others the "question"; others "that which appears from the question"; and Theodorus styles it the "general head", κεφάλαιον γενικώτατον (kephalaion genikotaton), to which everything else is referred. But though the names are different, the meaning is the same; nor is it of any consequence to learners by what term anything is distinguished, so that the thing itself be clear. The Greeks call the position στάσιν (stasis), a name which they think was not first given it by Hermagoras, but, as some suppose, by Naucratis, a disciple of Isocrates, or, as others imagine, by Zopyrus of Clazomenae; though even Aeschines appears to use the term in his oration against Ctesiphon when he intreats the judges not to allow Demosthenes to wander from the subject, but to oblige him to speak directly to the position of the case. The name is said to be derived either from the fact that in it lies the commencement of controversy in the cause, or that the cause rests on it.

Such is the origin of its name; let us now consider what it is. Some have defined the position to be the first conflict of questions, who, I think, have conceived rightly, but have not expressed themselves with sufficient judgment. For the position is not the first conflict: "You have done, I have not done," but that which results from the first conflict, that is, the nature of the question, "you have done; I have not done; has he done? You have done this; I have not done this; what has he done?" But as it appears from these examples, that the first sort of question depends on conjecture, the other on definition, and as it is on these points that each side will insist, the question will be one either of a conjectural or of definitive position. Supposing a person should say, "Sound is the concussion of two bodies"; he would be in the wrong, I think, for the sound is not the concussion, but the result of the concussion. This is a mistake, however, of but trifling consequence, for the meaning is understood in whatever way it be expressed. But in regard to oratory, an error of vast importance has arisen among students who have imperfectly understood their authors and who, as they read the words "first conflict," thought that the position was always to be taken from the first question, a supposition which is altogether unfounded. For there is no question that has not its position, since there is none that is not founded on assertion and denial. But some questions form an integral part of causes, and on these a decision must be pronounced, while others are introduced from without, contributing something, however, like auxiliaries, to the general strength of the cause, and it then happens that there are said to be several questions in the same suit. Of these the least important often occupies the first place, for it is a common artifice among us to abandon those points in which we have least trust, after they have been dwelt upon, sometimes conceding them as it were, of our own accord, to the opposite side, and sometimes contenting ourselves with making an ascent from them to stronger grounds of argument.

A simple cause, though it may be defended in various ways, cannot contain more than one point on which a decision is to be pronounced. Hence the position of the cause will be that which the pleader regards as the chief object to be gained, and the judge as the chief object of attention, for it is on this that the cause will take its stand. But of questions there may be different positions, since, to make this plain by a very short example, when the accused says, "Even if I did it, I was right in doing it," he makes the position that of quality, but when he adds, "but I did not do it," he makes it that of conjecture. But the defense, "I have not done it," is always the stronger, and therefore I shall consider the position as lying in that argument which I should use if I were not allowed to use more than one. 1We therefore rightly say the first conflict of causes, not of questions. Cicero, in pleading for Rabirius Postumus, makes it his object, in the first part of his speech, to show that the charge could not be brought against a Roman knight, but in the latter part, he asserts that no money came into his client's hands. But I should say that the state lies in that which is the stronger point. 1Nor, in his speech for Milo, should I consider that the struggle in the cause commences with those early questions which are introduced immediately after the exordium, but where he proceeds to prove, with his whole strength, that Clodius was a lier-in-wait, and was therefore justly put to death. And that which an orator ought to settle in his mind before everything else, even though he purpose to offer many arguments in support of his cause, is what he would wish to be most apparent to the judge. But though this is the first thing to be considered, it does not follow that it will be the first to be stated.

1Others have thought that the position is the first point of opposition offered by the party against whom you are pleading, an opinion which Cicero expressed in the following words: "On which the defense first takes its stand, as if ready to grapple with the opponent to overthrow him." Hence, again, rises another question, whether he who replies always determines the position. To this notion Cornelius Celsus is eminently opposed, saying the position does not arise from him who denies, but from him who supports his own assertion. For instance, if an accused person denies that a man has been killed, the position would come from the accuser, because he would proceed to prove what he had affirmed; if the accused should say that the man was lawfully killed, the position would come from him, and the affirmation be on his side, the burden of proof being transferred from one party to the other. 1With that writer I do not agree, for what is said in contradiction to him is nearer the truth, that there is no point of dispute if the party with whom you are going to law makes no reply, and that accordingly the state proceeds from the respondent. 1In my own opinion, however, the case happens sometimes one way and sometimes another, varying according to the nature of the cause, because the affirmation may be thought sometimes to determine the position, as in conjectural causes. For it is rather the plaintiff that uses conjecture (some, moved by this consideration, have said that the position proceeding from the defendant is a negative position), and in a syllogism the whole of the reasoning proceeds from him who affirms. 1But because he who denies appears in those cases also to lay upon the opposite party the necessity of determining the position (for if he says, "I have not done the deed," he will oblige his opponent to use conjecture, and if he says, "My opponent has not the law on his side," he will compel him to have recourse to the syllogism), let us grant that the position proceeds from the defendant. Nevertheless, however, the matter will come to the same thing, that sometimes the plaintiff will determine the position, and sometimes the defendant.

1For let this be the assertion of the accuser, "You have killed a man." If the accused deny the charge, it is the accused that will determine the position, but if he admits the truth of it, but says that the man was an adulterer and was lawfully killed (and it is certain that there is a law which gives permission to kill an adulterer), then unless the accuser makes some reply, there will be no case. But if the accuser rejoins, "He was not an adulterer," refutation then commences on the part of the accuser, and it is he that will determine the position, which will thus indeed have its origin in the first denial. But that denial will be made by the accuser, not by the accused. 1It may happen, too, that the same question may make the same person either accuser or accused; for instance, the law says, "Let not him who has exercised the profession of an actor sit in the first fourteen rows of seats"; but a man who had appeared as an actor before the praetor in his garden, but had not exhibited himself on the public stage, seated himself on one of those fourteen rows. 1The charge then brought against him is, "You have exercised the profession of an actor," the denial is, "I have not exercised it," and the question, "What is it to exercise the profession of an actor?" If he be accused under the law respecting the theater, the denial will proceed from the accused. But if he be expelled from the theater and demand reparation for unjust expulsion, the denial will be on the part of the accuser. 20. But that which is laid down by the majority of writers will certainly be of more frequent occurrence.

Those have escaped these difficulties who have said that the position is that which results from the affirmation and the denial, such as, "You have done the deed," "I have not done it," or "I was right in doing it." 2Let us consider, however, whether that is the isuee, or whether it is in that that the position lies. Hermagoras calls that the position from which the matter in question is understood, and to which also the proofs of each party are directed as their object. My own opinion has always been, as there are frequently different positions of questions in a cause, to regard that as the position of the cause which is the strongest point in it and on which the whole matter chiefly turns. If any one profess to call this the general question, or the general head, I shall not dispute with him on that point (any more than if he should invent yet another name by which the same thing might be signified, although I know that many rhetoricians have devoted whole volumes to this discussion). But I am satisfied to let it be called the position. 2As there is the greatest dissension among writers, however, on all other matters, so in regard to this there appears to me to have been extraordinary eagerness to advance different opinions, insomuch that it is neither agreed what number of positions there are, nor what are their names, nor which of them are general and which special.

2Aristotle, first of all, specifies ten elements, to which every possible question appears to have some reference:

Οὐσια (ousia) which Flavius calls essentia (nor indeed is there any other Latin word for it) and to which belongs the question "whether a thing is";
Quality, of which the signification is plain enough;
Quantity, of which a twofold distinction has been made by later writers, in reference to the questions "how great?" and "how many?"
Relation to something, whence are drawn considerations concerning "exception" and "comparison";
Where;
When;
Doing,
Suffering;
Condition, which has regard to a person's "being armed" or "clothed";
κεῖσθαι (keisthai), "position," which is a comprehensive sort of category, having reference to "sitting," "standing," or "lying."
But of all these, the first four only appear to concern the positions of causes; the rest seem to concern only topics for argument. 2Others have specified nine elements:

Person, in respect to which inquiry is made concerning the mind, the body, and external circumstances; an element which, I see, refers to the means of establishing conjecture and quality;
Time, which the Greeks call χρόνος (chronos), in regard to which arises, for example, the question "whether he whom his mother brought forth when she was given up to her creditors was born a slave?"
Place, in connection with which arises such a question as "whether it was lawful to kill a tyrant in a temple," or "whether he who lay hid in his own house underwent his term of exile;"
Time in another sense, which the Greeks call καιρός (kairos), and which they would have to mean a portion of time in a more general sense, as summer, or winter; under this falls the question about "the reveller during a pestilence;"
πρᾶξις (praxis), "act," or to which they refer the question "whether a man did a thing knowingly or unknowingly; from compulsion or by chance";
Number, which may be regarded as a species of quantity, as "whether thirty rewards were due to Thrasybulus for having cut off thirty tyrants";
Cause, from which proceed many trials, as whenever a deed is not denied, but defended, as having been done with justice;
τρόπος (tropos), or "manner," when what the law allowed to be done in one way is said to have been done in another; hence arises the question about "the adulterer scourged or starved to death;"
Opportunity for action, which is too well understood to need any explanation or example; the Greek term however is ἀφορμαὶ ἔργων (aphormai ergōn).
2These writers, like Aristotle, think that no case can occur that does not connect itself with some of these elements. Some take away two of them, "number" and "opportunity," and for what I called "act" substitute "things," that is, πραγματα (pragmata). These doctrines I have thought it sufficient just to notice, that I might not be supposed to have purposely omitted them. But I neither consider that positions of causes are properly determined by these categories, nor that all topics for argument are included in them. This will be apparent to those who read with attention what I am going to say on each of these heads, for there will be found to be many particulars that are not comprehended under these elements.

2I have read in many authors that some rhetoricians are of opinion that there is in reality but one position, namely, the conjectural; but who the rhetoricians that held this opinion were, those authors have not told us, nor have I been able anywhere to discover. They are said, however, to have formed their notions on this ground: that our knowledge of everything is the result of indications. But from similar reasoning they might say that the only position is that of quality, as a question may always arise about the quality or nature of anything about which we speak. 30. From either mode the greatest confusion will result; nor will it make any difference, indeed, whether we admit one kind of position only, or none at all, if all causes are of the same nature. "Conjecture" is derived from conjicere, "to throw together," that is, from making all our reasonings converge towards truth; whence also interpreters of dreams and omens are called conjectores, "conjecturers." But this sort of position has received various names, as will appear from what follows.

3Some have made two kinds of positions. Archidemus, for instance, admitted the conjectural and the definitive, excluding that of quality, because he thought that we imagine about quality thus—"What is unjust? What is iniquitous? What is it to be disobedient?"—questions which he terms de eodem et alio, "about identity and difference." 3With this opinion theirs is at variance who would make indeed two kinds of position—one negative and one juridical. The negative is the same as that which we call the conjectural, to which some have given the term "negative" absolutely, others partially, because they considered that the accuser employs conjecture, and the accused, denial. The juridical is that which in Greek is called δικαιολογικός (dikaiologikos), "treating of right." 3But as "quality" is set aside by Archidemus, so by these writers is rejected "definition," which they make dependent on the juridical position and think that we must imagine "whether it is right that what is charged against a person should be called sacrilege," for example, "or theft, or madness." 3Of this opinion was Pamphilus, but he distinguished quality into several kinds.

Many succeeding writers, altering only the names, have divided positions of causes into two kinds by saying that they are either about something that is doubtful, or about something that is certain. For such indeed is the case, nor can it be otherwise, than either certain that a thing has been done, or uncertain. If it is uncertain, the position is conjectural; if it is certain, there is room for other kinds of positions. 3Indeed, Apollodorus says the same thing when he observes that the question lies either in things external, by which conjecture is settled, or in our own opinions, calling the former sort of questions πραγματικόν (pragmatikon), "practical," the latter περὶ ἐννοίας (peri ennoias), "dependent on judgment." Those also say the same who make the two kinds of position, ἀπροληπτον (aprolēpton) and προληπτικόν (prolēptikon), "dubious" and "presumptive," the latter meaning what is evident. 3Theodorus, too, expresses himself similarly, as he thinks that the question is either as to whether a thing has happened, or as to particulars relating to what is admitted to have happened, that is, περὶ οὐσίας καί συμβεβηκότων (peri ousias kai symbebēkotōn).

For in all these distinctions the first kind of position belongs to conjecture, the second to other matters. But these other matters Apollodorus makes to be two: quality and de nomine, that is definition; Theodorus four: existence, quality, quantity, and relation. 3There are some also who make the question de eodem et alio, "about identity and difference," belong sometimes to quality and sometimes to definition.

Posidonius, too, ranges positions of causes under two heads, words and things. With respect to a word, he thinks that the questions are, "Whether it has any meaning?" "What?" "How many meanings?" and "How it has such meaning?" With respect to things, he notices conjecture, which he calls κατ᾽ αἲσθησιν (kat' aisthēsin), "assumption from perception," quality, definition, κατ᾽ ἒννοιαν (kat' ennoian), "rational induction," and relation. Hence also comes the distinction into things written and unwritten. 3Cornelius Celsus, himself, also makes two general positions: "Whether a thing is" and "of what nature it is." Under the first he includes definition, because it is equally a question whether a man who denies that he has stolen anything from a temple, or who owns that he stole from it the money of a private individual, is guilty of sacrilege. Quality he divides into fact and what is written; to what is written he assigns four legal questions, setting aside exception; quantity and intention he puts under conjecture.

3There is also another method of division into two positions, which tells us that a question must relate either to substance or to quality, and that quality is considered either in its most general sense or with regard to particulars. 40. To substance belongs conjecture, for inquiry may be made concerning anything, "whether it has been, is, or will be," and sometimes concerning the intention of it. This is better than the method of those who have named the conjectural position a position of fact, as if inquiry could be made only concerning the past and concerning what has been done. 4As to the consideration of quality in its most general sense, as "Whether that is honorable which is everywhere commended," it rarely occurs in judicial proceedings. But with reference to particulars, questions arise either about some common term, as "Whether he has committed sacrilege who has stolen a private person's money from a temple," or about a name given to some particular act, when it is certain that an act has been done, and there is no doubt about the act that has been done. Under this head are included all questions about what is honorable, just, expedient. 4In these positions, too, are said to be comprehended others, because quantity is sometimes referred to conjecture, as in the question, "Is the sun greater than the earth?" and sometimes to quality, as when it is asked, "What degree of punishment or reward is it just for some particular individual to receive," because, also, exception has relation to quality, and definition is concerned with exception. 4Moreover, contradictory laws, and the ratiocinatory position, that is, the syllogism, and questions in general regarding writings and the intention of the writer, depend on considerations of equity (except that this last case sometimes admits of conjecture, as when we inquire what the legislator meant). But ambiguity must necessarily be explained by conjecture, because, as it is plain that the words may be understood in two ways, the question is solely about the intention.

4By a great number of writers there are recognized three general positions, a division which Cicero also adopts in his Orator, expressing his opinion that everything that can become a subject of controversy or dispute is comprehended in the questions "Whether it is," "what it is," and "of what particular nature it is"; the names are too well known to make it necessary to mention them. Patrocles is of the same opinion. 4Marcus Antonius also made three positions, as in the following words: "The questions from which all pleadings arise are but few: whether a thing has been done or has not been done; if whether it is right or wrong; whether it is good or bad." But since that which we are said to have done rightly is understood in such a sense that we appear to have acted, not merely in conformity with the law, but in accordance with equity, those who have followed Antonius have been inclined to distinguish those positions more exactly. Consequently, they have called them the conjectural, the legal, and the juridical, a distinction which is approved by Virginius. 4Of these they then made several species, so as to put definition under the legal position, as well as other positions which have their name from what is written. These include contradictory laws, which is called ἀντινομία (antinomia); that of writing and meaning or intention, that is, κατὰ ῥητὸν καὶ διάνοιαν (kata rhēton kai dianoian); that of μετάληψις (metalepsis), which we distinguish by different terms, as translative, transsumptive, transpositive; the syllogism, which we call the ratiocinatory or collective position; and that of ambiguity, which is called in Greek ἀμϕιβολία (amphibolia): all which I have enumerated, because they are called positions by most writers, though some would prefer that they should be called legal questions.

4Athenaeus has made four positions, the προτρεπτικὴ (protreptikē) or παρορμητικὴ στάσις (parormētikē stasis), that is, the exhortative, which belongs properly to the suasory; the συντελικὴ (suntelikē), by which it appears from what follows, rather than from the name itself, that the conjectural is signified; the ὑπαλλακτικὴ (hypallaktikē), which is the definitive, for it consists in a change of terms; and the juridical, which he distinguishes by the same Greek name as other writers. For there is, as I said, great variation as to names. 4There are some who think the ὑπαλλακτικὴ στάσις (hypallaktikē stasis) is the exceptional, looking to the notion of change contained in the name. Others, as Caecilius and Theon, have made the same number of positions, but of a different kind: "Whether a thing is?" "What it is?" "Of what species it is?" and "How great it is?" 4Aristotle in his Rhetoric divides the whole matter into three parts: What is true, what is to be sought or avoided (which belongs to the deliberative department of oratory), and the consideration de eadem atque alio, "about identity and difference;" but, by division, he arrives at such a conclusion that he thinks we must examine, as to any thing, whether it is, of what nature it is, how great it is, and of what parts it consists. In one place, however, he notices the force of definition, where he says that some charges are thus met: "I have taken, but I have not stolen; I struck, but I did nothing wrong." 50. Cicero also in his books of rhetoric had enumerated four positions regarding fact, name, kind, and action, so that conjecture should refer to fact, definition to name, quality to kind, and right to action. Under right he had included exception. But in another place he treats legal questions as species of actions.

5Some writers on rhetoric have made five positions, those of conjecture, definition, quality, quantity, and relation. Theodorus also, as I remarked, adopts the same number of general heads, whether a thing is, what it is, of what species it is, how great it is, and to what it has reference. The last he regards as having most concern with comparison, since better and worse, greater and less, are terms that have no meaning unless they refer to something. 5But relation, as I observed before, affects questions of legal right, such as, "Has this man a right to go to law?" or "Is it fit that such a person should do such a thing?" or "May he proceed against a particular person," or "at a particular time," or "in a particular manner?" for all such inquiries must have reference to something.

5Others think that there are six positions: conjecture, which they call γένεσις (genesis); quality, peculiarity, that is, ἰδιότης (idiōtēs), a term in which definition is implied; quantity, which they call ἀξια (axia); comparison; exception, for which, also, a new name, μετάστάσις (metastasis), has been found (new, I mean, as applied to positions, for it had been previously used by Hermagoras in a different way, to denote one of the various sorts of juridical questions).

5Others have been of opinion that there are seven, by whom neither exception, nor quantity, nor comparison were admitted, but in place of those three were substituted four sorts of legal questions, which were added to the three positions determined by reasoning.

5Others have gone so far as to make eight, adding exception to the other seven.

By some writers another distinction has been introduced, that of giving the name of "positions" only to the status rationales, and calling the status legales, as I said before, "questions." In the former, the question is about fact, while in the latter, about the written letter. Others, on the contrary, have preferred that the status legales should be called "positions," and the status rationales "questions." 5But others have thought that there are only three status rationales—whether a thing is, what it is, and of what kind it is; Hermagoras is the only one who has made four—conjecture, peculiarity, exception, and quality, the latter of which he calls, κατὰ συμβεβηκότα (kata symbebēkota), "according to accidents," adding as an explanation, "whether it happen to a person to be good or bad." 5Quality he then distinguishes into four species: to things to be sought or avoided, which fall under the deliberative department of oratory; to persons, to whom the panegyrical kind applies; to things in general, a department which he calls πραγματική (pragmatikē), and in which the question is about things themselves, without any reference to persons, as "whether he is free who is under trial about his liberty; whether riches beget pride; whether a thing is just or good;" and to judicial questions, in which similar inquiries are made, but with regard to certain definite persons; as, "whether a certain person acted justly or well in a particular transaction?" 5Nor am I ignorant that in the first book of Cicero on Rhetoric there is another explanation of the part relating to things in general, as it is there said that "it is the department in which it is considered what is right according to civil usage and according to equity; a department with which lawyers are thought by us to be specially concerned." 5But what the judgment of Cicero himself was respecting these books, I have already mentioned; for into their pages were thrown the various portions of knowledge which he had brought from the school when a young man, and if there is any fault in them, it is that of his instructor; whether he was moved by the circumstance that Hermagoras places first under this head examples from questions of right, or by the consideration that the Greeks call interpreters of the law πραγματικοί (pragmatikoi). 60. Cicero, however, substituted for these books his excellent dialogues de Oratore, and, therefore, is not to be blamed as if he had delivered erroneous precepts.

I return to Hermagoras. He was the first of all rhetoricians that made exception a distinct position, though some advances towards it, but not under that name, are found in Aristotle. 6As to legal questions, he has specified these four: that which relates to what is written and what is intended (which he designates by the phrase κατὰ ῥητὸν καὶ ὑπεξαὶρεσιν (kata rhēton kai hypexairesin), that is, "the expression and the exception," the former of which terms is common to him with all other writers, the latter has been less used), that which is ratiocinatory or dependent on reasoning, that of ambiguity, and that which concerns contradictory laws. 6Albutius, adopting the same division, withdraws "exception," putting it under the juridical department. In legal questions also he thinks that there is no position which is properly called ratiocinatory.

I am aware that those who shall read the ancient writers with attention will find still more positions, but I am afraid that what I have said on this subject has exceeded due bounds.

6For myself, I confess that I am now inclined towards an opinion somewhat different from that which I formerly held, and perhaps it would be safest for me, if I regarded only my own reputation, to make no change in that which for many years I have not only thought but have sanctioned with my approbation. 6But I cannot endure to be guilty of dissimulation in any point on which I give judgment, especially in a work which I am composing with a view to being of some profit to well-disposed young men. For Hippocrates, so celebrated in the art of medicine, is thought to have acted most honorably in acknowledging some mistakes that he had made, in order to prevent posterity from erring with him. Cicero, too, did not hesitate to condemn some of his published works and others which he wrote afterwards, as his Catullus and Lucullus, and those books on rhetoric to which I just now alluded. 6For longer perseverance in study would be superfluous, if we were not at liberty to find out something better than what was advanced before. Nothing, however, of what I then taught was useless, for what I shall now teach will recur to the same principles, so that no one will repent of having learned from me. All I intend to do is to reproduce the same materials and to arrange them with somewhat better effect. But I wish every one to be satisfied that I communicate new light to others as soon as I have gained it myself.

6According to the system of most authors, then, I adhered to three ratiocinatory positions, those of conjecture, quality, and definition, and one legal. These were my general positions. The legal I divided into five species, those relating to writing and intention, contradictory law, induction, ambiguity, and exception. 6I now see that the fourth of the general positions may be withdrawn from them, for the primary division is sufficient by which I pronounced some positions to be ratiocinatory, others legal. Thus the fourth will not be an position, but a species of question, otherwise it would be a ratiocinatory position. 6From those also, which I called species, I withdrew exception, having frequently indeed observed (as all who listened to my instructions can remember) and having asserted even in those lectures which were published without my consent (but in which I, however, included this remark) that the position of exception can scarcely be found in any cause so evidently that some other may not seem to be rightly named in that cause instead of it, and that in consequence, that position had by some writers been wholly set aside. 6Yet I am not ignorant that many cases are treated under this position of exception, as in almost all causes in which a person is said to have failed from irregularity in for, such questions as these arise: "Whether it was lawful for such a person to bring an action at all, or against some other particular person, or before some particular judge, or at some particular time," and whatever other similar questions may be asked. 70. But persons, times, suits, and other matters are considered under the position of exception for some pre-existent cause, so that the question lies not in the position of exception itself, but in the cause for which recourse is had of the position of exception. "You ought not to seek restitution of this deposit before the praetor, but before the consuls, for the sum is too great to come under the cognizance of the praetor"; the question then is, "whether the sum is too great for the praetor's cognizance;" and this is a question as to fact. 7"It is not lawful for you to proceed against me, for you could not become agent for the opposite party"; here the question for judgment is, "whether he could become agent." "You ought not to have proceeded by interdict, but to have made a demand"; the matter in doubt is, "whether the proceeding by interdict was right." 7All these points come under the head of legal questions. Do not prescriptions, also, (even those in which exception appears most manifest) lead to the same sorts of questions as those laws under which the action is brought, so that the inquiry will be either about the name of an act, about what is written and the intent of the writer, or about something to be settled by argument. The position then springs from the question; the position of exception does not embrace the point for which the pleader contends, but the question because of which he contends. 7This will be made plainer by an example: "You have killed a man, I have not killed him"; the question is "whether the accused did kill the man," and the position is the conjectural. The following case is different: "I have a right to proceed against you; you have not"; when the question will be, "whether he has a right," and hence the position. For whether he be allowed to have a right or not belongs to the event, not to the cause, and to that which the judge may decide, not to that because of which he may give such decision. 7This is similar to it: "You deserve to be punished; I do not deserve to be punished"; the judge will see whether he does deserve to be punished, but here there will not be either question or position; where then? "You deserve to be punished, for you have killed a man; I have not killed a man"; here then is a question "whether he did kill a man?" "I ought to be honored; you ought not"; is there here any position? I think not. "I ought to be honored, for I have killed a tyrant; you have not killed a tyrant"; here there is both question and position. 7In like manner, "You have no right to proceed against me; I have a right," has no position; where is it then? "You have no right to proceed against me, because you are infamous"; here the question is "whether he is infamous" or "whether an infamous man has a right to proceed against another"; and here are both questions and position. The kind of cause is therefore exceptional, like the comparative and that of recrimination.

7But, you will say, "I have a right; you have not," is similar to "you have killed; I did right in killing"; I do not deny that it is so, but this does not make an position, for these are not propositions (if they were, the cause would receive no explanation from them). as propositions must be accompanied with reasons. "Horatius committed a crime, for he killed his sister; he committed no crime, for he had a right to kill her who mourned at the death of an enemy"; the question here will be, "whether this was a sufficient reason for killing her," and thus the position will be that of quality. 7In like manner with regard to exception: "You have no right to disinherit your son, for an infamous person is not allowed to engage in any legal process; I have a right, for disinheriting is not a legal process"; the question is, "what is a legal process?" here we shall use definition; "you are not allowed to disinherit;" here will be the syllogism. The case will be similar with regard to all matters concerning the ratiocinatory and legal positions. 7I am not unaware, however, that some have included exception under the ratiocinatory kind of positions, in this way: "I have killed a man, but by order of the emperor"; "I gave up the offerings in the temple to a tyrant, but he compelled me to do so"; "I quitted my post, but through being harassed by bad weather, floods, ill-health"; that is, it was not my fault, but the fault of those circumstances. 7From these authors I differ still more widely, for it is not the act that is brought under the exceptional position, but the cause of the act, as happens indeed in almost every defense. Besides, he who adopts such a mode of defense does not depart from the position of quality, for he says that he himself is free from blame. As a result, two kinds of quality are rather to be distinguished: one by which the act and the accused party are defended, the other by which the accused only is defended.

80. We must therefore adhere to those writers whose authority Cicero has followed and who say that there are three points about which there is a question in every cause—whether a thing is, what it is, and of what species it is—for this is a distinction which even nature herself teaches us. First of all, there must be something which is the object of the question; what it is and of what species it is certainly cannot be determined until it be settled that it really exists, and this, therefore, is the first question. 8But as to that which is proved to exist, it does not immediately appear what it is. When this point is also decided, there remains, last of all, the quality, and when all these particulars are settled, nothing further is left.

8Under these heads are contained indefinite and definite questions; some of these heads are considered in whatever kind of matter we discuss, whether demonstrative, deliberative, or judicial. They comprise also suits at law, whether regarded with reference to ratiocinatory or to legal questions, for there is no legal dispute which is not to be resolved by the aid of definition, consideration of quality, or conjecture. 8But to those who are instructing the ignorant, a plan more extended at first, and a road, if not marked out by the straightest possible line, yet more easy and open, will not be without advantage. Let students learn, therefore, before all, that there are four modes of proceeding in every cause and that he ought to make it his first business to consider which four modes he who is going to plead. Beginning first of all with the defendant, by far the strongest mode of defense is if the charge which is made can be denied; the next, if an act of the kind charged against the accused can be said not to have been done; the third, and most honorable, if what is done is proved to have been justly done. If we cannot command these methods, the last and only mode of defense is that of eluding an accusation, which can neither be denied nor combated, by the aid of some point of law, so as make it appear that the action has not been brought in due legal form. 8Hence arise questions referring either to the general action or to exception, for there are some things objectionable in their own nature, yet allowed by law, (as it was permitted, for instance, by the twelve tables, that the body of a debtor might be divided among his creditors; public feeling has set aside that law). Some things may be equitable in themselves, but prohibited by law, as liberty in making wills.

8By the accuser nothing more is to be kept in view than that he must prove that something was done; that a particular thing was done; that it was done wrongfully; and that he brings his action according to law. Thus, every cause will depend upon the same sorts of questions, only the allegations of the different parties will sometimes be interchanged. In those causes in which the question is about a reward, it is for the plaintiff to prove that what was done was right.

8These plans, as it were, and forms of proceeding, which I then called general positions, resolve themselves, as I showed, into two general kinds, the one dependent on reasoning, the other on legality. The one dependent on reasoning is the more simple, as it consists merely in the contemplation of the nature of things, and it is sufficient, therefore, in respect to it, to mention conjecture, definition, quality. 8Of legal questions, there must necessarily be more species, as laws are numerous and have various forms. We rest on the words of one law and on the spirit of another; when we find no law ready to support us, we press some one into our service; we compare some, one with another; and we interpret some in a manner different from that in which they are usually understood. 8Thus from those three positions spring the following resemblances as it were of positions, sometimes simple, sometimes mixed, yet always wearing their own peculiar appearance, as that which refers to what is written and what is intended, which, without doubt, is included under quality or conjecture; that which is treated by syllogism, which has regard especially to quality; that which respects contradictory laws, which belongs to the same positions as what is written and what is intended; and that referring to ambiguity, which is always settled by conjecture. 8Definition also is common to both kinds of questions, those which depend on the consideration of matters of fact, and those which are to be decided by adherence to the written letter.

All these questions, though they fall under those three positions, yet since they have severally, as I said, something peculiar, appear necessary to be explained to learners. They may be allowed to call them either legal positions or questions, or secondary heads, if they but understand that nothing is sought in them but what is contained under the three general heads which I have before mentioned. 90. But with questions referring to quantity, to a whole as consisting of parts, to relation, and, as some have thought, to comparison, the case is not the same. They are to be regarded, not as concerning differences in the laws, but as dependent on reasoning alone, and are, therefore, always to be placed under conjecture or quality, as when we ask with what intention a person did anything, or at what time, or in what place. 9But I shall speak of particular questions when I proceed to treat of the rules for division.

This is agreed among all writers: that in every simple cause, there is but one single position. But that many questions, which, as secondary points, are referred to that in which the main point for judgment is contained, may be comprised in one and the same cause. also think that it is sometimes doubtful what position we ought to adopt, as many means of defense are employed against one accusation. As it is said with regard to the color of a statement of facts, that that is the best which a speaker can best maintain, so it may be said in this case also, that that position should be chosen in support of which the orator can put forth most strength. 9Accordingly, in settling a mode of defense for Milo, one course found favor with Cicero, when he pleaded the cause, and another with Brutus, when he composed a speech for Milo by way of exercise, as Cicero maintained that Clodius had been killed deservedly, as a lier-in-wait, yet without intention on the part of Milo, but Brutus even gloried on behalf of Milo that he had killed a bad citizen. 9But in complex causes, two or three positions may be found, either of different kinds, as when a person denies that he did one thing and maintains that he was in the right in doing another, or of the same kind, as when a person denies two charges, or all the charges brought against him. 9This happens, also, when there is a question about some one thing which several persons are trying to obtain, either all relying on the same kind of claim, as that of relationship; or some on one kind and some on another, as some on a will and some on relationship. But whenever there are several claimants, and one kind of defense is made against one and another against another, there must necessarily be several kinds of positions. Consider the following subject of controversy, the law standing thus: 9Let wills made according to the laws be valid. Let the children of intestate parents be heirs. Let a disinherited son possess none of his father's property. Let an illegitimate son, if born before one that is legitimate, be to his father as legitimate; if born after, only as a citizen. Let it be lawful for every father to give his son in adoption. Let it be lawful for every son given in adoption to return into his own family if his natural father dies without children. father, who, having two sons, had allowed one to be adopted by another man and had disinherited the other, had afterwards an illegitimate son, and then, after appointing the disinherited son his heir, died. All the three laid claim to the estate (Let me observe that the Greeks call an illegitimate son νόθος (nothos); we have no Latin term exactly corresponding it, as Cato remarks in one of his speeches, and, therefore, adopt the Greek word. But let us attend to our subject).

9The law, "Let a disinherited son possess none of his father's property," was opposed to him who was named as heir in the will, and hence arose the position referring to what is written and what is intended, it being inquired "whether he could inherit in any way? Whether according to the intention of the father? Whether as being named as heir in the will?" As to the illegitimate son, there arise two considerations: that he was born after the legitimate sons and that he was not born before a legitimate one. 9The first consideration goes into the syllogism or inference, "whether sons alienated from the family are in the same condition as if they had never been born?" The other is that regarding what is written and what is intended, for it is admitted that he was not born before a legitimate son. But he will rest his cause on the intention of the law, which he will say was that an illegitimate son, born when there was no longer a legitimate son in the family, should be considered as legitimate. 100. He will also set aside the written letter of the law by saying that "it is certainly no detriment to an illegitimate son if a legitimate one was not born after him," and will insist on this argument: Suppose that only an illegitimate son is born; in what relation will he stand to his father? Only as a citizen? Yet he will not be born after a legitimate son. Will he be as a son in every respect? Yet he will not be born before a legitimate one. If, therefore, we can conclude nothing from the words of the law, we must take our stand on the intention of it. 10Nor let it perplex any one that two positions arise from one law; the law is two-fold and has accordingly the form of two laws. To the son wishing to return into the family, it will be said, in the first place, by him who is named as heir in the will, "Though it be lawful for you to return, I am still heir." The position will be the same as in regard to the claim of the disinherited son, for the question is "whether a disinherited son can be heir?" 10In the next place, it will be said by both (as well by the one who is named heir as by the illegitimate one), "It is not lawful for you to return into the family, for our father did not lie without children." But in saying this, each of the two will rest his case on his own peculiar ground, for the disinherited son will assert, "that a disinherited son is also one of the children" and will draw a proof of his assertion, from the very law by which it is pretended that he is set aside. It would be superfluous, he would say, for a disinherited son to be forbidden to inherit the property of his father, if he were to be accounted as a stranger, but, as he would have been, by his right as a son, the heir of his father if he had died without a will, the law is now brought against him, which, however, does not prevent him from being a son, but from being an heir. The position, then, will be that of definition: the question, "what is a son?" 10The illegitimate son, on his part, will allege that his father did not die without children, resting on the same arguments which he used in making his claim at first, to show that he was a son, unless he also have recourse to the position of definition and ask, "whether illegitimate children are not children?" There will thus be in this one cause either two special legal positions: those of the letter and intention and the syllogism, besides one of definition; or those three which are the only real and natural positions: that of conjecture, with regard to the writing and intention of the writer, that of quality in the syllogism, and that of definition, which sufficiently explains itself.

In every kind of legal controversy, too, must be comprehended a cause, a matter for judgment, and the containing point, for there is nothing brought into question in which there is not some reason, something to which judgment is directed and something which chiefly contains the substance of the matter in question. But as these things vary according to the nature of causes and as they are taught by most of the writers on judicial pleadings, let them be reserved for the part in which I shall treat of such affairs. For the present, as I have divided causes into three kinds, I shall follow the order which I have prescribed to myself.

 
3 - 7 Of panegyric or laudatory eloquence; not wholly distinct from practical discussion, § 2. An orator does not always speak on doubtful points, 4. Panegyric sometimes requires proof and defense, and very frequently amplification, 6. Praise of the gods, 7-9. Praise of men more varied, 11. Men extolled for personal endowments and fortunate circumstances, 12-14. For mental qualifications, 116. For memorials which they leave of themselves, 118. In censure the ease is reversed, 19-21. On praise of the living, 22. It makes a difference where a panegyric is delivered, 224. Advantage may be taken by the orator of the proximity of certain virtues to certain vices, 25. Praise of cities, places, public works, 227. What position most prevailed in this department of oratory, 28.

I SHALL commence with that species of oratory which is devoted to praise and censure. This species Aristotle, and Theophrastus who follows him, seem to have excluded altogether from the practical department of speaking and to have considered that its only object is to please the audience, an object which is indeed intimated by its name epideictic from ἐπιδείκνυμι, "to display." But the usage of the Romans has given it a place in civil transactions. Funeral orations are often a duty attached to some public office and are frequently assigned to the magistrates by a decree of the senate; and to commend or censure a witness is not without effect on the result of trials. It is lawful, also, to produce panegyrists on behalf of accused persons; and the written compositions published against Cicero's competitors, against Lucius Piso, Clodius, and Curio, are full of invective, and yet were received as opinions in the senate. But I do not deny that some discourses of this kind have been composed merely for ostentation, as those in praise of the gods and of the heroes of former times. This is a fact by which a question noticed above is solved and by which it is shown that those were mistaken who thought that an orator would never speak on any but doubtful subjects. Are the praises of Jupiter Capitolinus, a perpetual subject at the sacred contests, doubtful? Or are they not treated in oratorical style?

But as panegyric employed for practical purposes requires proof, so that which is composed for display calls sometimes for some semblance of proof. The orator who says that Romulus was the son of Mars and was nursed by a she-wolf would offer in proof of his celestial origin the arguments that, being thrown into a running stream, he could not be drowned; that he had such success in all his undertakings; that it is not incredible that he was sprung from the god who presides over war; and that the people of those times had no doubt that he was even received into heaven. But some particulars in such subjects will be treated as if they required defense; for example, in a panegyric on Hercules, the orator would perhaps apologize for his change of dress with the queen of Lydia, and the tasks, as we are told, imposed upon him. But the peculiar business of panegyric is to amplify and embellish its subjects.

This kind of eloquence is devoted chiefly to gods or men, though it is sometimes employed about animals and things inanimate. In praising the gods, we shall, in the first place, express a general veneration for the majesty of their nature and shall then eulogize the peculiar power of each and such of their inventions as have conferred benefit on mankind. In regard to Jupiter, for instance, his power in ruling all things is to be extolled; in regard to Mars, his supremacy in war; in regard to Neptune, his command of the sea. In respect to inventions, we extol, in praising Minerva, that of the arts; in praising Mercury, that of letters; in praising Apollo, that of medicine; in praising Ceres, that of corn; in praising Bacchus, that of wine. Whatever exploits, also, antiquity has recorded as performed by them, are to receive their encomium. Parentage, too, is a subject of panegyric in regard to the gods, as when any one is a son of Jupiter; antiquity, as to those who were sprung from Chaos; and offspring, as Apollo and Diana are an honor to Latona. We may make it a subject of praise to some that they were born immortal, and to others, that they attained immortality by their merits, a kind of glory which the piety of our own emperor has made an honor to the present age.

The praise of men is more varied. First of all, it is distinguished with respect to time, that which was before them, that in which they themselves lived, and in regard to those who are dead, that also which followed their death. Antecedent to the birth of a man will be his country, parents, and ancestors, to whom we may refer in two ways, for it will be honorable to them either to have equalled the nobility of their forefathers or to have ennobled a humble origin by their achievements. 1Other subjects for eulogy may also sometimes be found in the time that preceded a man's birth, such as occurrences that denoted his future eminence by prophetic indications or auguries; for example, the oracles are said to have foretold that the son of Thetis would be greater than his father. 1The praises of a man personally should be derived from the qualities of his mind, body, or external circumstances. The merits of corporeal and accidental advantages are of less weight than those of the mind and may be treated in many ways. Sometimes we celebrate beauty and strength with honor of words, as Homer extols them in his Agamemnon and Achilles. Sometimes comparative weakness may contribute much to our admiration, as when Homer says that Tydeus was small of stature, yet a warrior. 1Fortune, too, gives dignity, as in kings and princes, for in their condition, there is the ampler field for displaying merit, and among people of other conditions, the less resources a person has, the greater honor he acquires by making a praiseworthy use of them. All advantages, indeed, which are external to us and which have fallen to us accidentally, are not subjects of praise to a man merely because he possessed them, but only in case he employed them to good purpose. 1For wealth, power, and influence, as they offer most opportunities for good or evil, afford the surest test of our morals, since we are sure to be either better for them or worse.

1Praise of the good qualities of the mind is always just, but more than one way may be pursued in the treatment of it. Sometimes it is more honorable to follow the progress of a person's life and the order of his actions, so that his natural genius, shown in his early years, may be first commended, then his advancement in learning, and then his course of conduct including not only what he did, but what he said. Sometimes it will be better to divide our praises among the several kinds of virtues—fortitude, justice, temperance, and others—and to assign to each the honor of that which has been done under its influence. 1Which of these two methods will be the more eligible for us, we shall have to consider according to our subject, keeping in mind, however, that the celebration of those deeds is most pleasing to the audience which the object of our praise is said to have been the first to do, or to have done alone, or with the aid of but few supporters, whatever else he may have effected beyond hope or expectation, and especially what he has done for the good of others rather than for his own.

1Of the time which follows the death of persons, it is not always in our power to treat, not only because we sometimes praise them while they are still living, but because few occasions offer on which divine honors, public decrees, or statues erected at the expense of the state can be celebrated. 1Among such subjects for eulogy, I would reckon monuments of genius, which may be admired through all ages, for some, like Menander, have obtained more justice from the judgment of posterity than from that of their contemporaries. Children reflect glory upon their parents, cities on their founders, laws on those who have made them, arts on their inventors; institutions also on their authors, as it was appointed by Numa, for instance, that we should worship the gods, and by Publicola that the consuls should lower the fasces before the people.

1The same method will be observed in censure, but so as to set things in a different light, for meanness of origin has been a dishonor to many, and nobility itself has rendered others more conspicuous and more odious for their vices. To some, as is said to have been the case with Paris, mischief which it was foretold they should cause has produced dislike; on others, as Thersites and Irus, deformity of person or misfortune has thrown contempt. In regard to others, good qualities corrupted by vices have rendered them hateful; thus we find Nireus represented by the poets as cowardly, and Pleisthenes as debauched. 20. Of the mind, too, there are as many vices as virtues, and both, as in panegyric, may be treated in two ways. On some men ignominy has been thrown after death, as on Maelius, whose house was levelled with the ground, and Marcus Manlius, whose praenomen was not allowed to be borne by his posterity. 2Of the vicious, also, we hate even the parents. To founders of cities, it is an opprobrium to have drawn together a people noxious to those around them, as was the case with the original author of the Jewish superstition, so the laws of the Gracchi brought odium on their name. Any example of vice given to posterity disgraces its author, as that of the obscenity which a Persian is said to have first ventured to practice with a woman of Samos. 2With respect to the living, also, the judgments formed of them by others are proofs of their character, and the honor or dishonor shown to them proves the orator's eulogy or censure to be just.

2But Aristotle thinks it of importance to the orator to consider the place in which anything is to be commended or censured, for it makes a great difference what the manners of the audience are and what opinions are publicly entertained among them, as they will be most willing to believe that the virtues which they approve are in him who is eulogized, or that the vices which they hate are in him whom we censure. Thus the judgment formed by the orator as to the effect of his speech, even before the delivery of it, will be pretty certain. 2Some praise of his audience, too, should always be mingled with his remarks (for it makes them favorably disposed towards him) and, whenever possible, should be so introduced as to strengthen his cause. A panegyric on literary studies will be received with less honor at Sparta than at Athens; a panegyric on patience and fortitude with greater. Among some people it is honorable to live by plunder; among others to respect the laws. Frugality would perhaps have been an object of hatred with the Sybarites; luxury would have been the greatest of crimes among the ancient Romans. 2Similar diversity is found in individuals. A judge is most favorable to a pleader when he thinks that his sentiments coincide with his own. Aristotle also directs (a precept which Cornelius Celsus has since carried almost to excess) that, as there is a certain proximity of virtues and vices, we should sometimes avail ourselves of words that approach each other in sense, so as, for instance, to call a person brave instead of rash, liberal instead of prodigal, frugal instead of avaricious; or, on the contrary, the vice may be put for the virtue. This is an artifice, however, which a true orator, that is, a good man, will never adopt, unless he happen to be led to it by a notion promoting the public good.

2Cities are eulogized in the same way as persons, for their founder is to be considered as their parent, and antiquity confers much dignity on their inhabitants, as we see in regard to people who are said to be sprung from the soil of their country. In their transactions, there are the same virtues and vices as in the conduct of individuals. Some have peculiar advantages to be noticed, as in their situation or defenses. Citizens may be an honor to them, as children to parents.

2Encomiums may also be bestowed on public works, in respect to which magnificence, utility, beauty, and the architect of them are commonly considered—magnificence, as in temples; utility, as in walls; beauty and the architect, in both. Panegyrics on places are also found, as that on Sicily in Cicero, in which we regard, in like manner, beauty and utility—beauty in maritime regions, plains, and pleasant spots; utility, in respect to healthfulness or fertility of soil. There is a kind of general praise, too, for honorable sayings or actions. 2There is praise, indeed, for things of every kind, for eulogies have been written on sleep and death, and by physicians on certain sorts of food.

While I do not admit, therefore, that this laudatory department of oratory relates only to questions concerning what is honorable, I think, at the same time, that it is chiefly comprised under quality. Certainly all three positions may enter into this kind of composition, and Cicero has observed that Caius Caesar has availed himself of them in his invective on Cato. But the whole of panegyrical oratory bears some resemblance to deliberative because, for the most part, that which is recommended in the one is praised in the other.

 
3 - 8 Deliberative oratory not confined to questions of utility, § 1. Whether nothing is useful but what is honorable, 3. Deliberative oratory not concerned wholly with the position of quality, 5. What kind of exordium requisite in it, 6-9. Statement of facts, 11. The passions to be moved, 113. Whether it solely concerns affairs of government, 14. That a thing can be done, is either certain or uncertain, 17-21. The three topics of persuasion, 22-26. Some do not distinguish topics from divisions of topics, 228. The pleasing, the useful, and the honorable, 29-35. Use of examples, 337. How things that are honorable may be recommended, and sometimes such as are at variance with honor, 38-47. Authority of the speaker, 48Prosopopeiae49-51. In the schools, deliberative subjects have a great resemblance to controversies, 52-57. An error into which declaimers fall, 58-66. Advantage of reading history, 67-70.

I AM surprised, also, that deliberative oratory is confined by some authors wholly to matters of utility. If we ought to follow one sole object in it, the opinion of Cicero would have greater weight with me, who thinks that this department of speaking is chiefly occupied about what is honorable. Nor do I doubt, indeed, that those who adopt the former opinion consider, according to a very noble principle, that nothing is advantageous but what is honorable. This notion would certainly be very just, if the resolutions of the good and wise were always ready to support us. But in addressing the unlearned, to whom our opinions must often be delivered, and especially in haranguing the people, the majority of whom are ignorant, the two must be kept distinct, and we must speak more in conformity with ordinary apprehension. For there are many who, though they may consider an action to be honorable, do not immediately allow it to be sufficiently advantageous and, led by the prospect of advantage, approve what they cannot doubt to be highly dishonorable, as the treaty with the Numantines and the passing under the yoke at the defile of Caudium.

Nor is it sufficient to include deliberative oratory in the position of quality, in which is comprised the question of what is honorable and what is useful, for in respect to these, there is often room for conjecture. At times, some definition is to be considered, and occasionally, too, legal inquiries may occur, especially in reference to private proceedings, if ever a doubt arises whether a thing be lawful. Of conjecture I shall speak more fully a little below. As to definition, meanwhile, there is this question in Demosthenes, "Whether Philip should give or restore Halonnesus to the Athenians?" and in Cicero, in his Philippics, "What is a tumult?" Is there not, too, the question, similar to those in judicial causes, about the statue of Servius Sulpicius, "whether statues are to be erected to those only who perish on an embassy by the sword?" The deliberative department of oratory, therefore (which is also called the "suasory"), while it consults concerning the future, inquires also into the past. It has two objects: to persuade and to dissuade.

An exordium, such as is usual in judicial pleadings, it does not require, because whoever consults an orator is already well-disposed to hear him. Yet the commencement, whatever it be, ought to have some resemblance to an exordium, for we must not begin abruptly or with whatever we may fancy, because in every subject there is something naturally first. In speaking before the Senate, and, indeed, before the people, the same object is to be kept in view as in addressing judges, namely, that of securing the goodwill of the majority of those to whom we speak. Nor is this to be thought surprising, when the favor of the audience is sought even in panegyrics, where the purpose is not to attain any advantage, but merely to bestow praise. Aristotle, indeed, and not without reason, thinks that we may often commence, in deliberative speeches, with an allusion to ourselves or to the character of him who differs in opinion from us, borrowing this method, as it were, from judicial pleadings. In such a manner, sometimes our subject may be made to appear of less or greater importance than our audience imagine it. In panegyrics, he thinks that the exordium may be allowed the utmost latitude, since it is sometimes taken from something foreign to the subject, as Isocrates has taken his in his oration in praise of Helen, or from something bordering on the subject, as the same orator, in his Panegyric, complains that "more honor is paid to the good qualities of the body than to those of the mind," and as Gorgias, in his oration at the Olympic games, extols those who first instituted such meetings. Sallust, doubtless following the example of these orators, has commenced his histories of the Jugurthine War and the Conspiracy of Catiline with introductions having no relation to his narratives. But I am now to speak of deliberative oratory, in which, even when we adopt an exordium, we ought to content ourselves with one that is short, resembling as it were an initial chapter or statement.

As to a regular statement of facts, a private subject of discussion will never require it, at least a statement of the matter on which an opinion is to be given, for no man is ignorant of the particulars on which he consults others. 1Statements, however, of many external circumstances relative to the subject of deliberation may be introduced. In deliberative addresses to the people, a statement setting forth the order of circumstances is indispensable. 1Deliberative oratory requires appeals to the feelings more than any other kind of eloquence, for indignation is often to be kindled and allayed, and the minds of the audience are to be moved to fear, eagerness, hatred, or benevolence. Sometimes, too, pity is to be excited, whether we have, for example, to recommend that aid be given to a besieged town, or whether we be called upon to lament the overthrow of a people in alliance with us.

1But what is of most weight in deliberative speeches is authority in the speaker, for he who desires everybody to trust to his opinion about what is expedient and honorable ought to be, and to be esteemed, a man of the greatest judgment and probity. In judicial pleadings, it is commonly thought allowable for a man to indulge, in some degree, his own feelings, but everyone supposes that counsel is given by a speaker in accordance with his moral principles.

1Most of the Greek rhetoricians have been of opinion that the business of all this kind of oratory is with addresses to the multitude and have confined it wholly to affairs of government. Even Cicero considers it chiefly with reference to that department and accordingly says that for those who are to give advice concerning peace, war, levies of troops, public works, or revenues, the two things chiefly to be known are the resources and the manners of the people whom they address, so that his arguments may be derived at once from the particular circumstances and from the character of his hearers 1To me, it appears that there is greater variety in this field of eloquence, for the classes of persons who consult and the kinds of advice that may be given are extremely numerous.

In persuading and dissuading, then, three particulars are chiefly to be regarded: what is the subject of deliberation, who are those that deliberate, and what is the character of him that would influence their deliberations.

1As to that which is the subject of deliberation, it is either certain that it may be carried into effect, or uncertain. If it be uncertain, its uncertainty will be the sole point for consideration, or, I should say, the chief point, for it will often happen that we shall assert, first of all, that a thing, even if it could he done, ought not to be done, and, next, that it cannot be done. But when the question is respecting something uncertain, the point is conjectural: can the Isthmus be cut through, or the Pontine marshes drained, or a harbor made at Ostia, or was Alexander likely to find lands beyond the ocean? 1But even in regard to things which are acknowledged to be practicable, there will sometimes be room for conjecture: as if it were inquired, for instance, whether it would ever happen that the Romans would subdue Carthage, whether Hannibal would return if Scipio transported his army into Africa, or whether the Samnites would keep faith if the Romans were to lay down their arms. As to some things, too, it is credible both that they can be done and that they will be done, but at some other time, or in some other place, or in some other manner.

1Where there is no place for conjecture, other points are to be regarded. In the first place, the deliberation will be held either on account of the matter itself, on which opinions are asked, or on account of some extrinsic reasons that affect it. The Senate deliberates, for example, with regard to the matter itself when they consider whether they shall vote pay for the army. 1This is a simple question. Reasons are adduced for doing a thing, as when the Senate deliberates whether they shall deliver up the Fabii to the Gauls threatening war, or for not doing it, as when Julius Caesar deliberates whether he shall persist in marching into Germany when his soldiers were everywhere making their wills. 20. These two questions offer more than one point for consideration, for as to the former, the reason for deliberating is that the Gauls are threatening war, but a question may also be raised whether even, without such threatening, those ought not to have been given up who, being sent as ambassadors, had engaged in battle contrary to law and had killed the king to whom they had received communications. 2As to the other subject, Caesar would doubtless not have deliberated at all if it had not been for the consternation of his troops; yet there is room for inquiring whether, independently of that circumstance, it would have been proper for him to proceed into Germany. But we must always speak first on that point which might be a subject for deliberation even if other circumstances were detached from it.

2Some have thought that the topics for persuasion are the three considerations of what is honorable, what is useful, and what is necessary. For the introduction of the third, I find no motive, for when any force oppresses us, it may be necessary for us to suffer something, but certainly not to do anything; it is about doing that deliberation is concerned. 2If they call "necessity" that to which men are driven by the fear of some greater evil, the question respecting it will be one of expediency. If the inhabitants of a besieged city, inferior in numbers to the besiegers and in want of water and provisions, deliberate about surrendering to the enemy, and it be said, that "it is necessary" for them to surrender, it must be added, "for otherwise they must be destroyed"; however, if they prefer to submit to destruction, it appears that it is "not necessary" for them to surrender for the very reason that they may be destroyed. In fact, the Saguntines did not surrender nor those who were surrounded in the vessel of Opitergium. 2In such circumstances, therefore, the question will be either concerning expediency alone, or there will be hesitation between what is expedient and what is honorable. But, it may be said, if a man wishes to have children, he is under the necessity of taking a wife. Doubtless, but he who wishes to have children must first be convinced that he ought to take a wife. 2Consequently there appears to me to be no place for deliberation when there is necessity, any more than when it is settled that a thing cannot be done, for all deliberation is about something doubtful. Those, therefore, have made a better distinction who have called the third head δυνατόν (dynaton), which our countrymen term possibile, "possibility"; though our Latin term may seem uncouth, it is the only one to be found.

2That these three considerations do not enter into every subject of deliberation is too evident to make it necessary for me to demonstrate. Yet by most writers the number is increased, for things are reckoned by them as general considerations which are but special objects for notice, since what is lawful, just, pious, equitable, and merciful (mansuetum, for so they interpret τὸ ἥμερον, (to hēmeron)) and whatever else may be added of a similar character, may be included under what is honorable. 2Whether, again, a thing be easy, important, pleasant, or free from danger belongs to the consideration of expediency. These particular points for consideration arise from what is said in reply to us by our opponents: It is indeed expedient, but it is difficult, of little importance, unpleasant, and dangerous. 2Yet some think that deliberation at times occurs merely concerning agreeableness, as when a consultation is held about the erection of a theater or the institution of games; but I do not suppose that any man is so totally given up to pleasure as to look for nothing but gratification in deliberation of a subject. 2For there must always be something that should be thought of higher consideration: in regard to games, the honor of the gods; and in regard to the erection of a theatre, useful relaxation from labor, and the unbecoming and inconvenient contention for places among the crowd, if there should be no theater. Religion, at the same time, will have its place in the consideration, as we may call the theater a temple, as it were, for the festival solemnized there to the gods.

30. Often, too, we say that advantage is to be disregarded in order that we may do what is honorable (as when we counsel the people of Opitergium not to surrender themselves to the enemy, though they will perish unless they do so), and sometimes we may have occasion to set what is honorable below what is advantageous (as when we advise, as in the second Punic war, that the slaves should be armed). 3But even in the latter case, we must not altogether admit that the proceeding is dishonorable (for we may say that all men are free by nature and are formed of the same matter, and that even some of the slaves may be descended from noble ancestors), and in the former case, when the danger is evident, other considerations may be alleged, as we may assert that if they surrender, they may perish even more cruelly, should the enemy, for instance, not keep their word, or should Caesar, as is more probable, obtain the superiority. 3But considerations which are so much opposed to one another are frequently softened by some alteration in the words, for expediency itself is altogether set at nought by that sect who say not only that what is honorable is always preferable to what is expedient, but that nothing can even be expedient which is not honorable; on the other hand, what we call honorable, another sect calls vain, ostentatious, foolish, and more commendable in words than in reality.

3Nor is what is advantageous compared only with what is disadvantageous, but things that are advantageous or disadvantageous are compared with one another, as when we try to determine, of two advantageous measures, which is the more advantageous, or of two that are disadvantageous, which is the less so. The difficulty may be still increased, for sometimes three subjects for deliberation may present themselves, as when Pompey deliberated whether he should betake himself to Parthia, or Africa, or Egypt. Thus it is not only inquired which of two courses is preferable, but which is the most eligible of three. 3In questions of this kind, there will never occur any doubt as to a matter which is every way in our favor, for when there is no room for speaking against a measure, what motive can there be for hesitating about it? Thus every subject for deliberation is generally nothing else but a subject for comparison, and we must consider both what we would attain and by what means, so that we may form an estimate whether there is greater advantage in that which we pursue or greater disadvantage in the means by which we pursue it. 3A question of advantage may also have reference to time: it is expedient, but not now; or to place: not here; or to persons: not for us, or against those; or to a particular mode of proceeding: not thus; or to measure: not to so great a degree.

But still more frequently, we have to take persons into consideration with a view to what may be becoming, a point which is to be regarded in respect not only to ourselves but to those also who consult us. 3Though examples are of the utmost effect in deliberative oratory, because men are most easily led to consent to any measure by instances of similar proceedings, it makes a great difference whose authority is adduced and to whom it is recommended, for the feelings of those who listen to deliberative speeches are various. 3Our audience may be also of two kinds, for those who consult us are either many or single individuals, and as to each, distinctions are to be made, since, with regard to a number of persons, it makes a great difference whether they are a Senate, or a people, whether Romans, or Fidenates, whether Greeks, or Barbarians, and, in respect to individuals, whether we recommend that public offices should be sought by Cato or by Caius Marius, and whether Scipio the elder, or Fabius consult with us on the mode of conducting a war. 3We must in like manner look to sex, dignity, and age. But it is the character of our hearers that should lead us to make the chief difference in our addresses to them. To recommend honorable measures to those who are honorable is extremely easy, but if we ever have occasion to enforce a right course of conduct on the unprincipled, we must be careful not to reproach them with the opposite nature of their life. 3The minds of such an audience are to be influenced not by dissertations on the nature of virtue, for which they have no regard, but by allusions to honor and to the opinion of others, and if such arguments to their vanity do not move them, by showing the advantage likely to follow from what you advise, or rather perhaps, and with more effect, by showing them how much is to be dreaded if they act otherwise. 40. For besides the fact that minds of the lightest principles are most easily alarmed, I know not whether the fear of evil has not naturally more influence with the majority of mankind than the hope of good, to whom also the knowledge of what is vicious comes with greater facility than the knowledge of that which is virtuous. 4Sometimes, also, actions which are scarcely honorable are recommended to the good, and to those of a rather opposite character are proposed measures in which nothing but the advantage of those who seek the advice is regarded.

I am well aware what sort of reflection may at once occur to the reader of this passage. "Is this, then," he may ask, "the practice that you recommend, and do you think it right?" 4Cicero might absolve me, when he writes in the following manner to Brutus (after mentioning many courses of conduct which might be fairly recommended to Caesar): "Should I act as an honest man, if I should recommend these measures? Certainly not, for the proper object of an adviser is the advantage of him whom he advises. But the measures are right. Who says otherwise? But in giving advice, there is not always room for what is right." As this question, however, is of a deeper nature and does not concern deliberative speeches only, the subject is reserved by me for my twelfth book, which will be my last. should not wish anything to be done dishonorably, and in the meantime, let these questions be considered to belong at least to the exercises of the schools, for the nature of what is bad should be known, that we may the better support what is good.

4If any one, however, recommend to a good man anything not quite honorable, let him remember not to recommend it as dishonorable, in the manner in which some declaimers urge Sextus Pompey to engage in piracy, for the very reason that it is nefarious and cruel; but some palliation must be thrown over what is disgraceful, even in addressing the immoral. 4It is in this way that Catiline speaks in Sallust, so that he seems to rush daringly into a heinous enterprise, not through want of regard for honesty, but through indignation. It is thus also that Atreus speaks in Varius:

I now endure gross wickedness, and now
I'm forc'd to act it.
How much more then is this pretension to honor to be maintained before those who have a real regard to their character! 4Accordingly, if we advise Cicero to implore the mercy of Antony or even to burn his Philippics (supposing such to be the condition on which Antony offers him life), we shall not insist upon his love of life, (for if this has any influence on his mind, it will maintain that influence even though we remain silent), but we shall exhort him to preserve himself for the service of his country. 4He will have occasion for such a pretext, that he may not be ashamed of his supplications to Antony. Or if we advise Caius Caesar to assume kingly power, we shall assert that the state cannot subsist but under the rule of one master, for he who deliberates about a criminal proceeding seeks only how he may appear to do as little wrong as possible.

4It is of much importance, also, what the character of the adviser is, because if his previous life has been illustrious, or if the nobility of his birth, or his age or fortune, excites expectation, care must be taken that what he says may not be at variance with the dignity of him who says it. But a character of a contrary nature requires a humbler tone, for what is liberty in some is in others called presumption; to some their authority is sufficient support, while the force of reason itself scarcely upholds others.

4In consequence prosopopeiae appear to me the most difficult of all speeches of this kind, for in them the task of sustaining a character is added to the other arduous points of suasory eloquence. Caesar, Cicero, and Cato, speaking on the same subject, must each express himself differently. But exercise in this department is extremely beneficial, both because it requires double effort and because it greatly improves the powers of those who would be poets or historians. 50. To orators, it is even indispensable, for there are many speeches composed by Greek and Latin orators for others to use, and what was expressed in these had to be adapted to the speaker's condition and character. Did Cicero think uniformly in the same manner or assume the same character when he wrote for Cneius Pompey, for Titus Ampius, and for others? Did he not rather, looking to the fortune, dignity, and actions of each of them, express the very character of all to whom he gave words, so that, though they spoke in a better style than their own, they yet appeared to speak in their own persons? speech is not less faulty which is unsuited to the person than that which is unsuited to the subject to which it ought to be adapted. Lysias, accordingly, is thought to deserve great praise for preserving so exact an air of truth in the speeches which he wrote for the illiterate.

It ought, indeed, to be a chief object with declaimers to consider what is suitable to different characters, for they speak on but few subjects of controversy as advocates, but generally harangue in the character of sons, fathers, rich men, old men, morose or good-natured persons, misers or superstitious people, cowards or jesters, so that actors in comedy have scarcely more parts to master on the stage than they have in the schools. 5All these representations of characters may be regarded as prosopopeiae, which I include under deliberative orations because they differ from them in nothing but the personation of a character, though this is sometimes introduced into those deliberative subjects, which, taken from history, are conducted under the real names of the speakers. 5Nor am I ignorant that poetical and historical prosopopeiae are sometimes given in the schools by way of exercise, as the pleading of Priam before Achilles, or the address of Sylla to the people on laying down the dictatorship. But these will fall under some of the three heads into which I have divided causes, for we have to intreat, to make declarations, to give reasons, and to do other things of which I have spoken above, in various forms and as the subject may require, in the judicial, deliberative, and demonstrative kind of oratory. 5But in all these we very often utter fictitious speeches attributed to characters which we ourselves introduce; as in Cicero's speech Pro Caelio, Appius Caecus and Clodius, the brother of Clodia, are both represented as addressing Clodia, the former being made to reproach her with her intrigues, and the other to admonish her about them.

5Matters for debate, too, are often introduced in the schools, which approach nearer to the judicial than the deliberative kind of oratory, and which are indeed compounded of the two, as when a discussion is held before Caesar about the punishment of Theodotus, for it consists of an accusation and a defense, which are the proper parts of judicial pleadings. 5But the question of expediency also enters into it: it is inquired "whether it was to the advantage of Caesar that Pompey was killed; whether war is to be apprehended from the king if Theodotus be put to death; and whether such war would not be embarrassing and dangerous at the present time and likely to be of long duration." 5Considerations also arise about the honorableness of the proceeding: "as whether it would be becoming in Caesar to avenge Pompey, and whether it was to be apprehended that he would injure the cause of his party, if he should confess that Pompey was undeserving of death." 5Deliberations on such questions may occur even in real causes.

There has, however, prevailed among most declaimers in regard to deliberative speeches, an error that has not been without its consequences, for they have imagined that the deliberative style of speaking is different from the judicial, and indeed altogether opposed to it. Accordingly, they have affected abrupt commencements, a kind of oratory always vehement, and a liberal embellishment, as they call it, in their expressions, and have studied to make shorter notes, forsooth, for deliberative than for judicial subjects. 5For my part, though I do not see that there is any need for a regular exordium in deliberative speeches for the reasons which I have previously stated, I still do not understand why we should commence with furious exclamation, for he who is asked his opinion on a question proposed does not, if he is a man of sense, begin immediately to cry out, but endeavors to gain the confidence of those who consult him by a modest and rational entrance on the subject. 60. Or why should the style of the speaker be like a torrent and uniformly vehement, when counsel requires in the most eminent degree moderation and calm reasoning? I admit that in judicial pleadings, the tone of the speaker is often lowered in the exordium, the statement of facts, and the argumentative portions, and that, if you take away these three parts, there will remain something like the substance of which deliberative orations consist, but that substance ought to be more calm, not more violent and furious.

6As to grandeur of diction, it is not to be affected by those who declaim deliberative speeches more than by others, but it comes more naturally to them, for to those who imagine their own subjects, great personages—such as kings, princes, people, and Senate—are generally most attractive with important topics for discussion, and consequently, when the style is suited to the matter, it assumes a degree of magnificence from it. 6With regard to real causes, the case is different, and therefore Theophrastus has pronounced that the language in all deliberative oratory should be free from every kind of affectation, following in this respect the authority of his master, though he does not hesitate frequently to differ from him. 6For Aristotle was of opinion that the panegyrical department of oratory was the best adapted for improvement in composition, and next to it the judicial, since the first is devoted wholly to display, and the latter requires art so as even to deceive the hearers if expediency demands; but counsel needs nothing but truth and prudence. 6With respect to panegyric, I agree with these critics, for all other writers have expressed themselves of a similar opinion, but in judicial and deliberative subjects, I think that the manner of speaking is to be adapted to the matter, according to the nature of the question that may be under consideration. see that the Philippics of Demosthenes are distinguished by the same merits as the speeches which he pronounced in judicial causes, and the opinions of Cicero delivered in the Senate and his speeches to the people exhibit a splendor of eloquence no less luminous than that which appears in his accusations and defenses. Yet he speaks of the deliberative kind of oratory in this way: the language ought to be uniformly simple and grave, and more distinguished for studied thoughts than for studied phraseology. 6That there is no kind of oratory to which the application of examples is more suitable, all writers are justly agreed, as the future seems for the most part to correspond to the past, and experience is regarded as some attestation to reason.

6As to shortness or length in such speeches, it depends not on the nature of the subject, but on the compass of it, for as in deliberations, the question is generally more simple, so in judicial affairs it is often of less extent.

All these remarks will prove true to anyone who shall prefer, instead of growing grey over the treatises of the rhetoricians, to read not only speeches, but also histories, for in history the orations pronounced to the people, and the opinions delivered in councils of state, generally afford examples of persuasion and dissuasion. 6He will find, too, that in deliberative speeches the commencements are not abrupt; that the diction in judicial pleadings is often more animated; that style is suited to the matter in one class as well as in the other; and that the speeches in courts of justice are sometimes shorter than those in public councils. 6Nor will he find in them the faults into which some of our declaimers fall, who indulge in coarse invectives against those that dissent in opinion from them, and speak, on the whole, as if they were the natural adversaries of those who ask their advice, and thus exhibit themselves in the character rather of railers than of counsellors. 70. Let young men know that these remarks are written for their admonition, that they may not allow themselves to be taught otherwise than they will have to speak, and spend their time upon learning that which they will have to unlearn. But whenever they shall be called to give counsel to their friends, to pronounce an opinion in the senate, or to offer advice if the emperor consult them, they will be taught by practice what they cannot perhaps receive on the credit of precepts.

 
3 - 9 Judicial oratory, the departments of it often injudiciously increased; the proper number is five, § 1-6. The order to be observed in speaking and writing, 7-9.

I AM now to speak of the judicial kind of oratory, which is extremely varied, but lies in the two duties of attack and defense. The divisions of it, as most authors are of opinion, are five: the exordium, the statement of facts, the proof of what we advance, the refutation of our adversary, and the peroration. To these some have added partition, proposition and digression, the first two of which evidently fall under proof, for you must necessarily propose what you are going to prove, as well as conclude after you have proved, and, if proposition is a division of a cause, why is not also conclusion? As for partition, it is only one of the duties of arrangement, which is a portion of oratory in general, equally pervading all its parts and the whole body of each, like invention and delivery. We are, therefore, not to consider partition as one division of a speech taken as a whole, but as belonging to every single question in it, for what question is there in which the orator may not state what he is going to say in the first place, what in the second, and what in the third, and this is the business of partition. How ridiculous is it, then, that each question should be a species of proof and that partition, which is but a species of question, should be called a part of the speech as a whole? But as for digression, or what has become a more common term, excessus, "excursion," if it be without the cause, it cannot be a part of the cause, and if it be within the cause, it is an aid or ornament to the parts from which it proceeds, for if whatever is in the cause is to be called a part of the cause, why is not every argument, comparison, commonplace, address to the feelings, and example, called a part of the cause?

I do not, however, agree with those who, like Aristotle, omit refutation as comprehended under proof, for proof establishes, while refutation overthrows. Aristotle also makes an innovation, to a certain degree, by placing next to the exordium, not the statement of facts, but the proposition, but this he does because he thinks the proposition the genus, and the statement of facts the species, and supposes that there is not always a necessity for the first, but for the second always and in all cases. But with regard to the divisions which I have made, it is not to be understood that that which is to be delivered first is necessarily to be contemplated first, for we ought to consider, before everything else, of what nature the cause is; what is the question in it; what may profit or injure it; next, what is to be maintained or refuted; and then, how the statement of facts should be made. For the statement is preparatory to proof and cannot be made to advantage, unless it be first settled what it ought to promise as to proof. Last of all, it is to be considered how the judge is to be conciliated, for until all the bearings of the cause be ascertained, we cannot know what sort of feeling it is proper to excite in the judge, whether inclined to severity or gentleness, to violence or laxity, to inflexibility or mercy.

Yet, I do not, on these accounts, agree with those who think that the exordium is to be written last, for though it is proper that our materials should be collected and that we should settle what effect is to be produced by each particular, before we begin to speak or write, yet we ought certainly to begin with that which is naturally first. No man begins to paint a portrait or mold a statue with the feet, nor does any art find its completion where the commencement ought to be. Else, what will be the case if we have no time to write our speech? Will not so preposterous a practice disappoint us? The orator's materials are, therefore, to be first contemplated in the order in which we direct, and then to be written in the order in which he is to deliver them.

 
3 - 10 A cause rests either on one point of controversy, or on several; on points of the same or of different kinds, § 1, 2. Comparison, 4. We must first settle the kind of cause; what points are to be considered next, 5.

EVERY cause, in which there is one method for a plaintiff and another for a defendant, consists either in a controversy about one charge or about several. The one is called simple, the other complex. A question about a theft by itself, or an act of adultery by itself, is single and independent. When there are several questions, they may be either of the same kind, as in a charge of extortion, or of different kinds, as in a charge of sacrilege and homicide at the same time. This union of charges does not now occur in public trials, because the praetor takes cognizance of each according to a fixed law, but is frequent in the causes tried before the emperors and the Senate, and used to be common in those that came before the people. Also, disputes between private individuals often require one judge to determine as to many different points of law. Nor will there be more than two kinds of causes, even in cases where one party prosecutes the same suit, and on the same ground, against several; or two against one; or several against several, as we sometimes see occur in actions about inheritances. Though there be several parties, the cause is still but one, unless indeed the condition of the parties give rise to distinct questions.

There is, however, said to be a third kind, different from these, called comparative, and some consideration with regard to comparison frequently happens in some part of a cause, as when, in a case before the centumviri, there arises, after other questions, one of this kind, which of two persons is better entitled to an inheritance? But it seldom happens that trials are appointed in the forum merely for that object, and only in cases of divination, which take place for the purpose of appointing an accuser, or sometimes between informers to decide which of two has a better claim to a reward.

To this number, some have indeed added a fourth, called ἀντικατηγορία (antikatēgoria), "recrimination," or "mutual accusation," but others think that this is comprehended under the comparative kind. The case of reciprocal suits will be similar to it, a case which happens very frequently, and if this ought also to be called ἀντικατηγορία (antikatēgoria), for it has no proper appellation with us, there will be two kinds of it, one in which the parties bring the same charge against each other, the other in which they bring different charges. The case is similar with regard to demands.

When the nature of the cause has been determined, we shall then have to consider whether the fact, which is made a charge by the accuser against the defendant, is to be denied, to be justified, to be called by another name, or to be excluded from that particular sort of process. By this means, the states of causes are determined.

 
3 - 11 Hermagoras's method of proceeding; the question, § 1-3. The mode of defense, 4-6. The point for decision, 8. The ground or substance of the cause, 9. The question and the point for decision may be conjoined or separate, according to the nature of the cause, 10-17. Opinions of Cicero, 18-20. Hermagoras too fond of nice subdivisions, 21-25. Method of Theodorus, 227. Conclusion, 28.

WHEN these matters are settled, Hermagoras thinks that we must next consider what is the question, the mode of defense, the point for judgment, the συνέχον (synechon), or point "containing" the accusation, or, as some call it, the firmamentum, or "foundation" of the cause.

"Question," in its more general sense, is understood to mean everything on which two or more plausible opinions may be advanced. But in regard to judicial matters, it is to be taken in two senses: one, when we say that a cause involves several questions, among which we include even those of least importance; the other, when we mean the great question on which a cause turns. It is of the second that I now speak, and it is from this that the state has its origin: status conjecturalis, "Has a thing been done?"; status definitivus, "What has been done?"; and status qualitatis, "Has it been justifiably done?" These interrogatories Hermagoras, Apollodorus, and many other writers properly call "questions"; Theodorus, as I observed, terms them "general heads," and the minor questions, or those dependent on them, "special heads," as it admitted that one question may arise from another question and that a species may be divided into species. This principal question of all, then, they call the ζήτημα (zētēma).

The mode of defense is that process by which what is admitted to have been done is justified. To exemplify it, why should I not use that instance which almost all writers have adopted? "Orestes killed his mother": this is admitted, but he says that he killed her justly. The state will then be that of quality, the question, "Whether he killed her justly?" The ground of defense will be that Clytemnestra killed her husband, the father of Orestes. this is called the αἴτιον (aition).

The point for judgment, the κρινόμενον (krinomenon), will be, in this case, whether even a mother guilty of such a crime ought to be killed by her son.

Some have made a distinction between αἴτιον (aition) and αἰτία (aitia), making the first signify the cause for which a trial becomes necessary, as the killing of Clytemnestra, the second, the ground on which the deed is justified, as the killing of Agamemnon. But such has been the disagreement as to the sense of these words, that some call aitia the cause of the trial and aition the cause of the deed, while others use them in senses exactly contrary. Among the Latins, some have adopted the terms initium, "commencement," and ratio, "reason," while some include both under the same term. Cause also appears to arise from cause, αἴτιον ἐξ αἰτίον, as, "Clytemnestra killed Agamemnon because he had sacrificed their common daughter, and brought home a captive as his concubine." The same authors are of opinion that in one question, there may be several grounds of defense, as, for example, "if Orestes adds another cause for having killed his mother, namely, that he was forced to obey an oracle," and that whatever number of causes for the deed may be alleged, there are the same number of points for judgment, as it will also be a point for judgment whether he ought to have obeyed the oracle. But even one alleged cause for a deed may, as I conceive, give rise to several questions and points for judgment, as in the case of the man, who, after he had killed his wife on catching her in adultery, subsequently killed the adulterer, who at first escaped, in the forum. The alleged cause for the deed is but one, "He was an adulterer," but several questions and points for judgment may arise, as whether it was lawful to kill him at that time or in that place. But as when there are several questions, and all have their states, there is yet but one state in the cause to which everything is referred, so there is but one proper point for judgment on which the decision is pronounced.

As to the συνέχον (synechon), which, as I said, some call continens, others firmamentum, and Cicero "the strongest argument of the defender, and the fittest point for adjudication," some regard it as that after which nothing remains to be ascertained, some as that which is the strongest point for adjudication. The reason of the deed is not a point for consideration in all causes, for what reason for the deed need be sought when the deed is altogether denied? But when the reason of the deed is an object of consideration, they deny that the ultimate point for decision rests on the same ground as the first question, an observation which Cicero makes both in his Rhetorica and his Partitiones. 1For when it is said, "It was done; it was not done; was it done?" the question rests on conjecture, and the judication rests on the same ground as the question, because the first question and the ultimate decision are about the same point. But when it is said, "Orestes killed his mother; he killed her justly; no, but unjustly; did he kill her justly?" the question rests on the consideration of quality, but this is not yet the point for decision. When then will it be? After the statement, "She had killed my father; but you ought not, therefore, to have killed your mother; ought Orestes to have killed her?" Here is the point for decision. 1The fundamental point of the defense I will give in the words of Cicero himself: "if Orestes were inclined to say that the disposition of his mother towards his father, towards himself and his sisters, towards his kingdom, and towards the reputation of his race and family, had been of such a nature that her children felt of all people most obliged to inflict punishment on her." 1Others also use such examples as these: "the law says, let him who has exhausted his patrimony not be allowed to address the people; but the defendant exhausted his upon public works," and the question then is, "whether whoever has exhausted his patrimony is not to be allowed," and the point for judgment, "whether he who has exhausted his patrimony in such a way is not to be allowed." 1Or consider the case of the Auruncan soldier, who killed the tribune Caius Lusius when he made dishonorable advances to him, in which the question is, "whether he killed him justly," the ground of defense, "that he made dishonorable advances," the point for judgment, "whether it were lawful for a person to be killed uncondemned; whether it were lawful for a tribune to be killed by a soldier."

1Some also regard the question, as in one state, and the point for decision in another; for example, the question "whether Milo did right in killing Clodius" is in the state of quality, but the point for decision, "whether Clodius lay in wait for Milo," is in the state of conjecture. 1They say also that a cause often strays into some matter which does not properly belong to the question, and on which the decision is pronounced. I am not at all of their opinion, for the question, for instance, "whether every man who has exhausted his patrimony is forbidden to address the people," must have its decision. Therefore, the question and the point for decision will not be different, but there will be more than one question and more than one point for decision. 1In the case of Milo, too, is not the question of fact considered with reference to the question of quality? For if Clodius lay in wait, it follows that he was justly killed. But when the cause goes into some other matter and recedes from the question which was first proposed, the question will be in the state in which the point for decision is.

1Respecting these matters, even Cicero is in some degree at variance with himself, for in his Rhetorica, as I said above, he has followed Hermagoras, and in his Topica, he expresses himself of opinion that κρινόμενον (krinomenon), the "point of judgment," is the consideration arising from the state, and in addressing Trebatius, a lawyer of his time, he calls it "the point about which the discussion is" and terms the particulars in which that point is contained continentia, the "containing particulars" and the firmamenta, "supports," as it were, of the defense, without which there would be no defense at all. 1But in his Partitiones Oratoriae he calls the firmamentum that which is opposed to the defense, because the continens, the "containing point," as it is the first thing, is advanced by the accuser, while the ratio, "mode of defense," proceeds from the defendant. From the opposition of the ratio and firmamentum arises the question for decision.

Therefore, those authors who have made the state, the containing point, and the question for decision to be all the same and who have pronounced the containing point to be that without which there would be no discussion, have settled the matter more judiciously and concisely. 20. In this "containing point," they seem to me to have included both allegations, "that Orestes killed his mother, and that Clytemnestra killed Agamemnon." The same writers think that the state and the point for judgment always concur, and indeed any other opinion would have been at variance with their views.

2But this studied subtlety about names of things is but ostentatious labor and has only been noticed by me that I might not appear to have given too little consideration to the work which I have taken in hand. A master who teaches without affectation need not split his mode of teaching into such minute distinctions. 2Excessive subdivision is a fault into which many rhetoricians have fallen, and especially Hermagoras, a man otherwise of great sagacity, deserving of admiration on many accounts, and censurable only for too anxious diligence, so that even what we blame in him is not unworthy of some degree of commendation. 2But the way which I follow is far shorter and for that reason plainer, and will neither fatigue the learner with long windings, nor enervate the body of his language by portioning it out into minute particulars. For he who sees what point it is that comes into controversy; what the opposite side wishes to do with regard to it, and by what means; what his own side has to do (a particular especially to be regarded), cannot be without a full understanding of all the matters on which I have just spoken. 2Nor can there, we may say, be any person not utterly devoid of sense and a stranger to all practice in pleading that does not know what it is that gives rise to a discussion (which is called by the rhetoricians the cause and the containing point); what is the question between two parties; on what point judgment must be given; and which three things are indeed all the same. For the subject of the question is that which comes into controversy, and judgment is given respecting that which is the subject of the question.

2But we do not perpetually keep our attention fixed on these matters, but moved with the desire of obtaining praise by whatever means or carried away with the pleasure of speaking, we allow ourselves to wander from our subject. Matter without the cause is always more abundant than within it, for in the controversy itself there is indeed comparatively little, and everything else is beyond its limits; in the one case, we speak only of matters in which we have been instructed, in the other, on whatever we please. 2Nor is it so much to be charged upon ourselves that we should discover the question, the containing point, and the point for judgment (for to discover them is easy), as that we should always look steadily to our object, or at least, if we digress from it, should recover sight of it, lest, while we are striving for applause, our arms should drop from our grasp.

2The school of Theodorus, as I said, distinguishes everything into heads, under which term several particulars are comprehended. Under the first, only the main question, the same as the state; under the next, other questions, which refer to the main question; under the third, the proposition with its proofs. The word is used in the same sense in which we say caput rei est, "it is the head of the business"; in Menander, κεφάλαιόν ἐστι (kephalaion esti). But, in general, whatever is to be proved will be a head, whether of greater or lesser importance.

2Since I have now set forth, even more circumstantially than was requisite, what is taught on these points by the writers of books on rhetoric, and since I have already specified the several parts of judicial causes, my next book shall treat of proems or exordia.

 
4 5 90.2
4 - Introduction The grandsons of the sister of Domitian committed to the tuition of Quintilian; a new motive for care in composing his work. He proceeds to speak of the exordium of a speech, the statement of facts the proof, the refutation of adverse allegations, and the peroration.

AFTER finishing, my dear Marcellus Victor, the third book of the work dedicated to you and completing about the fourth part of my task, there have occurred to me a motive for fresh diligence and a deeper solicitude as to the judgment that I may deserve from the public. Hitherto, we were but comparing studies, as it were, between ourselves, and if my method of instruction was but little approved by others, I thought myself likely to be quite contented with our domestic advantage, deeming it sufficient to regulate the education of your son and my own. But since Domitian Augustus has vouchsafed me the charge of his sister's grandsons, I should not sufficiently feel the honor of his divine judgment if I were not to estimate the greatness of my undertaking as proportioned to this distinction. For what pains can I spare in the cultivation of the morals of youth in order that the most upright of censors may have reason to approve them? Or in promoting their studies, that I may not be found to have disappointed, in this respect, the expectations of a prince most eminent, not only in other accomplishments, but also in eloquence? And if no one is surprised that the greatest poets have often invoked the Muses, not only at the beginning of their works, but, on advancing in their course, and arriving at some point of great importance, have renewed their addresses and used ,as it were, fresh solicitations. I myself shall surely be pardoned also if I now do that which I omitted to do when I entered on my subject and call all the deities to my aid, especially that God than whom there is no deity more auspicious or more peculiarly favorable to learning, in order that he may inspire me with ability proportioned to the expectation which he has raised of me, may propitiously and kindly support me, and render me in reality such as he has supposed me to be.

For such devotional feeling, this, though my greatest, is not my only reason, for as my work advances, the parts on which I am entering are more important and more difficult than those which have preceded them. It is now to be shown, in the next place, what is the process of judicial causes, which are extremely numerous and diversified; what is the purpose of the exordium; what is the proper form of a statement of acts; what constitutes the force of proofs, either when we confirm our own assertions or overthrow those of our adversary; and what is the power of a peroration, either when the memory of the judge is to be refreshed by a short recapitulation, or when, what is far the most effective, his feelings are to be excited. On these particulars, some authors, as if they dreaded the weight of the whole in a body, have preferred to write separately, and even thus have published several books on each of them. Having ventured to embrace them all, I see before me a labor almost boundless and am oppressed with the very thought of the task which I have undertaken. But as I have begun, I must persevere, and if I fail in strength, must nevertheless proceed with courage.

 
4 - 1 Etymology of the word proem, § 1-An erroneous practice in the schools and in the forum, Object of the proem or exordium, How the good will and attention of the judge may be gained by allusion to different characters concerned in the cause, 6-1Farther observations on the same subject, 20-2Difference between the exordium and the conclusion, 22Matters connected with the characters and the cause to be considered, 30-3Solicitude to be shown by the pleader; brevity to be promised; accurate division of matter to be made, 33-3To conciliate the judge must be the pleader's constant object throughout his speech, 37-3Five kinds of causes, 40-4Some make two purposes of a proem, proposition and insinuation, the latter more easy for the advocate than for his client, 42-4An unnecessary rule of the Apollodoreans, 50, 5Points to be regarded in the exordium, 52-60. The speaker's memory must not fail him in it, 6Its length must be proportioned to the cause, 6Whether apostrophe, and other figures of speech, may be used in it, 63-7Whether a formal exordium is always necessary, 72-7Mode of transition to the statement of facts, 76-7

THAT which is called the beginning or exordium in Latin, the Greeks seem with greater reason to have termed the προοίμιον (prooimion), for by our writers is signified only a commencement, but the Greek rhetoricians plainly show that this is the part preliminary to the entrance on the subject on which the orator is to speak. For whether it be because οἴμη (oimē) signifies a tune, and players on the lyre have called the short prelude that they execute, for the purpose of conciliating favor, before they enter upon the regular contest for the prize, a prooimium, orators, in consequence, have used the same appellation to distinguish the address which they make to gain the good will of the judges before they commence their pleading; or whether, because the Greeks call a road οἴμος (oimos), it became a practice to call that a prooimium which precedes the entrance on a subject. It is certainly the proem or exordium that produces a good effect on the judge before he understands what the cause is, and we act erroneously in the schools in using exordia of such a nature as if the judge were thoroughly acquainted with the cause. The liberty taken in this respect arises from the circumstance that the usual idea of the cause is given previous to the commencement of the declamation. Such kind of exordia may be adopted indeed in the forum in second processes, but in a first process, seldom or ever, unless we chance to plead before a judge to whom the matter has become known from some other quarter.

In giving an exordium at all, there is no other object but to prepare the hearer to listen to us more readily in the subsequent parts of our pleading. This object, as is agreed among most authors, is principally effected by three means: by securing his good will and his attention, and by rendering him desirous of further information. These ends are not to be kept in view throughout the whole pleading, but they are pre-eminently necessary at the commencement, when we gain admission, as it were, to the mind of the judge in order to penetrate still farther into it.

As to good will, we either gain it from persons connected with the cause, or have it from the cause itself. But in respect to persons, regard is not to be had to three only (as most rhetoricians have supposed)—the prosecutor, the defendant, and the judge—for the exordium sometimes takes its complexion from the character of the pleader, and though he speaks sparingly and modestly concerning himself, yet, if he be deemed a good man, much influence, in reference to the whole cause, may depend on that consideration. He will then be thought to bring to the support of his party not merely the zeal of an advocate but almost the testimony of a witness. Let him be regarded as coming to plead, therefore, from being induced by obligations of kindred or friendship, or above all, if it be possible, by respect for his country, or for some strong considerations of precedent. This, without doubt, is still more to be observed by the parties themselves, so that they may seem to go to law from some important and honorable motive, or even from necessity.

But while the authority of the speaker becomes thus of the highest efficacy if, in his undertaking the business, all suspicion of meanness, hatred, or ambition be far removed from him, it is a sort of tacit commendation to him if he represents himself as weak and inferior in ability to those acting against him, a practice which is adopted in most of the exordia of Messala. For there is a natural feeling in behalf of those oppressed, and a conscientious judge most willingly listens to an advocate whom he does not suspect of any design to draw him from justice. Hence arose that dissembling of the speakers of antiquity to conceal their eloquence, so extremely different from the ostentation of our times.

We must also take care not to appear insolent, malignant, overbearing, or reproachful towards any man or body of men, especially such as cannot be wounded without exciting an unfavorable feeling in the judge. 1It would be foolish of me to advise that nothing should be said against the judge himself, not only openly, but nothing even that could be understood as adverse to him, if such things did not sometimes take place.

The character of the advocate for the opposite party may sometimes afford us matter for an exordium. We speak of him sometimes with honor, making it appear that we fear his eloquence and influence, so as to render them objects of suspicion to the judge, or sometimes, though very rarely, with contempt, as Asinius Pollio, in pleading for the heirs of Urbinia, enumerates the choice of Labienus as advocate for the opposite party among the proofs of the badness of their cause. 1Cornelius Celsus denies that such remarks constitute exordia, as having no relation to the cause; I, however, am led to form a contrary opinion, not only by the authority of the greatest authors, but because I consider, for my own part, that whatever relates to the pleader of the cause relates to the cause itself, since it is but natural that judges should be more inclined to believe those whom they are more inclined to hear.

1As to the character of the prosecutor, it may be treated in various ways; sometimes his worth may be asserted, sometimes his weakness commended to notice. Sometimes a statement of his merits may be proper, when a pleader may speak with less reserve in praise of another's worth than he would in that of his own. Sex, age, and condition are of great influence, as in the case of women, old men, or wards, when they plead in the character of wives, parents, or children. 1Commiseration alone, indeed, has effect even upon a right-minded judge. But such matters are to be lightly touched, and not exhausted, in an exordium.

The character of the adversary is commonly attacked with references to topics of a similar nature, but directed against him. Envy must be shown to attend on the powerful, contempt on the mean and abject, and hatred on the base and criminal—three qualities that have great power in alienating the favor of the judges. 1Nor is it enough merely to state such particulars (for this is in the power even of the ignorant), but most of them must be magnified or extenuated, as may be expedient. To give effect to them is the business of the orator; the mere expression of them may be inherent in the cause itself.

1The favor of the judge we shall conciliate, not merely by offering him praise (which ought indeed to be given with moderation, though it is to be remembered at the same time, that the privilege of offering it is common to both parties), but by turning his praises to the advantage of our cause. In behalf of the noble, we should appeal to the judge's dignified station; in behalf of the humble, to his justice; in behalf of the unfortunate, to his pity; and in behalf of the injured, to his severity, using similar appeals in other cases. 1I should wish also, if possible, to know the character of the judge, for according as it may be violent, gentle, obliging, grave, austere, or easy, it will be proper to make his feelings subservient to our cause where they fall in with it, and to soften them where they are repugnant to it.

1But it sometimes happens, also, that he who sits as judge is either our enemy or the friend of our opponent, a circumstance which ought to claim the attention of both sides but more particularly, perhaps, of that to which the judge seems to incline. For there is sometimes, in unprincipled judges, a foolish propensity to give sentence against their friends, or in favor of parties with whom they are at enmity, and to act unjustly that they may not seem to be unjust.

1Some have been judges, too, in their own causes. I find, for instance, in the books of observations published by Septimius, that Cicero was engaged in a cause of that nature, and I myself pleaded the cause of Queen Berenice before that queen herself. In this case, the mode of procedure is similar to that in those which I have just mentioned, for he who pleads in opposition to the judge exaggerates the confidence of his client, and he who pleads in his favor expresses apprehension of feelings of delicacy on his part. 20. Opinions, moreover, such as the judge may appear to have brought with him in favor of either party, are to be overthrown or established. Fear is sometimes to be removed from the mind of the judge, as Cicero, in his speech for Milo, strove to convince the judges that they were not to think the arms of Pompey arrayed against them; fear should sometimes be held out to them, as Cicero acted in his pleadings against Verres. 2But of the two modes of producing fear in judges, the one is common and well received, when we express concern, for example, that the Roman people may not think unfavorably of them, or that their privilege of sitting as judges may not be transferred from them to another body. But the other is unusual and violent, as when the speaker threatens the judges with a charge of bribery, a threat which it is certainly safer to address to a larger body of judges than to a small one, for the bad are alarmed and the good pleased. But to a single judge I should never recommend it to be used, unless every other resource has failed. 2But should necessity drive us to it, it is no part of oratorical art, any more than to appeal from the judgment of the tribunal (though an appeal is often advantageous) or to impeach a judge before he gives sentence, for one who is not an orator may threaten and denounce.

2If the nature of the cause itself afford us topics for conciliating the judge, it will be proper, above all, that such of them be selected for introduction into the exordium as may appear most favorable to our object. On this head, Virginius is in error, for he says Theodorus is of opinion that from every question in the cause some thought may be selected for the exordium. 2Theodorus does not say this, but merely that the judge is to be prepared for the most important points, a precept in which there would be nothing objectionable if it did not enjoin that as a general rule, which every pleading does not admit and which every cause does not require. For when we rise to open the case on behalf of the prosecutor, while it is still unknown to the judge, how shall we bring forward thoughts from every question in it? Surely the subject must previously be stated. Let us admit that some questions may then be brought forward (for so the form of our pleading sometimes requires), but must we, therefore, bring forward all the most important ones, that is, the whole cause? If so, the statement of facts will be dispatched in the exordium. 2Or if, as frequently happens, the cause is somewhat difficult, should we not try to gain the goodwill of the judge in other parts of the pleadings and not present the bare roughness of every point to his mind before we have attempted to incline it in our favor? If such matters were always rightly managed at the opening of a speech, there would be no need of any formal exordium. 2At times, accordingly, some particulars which may be of great effect in conciliating the favor of the judge may be previously introduced, and not without advantage, in the commencement.

Again, it is not necessary for me to enumerate what points are likely to gain us favor in causes, for they will be manifest to the pleader when he understands the nature of a cause, and all particulars, in so great a variety of suits, cannot possibly be specified. 2But as it is for the service of a cause to discover and amplify its favorable points, so it is expedient to refute, or at least to extenuate, whatever is prejudicial to it. Compassion may also spring from the nature of our cause, if we have suffered, or are likely to suffer, any severe misfortune.

2Nor am I inclined, as some are, to think that an exordium differs from a peroration only in this respect— that in a peroration is narrated what has gone before, and in an exordium is set forth what is to come. The difference rather lies in this: that in the introduction the kind feelings of the judge should be touched, but cautiously and modestly. In the peroration, however, we may give full scope to the pathetic, we may attribute fictitious speeches to our characters, and evoke the dead and produce their children, attempts which are not made in exordia.

2But as to those feelings of pity which I mentioned above, it is necessary not only to excite them in our favor in the exordium, but to turn away the effect of them from our opponent, and as it is for our advantage that our lot should be thought likely to be deplorable if we should be defeated, so is it that the pride of our adversary should be apprehended as likely to be overbearing if he should conquer.

30. But exordia are often taken from matters which are not properly concerns of our clients or their causes, but which yet in some way relate to both of them. With the persons of our clients are connected not only their wives and children, to whom I have previously alluded, but their relatives and friends, and sometimes countries and cities, and whatever else may be injured by the failure of those whom we are defending. 3To the cause, among external circumstances, may be referred the "occasion," from which is derived the exordium in behalf of Caelius; the "place," from which is taken that in behalf of Deiotarus; the "appearance of things," whence that in behalf of Milo; "public opinion," whence that against Verres; and in short, that I may not specify everything, "the report respecting the trial, the expectation of the people," for though none of these things form part of the cause, they yet have a connection with the cause. 3Theophrastus adds that an exordium may be derived from the form of the pleading, as that of Demosthenes for Ctesiphon appears to be, when he entreats to be allowed to speak as he himself may think most proper rather than according to the mode which the prosecutor has laid down in his charge.

3Confidence often suffers from being thought to partake of presumption. But artifices which procure us favor, and which, though common to almost all pleaders, are not to be neglected, even if for no other reason than that they may not be first employed against us, are to wish, to express detestation, to enterat, to show anxiety. If a cause appears to be brought forward which is new, important, atrocious, and of consequence in regard to precedent, it generally renders the judge extremely attentive, especially if he is moved by concern for himself or his country, and his feelings must then be excited by hope, fear, admonition, supplication, and even by false representations, if we think that they will be of service to us.

3It also has effect in securing the attention of the audience, if they think that we shall not detain them long, or enter upon matters foreign to the subject. Such attention in itself makes the judge desirous of information, and especially if we can state, briefly and clearly, the substance of the matter of which he has to take cognizance, a method which Homer and Virgil have adopted at the commencement of their poems. 3As to the length of it, it should be such as to resemble a proposition rather than an exposition, and show not how every particular in the cause occurred, but on what particulars the pleader intends to speak. Nor do I know that a better example of such a summary can be found than that of Cicero in his speech for Aulus Cluentius: 3"I have remarked, judges, that the whole speech of the accuser is divided into two parts, of which one appeared to me to rest, and principally to depend, on the odium, now long prevalent, arising from the judgment of Junius, the other to touch, for form's sake, timidly and diffidently, on the question of the charge of poisoning, though it is on this point that the present inquiry has according to law been instituted." All this, however, is more easy for the defender than the prosecutor, because by the one the judge is merely to be warned, by the other he must be informed.

3Nor shall any authors, however eminent, induce me to entertain the opinion that I may sometimes dispense with rendering the judge attentive and willing to listen (Not that I am ignorant of the reason which is alleged by them, namely, that it is for the advantage of a bad cause that its nature should not be understood; but the truth is that the judge's ignorance of a cause does not arise from inattention on his part, but from error into which he is led). 3Suppose that our adversary has spoken and has perhaps produced conviction in the judge; we require that his opinion should be changed, and it cannot be altered unless we render him attentive and willing to listen to what we are going to say. How are we to act then? I consider that some of our adversary's arguments must be weakened, or depreciated, and noticed with a sort of contempt, in order to lessen the strong feeling of favor which the judge has for the opposite party, a method which Cicero adopted in pleading for Ligarius. 3For what else was the object of that irony, but that Caesar might be induced to give less attention to the cause, as presenting no extraordinary features? What is the purpose of the speech for Caelius, but that the charge might seem less important than it was thought to be?

But of the rules which I have proposed, it is evident that some are applicable to one sort of causes and some to another. 40. The kinds of causes, too, most rhetoricians pronounce to be five: ἔνδοξον (endoxon), the "honorable"; ἄδοξον (adoxon), the "mean"; ἀμϕίδοξον (amphidoxon), the "doubtful" or "ambiguous"; παράδοξον (paradoxon), the "paradoxical"; and δυσπαρακολούθητον (dysparakolouthēton), the "obscure." Some think that to these it is proper to add the base, which some comprehend under the mean, others under the paradoxical. 4What they call paradoxical is something that is brought to pass contrary to human expectation. In an ambiguous cause, we should make it our chief object to render the judge well affected; in an obscure one, desirous of information; in a mean one, attentive. As for an honorable cause, it has sufficient attraction in itself to conciliate; in one that is paradoxical or base, there is need of palliation.

4Hence some divide the exordium into two parts, the introduction and the insinuation, in order that in general, in the introduction, there may be a straightforward request for the judge's goodwill and attention. But as this cannot be made in a dishonorable cause, some insinuation may then be directed cautiously into his mind, especially if the aspect of the cause is not even plausible, either because the ground of it is dishonorable in itself, or because it is disapproved by the public. This may also be true if the cause suffers from the appearance of a patron or a father against a client or a son, which renders it unpopular, or from that of an old or blind man, or an infant, which excites feelings of compassion. 4Rhetoricians teach us at great length what arts we must adopt to counteract these difficulties, imagining cases for themselves and treating them according to the forms of judicial processes. But such peculiarities, as they spring from varieties of causes of which we cannot give rules as to every species, unless they be comprehended under general heads, might be enumerated to infinity. 4For every difficulty a remedy must therefore be sought from the peculiar nature of the case. Let it, however, be laid down as a general rule that we should turn from that which is prejudicial to us to that which is favorable. If we are perplexed about our cause, the character of our client may aid us; if about our client, the nature of our cause. If nothing that can be a support to us presents itself, we may seek for something to damage our adversary, for as it is our greatest wish to gain more favor than our adversary, so it will be our next object to incur less dislike. 4In regard to offenses which cannot be denied, we must endeavor to make them appear less heavy than has been represented, or to have been committed with another intent, or to have no reference to the present question, or to be capable of being expiated by repentance, or to have been already sufficiently punished. Such allegations it is easier for the advocate to make, therefore, than for his client, for he can praise without incurring the charge of conceit and may sometimes even blame to advantage. 4He will sometimes, accordingly, pretend that he is moved with concern (like Cicero in his speech for Rabirius Posthumus), in order to gain the ear of the judge and will assume the sincerity of a person who feels the truth of what he says with a view to gain greater belief when he proceeds to justify or disprove the charges against his client. We are, therefore, to consider first of all whether we should adopt the character of a party in the suit or of an advocate, whenever either is in our power. In the schools, indeed, there is free choice, but in the forum, it is rare that a person is competent to plead his own cause. 4A youth learning to declaim, however, ought to plead causes, such at least as chiefly depend on the pathetic, in the character of the parties themselves, for the feelings cannot be transferred, and the emotion received from another person's mind is not communicated with the same force as that which proceeds from our own. 4For these reasons, there is thought to be need of insinuation, if the pleading of our opponent has taken effect on the mind of the judges, or if we have to address them when their attention is fatigued. From one of these difficulties we shall extricate ourselves by promising to bring our own proofs and by eluding the arguments of the adversary, and from the other by giving hopes that we shall be brief and by recurring to those other means by which I have shown that the judge may be rendered attentive. 4A little pleasantry, too, seasonably introduced, refreshes the minds of the judges, and gratification, from whatever quarter produced, relieves the tedium of listening. Nor is the art of anticipating what is likely to be said against us without its use, as Cicero says that he knew some had expressed surprise that he, who had for so many years defended many but prosecuted none, should now appear as the accuser of Verres, and then shows that the accusation of Verres is a defense of the allies. This rhetorical artifice is called prolēpsis or "anticipation." 50. As it is useful at times, it is now almost constantly adopted by some declaimers, who think that they must never begin but with something contrary to their real object.

Those who follow Apollodorus deny that there are only the three ways which I have specified of propitiating the judge, and enumerate various other sorts of them, almost infinite in number, derived from the character of the judge, from notions formed of circumstances relating to the cause, from opinions entertained of the cause itself, and from the elements of which every cause is composed, as persons, deeds, words, motives seasons, places, occasions, and the like. 5That advantage may really be taken of these particulars, I readily admit, but consider that they all come under the three heads specified. For if I make the judge propitious, attentive, and ready to be informed, I find nothing more that I need desire, as the very fear, which appears to have the greatest influence independent of these particulars, both secures the attention of the judge and deters him from showing partiality to the opposite side.

5Since it is not sufficient, however, to indicate to learners what enters into the nature of an exordium, without instructing them also how an exordium may be best composed, I add that he who is going to speak should reflect what he has to say, before whom, for or against whom, at what time or place, amidst what concurrence of circumstances, under what prepossessions of the public; what opinion it is likely that the judge has informed previous to the commencement of the pleadings; and what the speaker has to desire or deprecate. Nature herself will lead him to understand what he ought to say first. 5But now they think anything with which they happen to start, an introduction, and whatever occurs to them, especially if it be some thought that pleases them, serves them, forsooth, for an exordium. Many points, doubtless, may be introduced into the exordium which are derived from other parts of the cause, or which are common to the exordium with other parts, but nothing will be said preferably in any particular part but that which cannot be said equally well in any other part.

5There is much attraction in an exordium which derives its substance from the pleading of our opponent, for this reason, that it does not appear to have been composed at home, but to be produced on the spot and from the suggestion of the subject. It increases the reputation of the speaker for ability, from the facility which he exhibits, and, from wearing the appearance of a plain address, prompted by what has just been said, gains him the confidence of his audience, insomuch that, though the rest of his speech may be written and carefully studied, the whole of it nevertheless seems almost entirely extemporaneous, as it is evident that its commencement received no preparation at all. 5Very frequently, too, an exordium will be pleasing from a certain modesty in thoughts, style, tone, and look of the speaker. So far that even in a cause which hardly admits of controversy, the confidence of the orator ought not to display itself too plainly, for the judge generally detests assurance in a pleader and, as he knows his own authority, tacitly looks for a due portion of respect. 5We must take no less care, also, that we may not excite suspicion in the exordium; therefore, no appearance of study ought to be shown in it because all art on the part of the orator seems to be directed against the judge. 5But to avoid the suspicion of using art is the achievement of the highest art, a precept which is given by all writers on rhetoric, and with the utmost propriety; yet the present practice, from the state of things in our times, is somewhat at variance with it, because on certain trials, especially capital ones, and those before the centumviri, the judges themselves require to be addressed in careful and formal speeches and think themselves slighted if study is not apparent in every pleading before them, desiring not only to be instructed but to be pleased. 5Moderation in such a practice is difficult, but it may be so far observed that we may give our oratory the appearance of carefulness and not of cunning.

Of the old precepts, this still remains in force that no unusual expression, no highly audacious metaphor, nothing borrowed from what is obsolete and antiquated, or from poetic license, should appear in the exordium. 5For we are not as yet admitted to full freedom of speech, and the attention of the audience, being still fresh, keeps us under restraint, but when their minds are propitiated and warmed, greater liberty will be tolerated, and especially when we have entered on those moral topics of declamation whose natural fertility prevents the boldness of an expression from being observed amid the splendor of beauty that surrounds it.

60. Our style in the exordium ought not to resemble that of the argumentative, sentimental, or narrative parts of our speech. Nor should our manner be too prolix or circumlocutory, but should wear the appearance of simplicity and unaffectedness, not promising too much either in words or look. A mode of delivery in which all art is concealed, and which, as the Greeks say, is, ἀνεπίϕαντος (anepiphantos), or "unostentatious," steals often most successfully on the mind of the hearer. But such points are to be managed according to the way in which it is expedient that the minds of the judges should be impressed.

6To be confused in memory, or to lose our fluency of speech, has nowhere a worse effect than at the commencement, as a faulty exordium may be compared to a countenance disfigured with scars, and that pilot is surely one of the worst who runs his vessel aground as it is leaving the harbor. As to the length of an exordium, it must be regulated by the nature of the cause. 6Simple causes require but a short introduction, such as are perplexed, suspicious, or unpopular, demand a longer one. But those who have prescribed laws for all exordia, saying that they must be limited to four sentences, make themselves ridiculous. Yet immoderate length in the introduction is no less to be avoided, lest the speech should seem to have a head of disproportionate size, and lest that which ought to prepare the hearer should weary him.

6The figure by which the orator's address is turned from the judge, and which is called apostrophe, some rhetoricians wholly exclude from the exordium, being doubtless led by some show of reason to form such an opinion on this point, for it must be admitted that it is most natural for us to address ourselves chiefly to those whose good will we desire to secure. 6At times, however, some striking thought may be necessary to our exordium, and this may be rendered more lively and spirited if directed to another person. Should this be the case, by what law or by what superstitious regard for rules should we be prevented from giving force to our conceptions by this figure? 6Writers of books on the art, indeed, do not proscribe the figure as being illicit, but because they do not think it advantageous, and thus, should the advantage of using it be proved, we shall be forced to adopt it for the same reason for which we are now prevented. 6Demosthenes directs his remarks to Aeschines in his exordium; Cicero, in commencing his speech for Ligarius, addresses himself to Tubero, and, in the beginning of those for several other persons, speaks to whomsoever he pleases. 6His exordium to the speech for Ligarius, indeed, would have been much more languid if it had been in any other form, as the reader will better understand, if he directs to the judge all that most spirited part which is in this form: "You have, therefore, Tubero, that which is most to be desired by an accuser," etc., for then the address would seem really turned away, and the whole force of it would be lost if we were to say, "Tubero therefore has that which is most to be desired by an accuser." 6In the first method, the orator urges and presses on his opponent; in the second, he would merely make a statement. The case would be similar with the passage in Demosthenes, if you alter the turn of it. Has not Sallust, too, adopted an exordium directly addressed to Cicero, against whom he was pleading, starting with the words, "I should bear your reproaches, Marcus Tullius, with concern and indignation," etc.? The same form has been chosen by Cicero in his attack on Catiline, "How long then will you abuse our patience," etc.? 6And that we may not wonder at the use of the apostrophe, Cicero, in his defense of Scaurus, who was accused of bribery (a pleading which is found in his commentaries, for he defended Scaurus twice), employs the prosopopeia, making another person speak for his client, and in his oration for Rabirius Posthumus, and in that also for Scaurus when accused of extortion, he introduces examples in the exordium, while in his speech for Cluentius he commences, as I have previously observed, with partition.

70. But these figures are not, because they may sometimes be used effectively, to be used perpetually, but only whenever reason prevails over rule, as we may sometimes employ the simile, provided it be short, the metaphor, and other figures (which the timid and careful teachers of rhetoric prohibit) unless that noble specimen of irony in the speech for Ligarius, which I noticed a little above, gives offense to any reader. 7Other faults in exordia they have exposed with greater justice. That sort of exordium which may be adapted to several causes is called vulgar (a species which, though regarded with little favor, we may occasionally adopt with advantage, and which is not always avoided by the greatest orators); that which our opponent may use as well as ourselves, is termed common; that which our opponent may turn to his own purpose, is designated as commutable; that which has no just connection with the cause, is styled detached; that which is derived from some other subject, transplanted; some, again, are blamed as long or contrary to rule. Most of these faults, however, are not peculiar to the exordium but may be found in any or every part of a speech.

7Such are the points to be noticed with respect to the exordium, as often as there may be occasion for one. This is not always the case, for it is sometimes superfluous, as when the judge, for instance, is sufficiently prepared without it, or when the subject itself requires no introduction. Aristotle, indeed, denies that it is ever necessary in addressing able judges. Sometimes, too, we cannot employ an exordium, even if we wish, as when the judge is much occupied, when time is short, or when a superior authority obliges us to enter at once upon our subject. 7Sometimes, on the other hand, the nature of an exordium is found in other parts of the speech, for in the statement of facts, or in the course of our arguments, we occasionally ask the judges to attend or to be favorable to us, a practice by which Prodicus thought that they might be roused when disposed to sleep. 7The following passage is an example: "Then Caius Varenus, he who was killed by the slaves of Ancharius (to this point, judges, pay, I beseech you, the most careful attention)," etc. If the cause, moreover, consists of many heads, a proper introduction must be prefixed to each head, as, "Listen now to what follows" or "I now proceed to the next particular." 7But even among the proofs themselves, many observations occur that serve the purpose of an introduction, such as Cicero makes in his speech for Cluentius, when about to speak against the censors, and in that for Muraena, when he makes an apology to Servius. But this practice is so common as to make it unnecessary to establish it by examples.

7Whether, when we have used an exordium, we afterwards commence a statement of facts, or proceed at once to produce our proofs, that point ought to be stated last in our introduction, with which the commencement of the sequel will most naturally unite itself. 7But the affectation in the schools, of disguising the transition in some striking thought, and trying to gain applause, forsooth, for what is little more than a trick, is frigid and puerile, though Ovid constantly indulges in it in his Metamorphoses; but for him, necessity may be some excuse, as he had to unite things the most discordant into the semblance of a whole. 7But what need is there for the orator to conceal his transitions, and impose upon the judges, when they require to be admonished to give their attention to the order of particulars? The commencement of the statement of facts will even be lost upon them, if they are not aware that such statement is begun. 7Accordingly, as it is best not to rush abruptly into our statement, so it is preferable not to pass to it without notice. But if a long and perplexed exposition is to follow, the judges must be specially prepared for it, as Cicero gave one in many places, and more remarkably in this: "I shall make a rather longer introduction than ordinary to demonstrate this point, and I entreat you, judges, not to receive it unfavorably, for when the commencement is understood, you will with far more ease comprehend the sequel."

Such are the principal notions which I have conceived respecting the exordium.

 
4 - 2 Of the statement of facts; some make too nice distinctions respecting it, § 1-3. A formal statement not always necessary, 4-8. Those are mistaken who suppose that a statement is never necessary on the part of an aroused person who denies the charge, 9-19. What the judge already knows may sometimes be stated, 20-23. The statement need not always immediately follow the exordium, 24-27. The practice of the schools injudiciously transferred to the forum, 28-30. The statements should be clear, brief, and credible, 31-35. Of clearness, 36-39. Of brevity, 40-47. Of credibility, 48-53. The statement of facts should prepare the judge for the proof of them, 54-60. Certain qualities have injudiciously been made peculiar to the statement, 61-65. A ridiculous direction that the statement should be omitted in a cause which is unfavourable to us, 66. Difficult points must be variously managed, according to the nature of the case, 67-74. In a conjectural cause we must make a statement, but with art and care, 75-81. We must sometimes divide our statement, and invert the order of occurrences, 82-87. Of fictitious statements, 88-93. Complexion of a statement, 94-100. How we must act if the facts be partly for us and partly against us, 10102. Apostrophe and other figures absurdly excluded from the statement, 103-115. The statement should be embellished with every grace of language, 116-124. Of authority in the pleader, 125-127. Of repetition, 128. Of the commencement and conclusion of the statement, 129-132.

IT is most natural, and ought to be most usual, that when the judge has been prepared by the methods which have been noticed above, the matter on which he is to give judgment should be stated to him. This is the narrative, or statement of the case, but in touching upon it, I shall purposely pass over the too subtle distinctions of those who make several kinds of statements. For they will have an exposition, not only of the business on which the question is brought before the judges, but of the person whom it concerns, as "Marcus Palicanus, a man of humble birth, a native of Picenum, loquacious rather than eloquent"; or of the place at which it occurred, as, "Lampsacus, judges, is a town on the Hellespont"; or of the time, as,

In early spring, when from the hoary hills
The cold snow melting flows;
or of the causes of the occurrence, which historians very often give when they show whence arose a war, a sedition, or a pestilence. In addition to these distinctions, they call some statements perfect, others imperfect; but who is not aware of such a difference? They add that there is a kind of statement regarding past time, which is the most common kind; another respecting the present, such as that of Cicero about the stir of Chrysogonus's friends when his name was mentioned; and a third relating to the future, which can be allowed only to prophets, for hypotyposis is not to be regarded as a statement of facts. But let us turn our attention to matters of more importance.

Some have thought that there must always be a statement of facts, but that this notion is unfounded may be proved by many arguments. In the first place, there are some causes so brief that they require only a mere proposition rather than a statement. This may happen at times on either side, when there is either no exposition of matters, or when the parties are agreed about the fact, and there is no dispute but concerning the law, as in such questions as these before the centumviri, "Whether a son or a brother ought to be the heir of a woman that dies intestate"; or "whether puberty is to be decided by years or by a certain habit of body." Or when there is indeed room for a statement of facts in the cause, but every particular of it is previously known to the judge, or has been fully set forth in the preceding part. At times, again, it may happen only on one side and more frequently on that of the prosecutor, either because it is sufficient for him to make a simple proposition or because it is more advantageous for him to do so. It may be sufficient, for instance, to say, "I claim a certain sum of money lent on certain conditions"; or, "I claim a legacy according to a certain will"; and it will be for the opposite party to show why such claims are not due. It is sufficient for the prosecutor, and more advantageous, to open his cause in this way, "I say that the sister of Horatius has been killed by him," for the judge comprehends the whole charge from this one proposition, and then the way in which the act took place and the motive for it are left rather to be stated by the defendant. As for the accused person, he will withhold a statement of facts, when the charge against him can neither be denied nor palliated, but will rest solely on a question of law. Thus, in the case of the man who, having stolen the money of a private person out of a temple, is accused of sacrilege, a confession will show more modesty than a statement. "We do not deny," the defendant and his advocate may say, "that the money was taken from the temple, but the accuser makes the charge that we are amenable to the law against sacrilege, though the money was private and not consecrated, and it is for you to decide the question whether sacrilege has been committed."

But though I allow that there are at times such reasons for giving no statement of facts, I dissent from those who think that there is no statement when an accused person merely denies the charge which is brought against him, an opinion which is held by Cornelius Celsus, who considers that most trials for murder, and all those for bribery and extortion, are of this class. For he thinks that there are no statements of facts but such as give a general exposition of the charge on which judgment is to be pronounced. Yet he admits himself that Cicero gives a statement of facts in his oration for Rabirius Posthumus, though Cicero denies that any money came into the hands of Rabirius, which was the very point on which the question rested, and in his statement of facts, he gives no exposition of the charge.

1For my part, besides resting on the authority of eminent rhetoricians, I am myself of opinion that there are two kinds of statements in judicial causes: the one sort being an exposition of the cause itself, and the other of the circumstances connected with it. 1"I have not killed a man"—here there is no statement of facts; it is admitted that there is none. But there will be one, and sometimes a long one, in reply to the support of the accusation, and in regard to the past life of the accused, the causes by which an innocent man has been brought into peril, and other circumstances by which the charge is rendered incredible 1For the accuser does not say merely, "You have killed," but states by what proofs he can establish his assertion, as in tragedies, when Teucer accuses Ulysses of having killed Ajax, saying that he was found in a solitary place, near the dead body of his enemy, and with a blood-stained sword in his hand. Ulysses does not merely reply that the deed was not committed by him, but affirms that there was no enmity between Ajax and himself, and that they had been rivals only for glory; he then adds how he came into that lonely spot, saw the dead body lying on the ground, and drew the sword out of the wound. To this statement are subjoined various arguments. 1But there is a statement of fact even when the accuser says, "You were in the place in which your enemy was killed," and the defendant says, "I was not," for he must show where he was. For the same reason, causes of bribery and extortion may have several statements of this kind, as there may be several heads of accusation. In such statements, indeed, the charges will be denied, but resistance must at the same time be made to the accusers' arguments—sometimes singly, sometimes in a body—by an exposition of matters totally different from his. 1Will a person accused of bribery act wrong in stating what sort of parents he had, how he himself has lived, or on what pretensions he relied when he proceeded to stand for office? Or if a man is accused of extortion, may he not advantageously give an account of his past life, and of the means by which he brought upon him the resentment of his whole province, or of his accuser, or some particular witness? 1If such an account is not a statement of facts, neither is that first speech of Cicero in behalf of Cluentius, commencing with the words "Aulus Cluentius Habitus," for there is nothing in that speech about the poisoning, but merely about the causes by which his mother became his enemy. 1Statements also relate to the cause, but are not part of the cause itself, which are given for the sake of example, as that in Cicero's speech against Verres concerning Lucius Domitius, who crucified a shepherd because he confessed that he had used a hunting-spear in killing a boar which he offered as a present to Domitius; 1or for the purpose of exposing some charge foreign to the case, as in Cicero's oration for Rabirius Posthumus: "For as soon as he came to Alexandria, judges, the only method of preserving his money proposed by the king to Posthumus was this, that he should take the charge, and as it were stewardship, of the palace," or with the intention of exaggerating, as in the description of the journey of Verres.

1Sometimes a fictitious statement of particulars is introduced, either to rouse the feelings of the judges, as that in the speech for Roscius respecting Chrysogonus, which I mentioned a little above, or to amuse them with a little pleasantry, as that in the speech for Cluentius regarding the brothers Cepasii, or, occasionally, to make a digression for the purpose of embellishment, as that in the speech against Verres concerning Proserpine: "It was in these parts that a mother is said formerly to have sought her daughter." All these observations assist to show that he who denies may not only make a statement, but a statement concerning the very point which he denies.

20. Nor is the observation which I made above—that a statement is superfluous respecting a matter with which the judge is acquainted—to be taken absolutely, for I wish it to be understood in this sense, that it is superfluous if the judge not only knows the fact, but takes such a view of it as is favorable to our side. 2For a statement of facts is not made merely that the judge may comprehend the case, but rather that he may look upon it in the same light with ourselves. Though, therefore, he may not require to be informed, but only to be impressed in a certain way, we may make a statement with some preliminary remarks, as that we are aware that he has a general knowledge of the case, but entreat him not to be unwilling to listen to an account of particulars. 2Sometimes we may pretend to repeat our statement for the information of some new member taking his seat among the judges; sometimes in order that even the by-standers may be convinced of the iniquity of what is asserted on the opposite side. In this case, the statement must be diversified with varieties of phraseology, to spare the judge the weariness of hearing what he already knows. Thus, we may say, "You remember," and, "Perhaps it may be unnecessary to dwell on this point," or, "But why should I say more on this subject, when you are already acquainted with it?" or, "Of the nature of this affair, you are not ignorant," or we may introduce various other phrases similar to these. 2Besides, if a statement of facts seems always unnecessary before a judge to whom the cause is known, the pleading of the cause before him may seem also to be sometimes unnecessary.

2There is another point about which there is still more frequently a question: whether the statement of facts is always to be immediately subjoined to the exordium. Those who hold the affirmative cannot be thought destitute of arguments to support them, for as the exordium is made with the intent that the judge may be rendered more favorable by it, and more willing and attentive to understand the case, and as proof cannot be adduced unless the case be previously understood, it appears right that the judge should at once be made master of the facts. 2But the nature of a cause sometimes justly changes this order, unless, perchance, Cicero be thought, in that excellent oration which he wrote on behalf of Milo and which he has left to us, to have injudiciously delayed his statement of facts by introducing three questions before it, or unless it would have been of any profit to relate how Clodius lay in wait for Milo, if it had been supposed impossible for an accused person, who confessed that he had killed a man, to be defended, or if Milo had been already prejudged and condemned by the senate, or if Pompey, who, to favor some party, had surrounded the place of trial with a troop of armed men, had been dreaded by Milo as ill-disposed towards him. 2These questions, therefore, were of the nature of an exordium, as they all served to prepare the judge. But in his speech for Varenus, also, he did not introduce his statement of facts until he had refuted certain allegations. This mode of proceeding will be of advantage, too, whenever the charge is not only to be resisted, but to be retorted on the opposite party, so that our own case being first established, our statement of facts may be the commencement as it were of a charge against our adversary, as, in a passage of arms, care to ward off a blow takes the precedence of anxiety to inflict one.

2There are some causes, and indeed not a few, which are easy to be defended so far as to refute the charge on which the trial bears, but which labor under many grievous enormities of the defendant's former life, and these must first be set aside, in order that the judge may listen favourably to the defense of the point about which the question really is. Thus, when Marcus Caelius is to be defended, does not his advocate judiciously repel the imputations against him of luxury, licentiousness, and immorality, before he proceeds to consider that of poisoning? It is about these points that the whole of Cicero's pleading is employed. And does he not then make a statement about the property of Palla, and explain the whole question respecting the violence, which is defended by the pleading of Caelius himself? 2But the custom of the schools is our guide, in which certain points are proposed for us to speak upon, which we call themata, and beyond which there is nothing to be refuted, and thus it is that our statement of facts is always subjoined to our exordium. 2Hence, too, is the liberty which the declaimers take to make a statement of facts even when they appear to speak in the second place in a cause, for when they speak for the prosecutor, they make a statement of facts just as if they were speaking first, and a defense as if they were replying to the opposite party. Such practice is very proper, for as declamation is an exercise preparatory to pleading in the forum, why should not learners qualify themselves to take either the first or second place? But ignorant of the proceedings in the courts, they think that when they come into the forum no departure is to be made from the manner to which they have been accustomed in the schools. 30. Yet even in scholastic declamations, it occasionally happens that a mere proposition is in place of a statement of the case, for what statement has he to make who accuses a jealous man of ill-treating his wife, or he who accuses a cynic of indecency before the censors, when the whole charge is sufficiently expressed by a single word, in whatever part of the speech it be introduced? But on this head I have said enough.

shall now add some remarks on the method of stating a case. A statement of a case is an account of a thing done or supposed to have been done, which account is adapted to persuade, or as Apollodorus defines it, a narrative to inform the auditor what the matter in question is. Most writers, and especially those who are of the school of Isocrates, direct that it should be lucid, brief, and probable. It is of no consequence if, instead of lucid, we say perspicuous, or, instead of probable, credible or apparently deserving of belief. 3Of this specification I approve, though Aristotle differs from Isocrates in one particular, as he ridicules the direction about brevity, as if it were absolutely necessary that a statement should be long or short, and as if there were no possibility of fixing on a just medium. As to the followers of Theodorus, they recognize only the last quality, saying that it is not always proper to state briefly or lucidly. 3On this account I must the more carefully distinguish the various peculiarities of statements in order to show on what occasions each quality is most desirable.

A statement, then, is either wholly in our own favor, wholly in that of our opponent, or a mixture of both. If it be wholly in our own favor, we may be content with the three qualities of which the effect is that the judge more readily understands, remembers, and believes. 3Nor let any one think me to blame for remarking that the statement which is wholly in our favor ought be made probable, though it be true, for there are many narratives true which are not probable, and many probable which are not true. We must therefore take no less pains that the judge may believe what we say truly than what we invent. 3The qualities, indeed, which I have just enumerated are meritorious in other parts of our speech, for through our whole pleading we should avoid obscurity; a certain succinctness in what we say should be everywhere observed; and all that is advanced ought to be credible. But these qualities are most of all to be studied in that part which gives the first information to the judge, for if, in that part, he happens not to understand, not to remember, or not to believe, we shall exert ourselves to no purpose in the sequel.

3The statement, however, will be clear and perspicuous if it is expressed, first of all, in proper and significant words, not mean, nor far-sought, nor at variance with common use, and if it gives a lucid account, also, as to circumstances, persons occasions, places, and motives, and is delivered, at the same time, in such a way that the judge may without difficulty comprehend what is said. 3This excellence is wholly disregarded by most speakers, who, prepared for the shouts of a multitude, whether suborned for the purpose or collected by chance, cannot endure the silence of an attentive auditory and do not think themselves eloquent unless they shake the whole court with noise and vociferation. They consider that to state a matter calmly belongs only to every-day conversation and is in the power of even the most illiterate, while in truth, it is uncertain whether they will not or cannot perform that of which they express such easy contempt. 3For if they try every department of eloquence, they will find nothing more difficult than to say what everyone, when he has heard it, thinks that he himself would have said. For this reason, he does not contemplate it as said with ability, but with truth; it is when an orator is thought to speak truth that he speaks best. 3But now, as if they had found a wide field for themselves in their statement, they assume an extravagant tone of voice in this part of their speech, throw back their heads, strike their elbow against their sides, and revel in every sort of combination of thoughts and words. What is monstrous is that while their delivery pleases, their cause is not understood. But let me put an end to these animadversions, lest I should gain less favor by prescribing what is right than ill-will by censuring what is wrong.

40. Our statement will be sufficiently concise if, in the first place, we commence the exposition of the case at the point where it begins to concern the judge; next, if we say nothing foreign to the cause; and, lastly, if we retrench everything of which the absence will deduct nothing from the knowledge of the judge or the advantage of our client. 4For there is often a brevity in parts, which nevertheless leaves the whole very long, as "I came to the harbor; I beheld a vessel; I asked for how much it would take me; I agreed about the price; I went on board; the anchor was weighed; we loosed our cable, and set sail." Here none of the phrases can be expressed with greater brevity, yet it would be sufficient to say, "I set sail from the harbor," and whenever the event sufficiently indicates what has preceded it, we ought to be content with expressing that from which the rest is understood. 4As I can easily say, therefore, "I have a grown-up son," it is quite superflous for me to indulge in circumlocution and say, "Being desirous of having children, I married a wife, I had a son born to me, I reared him, and have brought him up to full age." Some of the Greek writers, accordingly, have distinguished a concise exposition, σύντομον (syntomos), from a brief one, the first being free from everything superfluous, while the other may possibly want something that is necessary. 4For myself, I make brevity consist not in saying less, but in not saying more than is necessary. As to repetitions, and ταυτολογίαι (tautologia), and περισσολογίαι (perissologia), which some writers on rhetoric desire to be avoided in a statement of facts, I say nothing about them, since such faults are to be shunned for other reasons than that of observing brevity.

4We must no less be on our guard, however, against that obscurity which attends on those who abbreviate every part too much, and it is better that there should be something superabundant in a statement than that anything should be wanting, for what is unnecessary is attended with weariness, but what is necessary is not withheld without danger. 4We must consequently avoid the conciseness of Sallust (though in him it is accounted a merit) and all abruptness in our language. That which does not escape a reader who has leisure to re-examine is perhaps lost altogether upon a mere auditor, who has no opportunity of hearing it repeated. A reader, besides, is generally a person of learning, while a judge is often one whom the country sends to the courts to give a decision on what he can manage to understand; perhaps everywhere, but especially in the statement of facts, we ought to adhere to a judicious medium in our language and say just what is necessary and what is enough. 4But by what is necessary I would not wish to be understood what is barely necessary to state a fact, for brevity ought not to be wholly unadorned or it becomes mere rudeness. What attracts us, beguiles our attention; the more agreeable a story is, the less long it appears, and a pleasant and easy road, though it be of greater extent, fatigues us less than a shorter one that is rugged and unattractive. 4Nor would I ever have so much regard to brevity as not to wish that everything should be inserted that can make the statement of facts credible, for one that is every way plain and curtailed may be called not so much a statement as a confession. There are also many statements that are necessarily long from the nature of the case, and for attending to them, as I recommended above, the judge must be prepared by the conclusion of the exordium. We must then study, by every art in our power, to take something from the length and something from the tediousness of our narrative. 4We shall make it somewhat less long, if we defer such particulars as we can to another part of our speech, not without specifying, however, what we defer: "What motives he had for killing him, whom he took as accomplices, how he disposed his ambush, I shall relate when I offer my proofs." 4Some particulars, too, may be set aside, as it were, out of the course of the narrative, an expedient of which we have an example in Cicero: "Fulcinius died; for many circumstances that attended the event, I shall omit, as being unconnected with the cause." Division also lessens the tediousness of a statement: "I shall relate what took place before the commencement of the affair; I shall relate what occurred during the course of it; I shall relate what happened afterwards." 50. Thus there will appear rather to be three short narratives than a single long one. Sometimes it will be proper to break our statements by a short interlocution: "You have heard what occurred before; hear now what followed." Thus the judge will be relieved at the conclusion of the first part and will prepare himself for entering, as it were, upon a new subject. 5But if, when all these artifices have been tried, the detail of particulars will still extend to a great length, a kind of recapitulation at the end of each part will not be without its advantage, such as Cicero gives even in a short statement: "Hitherto, Caesar, Quintus Ligarius is free from all blame; he left his home not only for no war, but without there being even the least suspicion of war," etc.

5As to credibility in our statement, it will not be wanting if we first consult our own judgment, so as to advance nothing contrary to nature, and if, in addition, we assign causes and motives for the facts which we detail (I do not mean for all, but for those about which there is any question). If we represent our persons, at the same time, as of a character in accordance with the facts which we wish to be believed of them—a person accused of theft, for instance, as covetous; of adultery, as libidinous; of homicide, as rash—or the contrary, if we are on the defense, and we must do the same with regard to places, occasions, and similar particulars. 5There is also a certain management of the narrative which gives it credibility, as in plays and pantomimes, for some things naturally follow and attach themselves to others, so that, if you make the first part of your statement judiciously, the judge himself will understand what you are going to say afterwards. 5Nor will it be without advantage if we scatter here and there some seeds of proof, but so as not to forget that we are stating a series of facts and not of arguments. Occasionally, however, we may even confirm what we advance with some degree of proof, but simple and short. For example, in a case of poisoning, we may say, "He was well when he drank, he fell down suddenly, and a blackness and swelling of the body immediately followed." 5Preparatory remarks produce the same effect, as when it is said that the accused was "strong, armed, and on his guard, in opposition to those who were weak, unarmed, and unsuspecting." On everything, indeed, of which we have to treat under the head of proof, as character, cause, place, time, instrument, occasion, we may touch in our statement of facts. 5Sometimes, if these considerations fail us, we may even confess that "the charge, though true, is scarcely credible," but observe that "it must be regarded on this account as a greater atrocity"; that "we know not how it was committed or why"; or that "we wonder at the occurrence, but will nevertheless prove the truth of it." 5But the best of all preparations of this kind are those of which the intention is not apparent; as in Cicero, every circumstance is most happily premised by which "Clodius may be proved to have lain in wait for Milo, and not Milo for Clodius." But what has the greatest effect is that most artful assumption of an air of simplicity: "Milo having been in the senate-house that day, returned home as soon as the senate broke up, changed his shoes and his dress, and waited a short time, while his wife, as is usual, was getting ready." 5How well is Milo represented as having done nothing with premeditation, nothing with haste! This effect that master of eloquence produces not only by the circumstances which he narrates, and by which he signifies Milo's delay and composed manner of departure, but by the familiar and ordinary words which he uses and his well concealed art in adopting them. For if the particulars had been stated in other terms, they would have warned the judge, by their very sound, to be on his guard against the pleader. 5To most people, this passage appears lifeless, but it is hence manifest how wholly the art escaped the judge, when it is hardly observed even by a reader.

Such are the qualities that render a statement of facts credible. 60. As to directions that we should avoid contradictions or inconsistencies, if any one needs them, he will receive further instruction in vain, though some writers on rhetoric introduce such matters into their works, imagining that they were hidden from the world till they were sagaciously discovered by themselves.

61.. To these three properties of a statement of facts some add magnificence, which they call μεγαλοπρεπεία (megaloprepeia), but which is neither appropriate to all pleadings (for what place can language, raised above the ordinary level, have in most causes about private property, about loans of money, letting and hiring, and interdicts?) nor is always beneficial, as is evident from the last example from the speech for Milo.

6Let us bear in mind, too, that there are many causes in which we have to confess, to excuse, to extenuate what we state, in all which cases magnificence of language is utterly inadmissible. It is therefore no more our business, in making a statement, to speak magnificently than to speak dolefully, or invidiously, or gravely, or agreeably, or politely, qualities which, though each is commendable in its proper place, are not to be assigned and, as it were, devoted to this part peculiarly.

63.. That quality, also, which Theodectes assigns peculiarly to the narrative of facts, desiring that it should be not only magnificent but pleasing, is, though very suitable to that part of a speech, merely common to it with other parts. There are some, too, who add clearness, or what the Greeks call ἐνάργεια (enargeia). 6Nor will I deceive my reader so far as to conceal from him that Cicero desires several qualities in a statement of facts, for besides requiring it to be plain, concise, and credible, he would have it self-evident, characteristic, and suitable to the occasion. But everything in a speech ought to be in some degree characteristic and suitable to the occasion, as far as is possible. Self-evidence in a narrative, as far as I understand the meaning of the term, is doubtless a great merit (as what is true is not only to be told, but ought to a certain extent to make itself seen), but it may surely be included under perspicuity, which some, however, have even thought hurtful at times, because in some cases, they say, truth must be disguised. 6But this is an absurd observation, for he who wishes to disguise truth wishes to relate what is false as if it were true, and in what he relates, he must still study that his statement may seem self-evident.

6But since we have come, by some chance as it were, to a more difficult kind of statement, let me say something on those causes in which the truth is against us, in which case some have thought that the statement of facts should be wholly omitted. Nothing, certainly, is easier than such omission, except it be to forbear from pleading the cause altogether. But if, for some good reason, you undertake a cause of this sort, what art will there be in confessing by your silence that your cause is bad, unless you think that the judge will be so senseless as to decide in favor of that which he knows that you are unwilling to tell him. 6I do not dispute that as some things in a statement may be denied, others added, and others altered, so likewise some may be suppressed, but such only are to be suppressed as we ought or are at liberty to suppress. This is done sometimes for the sake of brevity, as when we say, for example, "He answered what he thought proper."

6Let us distinguish, therefore, the different kinds of causes, for in causes in which there is no question about the charge, but only about a legal point, we may, though the matter be against us, admit the truth: "He took money from a temple, but it was that of a private individual, and he has therefore not committed sacrilege"; "He carried off a maiden, yet option is not to be granted to her father"; 6"He dishonored a well-born youth, and the youth, on being dishonored, hung himself, yet the author of his dishonor is not to be capitally punished as being the cause of his death, but is to pay ten thousand sesterces, the fine imposed on him who is guilty of such a crime." But in such confessions something of the bad impression may be removed which the statement of our opponent may have produced, since even our slaves speak apologetically concerning their own faults. 70. Some things, also, we may palliate without assuming the tone of narrative: "He did not, as our opponent alleges, enter the temple for the purpose of stealing, or watch for a favorable moment for accomplishing such object, but tempted by the opportunity, the absence of the guards, and the sight of money, which has too strong an influence over human resolution, he yielded. But what has this to do with the question? He transgressed, and became a thief? It is of no use to palliate an act of which we do not shrink from the penalty." 7Sometimes, too, we may seem even to condemn our own client, addressing him, for example, thus: "Would you have me say that you were excited with wine? That you fell into an error? That you were led astray in the darkness? All this may perhaps be true, but you have nevertheless dishonored a free-born person; you must pay ten thousand sesterces." Sometimes, again, our cause may be guarded by a careful opening, and then fully stated. 7Every thing was adverse to the three sons who conspired to kill their father; they had drawn lots and had entered their father's chamber, at night, one after another, while he was sleeping. But as none of them had the heart to kill him, they confessed the whole matter to him when he awoke. 7Yet if the father (who indeed divided his estate among them and defended them when accused of parricide) should plead thus, "As to defense against the law, a charge of parricide is brought against young men whose father is still alive and appears on their behalf; to give a regular statement of the case, therefore, would be superfluous, since the law has no bearing on it. But if you require a confession of my own misconduct, I was an austere father and a tenacious guardian of that property which would have been better managed by them." 7The father should then observe that they were prompted to the act by youths whose fathers were more indulgent, but had nevertheless such feelings as was proven by the fact that they could not kill their father. For it would have been needless for them to take an oath to kill him, if they had had the resolution to do so without it, nor would there have been any need of a lot, had not each of them been desirous to be exempted from the act. All arguments of this nature, such as they are, would find the minds of the audience more favorably disposed to receive them, when softened by the brief defense offered in the first proposition. 7But when it is inquired whether a thing occurred, or what sort of thing occurred, how, though everything be against us, can we avoid making a statement, if we adhere to what is due to our cause? The accuser has made his statement, and, not confining himself to intimate how matters took place, has added much to our prejudice and exaggerated it by his language. His proofs have been brought, and his peroration has excited the judges and left them full of indignation; they naturally wait to hear what will be advanced on our side. 7If we advance nothing, the judges must necessarily believe that what our opponent has said really happened, and that it happened just as he represented it. What then, it may be asked, shall we tell the same story as our opponent? If the question is about quality (which is the next consideration after that of fact is settled), we must tell the same story certainly, but not in the same way; we must assign other causes for actions and give another view of them. 7We may extenuate some things by the terms in which we speak of them; luxury may be mentioned under the softer term of gaiety, avarice under that of frugality, and carelessness under that of good nature. A certain degree of favor, or at least of commiseration, we may gain by our look, tone, or attitude. A confession of itself will sometimes draw tears.

As to those who are of a contrary opinion about a statement, I would willingly ask them whether they mean to justify or not to justify that which they do not mean to narrate. 7For if they neither justify facts nor make a statement of them, their whole cause will be betrayed. But if they mean to offer a justification, it is surely necessary for them, for the most part, to state what they intend to justify. Why, then, should we not make a statement of that which may be refuted, and make it indeed, with that very object? 7Or what difference is there between proof and a statement of facts, except that a statement is a connected exposition of that which is to be proved, and proof is a verification of that which has been stated? Let us consider, then, whether such a statement, in opposition to that of our opponent, ought not to be somewhat longer and more verbose than ordinary, by reason that we have to prepare the mind of the judge, and by reason of particular arguments that we may introduce (I say particular arguments, and not a continued course of argumentation). It will give great effect to our statement if we affirm, from time to time, that we shall establish what we say; that the strength of our cause could not be shown in the first exposition of it; and that we intreat the judges to wait, suspend their opinions, and trust that we shall make good our point. 80. Finally, we must relate whatever can be related otherwise than our adversary has related it; or, for the same reason, exordia in such causes may be thought superfluous, since what further purpose have they, than to render the judge more disposed to understand the cause? But it is admitted that there is nowhere greater use for them, than where the mind of the judge is to be freed from some prepossession conceived against us.

8As to conjectural causes, in which the question is about fact, they do not so often require an explanation of the point on which a decision is to be given, as of the circumstances from which a knowledge of it is to be collected. As the prosecutor will represent those circumstances in an unfavorable light, the defendant must try to remove the unfavorable impression produced by him; the circumstances must be laid before the judge by the one in a different way from that in which they are presented to him by the other. 8But, it may be said, some arguments are strong when advanced in a body, but of less force when separated. This remark, I answer, does not apply to the question of whether we ought to make a statement, but how we ought to make one. For what hinders us from accumulating a variety of evidence in our statement, promising to produce more, and dividing our statement into portions, to give proofs under each portion as it is brought forward and so proceed to what follows? 8For I do not agree with those who think that we must always relate matters in the order in which they occurred; I consider rather that we should relate them in the order which is best for our cause. This may be effected by various artifices, for sometimes we may pretend that something has escaped our memory, with a view to introduce it into a place better suited to our purpose; sometimes we may quit the proper order, and assure the judge that we shall afterwards return to it, as the case will thus be rendered clearer; sometimes, after relating a fact, we may subjoin the motives that preceded it. 8For there is no fixed law for a defense or any invariable rule; we must consider what is best adapted to the nature of the case and to the occasion, and must act as in regard to a wound, which, according to its state, must either be dressed at once, or, if the dressing can be delayed, must be bound up in the meanwhile. 8Nor would I consider it unlawful to repeat a thing several times, as Cicero has done in his speech for Cluentius, a liberty which is not only allowed to be taken, but is sometimes even necessary, as in cases of extortion and all such as are not at all complicated. It is the part of a fool, indeed, to be led by a superstitious regard for rules to act against the interest of his cause. 8It is the practice to put the statement of facts before the proofs, that the judge may not be ignorant of the point about which the question is. Why, then, if every circumstance is to be established or refuted, is not every circumstance to be stated in our narrative? For myself, as far as any account is to be made of my practice, I know that I used to adopt that method whenever the interest of any cause required it, and with the approbation, too, of men of experience and of those who sat in judgment; in general, the duty of stating the case was assigned to me (a remark which I do not make from vanity, for there are many with whom I was associated in pleading who can contradict me if I speak falsely). 8Yet I would not on that account say that we should not more frequently follow the order of facts. In some facts, the order cannot be changed without impropriety, as if we should say, for example, that a woman had a child and should afterwards say that she conceived, or that a will was opened and then that it was sealed. If, in speaking of such matters, you chance to mention first that which happened last, it is best to make no allusion to that which happened first.

8There are also at times false statements, of which two kinds are introduced in the forum: one which depends on extrinsic support, as Publius Clodius rested his cause on the testimony of witnesses when he affirmed that he was at Interamna the night on which he committed a heinous crime at Rome, the other, which must be supported by the ability of the pleader; this relies sometimes on a mere assumption of modesty in him, whence it appears to me to be called complexion, and sometimes on a peculiar representation of the case. 8But whichsoever of the two modes we adopt, our first care must be that what we invent is possible; next that it be in accordance with person, place, and time, and have a character and order that are probable; and, if it be practicable, our representation should be connected with something that is acknowledged to be true or be supported by some argument relative to the question, for what is altogether sought from without the cause is apt to betray the license which we take in inventing. 90. We must be extremely watchful, too, that no two particulars (as often happens with tellers of fiction) contradict one another (for some things may suit very well with certain parts of our case, and yet not agree with each other on the whole), and also that they be not at variance with what is acknowledged to be true. It is a maxim even in the schools that the complexion is not to be sought from without the argument. 9But both in the schools and in the forum, the speaker ought to keep in mind throughout the whole case what he has invented, since what is not true is apt to be forgotten, and the common saying is just: that a liar ought to have a good memory. 9Let us consider, also, that if the question be concerning an act of our own, we must adhere to one particular statement, but if concerning the act of another, we may bring it under a variety of suspicious aspects. In some scholastic causes, however, in which it is supposed that a person under accusation does not answer to the questions put to him, liberty is granted to enumerate all the answers that might have been given. 9But let us remember that we are to feign only such things as are not liable to be disproved by evidence. These are such as proceed only from our own thoughts, of which we alone are conscious; such as are supposed to have been said by the dead, of whom none will appear to refute them; or by one who has the same interest with ourselves, for he will not contradict us; or even by our adversary, as in denying them he will gain no credit. 9As to imputed motives from dreams and superstitious feelings, they have lost all credibility from the ease with which they are invented.

Nor is it sufficient to adopt a certain "color" in our statement of facts, unless it preserve a consistency through the whole case, especially as the only mode of establishing certain points lies in asseveration and persistence. 9The parasite who claims as his son a youth that had been three times disinherited by a rich man, and allowed to return to him, will have some "color" by asserting that poverty was his reason for exposing the boy, that the character of parasite was assumed by him merely because he had a son in that house, and that the innocent youth was disinherited three times only because he was not the son of the person who disinherited him. 9But he will not escape the suspicion of being a suborned claimant unless he exhibit throughout all his speech the affection of a father, and that in the most ardent manner, together with the hatred of the rich man towards the youth, and his own fear for him, as knowing that he will stay with the greatest danger in a house in which he is so detested.

9It happens at times in the declamations of the schools (I know not whether it can possibly happen in the forum) that both parties make the same allegations, and each supports them on its own behalf, as in this cause: 9"A wife informed her husband that her step-son had endeavored to seduce her, and had appointed a time and place for their meeting; the son, on his part, brought a similar charge against his step-mother, only naming a different time and place; the father finds his son in the place which the wife had named, and his wife in that which the son had named; he divorced his wife, and, as she said nothing, disinherited his son." Nothing can be said on behalf of the young man which may not also be said on behalf of his step-mother. 9What is common, however, to both parties will be stated, and then arguments will be drawn from the comparison of persons, from the order in which the informations were given, and from the silence of the wife when divorced. 100. Nor ought we to be ignorant that there are some cases which do not admit of any coloring but are simply to be defended, as was that of the rich man who lashed with a scourge the statue of a poorer man that was his enemy, and was in consequence accused of committing an insult. A pleader cannot say in palliation of such an act that it was that of a sensible man, but he may perhaps succeed in defending it from penalty.

10But if part of a statement be in our favor and part against us, we must deliberate, according to the nature of the case, whether we ought to blend those parts together or keep them distinct. If the facts which make against us be the more numerous, those which are in our favor will be overwhelmed by them. In such a case, then, it will be best to divide them, and, after stating and confirming the circumstances that are favorable to us, to adopt against the rest such remedies as we have already specified. 10If the facts in our favor be the more numerous, we may very well unite them, that those which are adverse to us, being placed as it were in the midst of our auxiliaries, may have less force. Neither the one nor the other, however, are to be exposed undefended, but we must take care to support such as favor us with proof, and add reasons why such as are against us are not to be credited, because unless we make a distinction, it is to be feared that the good may be polluted by the contamination of the evil.

10The following directions, too, are commonly given respecting the statement of facts: that no digression is to be made from it; that we are to address ourselves constantly to the judge; that we are to speak in no character but our own; and that we are to introduce no argumentation; and some even add that we are not to attempt to excite the feelings. These precepts, doubtless, are to be in general observed, or, I may say, never to be departed from unless the nature of our cause obliges us to disregard them. 10In order that our statement may be clear and concise, nothing can be so seldom justifiable in it as digression, nor ought there ever to be any except such as is short and of such a nature that we may seem to be hurried into it, out of our right course, by the strength of our feelings. 10Such is that of Cicero respecting the marriage of Sassia: "Oh, incredible wickedness in a woman, such as has not been heard of in the whole course of human life, except in this one female! Oh, unbridled and immoderate lasciviousness! Oh, unparalleled audacity! Not to have feared, if not the power of the gods or the opinion of men, at least that very night and those nuptial torches! Not to have respected the threshold of the chamber, or the couch of her daughter, or the very walls themselves, the witnesses of her former marriage!" 10As to constantly addressing the judge, a brief diversion of our speech from him sometimes intimates a thing more concisely and gives it more effect. On this point, accordingly, I hold the same opinion as I expressed respecting the exordium, and I think the same with regard to the prosopopeia, which, however, not only Servius Sulpicius has used in his defense of Aufidia, "That you were languid with sleep, should I suppose, or oppressed with a heavy lethargy?" etc., but Cicero himself, in speaking of the ship-masters (for that passage is a statement of facts) exclaims, "For liberty to enter, you will give so much," etc. 10In his pleading for Cluentius, too, does not the conversation between Stalenus and Bulbus contribute greatly to the rapidity of the narrative and to its credibility? And that he may not be supposed to have fallen into this manner undesignedly (a supposition which is indeed wholly incredible with regard to such an orator) he recommends, in his Oratorical Partitions, that the statement of facts should display agreeableness, something to excite surprise and expectation, unexpected results, conversations between different people, and all the feelings of the mind. 10Continued argumentation, as I observed, we must never use in our statement of facts, though we may introduce a single argument occasionally, as Cicero does in his speech for Ligarius when he says that he had governed his province in such a way as made it expedient for him that there should be peace. We may also introduce in our statement, if the subject requires, a short defense of our client's conduct or a reason for it, for we are not to state things as a witness, but as an advocate. 10The simple account of a fact may be such as this: "Quintus Ligarius went into Africa as lieutenant-general with Caius Considius." But how does Cicero give it? "Quintus Ligarius, when there was not even a suspicion of war, went into Africa as lieutenant-general with Caius Considius." 1In another place, again, "He set out, not only to no war, but not even upon the least suspicion of war." When it was sufficient for him, too, in proceeding to state a fact, to say, "Quintus Ligarius allowed himself to be involved in no transaction," he adds, "looking back to his home and being desirous to return to his friends." Thus what he stated he made credible by giving a reason for it, and made a strong impression, at the same time, on the feelings of his audience. am the more surprised at those, therefore, who think that we are not to touch the feelings in a statement of facts. If they mean, indeed, that we are not to work on them long, or as in the peroration, they agree with me, for tediousness is to be avoided, otherwise, why should I not move the judge while I am instructing him? 11Why should I not secure, if possible, at the very opening of my case, the object which I am desirous to attain at the conclusion of it, especially as I shall find his mind more manageable, when I come to proofs, if it has previously been swayed by indignation or pity? 11Does not Cicero, in a very few words, touch all the feelings by describing the scourging of a Roman citizen, not only showing the condition of the sufferer, the place of the outrage, the nature of the infliction, but extolling the spirit with which he bore it? For he exhibits him as a man of great magnanimity, who, when he was lashed with rods, uttered no groan and made no supplication, but only exclaimed that he was a Roman citizen, to the disgrace of his oppressor, and with confidence in the laws. 11Has he not also, through the whole of his statement, excited the greatest detestation of the treatment of Philodamus, and caused the tears of his audience to overflow at his punishment, not so much relating that they wept, as exhibiting them weeping, the father, that his son was to die, and the son that his father was to die? What more touching could any peroration present? 11It is late, too, to bring the feelings, at the end of a speech, to bear on particulars which we have previously narrated with coolness; the judge has become familiarized to them and hears, without any excitement, that with which he was not moved when it was new to him; and it is difficult for us to change the temper of his mind when once it is settled. 11For my own part (for I will not conceal my opinion, though that which I am going to say rests rather upon experience than upon precepts), I think that the statement of facts requires, as much as any part of a speech, to be adorned with all the attractions and grace of which it is susceptible. But it makes a great difference what the nature of the case which we state is. 11In the smaller sort of cases, therefore, such as private ones in general are, the garb of the statement ought to be neat, and, as it were close-fitting; there should be the greatest care with regard to words which, when we enlarge upon the common topics of morality, are poured forth with rapidity. Particular expressions are often lost in the profusion of language in which they are enveloped, but here every word ought to be expressive and, as Zeno says, tinctured with peculiar signification. The style should be apparently artless, but as agreeable as possible; 11there should be no figures borrowed from poetry and received on the authority of the ancients contrary to the simplicity of language (for the diction should be as pure as possible), but such only as lessen tedium by variety and relieve attention by change, so that we may not fall into similar terminations, similar phrases, and similar constructions. For a statement has no other attractions and, if it be not recommended by such graces, must fail to please. 11Nor is the judge in any part more attentive, and consequently nothing that is expressed with effect is lost upon him. Besides, he is more inclined, I know not how, to believe what gratifies his ear and is led by being pleased to being persuaded.

120. But when the cause is of greater moment, it will be proper to speak of heinous crimes in a tone of invective and of mournful occurrences in one of pity, not that the topics for exciting the feelings may be exhausted, but that an outline of them, as it were, may be presented, and that it may at once appear what the full picture of the case will be. 12Nor would I dissuade a speaker from reviving the strong feeling of the judge, when exhausted with attention, by some remark, especially if thrown in with brevity, such, for instance, as this: "The servants of Milo did what everyone would have wished his servants to do in such circumstances," or occasionally perhaps, a little more boldly, as this: "The mother-in-law marries her son-in-law, without auspices, without any to sanction the union and with the most fatal omens." 12As this practice was adopted even in days when every speech was composed rather for use than for show and the judges were still more austere, how much more aptly may it be done now, when pleasure has made its way even into trials for life and fortune? How far we ought to conform to this taste of our age, I will give my opinion in another place. Meantime, I allow that some concession is to be made to it.

probable representation of circumstances which appears to conduct the audience, as it were, to a view of the case has, when subjoined to what is really true, a powerful effect such, for example, as the description given by Marcus Caelius of Antonius: "They find him sunk in the sleep of drunkenness, snoring with the whole force of his lungs and repeating eructation on eructation, while the most distinguished of his female companions was stretched across towards him from their several couches, and the rest lying round in every direction; 12who, however, becoming aware of the approach of the enemy, attempted, half dead with terror, to awaken Antonius; they called him aloud by name to no purpose; they raised his head; one whispered gentle sounds into his ear; another struck him forcibly with her hand; but when at length he became conscious of the voice and touch of each, he only threw his arms round the neck of her that was next to him; he could neither sleep after being roused, nor keep awake from the effects of drunkenness, but was tossed about, half asleep and half awake, in the hands of centurions and harlots." Nothing could be imagined more probable than this description; nothing offered as a greater subject of reproach; nothing exhibited more vividly.

12Nor can I omit to remark how much credit the authority of the speaker gives to his statement, an authority which we ought to secure chiefly by our general conduct, but also by our style of oratory, since the more grave and serious it is, the more weight it must give to our assertions. 12We must especially avoid, therefore, in this part of our speech, all suspicion of artifice (for nowhere is the judge more on his guard) so that nothing may appear fictitious or studied, but that all may be thought to emanate rather from the cause than from the advocate. 12But this manner our modern pleaders cannot tolerate; we think that our art is lost if it is not seen, whereas art, if it is seen, ceases to be art. We dote upon praise and think it the great object of our labor, and thus betray to the judges what we wish to display to the bystanders.

12There is also a sort of repetition of the statement, which is called by the Greeks ἐπιδιήγησις (epidiēgēsis), a thing more common in school declamations than in the forum. It was introduced with this object: that as the statement of facts ought to be brief, the case might afterwards be set forth more fully and with more embellishment in order to move indignation or pity. I think we seldom should have recourse to this practice and never so as to repeat the whole order of circumstances, for we may effect the same object by recurring to particulars here and there. Let him, however, that shall determine on such repetition, touch but lightly on facts in his statement, and, contenting himself with relating what has been done, promise to explain more fully how it was done in the proper place.

12As to the commencement of a statement of facts, some think that it ought to be made with reference to some character, whom, if he is on our side, we are to extol, and, if adverse to us, to attack. This certainly is a very common mode of proceeding, because on each side there are persons between whom the dispute lies. 130. But they may sometimes be introduced with descriptive circumstances, when such a course is likely to be advantageous, as "Judges, Aulus Cluentius Habitus was the father of my client, a man who held the highest position, not only in the municipal town of Larinum, in which he was born, but in all that country and neighborhood, for his merit, reputation, and respectability of birth"; sometimes without them: as, "when Quintus Ligarius had set out, etc." 13Sometimes, however, we may commence with a fact, as Cicero in his speech for Tullius: "Marcus Tullius possesses an estate inherited from his father in the territory of Thurium"; or as Demosthenes in behalf of Ctesiphon: "For the Phocian war having broken out, etc." 13As to the end of the statement, it is a matter of dispute with those who think that the statement itself should be brought down to the point where the question arises: as, "These things having thus happened, Publius Dollabella the praetor published an edict, as is customary with regard to violence and men appearing in arms, without any exception, only that Aebutius should reinstate Caecina in the place from which he had expelled him. He said that he had reinstated him. A sum of money was deposited, and it is concerning this deposit that you must decide." This can always be done on the side of the prosecutor, but not always on that of the defendant.

 
4 - 3 Of digressions or excursions immediately after the statement, § 1-Not always unreasonable, 4-Some preparation often necessary before proceeding to proof, 9-1Digressions may be made in any part of a speech, but those in the middle should be short, 12-1

IN the order of things, the confirmation follows the statement, for we must prove what we stated only that it might be proved. But before I proceed to treat of this part, I must make a few observations on the opinions of certain rhetoricians.

It is the custom of most speakers, when the order of facts is set forth, to make a digression to some pleasing and attractive moral topic, so as to secure us much favorable attention as possible from the audience. This practice had its rise in the declamatory ostentation of the schools and passed from thence into the forum, after causes began to be pleaded not to benefit the parties going to law, but to enable the advocates to make a display. The apprehension is, I suppose, that if the stubbornness of argument should immediately follow the dry conciseness of narrative (such as is often necessary), and the gratification of eloquent diction should be too long withheld, their whole oration would appear cold and repulsive. To this custom there is this objection: that the speakers indulge in it without making due distinction of causes and what particular causes require, but as if such displays of eloquence were always expedient or even necessary. In consequence, they force into their digression matters taken from other parts to which they properly belong, so that many things must either be said over again, or, as they have been said in a place to which they had no right, cannot be said in their own. I admit, however, that this sort of excursion may be advantageously introduced, not only after the statement of the case, but after the different questions in it, altogether or sometimes severally, when the subject requires or at least permits it. I think that a speech is by such means greatly set off and embellished, provided that the dissertation aptly follows and adheres to what precedes and is not forced in like a wedge, separating what was naturally united. For no part of a speech ought to be more closely attached to any other part than the proof is to the statement, unless indeed the digression be intended either as the end of the statement or as the beginning of the proof. There will therefore sometimes be room for it; for instance, if our statement, towards the conclusion, contains something very heinous, we may enlarge upon it, as if our indignation, like our breath, must necessarily have vent. This, however, ought to be done only when the matter does not admit of doubt; else it is of more importance to make your charge true than atrocious, because the enormity of an accusation is in favor of the accused as long as it remains unproved, for belief in the commission of a heinous crime is extremely difficult. A digression may also be made with advantage, if, for example, when you have spoken of services rendered to the opposite party, you proceed to inveigh against ingratitude, or if, when you have set forth a variety of charges in your statement, you show how much danger in consequence threatens yourself. But all these must be signified briefly, for the judge, when he has learned the order of the facts, is impatient for the proof of them and desires as soon as possible to settle his opinion. You must be cautious, also, that your exposition of the case be not forgotten, through the attention of the judge being turned to something else or fatigued with useless delay.

But though such digression is not always a necessary sequel to a statement of facts, it is yet frequently a useful preparation for the consideration of the question, for instance, if the case appears, at first sight, unfavorable to us, if we have to uphold a severe law, or if we enforce penal inflictions. There will then be room, as it were, for a second exordium to prepare the judge for our proofs, or to soothe or excite him, and this may be done the more freely and forcibly in this place, as the case is already known to him. With these lenitives, so to speak, we may soften whatever is offensively hard in our statement, that the ears of the judge may the more readily admit what we may have to say afterwards, and that he may not be averse to concede us justice, for judges are not easily convinced of anything against their will. 1On these occasions, however, the disposition of the judge must also be ascertained, that we may know whether he is more inclined to law or to equity, for according to his inclination, our representations will be more or less necessary.

The same subject may also serve as a kind of peroration after the question. 1This part the Greeks call the παρἀκβασις (parekbasis), the Latins the egressus or egressio. But such sallies, as I remarked, are of several kinds and may be directed to different subjects from any part of the cause, as eulogies of men and places, descriptions of countries, or recitals of occurrences true or fictitious 1Of which sort, in the pleadings of Cicero against Verres, are the praises of Sicily, and the rape of Proserpine; in his speech for Caius Cornelius, the well-known celebration of the merits of Cneius Pompey, which the divine orator, as if the course of his pleading had been suspended at the very name of the heroic leader, suddenly turns aside to pronounce, breaking away from the matter on which he had entered.

1As to the definition of the παρἀκβασις, it is, in my opinion, a dissertation on any subject relating to the interest of the cause, digressing from the order of facts. I do not see, therefore, why they assign it to that part of a speech, above all others, which immediately follows the statement of the case any more than why they think that name belongs to a digression only when something is to be stated in it, as a speech may swerve from the right path in so many ways. 1For whatever goes beyond those five parts of a speech which we have specified is a digression, whether it be an expression of indignation, pity, detestation, reproach, apology, conciliation, or reply to invective. Similarly digressive is everything that does not lie within the question, and all amplification, extenuation, and excitement of the passions, as well as those moral observations concerning luxury, avarice, religion, duty, which contribute so much to the agreeableness and ornament of a speech, but which, however, as they are attached to cognate subjects and naturally cohere with them, do not appear to be digressions. 1But there are numbers of remarks introduced into matters that have no connection with them, remarks by which the judge is excited, admonished, appeased, intreated; or commended, Instances of them are innumerable; some we carry with us ready prepared; some we utter on the spur of the moment, or from necessity; if, for instance, anything extraordinary occurs while we are speaking, as an interruption, the sudden arrival of any person, or a disturbance. 1From such a cause Cicero was obliged to make a digression in his exordium, when he was speaking for Milo, as appears from the short speech which he pronounced on the occasion. But he that prepares something to precede the question, and he that adds something to his proofs as in support of them, may make a somewhat longer digression. He, however, who makes a sally from the middle of his speech ought soon to return to the point from which he started.

 
4 - 4 Of propositions preparatory to proof; not always necessary, § 2. Sometimes very useful, 4. Various kinds of propositions, and remarks on them, 5-9.

THERE are some writers who place the proposition after the statement of facts, as a division of a speech on any matter for judgment. To this notion I have already replied. In my opinion the commencement of any proof is a proposition, which may be advanced not only in stating the principal question, but sometimes even to introduce particular arguments, especially those which are called ἐπιχειρήματα (epicheirēmata). But I shall now speak of the former kind. It is not always necessary to use it, for sometimes the point in question is sufficiently manifest without any proposition whatever, for instance, if the statements of facts ends where the question begins. That which in arguments is commonly the recapitulation is sometimes immediately subjoined to the statement of the case: "These things occurred, judges, just as I have related them; the ambusher was cut off; violence was overcome by violence; or rather audacity was subdued by valor." But at times it is extremely useful, especially when the fact cannot be denied and the question is about the definition, as, in pleading for him who took the money of a private person from a temple, you would say, "The consideration is about sacrilege; it is concerning sacrilege that you have to decide," so that the judge may understand that his only duty is to ascertain whether that which is charged against the accused is sacrilege. It is also of use in causes that are obscure or complex, not only that they may be rendered more lucid, but also, occasionally, that they may be more striking. A proposition will produce this effect, if there be immediately subjoined to it something that may support our pleading: as, "A law has been made expressly that whatever foreigner mounts the wall is to be punished with death. That you are a foreigner is certain; that you mounted the wall there is no doubt. What remains, then, but that you undergo the penalty?" For such a proposition enforces a confession from the opposite party and prevents, in a great measure, delay in giving judgment, not only explaining the question, but supporting it.

Propositions are single, double, or complex, a distinction which results from more than one cause, for several charges may be combined, as when Socrates was accused of corrupting the youth and introducing new superstitions. A single charge may also be established by several proofs, as when it was alleged against Aeschines that he had acted dishonestly in his embassy because he had spoken falsely, because he had done nothing in conformity with the directions given him, because he had tarried, and because he had accepted presents. The defense may also contain several propositions, as in an action to recover a debt it may be said, "You have no right to demand it, for it was not in your power to become an agent; nor had he, in whose name you act, a right to have an agent; nor are you the heir of him from whom I am said to have borrowed; nor was I indebted to him." Such examples may be multiplied at pleasure, but it is sufficient to have pointed out that such is the case. If these allegations are stated singly, with proofs subjoined, they are so many distinct propositions; if they are combined, they come under the head of partition.

A proposition is sometimes, also, entirely bare, as is generally the case in conjectural causes: "I accuse of murder; I charge with theft"; sometimes it is accompanied with a reason, as "Caius Cornelius has been guilty of treason against the dignity of the tribunate, for he himself, when tribune of the people, read his own law before the public assembly." The proposition which we bring forward, too, is sometimes our own, as "I accuse this man of adultery"; sometimes that of our adversary, as "The charge against me is that of adultery"; sometimes affecting both parties, as "The question between my opponent and me is, which of the two is the nearer of kin to a person who has died intestate." Sometimes, moreover, we may couple opposite propositions, as "I say thus, my adversary thus."

There is a way of speaking which has, at times, the force of a proposition, though it is in reality not one, when, after having made our statement of facts, we add, "It is upon these points that you are to decide," this being a kind of admonition to the judge to direct his attention more earnestly to the case, and, being roused as by a touch, to observe that the statement is ended and the proof commenced, so that as we enter upon the establishment of our allegations, he may commence, as it were, a new stage of listening.

 
4 - 5 Partition of our matter generally useful, § 1-3. When it should be omitted, 4-9. Examples from Cicero, 10-12. As to states of conjecture and quality, 13-17. Artifices that may be used, 18-21. Utility of partition, and the proper qualities of it, 22-28.

PARTITION is the enumeration, according to their order, of our own propositions or those of our adversary, or both. Some think that we should always make an enumeration because, by its aid, the cause is rendered clearer and the judge more observant and attentive, if he knows exactly on what point we are speaking and on what points we intend to speak afterwards. Some, on the other hand, think it dangerous to a speaker, for two reasons: that some things, on which we promise to speak, may escape our memory, and others, which we may have omitted in our specification, may occur to us. But nothing of this kind can happen except to one who is utterly deficient in ability or one who brings to his pleading nothing settled or premeditated. Otherwise, what method is so plain and clear as that of a proper division of our matter? For it follows nature as a guide, so as to be the greatest aid to the memory, to prevent us from straying from our proposed course in speaking. I cannot, therefore, agree with those who think that our partition should not exceed three propositions. Doubtless, if it be too multifarious, it will escape the recollection of the judge and perplex his attention, but it is not to be confined, as by a law, to this or that number, when a cause may possibly require more.

There are other reasons why we should not always adopt a partition, first, because most observations please better when they appear to be conceived on the moment, and not to be brought from home, but to spring from the subject itself as we are discussing it. Hence the common expressions, "I had almost forgotten," "It had escaped me," "You aptly remind me," are by no means ill received. If you lay down your course of proof beforehand, all pleasure of novelty is cut off from the sequel of your speech. Sometimes, too, the judge must be misled and wrought upon by various artifices, that he may suppose something else to be intended than what is really our object. A proposition is sometimes startling, and a judge, if he sees it prematurely, dreads it as a patient dreads the surgeon's instrument before an operation is performed. But if, without any proposition being advanced beforehand, our observations come upon him when off his guard and penetrate his mind, without any warning, when wrapt up, as it were, in itself, they will make him believe that which he would have distrusted if we had advanced it at first. Occasionally, too, we should avoid not only the distinction of questions, but the mention of them altogether. The judge should have his feelings strongly moved and his attention diverted, for to instruct is not the only duty of an orator; the power of eloquence is best shown in producing excitement. But what is directly opposed to such an effect is a minute carefulness in division, scrupulously separated into parts, at a time when we should endeavor to deprive the judge of the power of deciding against us. Are not arguments, also, that are light and weak when detached, often of great force in a body? Such arguments, accordingly, should rather be collected in a mass, and we should make a sally with them, as it were, upon the judge, an expedient which should rarely, however, be adopted and only in case of necessity, when reasoning forces us to that which seems contrary to reasoning. In addition, it is to be considered that there is, in every division of a case, some one point of more importance than the rest, and when the judge has become acquainted with it, he is apt to disdain other points as requiring no notice. Consequently, if more charges than one are to be established or overthrown, a partition is both advantageous and agreeable, in order that what we have to say on each head may distinctly be shown; but if we have to combat one charge by various arguments, it is needless Thus, if you should make such a division as this, "I shall show that the accused, for whom I plead, is not of such a character that he can be thought to have committed murder; I shall show that he had no motive for committing murder; I shall show that at the time the murder was committed he was beyond the sea," all that you might prove before that which you place last must necessarily appear useless, for the judge is anxious to come to the strongest point of all. If he is of a patient temper, he will silently hold the advocate bound to adhere to his stated division, or, if he be pressed with business, or be a man of some dignity, or of rude manners, will call upon him, with some reproachful remark, to adhere to it. 1Some have been found, accordingly, to disapprove of Cicero's partition in his speech for Cluentius, where he promises, first of all, that he will show that "no man was ever brought to judgment for, greater crimes, or on stronger evidence, than Oppianicus; next, that the preliminary inquiries were conducted by those very judges by whom he was condemned; lastly, that the judgment was influenced by money, not on the side of Cluentius, but by the opposite party," such a division being needless because, if the third point could be proved, there was no necessity for introducing the first or second. 1On the other hand, no one will be so unjust or foolish as not to admit that Cicero adopted an excellent division in his pleading for Muraena: "I perceive, judges, that of the whole accusation there are three heads, one concerned with censure of my client's morals, another with his competition for honors, and a third with charges against him for bribery," for he thus exhibits the cause with the utmost clearness and does not render one head useless by another.

1Most writers also hesitate respecting the following mode of defense: "If I killed the man, I killed him justly; but I did not kill him," for "to what purpose," it is asked "is the first proposition, if the second can be proved? They are at variance with one another, and while we advance both, credit is given to neither." This is indeed partly true, as we ought to rest on the second only, provided it be incontrovertible. 1But if we have any apprehension as to the stronger, we may very well use the support of both, for different judges are moved by different arguments, and he who believes that the deed was done, may think it just, while he who will not allow it to be just will perhaps feel convinced that it was not done. An unerring hand may be content with one javelin, but by an uncertain hand, several should be thrown, in order that chance may have its influence. 1Cicero, in defending Milo, shows admirably, in the first place, that Clodius set the ambush, and then adds, superabundantly as it were, that even if he had not done so, a citizen of such a character might have been slain with great merit and honor on the part of the slayer. 1Yet I would not altogether condemn that order which I just now mentioned, because some arguments, though hard in themselves, may yet be of use to soften others that are to follow. The common saying, that "we must ask more than what is just in order to get what is just" is not without foundation in reason. 1No one, however, is to take it in such a sense as to suppose that everything may be attempted, for the Greeks very wisely instruct us that what cannot be accomplished ought not to be tried. But whenever we adopt that double mode of defense of which I am speaking, we ought to make it our object to draw from the first head confirmation for the second, for he who might even have confessed without danger may appear to have no motive for speaking falsely when he denies.

1We must also take good care, whenever we suspect that the judge desires some other proof than that which we are advancing, to promise that we will fully and speedily afford him satisfaction on the point, especially if it affects our client's honor. 1But it frequently happens that a cause, in itself far from honorable, is supported by the letter of the law. In this case, so that the judges may not listen with unwillingness or disapprobation, they must be often reminded that the vindication of the integrity and honor of our client will follow, that they have but to wait a little and allow us to proceed in order. 20. We may pretend also, occasionally, to say some things against the wish of our client, as Cicero does in his speech for Cluentius, in regard to the law respecting the duties of judges. Sometimes we may stop, as if we were interrupted by our client, and sometimes we may address ourselves to him and entreat him to allow us to take our own course. 2Thus we shall gradually make an impression on the mind of the judge, who, while he trusts that the honor of our client is going to be vindicated, will listen with less reluctance to our more startling arguments; when he has received some impression from these, the maintenance of our client's honor will be the easier for us. Thus the two points will support each other, and the judge, trusting to our vindication of character, will be more attentive to the point of law and, the point of law being established, will be more disposed to listen to our vindication of character.

2But though partition is not always necessary or even advantageous, yet, when it is seasonably adopted, it contributes great lucidity and agreeableness to a speech, for it not only causes what is stated to become clearer, by drawing certain particulars out of the crowd, as it were, and placing them full in the sight of the judges, but relieves the attention by fixing a definite termination to certain parts, as distances on a road, marked by inscribed stones, appear greatly to diminish the fatigue of travelers. 2For it is a gratification to learn the measure of the labor which we have acomplished, and to know how much remains encourages us to proceed with greater spirit to the conclusion; nothing, indeed, need seem long when it is understood where the end is. 2It was not without justice that Quintus Hortensius gained great praise for his exactness in division, though Cicero sometimes gently laughs at his partitions as being counted upon his fingers, for, as there is moderation requisite in gesture, so we should, even with greater reason, avoid a too precise and, as it were, jointed division of our matter. 2Minute sections, which, instead of being members, are bits, detract greatly from the weight of a speech, and those who are eager for the praise of such distinction are apt, that they may be thought to have made nice and numerous divisions, to introduce what is wholly superfluous and to cut asunder what is naturally united. They make their parts, not so much more in number, as less in bulk and, after a thousand partitions, fall into that very obscurity against which partition was invented.

2The proposition of a cause, whether divided or single, ought, whenever it can be introduced with advantage, to be, above all, plain and clear (for what can be more disgraceful than to make that obscure which is adopted for no other purpose than that other parts may not be obscure?). It should also be brief and not loaded even with a single useless word, for we must remember that we have not to show what we are saying, but what we are going to say. 2We must be cautious, too, that nothing may be deficient in it and nothing redundant. The most frequent cause of redundancy is, when we divide into species what it would be sufficient to divide into genera, or when, after mentioning the genus, we add species to it, as if we should speak of virtue, justice, and temperance, when justice and temperance are but species of virtue.

2The first step in partition is to distinguish what is admitted and what is disputed. Next, in regard to what is admitted, to distinguish what our adversary admits and what we admit, and in respect to what is disputed, to specify our propositions and those of our opponent. But what is most culpable is not to treat of your several points in the order in which you have arranged them.

 
5 14 128.7
5 - Introduction Some rhetoricians have thought that the only duty of an orator is to teach; others have called this his chief duty. The necessity for this book.

THERE have been authors, and some, indeed, of high reputation, who have thought that the sole duty of an orator is to inform. Excitement of the feelings, they considered, was to be prohibited for two reasons: first, because all perturbation of the mind is an evil, and secondly, because it is inexcusable for a judge to be diverted from the truth by pity, anger, or any similar passion. To aim at pleasing the audience, when the object of speaking is to gain victory, they regarded not only as needless in a pleader, but scarcely worthy even of a man. Many, too, who doubtless did not exclude those arts from the department of the orator, considered, nevertheless, that his proper and peculiar office was to establish his own propositions and to refute those of his adversary. Whichsoever of these opinions is right (for I do not here offer my own judgment), this book must appear, in the estimation of both parties, extremely necessary, as the entire subject of it is proof and refutation, to which all that has hitherto been said on judicial causes is subservient. For there is no other object either in an introduction or a narrative than to prepare the judge. To know the states of causes and to contemplate all the other matters of which I have treated above would be useless unless we proceed to proof. In fine, of the five parts into which we have distinguished judicial pleading, whatever other may occasionally be unnecessary in a cause, there certainly never occurs a suit in which proof is not required.

As to directions regarding it, I think that I shall make the best division of them by first showing what are applicable to all kinds of questions, and next, by enlarging on what are peculiar to the several sorts of causes.

 
5 - 1 Inartificial proofs. Eloquence not inefficient in regard to them.
IN the first place, then, the division which has been laid down by Aristotle has gained the approbation of almost all rhetoricians, namely, that there are some proofs which an orator adopts that are unconnected with the art of speaking and others which he himself extracts and, as it were, produces from his cause. Hence they have called the one sort ἄτεχνοι (atechnoi), "inartificial," and the other ἔντεχνοι (entechnoi), "artificial." Of the former kind are precognitions, public report, evidence extracted by torture, writings, oaths, and the testimony of witnesses, with which the greater part of forensic pleadings are wholly concerned. But though these species of proof are devoid of art in themselves, they yet require, very frequently, to be supported or overthrown with the utmost force of eloquence, and those writers, therefore, appear to me highly deserving of blame who have excluded all this kind of proofs from the rules of art. It is not, however, my intention to collect all that is usually said for and against these points, for I do not design to lay down commonplaces, which would be a task of infinite labor, but merely to point out a general method and plan. The way being shown, each must exert his ability, not only to follow it, but to find out similar courses, as the nature of particular cases may require, since no one can speak of all kinds of causes, even among such as have occurred, to say nothing of such as may occur.
 
5 - 2 Previous judgments. The authority of those who deliver them to be considered. Similitude in cases; how to be refuted.
AS to precognitions, the whole matter of them ranges itself under three heads: first, cases which have been already decided under similar circumstances, and which may more properly be termed precedents, as about wills of fathers which have been annulled or ratified in opposition to their children; secondly, judgments relative to the cause itself (from which also is derived the name), such as those which are said to have been pronounced upon Oppianicus and those of the senate upon Milo; or, thirdly, when sentence has already been given on the same affair, as in the case of persons that have been sent out of the country, of appeals in regard to personal liberty, and of divisions in the judgments of the centumviri, when they have been separated into two parties. Precognitions are established chiefly by two things: the authority of those who have given judgment and the similitude of the cases in question. As for the annulling of them, it is rarely obtained by reproaching the judges, unless there be a manifest error in them, for each of the judges wishes the sentence of another to stand firm, remembering that he himself is also to pronounce a sentence and being unwilling to offer a precedent which may recoil upon himself. The pleader must have recourse, therefore, in the first two cases, if the matter allow, to the discovery of some dissimilarity in the cases (and there is scarcely one exactly like another in all particulars) or, if that course be impossible or the cause be the same, some negligence in the pleadings must be exposed, or we must complain of the weakness of the parties against whom judgment was given, or influence that corrupted the witnesses, or of public odium, or ignorance, or we must find something that has since occurred to affect the cause. If none of these allegations be possible, we may observe that many motives on trials have led to unjust sentences, and that through such influence, Rutilius was condemned, and Clodius and Catiline acquitted. The judges may also be solicited rather to examine the question themselves than to rest their faith on the verdict of others. But against decrees of the senate, and the ordinances of princes or magistrates, there is no remedy, unless some difference, however small, be discovered in the cases, or some subsequent determination of the same persons or personages of the same dignity, at variance with the former. If nothing of the kind be discoverable, there will be no case for judgment.
 
5 - 3 Public report.
COMMON fame and report, one party will call the consent of the whole people and a sort of public evidence; the other will term it mere talk without any certain authority, to which malignity has given rise, and credulity augmentation, an evil which may affect every man, even the most innocent, through the artifice of enemies spreading falsehood. Examples will not be wanting to support either representation.
 
5 - 4 Evidence exacted by torture.
. THE case is similar with regard to evidence exacted by torture, which is a frequent subject of discussion, as one side will call torture an infallible means for discovering truth, the other will represent it as a cause of the utterance of falsehood, because to some persons, the ability to endure makes lying easy, to others weakness renders it necessary. To what purpose should I say more on this subject? The pleadings of the ancients and the moderns are alike full of instances. Yet under this head, there will be circumstances peculiar to certain cases, for if the question be about applying the torture, it will make a great difference who it is that demands it, and whom he demands or offers for it, and against whom, and from what motive; or, if the torture has been applied, who presided at it, who it was that was tortured, and how; whether he uttered what was incredible or consistent; whether he persisted in his first assertions, or made any change in them; whether he confessed at the commencement of the torture, or after it had proceeded for some time; questions which are as numberless as the variety of cases.
 
5 - 5 Refutation of written testimony.
AGAINST writings, too, pleaders have often spoken and must often speak, as we know that it is common for documents not only to be set aside, but to be charged with being forged. As there must, in the latter case, be either guilt or innocence on the part of those who signed them, ignorance will be the safer and lighter charge, because the number of those whom we actually accuse will be smaller. But the whole of such a proceeding must rest on arguments drawn from the particular case, if, for example, it is difficult to prove, or even incredible, that what the writing states occurred; or if (as more frequently happens) it may be overthrown by proofs equally inartificial; if he to whose prejudice the deed was signed, or any one of those who signed it, can be said to have been absent at the time, or to have died before it; if dates disagree; or if anything that occurred before or after is at variance with what is written. Even a mere inspection is often sufficient to discover forgery.
 
5 - 6 On offering to take an oath, and receiving that of the opposite party, § 1, 2. Arguments on the subject, 3-5. Judgment of the experienced respecting it, 6.

AS to an oath, parties going to law either offer their own or refuse to receive that of their adversary when offered, or they require one from him, or refuse to take one when required from themselves. For a person to offer to take an oath himself, without allowing his opponent to take his, is commonly a sign of bad faith. He, however, who shall do so must either shelter himself under such purity of moral conduct as to make it incredible that he will commit perjury, or under the influence of religion (in regard to which he will gain more credit if he act in such a manner as not to appear to come forward with eagerness to take his oath, and yet not to shrink from taking it); or on the small importance of the cause, should such be its nature, for the sake of which he would hardly incur the divine displeasure; or if, in addition to other means of gaining his cause, he offers his oath, superabundantly, as it were, as the testimony of a pure conscience.

He who shall be unwilling to receive the oath of his adversary will allege the inequality of the terms and remark that the fear of taking an oath is lightly regarded by many, as even philosophers have been found to deny that the gods pay any attention to human affairs. He who is ready to swear without any one putting him to his oath is disposed to give sentence himself in his own cause and to show how light and easy a thing he considers the obligation by which he offers to bind himself. But he who offers to accept his adversary's oath, besides appearing to act with moderation, as he makes his opponent the arbiter of the cause, relieves the judge also, to whom the decision belongs, from a heavy responsibility, since he would certainly rest rather on another man's oath than on his own. Hence the refusal to take oath becomes the more difficult, unless the affair in question happens to be such that it cannot be supposed to be known to the party. If this excuse be wanting, there will be but one course left for him, which is to say that odium is sought to be excited against him by his opponent, whose object is to make it appear that he has ground for complaint in a cause in which he cannot obtain victory. Accordingly, though a dishonest man would have eagerly availed himself of such a proposal, he himself would rather prove what he asserts than leave it doubtful in the mind of any one whether he were guilty of perjury.

But in my younger days, men who had grown old in pleading used to lay it down as a rule that we should never give our opponent the option of taking his oath, as also that he should never be allowed the choice of a judge, and that a judge should not be taken from the counsellors of the opposite party, since if it was thought dishonorable in an advocate to speak against his client, it should assuredly be considered more dishonorable to do anything that would injure him.

 
5 - 7 Written evidence; how to be refuted, § 1, 2. Modes of proceeding with regard to witnesses that appear in person, 3-An intimate knowledge of the cause necessary, How voluntary witnesses should be produced, 9-1Caution requisite in respect to them, 12-1How a pleader must act with regard to a witness whom he knows to be adverse or favourable to the accused, 15-1How he must act in regard to one whose disposition he does not know, 20, 2Of the interrogation of witnesses, 22-3Of the collision between written and oral testimony, 32-3Of supernatural testimony, 36-3

THE greatest efforts of pleaders, however, are employed about evidence. Evidence is given either in writing or by witnesses present in court. The opposition to writings is the more simple, for shame may seem to have had less preventive power in the presence of only a few witnesses, and absence may be unfavorably represented as intimating self-distrust. If the character of the writer is open to no reflection, we may perhaps throw some discredit on that of the witnesses to it. Besides, a secret feeling is entertained unfavorable to all who offer evidence in writing, as no man gives it in that way unless of his own free-will, and thus shows that he is no friend to the party against whom he deposes. Yet a pleader on the opposite side should not be ready to admit that a friend may not speak truth on behalf of a friend, or an enemy against an enemy, if the credit of either be unimpeached. But the subject, in both its bearings, furnishes much matter for consideration.

With witnesses who are present there may be great contention, and we accordingly engage, whether against them or for them, with the double force of regular speeches and interrogatories. In regular speeches, we commonly offer observations, first of all, for and against witnesses in general. This is a common topic for argument, one side maintaining that there is no evidence stronger than that which rests on human knowledge, and the other, to detract from the credit of such knowledge, enumerating every cause by which testimony is rendered false. The next step is when pleaders make special attacks, though on bodies of men, for we know that the testimonies of whole nations have been invalidated by orators, as well as whole classes of evidence, as in the case of hear-say witnesses, for pleaders maintain that they are not in reality witnesses, but mere reporters of the words of unsworn individuals. In cases of extortion, those who swear that they have paid money to the accused are to be regarded as parties in the prosecution, not as witnesses. Sometimes a pleader's remarks are directed against individual witnesses, a kind of attack which we find in many pleadings, sometimes combined with a defense, and sometimes given separately, as that of Cicero on the witness Vatinius.

Let me therefore consider the whole subject, as I have taken upon myself to attempt the entire education of an orator; otherwise, the two books composed on this head by Domitius Afer would have been sufficient, a rhetorician whom I attended with great respect when he was old and I was young, so that the contents of his books were not only read by me, but learned from his own mouth. He very justly makes it a rule that it is the great business of an orator, in regard to this part of his cause, to gain a thorough knowledge of the whole of it, but it is a rule to be observed in regard to every part. How this knowledge may be attained, I shall show when I arrive at the part of my work destined for that subject. Such knowledge will suggest matter for questions, and supply, as it were, weapons to the hand. It will also show us for what the mind of the judge should be prepared by our speech, as it is by a regular address that the credit of witnesses should be either established or overthrown, since every judge is affected by testimony just as he has been previously influenced to believe or disbelieve it.

Since, then, there are two sorts of witnesses, those who appear voluntarily and those whom the judge commonly summons on public trial according to law (of the first of which kinds either party may avail themselves, while the latter is conceded only to accusers), let us distinguish the duty of the pleader who produces witnesses from that of him who refutes their testimony.

He that produces a voluntary witness may know what he has to say and consequently appears to have the easier task in examining him. But even this undertaking requires penetration and watchfulness, and we must be cautious that the witness may not appear timid, inconsistent, or foolish, 1for witnesses are confused, or caught in snares, by the advocates on the opposite side, and when they are once caught, they do more harm than they would have done service if they had been firm and resolute. They should therefore be well exercised before they are brought into court, and tried with various interrogatories, such as are likely to be put by an advocate on the other side. By this mean they will either be consistent in their statements or, if they stumble at all, will be set upon their feet again, as it were, by some opportune question from him by whom they were brought forward. 1But even in regard to those who are consistent in their evidence, we must be on our guard against treachery, for they are often thrown in our way by the opposite party and, after promising everything favorable, give answers of a contrary character and have the more weight against us when they do not refute what is to our prejudice, but confess the truth of it. 1We must inquire, therefore, what motives they appear to have for declaring against our adversary. Nor is it sufficient to know that they were his enemies. We must ascertain whether they have ceased to be so; whether they may not seek reconciliation with him at our expense; whether they have been bribed; or whether they may not have changed their purpose from penitential feeling. These precautions are not only necessary in regard to witnesses who know that which they intend to say is true, but far more necessary in respect to those who promise to say what is false. 1For they are more likely to repent, and their promises are more to be suspected. Even if they keep to their word, it is much more easy to refute them.

1Of witnesses who are summoned to give evidence, some are willing to hurt the accused party and some unwilling, and the accuser sometimes knows their inclination and is sometimes ignorant of it. Let us suppose for the moment that he knows it, yet in either case, there is need of the greatest circumspection on the part of him who examines them. 1If he finds the witness disposed to prejudice the accused, he ought to take the utmost care that his disposition may not show itself, and he should not question him at once on the point for decision, but proceed to it circuitously, so that what the examiner chiefly wants him to say may appear to be wrung from him. Nor should he press him with too many interrogatories, lest the witness, by replying freely to everything, should invalidate his own credit, but he should draw from him only so much as it may seem reasonable to elicit from one witness. 1But in the case of one who will not speak the truth unless against his will, the great happiness in an examiner is to extort from him what he does not wish to say. This cannot be done otherwise than by questions that seem wide of the matter in hand, for to these he will give such answers as he thinks will not hurt his party, and then, from various particulars which he may confess, he will be reduced to the inability of denying what he does not wish to acknowledge. 1For as in a set speech, we commonly collect detached arguments, which, taken singly, seem to bear but lightly on the accused, but by the combination of which we succeed in proving the charge, so a witness of this kind must be questioned on many points regarding antecedent and subsequent circumstances, and concerning places, times, persons, and other subjects, so that he may be brought to give some answer. After this he must either acknowledge what we wish or contradict what he himself has said. 1If we do not succeed in that object, it will then be manifest that he is unwilling to speak, and he must be led on to other matters that he may be caught tripping, if possible, on some point, though it be unconnected with the cause. He may also be detained an extraordinary time, that by saying everything and more than the case requires, in favor of the accused, he may make himself suspected by the judge, and he will thus do no less damage to the accused than if he had stated the truth against him. 20. But if (as we supposed in the second place) the accuser be ignorant of the witness's disposition, he must sound his inclination cautiously, interrogating him, as we say, step by step and leading him gradually to the answer which is necessary to be elicited from him. 2But as there is sometimes such art in witnesses, that they answer at first according to an examiner's wish, in order to gain greater credit when they afterwards speak in a different way, it is wise in an orator to dismiss a suspected witness before he does any harm.

2For advocates that appear on behalf of defendants, the examination of witnesses is in one respect easier, and in another more difficult, than for those who are on the side of the prosecutor. It is more difficult on this account, that they can seldom or ever know, before the trial, what the witness is going to say; and it is easier, in as much as they know, when he comes to be questioned, what he has said. 2Under the uncertainty, therefore, which there is in the matter, great caution and inquisition is necessary, to ascertain what sort of character he is that prosecutes the defendant; what feeling he entertains against him; and from what motives. All such matters are to be exposed and set aside in our pleading, whether we would have the witnesses appear to have been instigated by hatred, by envy, by desire of favor, or by money. If the opposite party, too, produces but few witnesses, we may reflect on their small number. If they are extraordinarily numerous, we may insinuate that they are in conspiracy; if they are of humble rank, we may speak with contempt of their meanness; if persons of consequence, we may deprecate their influence. 2It will be of most effect, however, to expose the motives on which the witnesses speak against the defendant, which may be various, according to the nature of causes and the parties engaged in them. For to such representations as I have just mentioned, the opposite party can answer with commonplace arguments, as when the witnesses are few and humble, the prosecutor can boast of his simple honesty in having sought for none but such as were acquainted with the case in hand, while to commend a large number or persons of consideration is a somewhat easier task. 2But occasionally, as we have to commend witnesses, so we have to decry them, whether their testimony is read in our pleading or they are summoned to give it personally. Such attempts were easier and more frequent in the times when the witnesses were not examined after the pleading was ended. As to what we should say against the witnesses respectively, it can only be drawn from their individual characters.

2The manner of questioning witnesses remains to be considered. In this part of our duty, the principal point is to know the witness well, for if he is timid, he may be frightened; if foolish, misled; if irascible, provoked; if vain, flattered; if prolix, drawn from the point. If, on the contrary, a witness is sensible and self-possessed, he may be hastily dismissed as malicious and obstinate; or he may be confuted, not with formal questioning, but with a short address from the defendant's advocate; or he may be put out of countenance, if opportunity offer, by a jest; or, if anything can be said against his moral character, his credit may be overthrown by infamous charges. 2It has been advantageous, on certain occasions, not to press too severely on men of probity and modesty, for those who would have fought against a determined assailant are softened by gentle treatment.

Every question is either about some point within the cause or on some point without it. On matters within the cause, the advocate of the accused, as we also directed the accuser, may frequently, by putting questions a little widely and on subjects from which no suspicion will arise, and by comparing previous with subsequent answers, reduce witnesses to such a dilemma as to extort from them against their will what may be of service to his own cause. 2On this point, there is certainly no instruction or exercise given in the schools, and excellence in it depends rather on natural acuteness or experience than anything else. If any model, however, ought to be pointed out for imitation, the only one that I can recommend is that which may be drawn from the dialogues of the Socratic philosophers, and especially Plato, in which the questions are so artful that though the respondent answers correctly to most of them, the matter is nevertheless brought to the conclusion which the questioner wishes to establish. 2Fortune sometimes favors us by causing something to be said by a witness that is inconsistent with the rest of his evidence, and sometimes (as more frequently happens) she makes one witness say what is at variance with the evidence of another, but an ingenious mode of interrogation will often lead methodically to that which is so frequently the effect of chance.

30. On matters without the cause, also, many serviceable questions are often put to a witness, as concerning the character of other witnesses; concerning his own; whether anything dishonorable or mean can be laid to the charge of any of them; whether they have any friendship with the prosecutor, or enmity against the defendant. In replying to such questions, they are likely to say something of which we may take advantage, or may be convicted of falsehood or malevolence. 3But all questioning ought to be extremely circumspect, because a witness often utters smart repartees in answer to the advocates and is thus regarded with a highly favorable feeling by the audience in general. Questions should be put, too, as far as possible, in familiar language, that the person under examination, who is very frequently illiterate, may clearly understand or at least may not pretend that he does not understand, an artifice which throws no small damp on the spirit of the examiner.

3It is a disgraceful practice to send a suborned witness to sit on the benches of the opposite party, that in being called from thence he may do him the more damage, either by speaking directly against the person on whose side he had placed himself, or by assuming, after having appeared to benefit him by his evidence, airs of impudence and folly, by which he not only discredits his own testimony, but detracts from the weight of that of others who may have been of service. I mention them, not that they may be adopted, but that they may be shunned.

There is frequently a collision between written attestations on the one side and the witnesses who appear in person on the other, and this furnishes matter of debate for both parties, the one resting their arguments on the oaths of the witnesses, and the other on the unanimity of those who signed the depositions. 3There is often a question, too, between the witnesses and the arguments. On the one side, it is argued that there is in the witnesses knowledge of facts and regard for their oaths, and in the arguments nothing but mere subtlety. On the other side, it is argued that witnesses are procured favor, fear, money, malice, hatred, friendship, or solicitation, while arguments are drawn from the nature of the subject, that in hearing witnesses, the judge trusts to himself, in listening to arguments, to another. 3Such questions are common to numbers of causes; they have always been, and always will be, subjects for violent discussion.

Sometimes there are witnesses on both sides, and the question arises, with regard to themselves, "Which of them are the most respectable?" with regard to the cause, "Which of them have given the most credible evidence?" and, with regard to the litigating parties, "Which may have had most influence over the witnesses?"

3To these kinds of evidence, if any one wishes to add what are called supernatural testimonies, from responses, oracles, and omens, let him be reminded that there are two modes of treating them, the one general, in respect to which there is an eternal dispute between the Stoics and Epicureans, whether the world is governed by a divine providence, the other special, in reference to certain parts of supernatural evidence, as they happen severally to affect the question. 3For the credit of oracles may be established or overthrown in one way, and that of soothsayers, augurs, diviners, and astrologers in another, as the nature of the things themselves is entirely different.

In supporting or demolishing such circumstances in a cause the voice of the pleader has much to do, as if, for instance, expressions have been uttered under the effects of wine, or in sleep, or in madness, or if information has been caught from the mouths of children, for in regard to all such individuals, one party will say that they do not feign, and the other that they mean nothing.

3The mode of proof by witnesses may not only be offered with great effect, but may also be greatly missed where it is not produced: "You gave me the money; who counted it? where? whence did he come? You accuse me of poisoning; where did I buy the poison? from whom? for how much? by whose agency did I administer it? who had any knowledge of the deed?" Almost all these points Cicero discusses in his speech for Cluentius under a charge of poisoning. Such are the remarks which I have ventured to offer, as briefly as I could, concerning inartificial proofs.

 
5 - 8 Artificial proofs too much neglected, § 1-3. There are certain particulars common to all kinds of proofs, 4-7.

THE other sort of proofs, which come wholly under the head of art and consist in matters adapted to produce belief, is, for the most part, either altogether neglected or very lightly touched upon by those rhetoricians who, avoiding arguments as repulsive and rugged, repose themselves in more agreeable spots. Like those who are said by the poets to have preferred pleasure to security, being charmed with the taste of a certain herb among the Lotuphagi or with the song of the Sirens, these people pursued an empty semblance of glory and failed to obtain that success for which eloquence is exerted.

But other efforts of oratory, which run through the continued course of a speech, are designed as aids or embellishments to the arguments of a cause, and add to those sinews, by which it is strengthened, the appearance of a body, as it were, superinduced upon them. If anything is said to have been done, perchance, through anger, or fear, or covetousness, we can expatiate somewhat fully on the nature of those passions, and, in similar accessory parts, we praise, blame, exaggerate, extenuate, describe, deter, complain, console, or exhort. Such oratorical efforts may be of great service in treating matters which are certain, or of which we speak as being certain, and I would not deny that there is some advantage in pleasing, and very much in exciting the feelings. But pleasure and excitement have the most effect when the judge thinks that he has acquired a full knowledge of the cause, knowledge which we cannot convey to him but by arguments and by every other means in support of facts.

But before I distinguish the different sorts of artificial proofs, I think it necessary to intimate that there are certain qualities common to all kinds of proof. For there is no question which does not relate either to a thing or to a person. Nor can there be any grounds for argument, except respecting matters that affect things or persons, and these matters are either to be considered by themselves or referred to something else. Nor can there be any proof except from things consequent or opposite which we must seek either in the time that preceded the alleged fact, in the time at which it took place, or in the time that followed it, nor can anything be proved but from some other thing, which must either be greater or less than it, or equal to it. As for arguments, they arise either from general questions, which may be considered in themselves, apart from any connection with things or persons, or from the cause itself, when anything is found in it not derived from common reasoning, but peculiar to that point on which the decision is to be pronounced. Of all conclusions, moreover, some are necessary, some probable, some not impossible.

Of all proofs, too, there are four forms: because one thing is, another is not, as, "It is day, therefore it is not night"; because there is one thing, there is also another, as, "The sun is above the earth, therefore it is day"; because one thing is not, another is, as, "It is not night, therefore it is day"; and because one thing is not, another is not, as, "He is not a rational being, therefore he is not a man." Having promised these general remarks, I shall proceed to particulars.

 
5 - 9 Difference of signs, indications, or circumstantial evidence, from proofs, § 1, 2. Of conclusive signs or indications, 3-Inconclusive signs are of weight when supported by others, 8-1Of mere appearances, 12-1Of prognostics, 11

ALL artificial proof, then, depends on indications, arguments, or examples. I am aware that indications are thought by many a species of arguments, and I had, in consequence, two motives for distinguishing them. The first is that indications generally, almost always, belong to inartificial proofs, for a blood-stained garment, a shriek, a livid spot, and similar particulars, are circumstances of the same nature as writings, reports, and depositions; they are not invented by the orator, but communicated to him with the cause itself. The second is that neither can indications, if they are certain, be arguments, because where there are certain indications, there is no question, and there can be no room for argument except upon a controverted point. Nor, if they are uncertain, can they be arguments, but have themselves need of arguments.

All artificial proofs, then, as I say, are distinguished, first of all, into two kinds, one in which the conclusion is necessary, the other in which it is not necessary. The former are those which cannot be otherwise, and which the Greeks call τεκμήρια (tekmēria) or ἄλυτα σημεῖα (aluta sēmeia), "irrefutable signs." These scarcely seem to me to come under the rules of art, for when there is an irrefutable indication, there can be no ground for dispute. This happens whenever a thing must be, or must have been; or cannot be, or cannot have been; and this being stated in a cause, there can be no contention about the point. This kind of proof is considered with reference at all times, past, present, and future, for "that she who has had a child must have lain with a man" regards the past; "that there must be waves when a strong wind has fallen on the sea" concerns the present, and "that he whose heart is wounded must die" relates to the future. In like manner, it is impossible "that there can be harvest where there has been no sowing"; "that a person can be at Rome when he is at Athens"; or "that he who is without a scar can have been wounded with a sword." Some have the same force when reversed, as, "A man who breathes must be alive," and "a man who is alive must breathe"; but others are not reversible, for it does not follow that "because he who walks must move," therefore "he who moves must walk." It is consequently possible that "she who has not had a child may have had connection with a man"; that "where there are waves, there may yet be no wind on the sea"; that "the heart of him who dies may not have been wounded"; and, in like manner, that "there may hare been sowing, when there was no harvest"; that "he who was not at Athens, may not have been at Rome"; and that "he who is marked with a scar may not have been wounded with a sword."

The other sort of indications are those from which there is no absolutely necessary conclusion, and which the Greeks call εἰκότα (eikota). Though these are not sufficient of themselves to remove all doubt, when they are combined with others, they are of great weight.

That from which something else is inferred, as from blood is suspected murder, the Greeks term, as I said, σημεῖον (sēmeion), we call, signum, "a sign," though some of our writers have used the word indicium, "an indication" and others vestigium, "a trace." But as the blood that stained a garment may have proceeded from a sacrifice or may have flowed from the nose, it does not necessarily follow that he who has a blood-stained garment has committed a murder. Though it is not a sufficient proof of itself, still it cannot but be regarded as evidence when combined with other circumstances, such as if the man with the blood-stained garment was the enemy of him who was killed; if he had previously threatened his life; if he was in the same place with him. When some presumptive proof is added to these circumstances, it makes what was suspected appear certain. 1Among such indications, however, there are some which either side may interpret in its own way, as livid spots and swelling of the body, for they may seem to be the effects either of poison or intemperance, and a wound in the breast, from which people may argue that he in whom it is found has perished either by his own hand or by that of another. The strength of such indications is proportioned to the support which they receive from other circumstances.

1Of indications, which are presumptions indeed, but from which no necessary conclusion follows, Hermagoras thinks the following an example: "Atalanta is not a virgin, because she strolls through the woods with young men." If we admit such a circumstance as a presumption, I fear that we shall make everything that has any reference to a fact a presumption. Such circumstances are, however, treated by rhetoricians as presumptive proofs. 1Nor do the Areopagites, when they condemned a boy to death for picking out the eyes of quails, appear to have had any other thought than that such an act was the indication of a cruel disposition, likely to do mischief to many if he should be allowed to reach maturity. Hence also the popularity of Spurius Maelius and Marcus Manlius was regarded as an indication that they were aspiring to sovereignty. 1But I am afraid that this mode of reasoning would carry us too far, for if a woman's bathing with men is a sign that she is an adulteress, it will be a sign of the same nature if she takes her meals with young men, or if she enjoys the intimate friendship of any man, as a person might perhaps call depilated skin, a sauntering walk, and a delicate dress signs of effeminacy and unmanliness, if he thinks that they proceed from corrupt morals as blood flows from a wound. A sign is properly that which, proceeding from a matter about which there is a question, fills under our own observation. 1Those appearances, also, which, as they are constantly noticed, are vulgarly called signs, such as prognostics of the weather, "The golden moon is red from the approach of wind," and "The mischievous crow calls for rain with a loud voice," may, if they have their causes from the state of the atmosphere, receive that appellation, 1for if the moon is red from the influence of wind, its redness is a sign of wind, and if, as the same poet infers, a condensed or rarefied atmosphere gives rise to a chattering of birds, we shall consider such chattering also a sign. We may likewise observe that small things are sometimes signs of great, as this very chattering of the crow; that greater things are signs of less, nobody wonders.

 
5 - 10 Of the different names given to arguments among the Greeks and Latins, § 1-8. Various significations of the word argument, 9-11. In every cause there must be something that does not require proof, 12-14. Of credibilities, 15-19. Of sources from which arguments are drawn, 20-22. From the character of individuals, 23-31. From circumstances, as motives, place, time, manner, 32-48. Opportunities and means, 49-52. Arguments from definition, 53-61. Remarks on Cicero's method; argument and definition assisted by division, 62-70. Arguments from commencement, increase, and event, 772. From dissimilitude, opposition, consequentiality, 73-79. From causes and effects, 80-85. From comparison, 86-89. Too many subdivisions under this head, 90-94. Arguments from supposition, 95-99. Precepts not to be followed too superstitiously; examples, 100-108. An orator must take care what he proposes to be proved, an example, 109-118. Utility of rules, 119-121. Necessity and advantages of study and practice, 122-125.

I NOW proceed to speak of arguments, for under this term we include all that the Greeks call ἐνθυμήματα (enthymēmata), ἐπιχειρήματα (epicheirēmata), and ἀποδείξεις (apodeixeis), for which, though there is some difference in the names, the meaning is nearly the same. The word enthymema (which we translate, indeed, as we cannot render it otherwise, by commentum, or commentatio, but we had better use the Greek word itself) has three meanings: one, which signifies everything that is conceived in the mind (but with this meaning we have now no concern); another, which signifies a proposition with a reason; a third, which signifies a conclusion of an argument, deduced from consequents or opposites. With regard to this latter sense authors differ, for some call a conclusion from consequents an epicheirema, but more will be found of opinion that a conclusion from opposites only should be called an enthymeme, and hence Cornificius gives it the appellation contrarium. Some have called it a rhetorical syllogism, others an imperfect syllogism, because it is not comprised in distinct parts, or in the same number of parts, as the regular syllogism, such exactness, indeed, not being required in the orator.

Valgius calls the epicheirema instead aggressio, "attempt." Celsus thinks that it is not our management of the subject, but the subject itself which we attempt (that is, the argument by which we propose to prove anything, and which, though not yet set forth in words, is fully conceived in the mind) that is called an epicheirema. Others are of opinion that it is not an intended or imperfect proof, but a complete one, proceeding even to the last species, that ought to receive this appellation. Hence its proper acceptation, and that which is most in use, is that in which it is understood to be a certain comprehension of a thought which consists at least of three parts. Some have called an epicheirema a reason, Cicero, more happily, a reasoning, although he seems to have taken that name rather from the syllogism than from anything else, for he calls the status syllogisticus a "ratiocinatory state" and gives examples from the philosophers. As there is some affinity between the syllogism and the epicheirema, he may be thought to have adopted that term judiciously.

As to the ἀποδείξεις (apodeixeis), it is an evident proof; and hence the term γραμμικαι ἀποδείξεις (grammikai apodeixeis), "linear demonstrations," among geometers. Caecilius thinks that it differs from the epicheirema only in the manner of its conclusion, and that an apodeixeis is an imperfect epicheirema, for the same reason for which we said an enthymeme differs from a syllogism, for an enthymeme is a part of a syllogism. Some think that the apodeixeis is included in the epicheirema and is the part of it which contains the proof. But authors, however different in other respects, concur in defining both of them so far similarly as to say that the reasoning in them is from that which is certain to give confirmation to that which is doubtful, a quality which is common to all arguments, for what is certain is never deduced from what is uncertain. To all these forms of argument the Greeks give the general name of πίστεις (pisteis), which we might by a literal interpretation render fides, "faith," but we shall make the sense of it clearer if we call it proof.

But the word argument has itself also several significations, for the subjects of plays, composed for acting on the stage, are called arguments. Asconius Pedianus, in explaining the topics of the orations of Cicero, says "The argument is this," and Cicero himself, in writing to Brutus, says, "Fearing lest I should bring from thence any evil upon my Cato, though the argument was far from similar, etc." Whence it appears that every subject for writing is so called. Nor is this wonderful, when the word is common even among artisans; Virgil also has argumentum ingens, "a great argument," and a work of any considerable number of heads is vulgarly called argumentosum, "argumentative." But we have now to speak of that sense of the word argument, which includes proof, indication, credibility, and aggression, which are all used as names for the same thing, but, in my opinion, with too little distinction. 1For proof and credibility are established not only by arguments dependent on reasoning, but by such as are called inartificial. As to signs, which Celsus calls "indications," I have already distinguished them from arguments.

Since, then, an argument is a process of reasoning affording a proof, by which one thing is gathered from another, and which establishes what is doubtful by reference to what is certain, there must assuredly be something in a cause that does not require proof. For unless there be something which is true, or which appears true, and from which support may be gained for what is doubtful, there will be no ground on which we can prove anything. 1As certainties, accordingly, we have, in the first place, what is perceived by the senses, as what we see, what we hear, as signs or indications. Next, we have what is admitted by the general consent of mankind, as, that there are gods, and that respect is to be paid to parents. 1Also, we have what is established by the laws, or what is passed into general usage, with the concurrence, if not of the whole world, at least of that community or people among whom we have to plead, as indeed, in what is called legal right, most points are settled, not by positive laws, but by common custom. Lastly, there is whatever is agreed between the two parties, whatever is proved, or whatever our adversary does not dispute. 1For thus will arise an argument, "As the world is governed by a providence, the state ought to be governed by some ruling power," showing that if it is acknowledged that the world is governed by a providence, the state ought likewise to be governed. 1But to him who would handle arguments properly, the nature and quality of all things whatever ought to be known, as well as their general effects, for it is by such knowledge that arguments called εἰκότα (eikota), "probable," are established. 1Now of probability there are three degrees: one, which rests on very strong grounds, because that to which it is applied generally happens, as that children are loved by their parents; a second, somewhat more inclined to uncertainty, as that he who is in good health today will live till tomorrow; and a third, which is only not repugnant to credibility, as that a theft committed in a house was committed by one of the household. 1Hence it is that Aristotle, in his second book on the Art of Rhetoric, has so carefully considered what generally attends on various things and persons, and what things or what persons nature has rendered friendly or unfriendly to other things or other persons: such as what accompanies riches, or ambition, or superstition; what the good approve; what the bad pursue; what soldiers or husbandmen desire; and by what means things are severally shunned or sought. 1But this subject I do not intend to pursue, for it is not only long, but even impracticable, or rather infinite, and it is plain, moreover, to the common understanding of all. If any one shall desire, however, to be enlightened upon it, I have shown him from whom he may seek instruction. 1But all probability, on which the far greater part of reasoning depends, flows from sources of this nature, whether it be credible that a father was killed by his son; that a father committed incest with his daughter; and, again, whether poisoning be credible in a step-mother, or adultery in a man of licentious life, also, whether it be credible that a crime was committed in the sight of the whole world, or that false testimony was given for a small bribe. Each of these crimes proceeds from a peculiar cast, as it were, of character—I mean generally, not always, else all reasoning about them would be absolute certainty and not mere probable argument.

20. Let us now examine the places of arguments, although, indeed, the topics of which I have previously spoken are regarded as places of argument by some rhetoricians. By places, I do not mean commonplaces, in the sense in which the word is generally understood, in reference to luxury, adultery, or such subjects, but the seats of arguments in which they lie concealed and from which they must be drawn forth. 2For as all kinds of fruits are not produced in all countries, and as you will be unable to find a bird or a beast if you are ignorant where it is usually produced or makes its abode, and as among the several kinds of fishes, some delight in a smooth and others in a rocky bottom of the water, while particular sorts are confined to particular regions or coasts, and you could not attract the ellops or the scarus to our shores, so every kind of argument is not to be got from every place and is consequently not everywhere to be sought. 2Otherwise, there would be much wandering about, and after enduring the utmost labor, we should not be able to find, unless by chance, that for which we should seek without method. But if we ascertain where particular arguments offer themselves, we shall, when we come to the place where they lie, easily discern what is in it.

2First of all, then, arguments are to be drawn from persons, there being, as I said, a general division of all arguments into two kinds, those which concern things and those which concern persons, the accidents of things being cause, time, place, opportunity, instruments, manner, and the like. As to persons, I do not undertake to treat of every particular concerning them, as most rhetoricians have done, but only of those topics from which arguments may be drawn. 2These, then, are:

Birth, for people are mostly thought similar in character to their fathers and forefathers, and sometimes derive from their origin motives for living an honorable or dishonorable life;
Nation, for every nation has its peculiar manners, and the same thing will not be alike probable in regard to a Barbarian, a Roman, and a Greek; 25.
Country, for in like manner, the laws, institutions, and opinions of states have their peculiarities;
Sex, for you would more readily believe a charge of robbery with regard to a man, and poisoning with regard to a woman;
Age, for different modes of action belong to different periods of life;
Education and discipline, for it makes a difference by whom, and in what manner a person has been brought up; 26.
Bodily constitution, for beauty is often drawn into an argument for libertinism, and strength for insolence, and the contrary qualities for contrary conduct;
Fortune, for the same charge is not equally credible in reference to a rich and a poor man, in reference to one who is surrounded with relations, friends and clients, and one who is destitute of all such support;
Condition, for it makes a great difference whether a man is illustrious or obscure, a magistrate or a private person, a father or a son, a citizen or a foreigner, free or a slave, married or a bachelor, the father of children or childless; 27.
Natural disposition, for avarice, passionateness, sensibility, cruelty, austerity, and other similar affections of the mind, frequently either cause credit to be given to an accusation or to be withheld from it;
Manner of living, for it is often a matter of inquiry whether a person is luxurious, or parsimonious, or mean;
Occupations, for a countryman, a lawyer, a trader, a soldier, a mariner, a physician, act in very different ways. 28.
We must consider also what a person affects, whether he would wish to appear rich or eloquent, just or powerful.
Previous doings and sayings, too, are to be taken into account, for the present is commonly estimated from the past.
To these some add commotion of the mind, which they wish to be understood in the sense of a temporary excitement of the feelings, as anger, or fear; 29.
Designs, which respect the present, past, and future, but these, though they are accidents of persons, should yet be referred, I think, as considered in themselves, to that species of argument which we derive from motives;
Also certain dispositions of mind, in regard to which it is considered whether a particular person is a friend or an enemy of another person.
30. They specify also the name among the topics of argument in regard to a person, and the name must certainly be termed an accident of a person, but it is rarely the foundation of any reasoning, unless when it has been given for some cause, as Sapiens, Maqnus, or Plenus, or has suggested some thought to the bearer of it, as Lentulus's name led him to think of joining the conspiracy of Catiline, because dominion was said to be promised by the Sibylline books and the predictions of the soothsayers "to three Cornelii," and he believed himself, as he was a Cornelius, to be the third after Sylla and Cinna. 3As to the conceit of Euripides, where the brother of Polynices reflects on his name, as an argument of his disposition, it is extremely poor. For jesting, however, occasion is frequently furnished by a name, and Cicero has more than once indulged in it in his pleadings against Verres. Such, and of such a nature, are the common subjects of argument with regard to persons. All I cannot enumerate, either under this head or under others, but content myself with showing the way to those who may inquire farther.

now come to things, among which actions are most closely connected with persons and must therefore be first considered. In regard, then, to everything that is done, the question is either "why," or "where," or "when," or "in what manner," or "by what means," it was done. 3Arguments are consequently derived from the motives for actions done or to be done. The matter of such motives, which some of the Greek writers call ὕλη (hylē) and others δύναμις (dynamis), they divide into two kinds, subdividing each kind into four species, for the motive for any action is generally connected with the acquisition, the augmentation, the preservation, or the enjoyment, of some good, or the avoidance, diminution, endurance, of some evil, or delivery from it. These are considerations which have great weight in all our deliberations. 3But right actions have such motives; wrong ones, on the contrary, proceed from false notions, for the origin of them is from the objects which men fancy to be good or evil. Hence arise errors of conduct and corrupt passions, among which may be reckoned anger, envy, hatred, avarice, presumption, ambition, audacity, timidity, and other feelings of a similar nature. Sometimes fortuitous circumstances are added, as drunkenness, or mistake, which sometimes serve to excuse and sometimes to give weight to a charge, as when a man is said to have killed one person while he was lying in wait for another. 3Motives, moreover, are constantly investigated not only to establish, but to repel accusations, as when an accused person maintains that he acted rightly, that is, from a laudable motive, on which point I have spoken more fully in the third book. 3Questions of definition, too, sometimes depend upon motives, as whether he is a tyrannicide who killed a tyrant by whom he had been caught in adultery, and whether he is guilty of sacrilege who took down arms suspended in a temple to drive enemies out of his city. 3Arguments are also drawn from places, for it often concerns the proof of a fact, whether the scene of it was mountainous or level, maritime or inland, planted or uncultivated, frequented or lonely, near or distant, suitable or unsuitable for the alleged purpose, considerations which Cicero treats with very great effect in his defense of Milo. 3These and similar points most commonly relate to questions of fact, but sometimes also to questions of law, as whether a place be private or public, sacred or profane, our own or belonging to another, as we consider in regard to a person whether he be a magistrate, or a father, or a foreigner. 3For hence questions arise, as, "You have taken the money of a private individual, but, as you took it from a temple, your crime is not mere theft, but sacrilege"; "You have killed an adulterer, an act which the law allows, but as you committed it in a brothel, it is murder"; and "You have done violence, but as you did it to a magistrate, an action for treason may be brought against you." 40. Or, on the other hand, a person may argue, "I had a right to act in such a way, for I was a father, or I was a magistrate." But it is to be observed that arguments derived from place afford matter for dispute as to questions of fact as well as regarding points of law. Place, too, frequently affects the quality of an action, for the same act is not allowable or becoming in all places alike. It is likewise of consequence before what people a question is tried, for every people has its peculiar customs and laws. 4Place has also influence in commendation or disparagement, as Ajax says in Ovid, Agimus ante rates causam, et mecum confertur Ulysses? "Do we plead our cause before the ships, and is Ulysses compared with me?" To Milo, too, it was made a subject of reproach, among other things, that Clodius had been killed by him amidst the monuments of his ancestors. 4Place has influence, moreover, in deliberative oratory, as well as time, some remarks on which I shall subjoin.

Of time, as I have already observed in another place, there are two acceptations, since it is viewed either generally or specially. Generally, as when we say, "now, formerly, in the time of Alexander, during the struggle at the siege of Troy," or whatever relates to the present, past, or future. Specially, when we speak of received divisions of time, as "in the summer, in the winter, by day, or by night," or of accidental occurrences at any particular period, as "during a pestilence, in a war, or at a banquet." 4Some of our Latin authors have thought that sufficient distinction was made if they called time in general merely time, and special portions of it times. To say nothing more on that point, regard to time in both senses is to be had both in deliberative and epideictic, but most frequently in judicial, pleading. 4For it gives rise to questions of law, determines the quality of actions, and has great influence in questions of fact, since it sometimes offers irrefragable proofs, as if a person should be said (as I supposed above) to have signed a deed when he died before the date of it, or to have done something wrong when he was quite an infant or even not born. 4Besides, it is to be observed that arguments of all kinds are readily drawn either from circumstances that preceded the fact in question, occurred at the same time with it, or happened after it: Previous circumstances include examples such as "You threatened the deceased with death, you went out at night, you went before him on the road," and motives for deeds, too, relate to time past. 4Contemporaneous circumstances, which some have distinguished more nicely than was necessary, dividing them into that which is combined with an act, include examples such as "A noise was heard" and those attached to an act, such as "A cry was raised." Subsequent circumstances include examples such as, "You concealed yourself; you fled; and discolorations and swellings appeared on the body." The defendant also will direct his thoughts to the same divisions of time in order to discredit the charge that is brought against him.

4In these considerations is included all that concern deeds and words, but under two aspects, for some things are done because something else will follow, and others because something else was done before. For example, it is alleged against a man accused of trafficking in women that he bought a beautiful woman who had been found guilty of adultery, or against a rake accused of patricide that he had said to his father, "You shall not reproach me any more." The former is not a trafficker in women because he bought the woman, but he bought her because he was a trafficker in women, and the latter did not kill his father because he uttered those words, but uttered the words because he meditated killing his father.

4As to fortuitous occurrences, which also afford ground for arguments, they doubtless belong to subsequent time, but are generally distinguished by some peculiarity in the persons whom they concern. For example, I might say, "Scipio was a better general than Hannibal; he defeated Hannibal," or "He was a good pilot; he never suffered shipwreck," or "He was a good husband-man; he raised large crops," or in reference to bad qualities, "He was extravagant; he exhausted his patrimony," or "He lived disgracefully; he was disliked by all."

4We must also, especially in questions of fact, regard the means of which a party was possessed, for probability inclines us to suppose that a smaller number was killed by a larger, a weaker by a stronger, people asleep by people awake, the unsuspecting by the well prepared. Opposite states of things lead to opposite conclusions. 50. Such points we regard in deliberative speeches, and in judicial pleadings we keep them in view with reference to two considerations: whether a person had the inclination and whether he had the power, for hope depending on power often gives rise to inclination. Hence that conjecture in Cicero: "Clodius lay in wait for Milo, not Milo for Clodius; Clodius was attended with a body of stout slaves, Milo with a party of women; Clodius was travelling on horseback, Milo in a carriage; Clodius was unencumbered, Milo enveloped in a cloak." 5Under means, also, we may include instruments, for they form part of appliances and resources, and presumptive proofs, too, sometimes arise from instruments, as when a sharp weapon is found sticking in a dead body. 5To all this is to be added "manner," which the Greeks call τρόπος (tropos), in reference to which the question is, "How a thing was done?" And it has relation both to the quality of an act and to the interpretation of writings, as if we should deny that it is lawful to kill an adulterer with poison and say that he ought to have been killed with a sword. It may concern questions of fact also, as if I should say that a thing was done with a good intention and therefore openly, or with a bad intention and therefore insidiously, in the night and in a lonely place.

5But in regard to every matter, about the quality or nature of which there is any question, and which we contemplate independently of persons and all else that constitutes a cause, three points are doubtless to be considered: whether it is, what it is, and of what nature it is. But as certain topics of argument are common to all these, the three cannot be divided and must accordingly be introduced under the heads which they respectively happen to fall.

5Arguments, then, are drawn from definition (ex finitione or fine, for both terms are in use) of which there are two modes, for we either inquire simply whether such a thing is a virtue or, with a definition previously given, what virtue is. Such definition we either express in a general way, as "Rhetoric is the art of speaking well," or with an enumeration of particulars, as "Rhetoric is the art of rightly conceiving, arranging, and expressing our thoughts, with an unfailing memory and with propriety of action." 5We also define a thing either by its nature, as in the preceding example, or by reference to etymology, as when we derive the sense of assiduus from aes and do, that of locuples from copia locorum, or that of pecuniosus from copia pecorum.

To definitions seem especially to belong genus, species, difference, and property. 5From all these, arguments are deduced. Genus can do little to establish species, but very much to set it aside; what is a tree, therefore, is not necessarily a plane tree, but what is not a tree, is certainly not a plane tree. Nor can that which is not a virtue be justice, and therefore we must proceed from the genus to the ultimate species, as to say, "Man is an animal," is not enough, for "animal" is the genus, and to say that he is "mortal," though it expresses a species, is but a definition common to other animals. But if we say that he is "rational," nothing will be wanting to signify what we wish. 5On the contrary, species affords a strong proof of genus, but has little power to disprove it, for that which is justice is certainly a virtue, while that which is not justice may be a virtue if it is fortitude, prudence, or temperance. A genus, therefore, will never be disproved by proving a species, unless all the species included under that genus are set aside, as "That which is neither mortal nor immortal is not an animal."

5To genus and species writers add properties and differences. By properties, a definition is established; by differences, it is overthrown. A property is that which either belongs only to one object, as speech and laughter to man, or belongs to it, but not to it alone, as heat is a property of fire. There may be also many properties of the same thing, as fire, for instance, shines as well as heats. Consequently, whatever property is omitted in a definition will weaken it, but it is not every property introduced in it that will establish it. 5It is very often a question, too, what is a property of something under consideration. For instance, if it is asserted, on the etymology of the word, "To kill a tyrant constitutes a man a tyrannicide," we may deny it, for if an executioner should kill a tyrant delivered to him to be put to death, he would not be called a tyrannicide, nor would a man be called so that had killed a tyrant unawares or unwillingly. 60. But that which is not a peculiar property will be a difference, as it is one thing to be a slave and another to serve. Hence, there is this distinction with regard to addicti, or insolvent debtors sentenced to serve their creditors: "He who is a slave, if he is set free, becomes a freedman," but this is not the case with an addictus, and there are other points of difference between them of which I shall speak in another place. 6They call that also a difference, by which, when the genus is distinguished into species, a species itself is particularized, as "Animal" is the genus, "mortal," a species, and "terrestrial" or "two-footed," a difference. We have not yet come to property, though the animal is distinguished from the aquatic or the four-footed, but such distinction belongs not so much to argument as to exact expression of definition. 6Cicero separates genus and species, which later he calls form, from definition and puts them under relation, as, for example, "if a person to whom all the silver of another person has been bequeathed should claim also the coined silver," he would found his claim upon genus; but "if a person, when a legacy has been left to a woman who should have been a materfamilias to her husband, denies that it ought to be paid to her who never came into her husband's power," he reasons from species, because there are two sorts of marriages.

6Cicero also shows that definition is assisted by division, which he makes distinct from partition, partition being the distribution of a whole into its parts, division that of a genus into its forms or species. The number of parts, he says, is uncertain, for instance, the parts of which a state consists, but that of forms, certain, as the number of forms of government. We understand these to be three, that with power in the hands of the people, that in the hands of a few, and that in the hands of one. 6He, indeed, does not use these examples, because, writing to Trebatius, he preferred taking his instances from law. I have given such, as I think, plainer ones.

Properties have reference also to questions dependent on conjecture, for as it is the property of a good man to act rightly and of a passionate man to be violent in his languange, it is supposed that he who acts rightly is a good man and that he who is violent in his language is a passionate one, and such as act or speak otherwise are supposed to be of opposite characters. For when certain qualities are not in certain persons, the inference, though from opposite premises, is of a similar nature.

6Division, in a similar way, serves to prove and to refute. For proof, it is sometimes sufficient to establish one half, as in this example: "A man, to be a citizen, must either have been born a citizen or have been made one," but in refuting you must overthrow both particulars and show that he was neither born nor made a citizen. 6This mode of reasoning is manifold, and there is a form of argument by successive removals, by which a whole allegation is sometimes proved to be false, and sometimes a portion of it, which is left after successive removals, is shown to be true. A whole allegation is proved to be false in this manner: "You say that you lent this money. Either then you had it of your own, or you received it from some one else, or you found it, or you stole it. If you neither had it of your own, nor received it from any one, nor etc., you did not lend it." 6What is left is established as true in this way: "This slave, whom you claim as your own, was either born in your house, or bought by you, or given to you, or left to you by will, or captured by you from the enemy—or he belongs to another person"; when it is shown that the suppositions are all unfounded, except the last, it will be clear that the slave belongs to another. This kind of argumentation is dangerous and must be conducted with great wariness, for if we omit one particular in the enumeration, our whole edifice will fall to the ground, to the amusement of our audience. 6That mode is safer which Cicero uses in his speech for Caecina, when he asks, "If this is not the point in question, what is it?" for thus all other points are set aside at once. That also is safer, in which two contrary propositions are advanced, of which it is sufficient for our purpose to establish either, as in this example from Cicero: "There is certainly no one so unfavorable to Clueutius as not to grant me one thing. If it is certain that those judges were bribed, they must have been bribed either by Habitus or by Oppianicus; if I show that they were not bribed by Habitus, I prove that they were bribed by Oppianicus; if I make it appear that they were bribed by Oppianicus, I clear Habitus from suspicion." 6Or liberty may be granted to our adversary to choose one of two propositions, of which one must necessarily be true, and, whichsoever he chooses, it may be proved to be adverse to his cause. This is a mode which Cicero adopts in pleading for Oppius: "Whether was it when he was aiming at Cotta, or when he was attempting to kill himself, that the weapon was snatched from his hand?" And in that for Varenus: "The option is granted you, whether you would prefer to say that Varenus took that road by chance or at the instigation and persuasion of the other," and he then shows that either supposition is equally adverse to the accuser. 70. Sometimes two propositions are stated of such a nature that from either, if adopted, the same consequence follows, as in the common adage, "We must philosophize, though we must not philosophize," or in the still more common question, "To what purpose is a figure if the subject is intelligible? To what purpose if it is not intelligible?" And in this saying, "He who can endure pain will tell lies under torture; he who cannot endure pain will tell lies."

7As there are three parts of time, so the order of things is comprised in three stages of progress, for everything has a beginning, an increase, and a completion. For instance, first there is a quarrel, then one man's blood is shed, then that of several. Here then is an origin for arguments supporting one another, for the end may be inferred from the beginning, as in the common saying, "I cannot expect a toga praetexta when I see the commencement of the web black," or the beginning may be argued from the end, as "the resignation of the dictatorship may be made an argument that Sylla did not take arms with the object of making himself a tyrant." 7From the increase of a thing, in like manner, arguments may be drawn with regard both to its beginning and its end, and that not only in conjectures as to matters of fact, but in the consideration of points of law, as "Is the end referable to the beginning?" That is, "Ought the blood shed to be imputed to him with whom the quarrel began?"

7Arguments are also drawn from similarities: "If continence be a virtue, abstinence is also a virtue" and "If a guardian ought to give security, so likewise should an agent." This argument is of the nature of that which the Greeks call ἐπαγωγή (epagōgē), Cicero induction. 7From dissimilarities: "If joy is a good, pleasure is not therefore necessarily a good" and "What is lawful in regard to a woman is not also lawful in regard to a minor." From contraries: "Frugality is a good, for extravagance is an evil"; "If war is the cause of sufferings, peace will be the remedy of them"; "If he deserves pardon who has done an injury unawares, he does not merit reward who has done a service unawares." 7From contradictions: "He who is wise is not a fool." From consequences or adjuncts: "If justice is a good, we ought to judge with justice"; If deceit is an evil, we must not deceive," and such propositions may be reversed. Nor are the arguments that follow dissimilar to these, so that they may properly be ranged under the same head, to which, indeed, they naturally belong: "What a man never had he has not lost"; "A person whom we love we shall not knowingly injure"; "For a person whom a man has resolved to make his heir, he has had, has, and will have affection." But as such arguments are incontrovertible, they partake of the nature of necessary indications. 7The latter sort, however, I call arguments from what is consequent, or what the Greeks call a ἀκόλουθον (akolouthon), as goodness is consequent upon wisdom (what merely follows, that is, happens afterwards, or will be, I would distinguish by the Greek term παρεπόμονον (parepomena).) But about names I am not anxious; every one may use what terms he pleases, provided that the character of the things themselves be understood and that the one be regarded as dependent on time and the other on the nature of things. 1Accordingly, I do not hesitate to call the following forms of argument consequential (though from what precedes in order of time, they give an indication of what is to follow in order of time) of which some have sought to make two kinds: the first regarding action, as exemplified in Cicero's speech for Oppius: "Those whom he could not lead forth into the province against their will, how could he detain against their will?" The other regards time, as shown in this passage against Verres: "If the Kalends of January put an end to the authority of the praetor's edict, why does not the commencement of its authority bear date from the Kalends of January?" 7Both of these examples are of such a nature that if you reverse the propositions, they lead to an opposite conclusion, for it is also a necessary consequence that they who could not have been retained against their will could not have been led forth against their will.

7Those arguments, too, which are drawn from particulars that mutually support each other and which some rhetoricians wish to be deemed of a peculiar kind (they call them ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα (ek ton pros allēla) "out of and toward each other"—correlative ideas; Cicero terms them ex rebus sub eandem rationem venientibus) I would rank with those of necessary consequence, as, "If it is honorable for the Rhodians to let their customs, it is also honorable in Hermocreon to farm them," and, "What it is proper to learn, it is also proper to teach." 7Of which nature is the happy saying of Domitius Afer, not expressed in this manner, but having a similar effect: "I accused, you condemmed." There is also a kind of argument from two propositions relatively consequent and which proves the same thing from opposite statements, as, "He who says that the world was produced says also that it will come to an end, for everything which is produced comes to an end." 80. Similar to this is the kind of argument by which that which is done is inferred from that which does, or the contrary, which rhetoricians call an argument from causes. Sometimes the consequence necessarily happens, sometimes generally, though not necessarily. Thus a body, for example, casts a shadow in the light, and wherever there is a shadow, it necessarily proves that there is a body. 8Sometimes, as I said, the consequence is not necessary, whether with reference to the cause and the effect together, or to the cause or effect severally. Thus, "The sun darkens the skin, but it does not necessarily follow that he whose skin is dark has been darkened by the sun." "A road makes a man dusty, but it is not every road that throws up dust, nor does it follow that every man who is dusty has been on a road." 8Arguments of necessary consequence both from cause and effect are such as these: "If it is wisdom that makes a man good, a good man is necessarily wise," and so, "It is the part of a good man to act uprightly, of a bad man to act dishonorably, and accordingly those who act uprightly are considered good, and those who act dishonorably, bad," and this is a just conclusion. But if we say that "exercise generally makes the body strong," it will not follow that "whoever is strong has taken exercise" or that "whoever has taken exercise is strong," nor "because fortitude secures us from fearing death" will it follow that "whoever does not fear death is to be thought a man of fortitude," nor "if the sun gives men a headache" does it follow that "the sun is not useful to men." 8The following kind of argument belongs chiefly to the suasory department of oratory: "Virtue confers glory, therefore it is to be followed; pleasure brings infamy, therefore it is to be avoided."

8But we are judiciously admonished by writers on oratory that causes are not to be sought too far back, as Medea, for example, says in the play "Would that never in the grove of Pelion," as if "the felling of a fir tree to the earth" there had had the effect of producing her misery or guilt, or as Philoctetes says to Paris, "If you had controlled your passion, I should not now be miserable," for retracing causes in this way, we may arrive at any point whatever.

8To these I should think it ridiculous to add what they call the conjugate argument, had not Ciecro introduced it. An example of it is, "That they who do a just thing do justly," which certainly needs no proof, any more than Quod compascuum est, compascere licere, "On a common pasture it is common to every man to send his cattle to feed."

8Some call those arguments which I have specified as drawn from causes or efficients by another name, ἐκβάσις (ekbasis), that is, "issues," for nothing is indeed considered in them but how one thing results from another.

Arguments called apposite or comparative are such as prove the greater from the less, the less from the greater, or equals from equals. conjecture about a fact is supported by arguing from something greater, as, "If a man commits sacrilege, he will also commit an ordinary theft"; from something less, as, "He who readily and boldly tells a lie, will commit perjury"; from something equal, as, "He who has taken a bribe to pronounce unjust judgment will also take a bribe to bear false witness." 8A question about a point of law is supported in a similar way, from something greater, as, "If it is lawful to kill an adulterer, it is also lawful to scourge him"; from something less, as, "If it is lawful to kill a thief in the night, how much more is it lawful to kill an armed robber?"; from something equal, as, "The punishment which is justly pronounced on him who has killed his father is also justly pronounced on him who has killed his mother." All these arguments find a place in causes in which we proceed by syllogism.

8The following forms are more suitable for questions dependent on definition or quality: "If strength is good for bodies, health is not less so"; "If theft is a crime, much more is sacrilege"; "If abstinence is a virtue, so is continence"; "If the world is ruled by a providence, a state must be directed by a government"; "If a house cannot be built without a plan, what are we to think of the conduct of a fleet or an army?" 90. To me it would be sufficient to notice this form merely as a genus, but it is divided by others into species, for arguments are deduced by them from several things to one, and from one to several (as in the common remark, "What happens once, may happen often"), from a part to the whole, from genus to species, from that which contains to that which is contained, from the more difficult to the easier, from the more remote to the nearer, and from the opposites of all these to their opposites. 9But such arguments are all of the same nature, for they are drawn from greater things and less, or from things of equal force, and if we pursue such distinctions, there will be no end of particularization, for the comparison of things is infinite, and if we enumerate every kind, we must specify things that are more pleasant, more agreeable, more necessary, more honorable, more useful. But let me abstain from speaking of more, lest I fall into that prolixity which I wish to avoid. 9As to the examples of this kind of arguments, their number is incalculable, but I will notice only a very few. From the greater, in Cicero's speech for Caecina: "Shall that which alarms armed troops be thought to have caused no alarm in a company of lawyers?" From the easier, in his speech against Clodius and Curio: "Consider whether you could so easily have been made praetor, when he to whom you had given way was not made praetor?" 9From the more difficult, in his speech for Ligarius: "Observe, I pray you, Tubero, that I, who do not hesitate to speak of my own act, speak boldly of that of Ligarius," and in the same speech, "Has not Ligarius ground for hope, when liberty is granted me to intercede with you even for another?" From the less, in his speech for Caecina: "Is the knowledge that there were armed men a sufficient ground for you to prove that violence was committed, and is the fact of having fallen into their hands insufficient?" 9To sum up the whole in a few words, then, arguments are drawn from persons, causes, places, time (of which we distinguished three parts: the preceding, the coincident, and the subsequent), manner (that is, how a thing has been done), means (under which we included instruments), definition, genus, species, differences, peculiarities, removal, division, beginning, increase, completion, similaritity, dissimilarity, contraries, consequences, causes, effects, issues, connection, and comparison, each of which is divided into several species.

9It seems necessary to be added that arguments are deduced not only from acknowledged facts, but from fictions or suppositions, or, as the Greeks say, καθ᾽ ὑπόθεσιν (kat’ hypothesin), "hypothetical," and this kind of arguments is found in all the same forms as the other kinds, because there may be as many species of fictitious as of true arguments. 9By using fiction, I here mean advancing something which, if it were true, would either solve a question or assist to solve it, and then showing the resemblance of the point supposed to the point under consideration. So that young men who have not yet left school may understand this process better, I will illustrate it by some examples more suitable to that age. 9The law is that he who does not maintain his parents is to be imprisoned; a man does not maintain his parents, and yet pleads that he ought not to go to prison. He would perhaps have recourse to supposition, "if he were a soldier, if he were an infant, or if he were absent from home on public service." And to oppose the option of a man distinguished for bravery, we might use the supposition, "if he asked for supreme power or for the overthrow of temples." 9This is a form of argument of great force against the letter of a law. Cicero adopts it in his defense of Caecina: "whence you, or your slaves, or your steward—if your steward alone had driven me out—but if you have not even a single slave but him who drove me out," and there are several other examples in that speech. 9But the same sort of fiction is of great use in considering the quality of an act: "If Catiline, with the troop of villains that he took with him, could judge of this affair, he would condemn Lucius Muraena." It serves also for amplification: "If this had happened to you at supper over those monstrous cups of yours," and, "If the republic had a voice."

100. These are the common topics of proofs which we find specified and which it is hardly satisfactory to mention under general heads, as a numberless multitude of arguments springs from each of them; nor, on the other hand, does the nature of things allow us to pursue them through all their species, a task for which those who have attempted have incurred the double disadvantage of saying too much and yet not all. 10Hence most students of rhetoric, when they have fallen into these inexplicable labyrinths, have, as being fettered by the inflexible restrictions of rules, lost all power of action, even that which they ought to have from their own mind and, keeping their eyes fixed on a master, have ceased to follow the guidance of nature. 10But as it is not sufficient to know that all proofs are to be drawn from persons or from things, because each of these general heads branches out into an infinity of others, so he who shall have learned that arguments are to be deduced from preceding or coincident or subsequent circumstances will not necessarily be qualified to judge what arguments proper for any particular cause are to be deduced from such circumstances. 10This is especially true because most proofs are taken from what is inherent in the nature of a cause,and have nothing in common with any other cause, and these proofs, while they are the strongest, are also the least obvious because, though we learn from rules what is common to all causes, what is peculiar to any particular cause we have to discover for ourselves. 10This kind of arguments we may well call arguments from circumstances (as we cannot otherwise express the Greek word περίστασις (peristatis)), or from those things which are proper to any individual cause. Thus in the case of the priest guilty of adultery, who, by virtue of the law by which he had the power of saving a life, wished to save his own life, the argument proper to the cause, in opposing him, would be, "You would not save one criminal only, for if you are released, it will not be lawful to kill the adulteress," for this argument is supplied by the law, which prohibits killing the adulteress without the adulterer. 10Thus, too, in that controversy in which the law states that bankers might pay half of what they owe, but demand payment of the whole of what was due to them, and that one banker requires the whole of his debt from another banker. The proper argument for the creditor, from the nature of the cause, is, "that it was expressly inserted in the law that a banker might demand the whole of a debt, for with regard to other people, there was no need of a law, as every one had the right of exacting a debt in full except from a banker." 10But many new considerations present themselves in every kind of subject, and especially in those cases which depend upon writing, because there is often ambiguity, not only in single words, but, still more, in words taken together. 10These points for consideration must necessarily vary, from the complication of laws and other written documents produced to support or overthrow them, as one fact brings to light another, and one point of law leads to the consideration of another: as, "I owed you no money. Why? You never summoned me for a debt; you took no interest from me; you even borrowed money from me yourself." A law says, "A son who does not defend his father when accused of treason is to be disinherited"; a son denies that he is amenable to this law unless his father be acquitted, and what is his proof? Another law says that "he who is found guilty of treason is to be sent into exile with his defender." 10Cicero, in his speech for Cluentius, says that Publius Popilius and Tiberius Gutta were found guilty, not of having bribed the judges, but of having tried to bribe them. What is the proof? That their accusers, who were themselves found guilty of trying to bribe, were reinstated, according to law, after having proved Popilius and Gutta guilty of the same offense.

10But no less care ought to be taken as to what you advance than as to the manner in which what you advance is to be proved. Here the power of invention, if not the greatest, is certainly the first requisite, for as arrows are useless to him who knows not at what he should aim, so arguments are useless to him who has not ascertained to what point they are to be applied. 1This is what cannot be attained by art, and though several orators, after having studied the same rules, will doubtless use arguments of a similar kind, some will devise more arguments for their purpose than others. Let the following cause, which involves questions by no means common with other causes, be given as an example. 11"When Alexander had demolished Thebes, he found a document in which it was stated that the Thebans had lent the Thessalians a hundred talents. Of this document Alexander made a present to the Thessalians, as he had had their assistance in the siege. But subsequently, when the Thebans were reestablished by Cassander, they demanded payment of the money from the Thessalians." The cause was pleaded before the Amphictyons. It was admitted that the Thebans had lent a hundred talents and had not been repaid. 11The whole controversy depends on this point: that Alexander is said to have made the present to the Thessalians. But it is admitted also that no money was given by Alexander to the Thessalians, and it is therefore a question whether that which was given was the same as if he had given them money. 11Of what profit, then, will grounds of argument be, unless I first settle that the gift of Alexander was of no avail, that he could not give and that he did not give. The commencement of the pleading on the part of the Thebans is at once easy and such as to conciliate favor, as they seek to recover as their right that which was taken from them by force; but then a sharp and vehement dispute arises about the rights of war, the Thessalians alleging that upon those rights depend kingdoms and people, and the boundaries of nations and cities. 11We have therefore to discover, on the other side, how this cause differs from causes concerning other things that fall into the hands of a conqueror, and the difficulty in this respect lies not so much in the proof as in the proposition to be advanced. We may state in the first place that "in regard to whatever can be brought before a court of justice, the right of war can have no power; that things taken away by arms cannot be retained except by arms; that, consequently, where arms prevail, the judge has no power, and that when the judge has power, arms have none." 11Such a statement is first to be made that an argument, such as the following, may be brought to support it: "That prisoners of war, if they effect a return into their country, are at once free, because what is taken by force of arms cannot be held except by force of arms." It is peculiar to the cause, also, that the Amphictyons are the judges in it (for, concerning the same question, there is one mode of proceeding before the centumviri and another before a private judge).

11On the second head, we may allege that the right to the money could not have been given by Alexander to the Thessalians, as right can belong only to him who holds it and, being incorporeal, cannot be grasped by the hand. This is a proposition more difficult to conceive than it is, when you have conceived it, to support it with arguments, such, for example, as the following: "that the condition of an inheritor is different from that of a conqueror, because right passes to the one, and mere property to the other. "11It is also an argument peculiar to the cause itself that "the right over what was owing to a whole people could not have passed into the hands of the conqueror, because what a whole people had lent, was due to them all, and as long as a single one of them survived, he was a creditor for the whole sum; and that all the Thebans had not fallen into the power of Alexander." 11This argument, such is its force, is not upheld by external support, but sustains itself by itself.

On the third head, the commencement of the argumentation will rest on the more obvious assertion that the right did not lie in the writing, a proposition which may be supported by many confirmations. The intention of Alexander may also be brought into question, and it may be inquired whether he meant to oblige or to deceive the Thessalians. It is likewise an argument peculiar to the cause and the commencement, as it were, of a new discussion, "that the Thebans, even though it be admitted that they lost their right, must be thought to have recovered it by their re-establishment." Under this head may be inquired, too, what were the views of Cassander. But all pleading on behalf of equity had the highest influence with the Amphictyons.

make these observations, not because I think that the knowledge of the general topics from which arguments are drawn is useless (for if I had thought so, I should have given no precepts respecting them), but that those who have studied them may not think themselves, while they neglect other points, complete and consummate masters of their art and may understand that unless they acquire other accomplishments, on which I shall soon give instructions, they will have attained but dumb knowledge. 120. For the power of finding arguments was not a result of the publication of books on rhetoric; all kinds of arguments were conceived before any instruction was given respecting them, and writers afterwards published the forms of them when they were observed and collected. It is a proof of this fact that writers on rhetoric use old examples of argumentation, extracting them from the orators and producing nothing new of their own or anything that has not been said before. 12The real authors of the art, therefore, are the orators, though certainly some thanks are due to those by whom our labor has been diminished, for the arguments which preceding orators have discovered one after another, by the aid of their natural genius, it is not necessary for us to seek, and yet they are all accurately known to us. But this is not sufficient to make an orator, any more than to have studied in the palaestra is sufficient to make an athlete, unless the body be also strengthened by exercise, continence, food, and, above all, by constitutional vigor; on the other hand, all these advantages are of no avail without the assistance of art.

12Let students of eloquence consider also that every point to which I have called their attention is not to be found in every cause and that when a subject for discussion is brought before them, they need not search for every topic of argument and knock, as it were, at its door to know whether it will answer and serve to prove what they desire; they need not do this, I say, unless they are still learners and destitute of experience. 12Such examination, indeed, would render the process of speaking infinitely slow, if it were always necessary to examine the several kinds of arguments and ascertain, by trial, which of them is fit and proper for our purpose. I know not whether all rules for argument would not be a hindrance to us unless a certain penetration of mind, engendered in us by nature and exercised by study, conducted us straight to all the considerations suited to any particular cause. 12For the accompaniment of a stringed instrument, when joined to the notes of the voice, is a great assistance to it, and yet, if the hand of the player be slow and hesitates to which string each note of the voice corresponds until every string has been sounded and examined, it would be better for the singer to be content with what his unassisted power of voice enables him to accomplish. Thus, too, our system of study ought to be fitted and applied, as it were, after the manner of a stringed instrument, to rules of this nature. 12But such an effect is not to be produced without great practice in order that, as the hand of the musician, though he be attending to something else, is yet led by habit to produce grave, acute, or intermediate notes, so the variety and number of arguments in a case may not embarrass the judgment of the orator, but may present and offer themselves to his aid, and that as letters and syllables require no meditation on the part of the writer, so reasons may follow the orator as of their own accord.

 
5 - 11 Of examples and instances, § 1-5. Of the efficiency, and various species, of examples, 6-16. Of examples from the fables of the poets, 118. From the fables of aesop, and proverbs, 19-21. Comparison, 22-25. Caution necessary with respect to it, 26-29. Too much subdivision in it, 30, 31. Comparison of points of law, 333. Analogy, 335. Authority, 36-41. Authority of the gods, 42. Of the judge, and of the adverse party, 43. Examples and authority not to be numbered among inartificial proof, 44.

THE third sort of proofs, which are introduced into causes from without, the Greeks call παραδείγματα (paradeigmata), a term which they apply to all kinds of comparison of like with like, and especially to examples that rest on the authority of history. Our rhetoricians, for the most part, have preferred to give the name of "comparison" to that which the Greek calls παραβολή (parabolē), and to render παράδείγμα (paradeigma) by "example." Example, however, partakes of comparison, and comparison of example. For myself, that I may the better explain my object, let me include both under the word παράδείγμα (paradeigma), and translate it by "example." Nor do I fear that in this respect I may be thought at variance with Cicero, though he distinguishes comparison from example, for he divides all argumentation into two parts, induction and reasoning, as most of the Greeks divide it into παραδείγματα (paradeigmata) and έπιχειρήματα (epicheirēmata), and call the παράδείγμα (paradeigma) "rhetorical induction." Indeed the mode of argument which Socrates chiefly used was of this nature, for when he had asked a number of questions to which his adversary was obliged to reply in the affirmative, he at last inferred the point about which the question was raised and to which his antagonist had already admitted something similar; this method was induction. This cannot be done in a regular speech, but what is asked in conversation is assumed in a speech. Suppose that a question of this kind be put: "What is the most noble fruit? Is it not that which is the best?" This will at once be granted. "And which is the most noble horse? Is it not that which is the best?" This, and perhaps more questions to the same effect, will readily be admitted. Last of all will be asked the question with a view to which the others were put. "And among men who is the most noble? Is it not he who is the best?" and this may also be allowed. This mode of interrogation is of great effect in questioning witnesses, but in a continuous speech there is a difference, for there the orator replies to himself: "What fruit is the most noble? The best, I should suppose. What horse? That surely which is the swiftest. And thus he is the best of men, who excels most, not in nobleness of birth but in merit."

Therefore, all arguments of this kind must either be from things similar, dissimilar, or contrary. Similitudes are sometimes sought, merely for the embellishment of speech, but I will speak on that subject when the progress of my work requires me to do so; at present I am to pursue what relates to proof. Of all descriptions of proof, the most efficacious is that which we properly term example, that is, the adducing of some historical or supposed fact intended to convince the hearer of that which we desire to impress upon him. We must consider, therefore, whether such fact is completely similar to what we wish to illustrate, or only partly so, that we may either adopt the whole of it or only such portion as may serve our purpose. It is a similitude when we say, "Saturninus was justly killed, as were the Gracchi"; a dissimilitude, when we say, "Brutus put his children to death for forming traitorous designs on their country; Manlius punished the valor of his son with death"; a contrariety, when we say, "Marcellus restored the ornaments of their city to the Syracusans, who were our enemies; Verres took away like ornaments from our allies." Proof in eulogy and censure has the same three varieties. In regard also to matters of which we may speak as likely to happen, exhortation drawn from similar occurrences is of great effect. For example, on remarking that "Dionysius requested guards for his person in order that he, with the aid of their arms, might make himself tyrant," a person should support his remark with the example that "Pisistratus secured absolute power in the same manner."

But as some examples are wholly similar, such as the last which I gave, so there are others by which an argument for the less is drawn from the greater, or an argument for the greater from the less. "For the violation of the marriage-bed, cities have been destroyed; what punishment is proper to be inflicted on an adulterer?" or "Flute-players, when they have retired from the city, have been publicly recalled; and how much more ought eminent men of the city, who have deserved well of their country and who have withdrawn from popular odium, to be brought back from exile?" But unequal comparisons are of most effect in exhortation. Courage is more deserving of admiration in a woman than in a man, and, therefore, if a person is to be excited to a deed of valor, the examples of Horatius and Torquatus will not have so much influence over him as that of the woman by whose hand Pyrrhus was killed, and to nerve a man to die, the deaths of Cato and Scipio will not be so efficient as that of Lueretia, though these are arguments from the greater to the less.

1Let me then set before my reader examples of each of these kinds, extracted from Cicero, for from whom can I adduce better? An example of the similar is the following from the speech for Muraena: "For it happened to myself, that I stood candidate with two patricians, the one the most abandoned, and the other the most virtuous and excellent of mankind; yet in dignity I was superior to Catiline, and in infuence to Galba." 1An argument from the greater to the less is found in the speech for Milo: "They deny that it is lawful for him, who confesses that he has killed a human being, to behold the light of day; but in what city is it, I ask, that these most foolish of men thus argue? In that city, assuredly, which saw the first trial in it for a capital offense in the case of the brave Horatius, who, though the state was not then made free, was nevertheless acquitted in a public assembly of the Roman people, even though he confessed that he had killed his sister with his own hand." Another from the less to the greater is found in the same speech: "I killed not Spurius Maelius, who, because, by lowering the price of corn and by lavishing his patrimony, he appeared to court the populace too much, incurred the suspicion of aspiring to royalty, etc., but him (for Milo would dare to avow the act when he had freed his country from peril), whose shameless licentiousness was carried even to the couches of the gods, etc.," with the whole of the invective against Clodius.

1Arguments from dissimilar things have many sources, for they depend on kind, manner, time, place, and other circumstances, by the aid of which Cicero overthrows nearly all the previous judgments that appeared to have been formed against Cluentius, while, by an example of contrast, he attacks at the same time the animadversion of the censors, extolling the conduct of Scipio Africanus who, when censor, had allowed a knight whom he had publicly pronounced to have formally committed perjury, to retain his horse, because no one appeared to accuse him, though he himself offered to bear witness to his guilt if any one thought proper to deny it. These examples I do not cite in the words of Cicero only because they are too long. 1But there is a short example of contrast in Virgil.

At non ille, satum quo te mentiris, Achilles,
Talis in hoste fruit Priamo.
Not he, whose son thou falsely call'st thyself
Achilles, thus to Priam e'er behav'd,
Priam his foe.
1Instances taken from history we may sometimes relate in full, as Cicero in his speech for Milo. When a military tribune in the army of Caius Marius, a relative of that general, offered dishonorable treatment to a soldier, he was killed by the soldier whom he had thus insulted, for being a youth of proper feeling, he chose rather to risk his life than to suffer dishonor, and that eminent commander accounted him blameless and inflicted no punishment on him. 1To other instances it will be sufficient to allude, as Cicero in the same speech: "For neither could Servilius Ahala, or Publius Nasica, or Lucius Opimius, or the senate during my consulship, have been considered otherwise than criminal, if it be unlawful for wicked men to be put to death." Such examples will be introduced at greater or lesser length, according as they are more or less known, or as the interest or embellishment of the subject may require.

1The same is the case with regard to examples taken from fictions of the poets, except that less weight will be attributed to them. How we ought to treat them, the same excellent author and master of eloquence instructs us; 1for an example of this kind also will be found in the speech already cited: "Learned men, therefore, judges, have not without reason preserved the tradition, in fictitious narratives, that he who had killed his mother for the sake of avenging his father, was acquitted, when the opinions of men were divided, by the voice not only of a divinity, but of the divinity of Wisdom herself." 1Those moral fables, too, which, though they were not the invention of Aesop (for Hesiod appears to have been the original inventor of them), are most frequently mentioned under the name of Aesop, are adapted to attract the minds, especially of rustic and illiterate people, who listen less suspiciously than others to fictions and, charmed by the pleasure which they find in them, put faith in that which delights them. 20. Thus, Menenius Agrippa is said to have reconciled the people to the senators by that well-known fable about the members of the human body revolting against the belly; and Horace, even in a regular poem, has not thought the use of this kind of fable to be disdained, as in the verses,

Quod dixit vulpes aegroto cauta leoni, etc.
To the sick lion what the wily fox observed, etc.
The Greeks called this kind of composition αἰνος (ainos), "tales"; αἰσωπείος λόγος (Aesopeios ainos), "Aesop's fables," as I remarked; and λιβυκός (libukos), "Libyan fables." Some of our writers have given it the turn apologatio, or "apologue," which has not been received into general use. 2Similar to this is that sort of παροιμία (paroimia), "proverb," which is, as it were, a shorter fable and is understood allegorically, as a person may say, Non nostrum onus; bos clitellas: "The burden is not mine; the ox, as they say, is carrying the panniers."

2Next to example, comparison is of the greatest effect, especially that which is made between things nearly equal, without any mixture of metaphor: "As those who have been accustomed to receive money in the Campus Martius are generally most adverse to those candidates whose money they suppose to be withheld, so judges of a similar disposition came to the tribunal with a hostile feeling towards the defendant." 2Παραβολή (Parabolē), which Cicero calls "comparison," frequently brings things less obvious into assimilation. Nor is it only like proceedings of men that are compared by this figure (as in the comparison which Cicero makes in his speech for Muraena, "If those who have already come off the sea into harbor are accustomed to warn, with the greatest solicitude, those who are setting sail from the harbor, in regard to storms, pirates, and coasts, because nature inspires us with kindly feelings towards those who are entering on the same dangers through which we have passed, how, let me ask you, must I, who just see land after long tossing on the waves, feel affected towards him by whom I see that the greatest tempests must be encountered?"), but similitudes of this kind are also taken from dumb animals and even from inanimate objects.

2Since, too, the appearance of like objects is different in different aspects, I ought to admonish the learner that that species of comparison which the Greeks call εἲκων (eikōn) and by which the very image of things or persons is represented (as Cassius says, for instance, "Who is that making such grimaces, like those of an old man with his feet wrapped in wool?") is more rare in oratory than that by which we enforce is rendered more credible. For example, if you should say that the mind ought to be cultivated, you would compare it with land, which, if neglected, produces briars and thorns, but when tilled, supplies us with fruit. Or, if you would exhort men to engage in the service of the state, you should show that even bees and ants, animals not only mute but extremely diminutive, labor nevertheless in common. 2Of this kind is the following comparison of Cicero: "As our bodies can make no use of their several parts—the nerves, or the blood, or the limbs—without the aid of a mind, so is a state powerless without laws." But as he borrows this comparison from the human body in his speech for Cluentius, so, in that for Cornelius, he adopts one from horses, and in that for Archias, one from stones. 2As I said, the following are more ready to present themselves: "As rowers are inefficient without a steersman, so are soldiers without a general."

But the appearance of similitude is apt to mislead us, and judgment is accordingly to be employed in the use of it, for we must not say that "as a new ship is more serviceable than an old one, so it is with friendship," nor that "as the woman is to be commended who is liberal of her money to many, so she is to be commended who is liberal of her beauty to many." The allusions to age and liberality have a similarity in these examples, but it is one thing to be liberal of money, and another to be reckless of chastity. 2We must therefore consider, above all things, in this kind of illustration, whether what we apply is a proper comparison, just as in the Socratic mode of questioning, of which I spoke a little above, we must take care that we do not answer rashly. Xenophon's wife, in the Dialogues of Aeschines Socraticus, makes inconsiderate replies to Aspasia, 2a passage which Cicero translates thus:

"Tell me, I pray you, wife of Xenophon, if your female neighbor had better gold than you have, would you prefer hers or your own?"

"Hers," replied she.

"And if she had dress and other ornaments suited to women, of more value than those which you have, would you prefer your own or hers?

"Hers, assuredly," said she.

"Tell me then," added Aspasia, "if she had a better husband than you have, whether would you prefer your husband or hers?"

2At this question the woman blushed, and not without reason, for she had answered incautiously, at first, in saying that she would rather have her neighbor's gold than her own, as covetousness is unjustifiable. But if she had answered that she would prefer her own gold to be like the better gold of her neighbor, she might then have answered, consistently with modesty, that she would prefer her husband to be like the better husband of her neighbor.

30. I know that some writers have, with useless diligence, distinguished comparison into several almost imperceptibly different kinds and have said that there is a minor similitude, as that of an ape to a man, or that of imperfectly formed statues to their originals, and a greater similitude, as an egg, we say, is not so like an ege, as etc., and that there is also similitude in things unlike, as in an ant and an elephant in genus, both being animals, and dissimilitude in things that are like, as whelps are unlike to dogs and kids to goats, for they differ in age. 3They say, too, that there are different kinds of contraries, such as an opposite, as night to day; such as are hurtful, as cold water to fever; such as are repugnant, as truth to falsehood; and such as are negatively opposed, as hard things to those which are not hard. But I do not see that such distinctions have any great concern with my present subject.

3It is more to our purpose to observe that arguments are drawn from similar, opposite, and dissimilar points of law. From similar, as Cicero shows, in his Topics, that "the heir to whom the possession of a house for his life has been bequeathed will not rebuild it if it falls down, because he would not replace a slave if he should die." From opposite points, as, "There is no reason why there should not be a valid marriage between parties who unite with mutual consent, even if no contract has been signed, for it would be to no purpose that a contract had been signed, if it should be proved that there was no consent to the marriage." 3From dissimilar points, as in the speech of Cicero for Caecina, "Since, if any one had compelled me to quit my house by force, I should have ground for an action against him, shall I have no ground for action if a man prevents me by force from entering it?" Dissimilar points may be thus stated: "If a man who has bequeathed another all his silver may be considered to have left him all his coined silver, it is not on that account to be supposed that he intended all that was on his books to be given to him."

3Some have separated analogy from similitude; I consider it comprehended in similitude. For when we say, "As one is to ten, so are ten to a hundred," there is a similitude, as much as there is when we say, "As is an enemy, so is a bad citizen." But arguments from similitude are carried still further, as, "If a connection with a male slave is disgraceful to a mistress, a connection with a female slave is disgraceful to a master. If pleasure is the chief object of brutes, it may also be that of men." 3But an argument from what is dissimilar in the cases very easily meets such propositions: "It is not the same thing for a master to form a connection with a female slave as for a mistress to form one with a male slave," or from what is contrary: "Because it is the chief object of brutes, it should, for that very reason, not be the chief object of rational beings."

3Among external supports for a cause are also to be numbered authorities. Those who follow the Greeks, by whom they are termed κρίσεις (kriseis), call them judicia or judicationes, "judgments" or "adjudications," not on matters on which a judicial sentence has been pronounced (for such matters must be considered as precedents), but on whatever can be adduced as expressing the opinions of nations or people, or of wise men, eminent political characters, or illustrious poets. 3Nor will even common sayings, established by popular belief, be without their use in this way, for they are a kind of testimony and are so much the stronger, as they are not invented to serve particular cases, but have been said and confirmed by minds free from hatred or partiality, merely because they appeared most agreeable to virtue and truth. 3If I speak of the calamities of life, will I not be supported by the opinion of those nations who witness births with tears, and deaths with joy? Or if I recommend mercy to a judge, will it not support my application to observe that the eminently wise nation of the Athenians regarded mercy not as a mere affection of the mind, but as a deity? 3As for the precepts of the seven wise men, do we not consider them as so many rules of life? If an adulteress is accused of poisoning, does she not seem already condemned by the sentence of Cato, who said that every adulteress was also ready to become a poisoner? With maxims from the poets, not only the compositions of orators are filled but the books also of philosophers who, though they think everything else inferior to their own teaching and writings, have yet not disdained to seek authority from great numbers of verses. 40. Nor is it a mean example of the influence of poetry that when the Megareans and Athenians contended for the possession of the isle of Salamis, the Megareans were overcome by the Athenians on the authority of a verse of Homer (which, however, is not found in every edition), signifying that Ajax united his ships with those of the Athenians. 4Sayings, too, which have been generally received, become as it were common property for the very reason that they have no certain author, such as "Where there are friends, there is wealth"; "Conscience is instead of a thousand witnesses"; and, as Cicero has it, "Like people, as it is in the old proverb, generally join themselves with like." Such sayings, indeed, should not have endured from time immemorial had they not been thought true by everybody.

4By some writers, the authority of the gods, as given in oracles, is specified under this head and placed, indeed, in the first rank, for instance, the oracle that "Socrates was the wisest of men." To this, an allusion is rarely made, though Cicero appeals to it in his speech De Aruspicum responsis, and in his oration against Catiline, when he points the attention of the people to the statue of Jupiter placed upon the column, and in pleading for Ligarius when he allows that the cause of Caesar is the better, as the gods have given judgment to that effect. Such attestations, when they are peculiarly inherent in the cause, are called "divine testimonies," when they are adduced from without, "arguments." 4Sometimes, too, we may have an opportunity of availing ourselves of a saying or act of the judge, or of our adversary, or of the advocate that pleads against us, to support the credit of what we assert.

Hence, there have been some that have placed examples and authorities in the number of inartificial proofs, as the orator does not invent them, but merely adopts them. 4But there is a great difference, for witnesses, examinations, and like matters decide on the subject that is before the judges, while arguments from without, unless they are made of avail by the ingenuity of the pleader to support his allegations, have no force.

 
5 - 12 How far we may use doubtful grounds of argument, § 1-3. Some arguments to be urged in a body, some singly 5. Some to be carefully supported, and referred to particular points in our case 7. Not to be too numerous, 8. Arguments from the characters of persons, 9-13. In what order arguments should be advanced, 14. Quintilian states summarily what others have given at greater length, 15-17. Argument too much neglected in the exercises of the schools, 17-23.

SUCH are the notions, for the most part, which I have hitherto held concerning proof, either as conveyed to me by others or as gathered from my own experience. I have not the presumption to intimate that what I have said on the subject is all that can be said; on the contrary, I exhort the student to search after me and allow the possibility of more being discovered, but whatever is added will be pretty much the same with what I have stated. I will now subjoin a few remarks on the mode in which we must make use of proofs.

It is generally laid down as a principle that a proof must be something certain, for how can what is doubtful be proved by what is doubtful? Yet some things, which we allege in proof of something else, require proof themselves. "You killed your husband, for you were an adulteress." Here we must bring proof as to the adultery, that when that point appears to be established, it may become a proof of the other which is doubtful. "Your weapon was found in the body of the murdered man; the accused denies that the weapon is his and we must establish this circumstance in order to prove the charge." But it is one of the admonitions necessary to be given here that no proofs are stronger than those which have been shown to be certain after having appeared to be doubtful. "You committed the murder, for you had your apparel stained with blood." Here the allegation that his apparel was stained with blood is not so strong an argument against the accused if he admits it, as if he denies it and it is proved, for if he admits it, his apparel may have been stained with blood from many causes, but if he denies it, he hinges his cause on that very point. If he is convicted on that point, he can make no stand on anything that follows, since it will be thought that he would not have had recourse to falsehood to deny the fact, if he had not despaired of justifying himself if he admitted it.

We must insist on the strongest of our arguments singly; the weaker must be advanced in a body, for the former kind, which are strong in themselves, we must not obscure by surrounding matter, but take care that they may appear exactly as they are. The other sort, which are naturally weak, will support themselves by mutual aid, and, therefore, if they cannot prevail from being strong, they will prevail from being numerous as the object of all is to establish the same point. Thus, if any person should accuse another of having killed a man for the sake of his property and should say, "You expected to succeed to the inheritance, and a large inheritance it was; you were poor and were greatly harassed by your creditors; and you had offended him to whom you were heir and knew that he intended to alter his will." The allegations, considered separately, have little weight and nothing peculiar, but brought forward in a body, they produce a damaging effect, if not with the force of a thunderbolt, at least with that of a shower of hail.

For some arguments, it is not sufficient merely to advance them; they must be supported, as if you say that "covetousness was the cause of a crime," you must show how great the influence of covetousness is," or if you say "anger," you must observe how much power that passion has over the minds of men. Thus the arguments will be both stronger in themselves and will appear with more grace from not presenting, as it were, their limbs unapparelled or denuded of flesh. If, again, we rest a charge upon a motive of hatred, it will be of importance to show whether it arose from envy, from injury, or from ambition; whether it was old or recent; and whether it was entertained towards an inferior, an equal, or a superior, a stranger or a relative. All such circumstances require peculiar consideration and must be turned to the advantage of the side which we defend. Yet we must not load a judge with all the arguments that we can invent, for such an accumulation would both tire his patience and excite his mistrust, since he can hardly suppose those proofs sufficiently valid which we ourselves, who offer them, seem to regard as unsatisfactory. On the other hand, to argue in support of a matter that is clear is as foolish as to bring a common taper into the brightest sunshine.

To these kinds of proof some add those which the Greeks call παθητικάς (pathētikas), "pathetic," drawn from the feelings, and Aristotle indeed, thinks that the most powerful argument on the part of him who speaks is that he be a good man, and as this will have the best effect, so to seem good ranks next to it, though far below it Hence that noble defense of Scaurus: "Quintus Varius of Sacro says that Aemilius Scaurus has betrayed the interests of the people of Rome; Aemilius Scaurus denies it." Iphicrates, too, is said to have justified himself in a similar manner by asking Aristophon, who, as accuser, was charging him with a like offense, "whether he would betray his country on receiving a sum of money." Aristophon replied that he would not, to which Iphicrates rejoined, "Have I, then, done what you would not do?" 1But we must consider what is the character of the judge before whom we plead and ascertain what is likely to appear most probable to him, a point on which I have spoken both in my directions regarding the exordium and on those regarding deliberative oratory.

1There is another mode of proof in asseveration: "I did this"; "You told me this"; "O horrible deed!" and the like. Such affirmations ought not to be wanting in any pleading, and if they are wanting, their absence has a very ill effect. They are not to be accounted, however, as great supports, because they may be made on either side, in the same cause, with equal positiveness. 1Those proofs are stronger which are drawn from the character of a person and have some credible reason to support them, as, "It is not likely that a wounded man, or one whose son has been murdered, would mean to accuse any other than the guilty person, since if he makes a charge against an innocent person, he would let the guilty escape punishment." It is from such reasoning that fathers seek support when they accuse their sons, or others, whoever they may be, that accuse their own relatives.

1It is also inquired whether the strongest arguments should be placed in front, that they may take forcible possession of the judge's mind, or in the rear, that they may leave an impression upon it, or partly in front and partly the rear, so that, according to Homer's arrangement, the weakest may be in the middle, or whether they should be in a progressive order, commencing with the weakest. But the disposition of the arguments must be such as the nature of the cause requires, a rule, as I think, with only one exception: that our series must not descend from the strongest to the weakest.

1Contenting myself with giving these brief intimations respecting arguments, I have offered them in such a way as to show, with as much clearness as I could, the topics and heads from which they are derived. Some writers have descanted on them more diffusely, having thought proper to speak of the whole subject of commonplaces and to show in what manner every particular topic may be treated. 1But to me, such detail appeared superfluous, for it occurs almost to every person what is to be said against envy, or avarice, or a malicious witness, or powerful friends. To speak on all such subjects would be an endless task, as much as if I should undertake to enumerate all the questions, arguments, and opinions in all cases now depending or that will ever arise. 1I have not the confidence to suppose that I have pointed out all the sources of argument, but I consider that I have specified the greater number.

Such specification required the greater care, as the declamations in which we used to exercise ourselves, as military men with foils for the battles of the forum, have for some time past departed from the true resemblance of pleading, and being composed merely to please, are destitute of vigor, there being the same evil practice among declaimers, assuredly, as that which slave dealers adopt, when they try to add to the beauty of young fellows by depriving them of their virility. 1For as slave dealers regard strength and muscles, and more especially the beard and other distinctions which nature has appropriated to males, as at variance with grace and soften down, as being harsh, whatever would be strong if it were allowed its full growth, so do we cover the manly form of eloquence, and the ability of speaking closely and forcibly, with a certain delicate texture of language, and if our words be but smooth and elegant, we think it of little consequence what vigor they have. 1But to me, who looks to nature, any man with the full appearance of virility will be more pleasing than a eunuch, nor will divine providence ever be so unfavorable to its own work as to ordain that weakness be numbered among its excellences, nor shall I think that an animal is made beautiful by the knife, which would have been a monster if it had been born in the state to which the knife has reduced it. Let a deceitful resemblance to the female sex serve the purposes of licentiousness, if it will, but licentiousness will never attain such power as to render also honorable that which it has rendered valuable for its own purposes. 20. Regardless of how much audiences, overcome with pleasure, may applaud it, such effeminate eloquence (for I shall speak what I think) will never be worthy of the name of eloquence, for it is language which bears in it not the least indication of manliness or purity, to say nothing of gravity or sanctity, in the speaker. 2When the most eminent sculptors and painters, if they sought to represent the highest personal beauty in stone or on canvas, never fell into the error of taking a Bagoas or Megabyzus for their model, but choose a young Doryphoru, fitted alike for war or the palaestra, and consider the persons of other warlike youths and athletes truly graceful, shall I who study to form a perfect orator give him, not the arms, but the tinkling cymbals, of eloquence? 2Let the youth whom I am instructing, therefore, devote himself, as much as he can, to the imitation of truth, and as he is to engage in frequent contests in the forum, let him aspire to victory in the schools and learn to strike at the vital parts of his adversary and to protect his own. Let the preceptor exact such manly exercise above all things and bestow the highest commendation on it when it is displayed, for though youth are enticed by praise to what is faulty, they nevertheless rejoice at being commended for what is right. 2At present, there is this evil among teachers that they pass over necessary points in silence, and the useful is not numbered among the requisites of eloquence. But these matters have been considered by me in another work and must frequently be noticed in this. I now return to my prescribed course.

 
5 - 13 Refutation twofold, § 1. Why it is more difficult to defend than to accuse, 3. Deprecation not to be adopted without some ground of defense, 4-6. Nothing to be gained by silence in regard to matters that cannot be defended, 7-11. We may attack some of our adversary's arguments in a body, some singly, 12-14. What arguments may be easily refuted, 116. What arguments of our adversary may be turned to our advantage, 118. Many will fall under conjecture, definition, quality, 19-21. Some of the adversary's arguments may be treated as unworthy of notice, 22. Precedents, which he assumes to be applicable to his case we must endeavor to prove inapplicable, 224. We may repeat the statements of the adversary so as to weaken them, 25-27. We may sometimes expose the whole charge, sometimes particular parts of it, 28. How we make arguments common to both sides adverse to us; how discrepancies in the pleading of the adversary are to be exposed, 29-33. Some faults easily shown, 335. Not to neglect arguments of our adversary, and not to be too anxious to refute them all, 337. How far we should spare our adversary personally, 38-44. Some pleaders, in endeavoring to expose their adversaries, give occasion against themselves, 45-48. Sometimes, however, we may represent that there are contradictions in his statements, 450. A pleader ought to appear confident of the justice of his cause, 552. Order which we must observe in supporting our own arguments and refuting those of the opposite party, 53-55. We must support our proofs and refutations by the power of eloquence, 56-58. Foolish dispute between Theodorus and Apollodorus, 560.

Refutation may be understood in two senses, for the part of the defender consists wholly in refutation, and whatever is said by either party in opposition to the other requires to be refuted. It is properly in the latter sence that the fourth place is assigned to it in judicial pleadings. But the manner of conducting both is similar, for the principles of argument in refutation can be drawn from no other sources than those used in affirmation, nor is the nature of the commonplaces, or thoughts, or words, or figures, at all different. It has, in general, little to do with moving the passions.

It is not without reason, however, that it is thought more difficult (as Cicero often testifies) to defend than to accuse. In the first place, accusation is more simple, for a charge may be brought in one way, but may be overthrown in many, and it is sufficient for the accuser, in general, that what he advances appear true, while the defendant has to deny, to justify, to take exceptions, to excuse, to deprecate, to soften, to extenuate, to avert, to affect contempt, to ridicule, and accordingly, on the accuser's side, the pleading is for the most part straightforward and, so to speak, open-mouthed, while on that of the defendant, a thousand turns and artifices are required. The accuser, too, generally sets forth what he has previously meditated at leisure; the defendant has frequently to oppose what is entirely unexpected. The accuser produces his witnesses; the defendant has to refute him by arguments drawn from the cause itself. The accuser finds matter for his speech in the odiousness of the charges, even though they are false as parricide, for instance, or sacrilege, or treachery to the state, which the defendant can only deny. Hence, even moderate speakers have succeeded in accusations, while none but the most eloquent have proved able defenders. To dispatch what I mean in a word, it is as much easier to accuse than to defend as it is to make wounds than to cure them.

It is a point of great importance to consider what the opposite party has said, and in what manner. We must first of all examine, therefore, whether that which we have to answer belongs properly to the cause or has been introduced into it extrinsically, for if it be inherent in the cause, we must either deny it, justify it, or prove that the action is illegally brought; besides these, there is scarcely any means of defense in any kind of trial. Deprecation, at least such as is without appearance of defense, is extremely rare and is made only before judges who are confined to no certain form of decision. Even those pleadings before Caius Caesar and the Triumviri on behalf of men of the opposite party, though they depend chiefly on intreaty, also mingle with it some defensive arguments, for it is surely the expression of a bold defender to exclaim, "What object have we had in view, Tubero, but that we might have the power which Caesar now has?" But if on any occasion, in pleading for another before a sovereign prince or any other personage who may condemn or acquit at his pleasure, we have to say that he whose cause we undertake is worthy indeed of death, but of such a character that his life may be spared by a merciful judge, we must consider, first of all, that we shall not have to do with an adversary, but with an arbitrator, and in the next that we shall have to adopt the style of deliberate rather than of judicial oratory, for we shall have to counsel him to prefer the praise of humanity to the pleasure of vengeance As for pleadings before judges who must give sentence according to law, it would be ridiculous to offer precepts in regard to those who confess their guilt. Charges, therefore, which cannot be denied or set aside by taking exceptions on a point of law, must be justified, whatever be their nature, or we must abandon our cause.

Of negation I have specified two forms: that the matter in question did not happen, or that what did happen is not the matter in question. What cannot be justified, or set aside on a point of law, must necessarily be denied, not only if a definition of it may prove in our favor, but even if nothing but simple denial is left to us. If witnesses be produced, we may say much against them; if writings, we may descant on the resemblance of hands. Certainly nothing can be worse than confession. When there is no ground either for justification or denial, the last resource for maintaining our cause is legal exception. But, it may be said, there are some charges which can neither be denied nor justified, and to which no legal exception can be taken. A woman is accused, for instance, of adultery, who, after being a widow a year, had a child; here there can be no case for the judge. It is, therefore, most foolishly directed that what cannot be justified should be pretended to be forgotten and passed in silence, for that is the point on which the judge has to pronounce. But if what the accuser alleges be foreign to the cause, or merely accessory to it, I should prefer to say in the defense that it has nothing to do with the question, that it is needless to dwell upon it, and that it is of less importance than our adversary represents it. Or I might, indeed, in such a case, pardon the pretense of forgetfulness to which I just now alluded, for a good advocate ought not to fear a slight censure for negligence if he can thus save his client.

1We must consider also whether we ought to attack the charges of an accuser in a body, or overthrow them one by one. We may assail a number at once, if they are either so weak that they may be borne down in a mass, or so annoying that it is not expedient to engage them in detail, for we must then struggle with our whole force, and, if I may be allowed the expression, must fight with the enemy front to front. 1Sometimes, if it be difficult to refute the allegations on the other side, we may compare our arguments with those of our opponents, provided there be a probability of making ours appear the stronger. Such arguments against us as are strong from their number must be separated, as, in the example which I gave a little above, "You were the heir of the deceased; you were poor; you were harassed for a large sum of money by your creditors; you had offended the deceased, and you know that he purposed to alter his will." 1These arguments, taken together, have much weight, but if you divide them and consider them separately, they will be like a great flame, which had its strength from a large mass of fuel, but which will dwindle away when that which nourished it is withdrawn, or like large rivers, which, if they are divided into rivulets, become fordable in any part. The form of our refutation, therefore, must be adapted to the interest of our cause; we may sometimes state the arguments of our adversary separately and sometimes collect them into a body. 1For in certain cases, what our opponent has deduced from several particulars, it will be sufficient for us to include in a single proposition. For example, if the accuser shall say that the defendant had many motives for committing the crime with which he charges him, we may, without recapitulating all the alleged motives, deny simply that the argument from the motives ought to be regarded, because it is not to be supposed that every man who had a motive for committing a crime has committed it. 1Yet it is best for the prosecutor, in general, to group arguments and for the defendant to disperse them.

But the defendant must consider in what manner that which has been stated by the prosecutor must be refuted. If it be evidently false, it will be sufficient to deny it, as Cicero, in pleading for Cluentius, denies that he, whom the accuser had affirmed to have fallen down dead on drinking from a cup, died the same day. 1To refute allegations that are inconsistent, idle, or foolish requires no art, and it is therefore unnecessary to give either precepts or examples concerning them. That also which is said to have been done in secret (they call it the obscure kind of charge) and without witness or proof is sufficiently weak in itself (for it is enough that the adversary cannot attest it), and it is the same with whatever has no reference to the question. 1It is the business of a pleader, however, at times, to represent the statements of the adversary in such a way that they may either appear contradictory, or foreign to the question, or incredible, or superfluous, or favorable to our side rather than his own. It is a charge against Oppius that he embezzled the provisions intended for the soldiers, a grave accusation; but Cicero shows that it was inconsistent with other charges brought by the same prosecutors, who accused Oppius, at the same time, of attempting to corrupt the soldiers with largesses. 1The accuser of Cornelius engages to produce witnesses to testify he read the law when tribune; this charge Cicero renders ineffectual by admitting it. Quintus Caecilius solicits the office of prosecuting Verres, because he had been Verres' quaestor, but Cicero made that very circumstance appear in his own favor.

1As to other charges, the mode of refuting them all is much the same, for they are either to be examined by conjecture, whether they are true; by definition, whether they properly concern the cause; or with regard to their quality, whether they are dishonorable, unjust, scandalous, inhuman, cruel, or deserve any other designation that falls under the head of quality. 20. It is to be considered, indeed, not only with regard to the first charges in an action, but throughout the whole of it, whether it be excessively rigorous, as that of Labienus against Rabirius, under the lex perduellionis; or unfeeling, as that of Tubero against Ligarius, whom he accused when an exile, and exerted himself to the utmost to prevent Caesar from pardoning him; or presumptuous, as that against Oppius when he was accused on a letter of Cotta. 2In like manner, other actions may be contemplated and shown to be rash, insidious, or vindictive. But the strongest allegation that you can bring against an action is either that it is fraught with danger to the public, as Cicero says in his defense of Tullius, "who has ever laid down such a maxim, or to whom could it be permitted without danger to the whole community, to kill a man because he says that he is apprehensive of being killed by him?" or to the judges themselves, as Cicero, speaking for Oppius, exhorts the judges at some length that "they should not sanction that kind of action against the equestrian order." 2For some arguments, again, contempt may be at times expressed, as being frivolous or having nothing to do with the question, a course which Cicero frequently adopts, and this affectation of contempt is sometimes carried so far that we trample with disdain, as it were, upon that which we should be unable to refute by regular argument.

2But since the greater part of such charges is founded upon resemblances, we must, in refuting them, use our utmost efforts to discover some discrepancy in what is stated. This is most easily found in legal questions, for the law to which we refer was assuredly made with reference to other matters than that under consideration, and so much more easily may variation in the different cases be made to appear. As to comparisons drawn from brute animals or inanimate objects, it is easy to elude them. 2As to examples from historical facts, if they bear hard upon us, they may be met in various ways: if they are ancient, we may treat them as fabulous, and if they cannot be doubted, we may endeavor to show that they are inapplicable to the case, for it is impossible that two cases should be alike in all respects. For instance, if Scipio Nasica, after killing Gracchus, should be defended on the resemblance of his act to that of Ahala, by whom Maelius was killed, it may be said that "Maelius aspired to sovereignty, but that Gracchus only brought forward some popular laws, that Ahala was master of the horse, but Nasica a private individual." If all other means fail us, we must then see whether it can be shown that even the fact adduced as a precedent was not justifiable. What is to be understood with regard to examples is also to be observed with regard to previous judgments.

2From the remark which I made above, that it is important to notice in what manner the accuser stated his charges, I wish it to be understood, that if he has expressed himself but feebly, his very words may be repeated by ourselves, or if he has used fierce and violent language, we may reproduce his matter in milder terms. 2As Cicero says in his defense of Cornelius, "He took hold of the tablet of the law," and this we may do with a certain degree of deference to our client, so that if we have to speak on behalf of a man of pleasure, we may observe that a rather free course of life has been imputed to him, and so we call a person "frugal" instead of "niggardly," or "free of speech" instead of "slanderous." 2We must at any rate take care not to repeat our adversary's charges with their proofs or to amplify any point in them, unless such as we mean to ridicule, as is done in the following passage from Cicero: "You have been with the army," says he, "for so many years you have not set foot in the forum and, when you return after so long an interval of time, do you contend for honors with those who have made the forum as it were their dwelling-place?" 2In replies, too, the whole accusation may be sometimes repeated, a mode which Cicero adopts in his defense of Scaurus with reference to Bostar, speaking in the character of his antagonist, or if we do not repeat the whole, we may take parts of it, and put them together, as in Cicero's defense of Varenus: "When he was travelling through fields and solitary places with Pompulenus, they met, as they said, the slaves of Ancharius, when Pompulenus was killed, and Varenus immediately after bound and kept in custody till his father should signify what he wished to be done with him." Such a mode may always be adopted when the order of facts stated by the accuser appears improbable and may be deprived of credit by a comment. Sometimes points which prejudice us collectively may be separated, and this is generally the safest method. Sometimes the parts of a reply are naturally independent of each other, of which no example need be given.

2Common arguments are easily apprehended, not only because they may be used by either party, but because they are of more service to the defendant than to the prosecutor, for I think it no trouble to repeat what I have often intimated: that he who is the first to employ a common argument renders it adverse to him, for that is adverse to him which his opponent can use equally well. "You say it is not probable that Marcus Cotta contemplated so great a crime, and is it credible, then, that Oppius attempted to commit so great a crime?" 30. But it is the part of a skilful pleader to discover in the case of his adversary particulars that are at variance with one another or that may be made to appear at variance, and such contradictions are sometimes evident on the very face of a statement, as those noticed by Cicero on the trial of Caelius: "Clodia says that she lent Caelius money, which is a sign of great friendship on her part, yet alleges that poison was prepared for her by Caelius, which is a sign of the most violent hatred on his." 3So, in his speech for Ligarius, "Tubero," says he, "makes it a crime in Ligarius that he was in Africa, and yet complains that he himself was not admitted into Africa by Ligarius." Sometimes an inadvertent remark of our opponent affords us an opportunity of exposing his statements, an opportunity given chiefly by those who are fond of fine thoughts, and who, enticed by some opening for their eloquence, do not sufficiently regard what they assert, fixing their attention on the passage before them, and not on the whole scope of the cause. 3What could appear more prejudicial to Cluentius than the mark of infamy set on him by the censors? What could have seemed more to his disadvantage than that the son of Egnatius had been disinherited by his father for the very crime of corrupt judgment by which Cluentius had procured the condemnation of Oppianicus? 3But Cicero shows that these two facts contradict one another:

But I think that you, Accius, should consider carefully whether you would have the judgment of the censors, or that of Egnatius, to carry the greater weight. If that of Egnatius, you think that judgment light which the censors have pronounced against others, for they expelled this very Egnatius, whom you represent as a man of authority, from the senate. If that of the censors, they retained Egnatius the son, whom his father had disinherited by exercising censorial functions, in the senate, when they ejected his father from it.

3As to some faults, there is far more folly in committing them than acuteness in noting them. I mean such as advancing a disputable for an indisputable argument, a controverted for an acknowledged fact, a point common to many causes, for one peculiar to the cause in hand, or introducing anything vulgar, superfluous, too late for the purpose, or incredible. For it is incident to incautious speakers to aggravate a charge when it is still to be proved; to dispute about an act when the question is about the agent; to attempt what is impossible; to break off a discussion as finished when it is scarcely commenced; to prefer speaking of the party instead of the cause; to attribute to things the faults of persons, as, for example, accusing the decemviral power instead of Appius; to contradict what is evident; to say what may be taken in another sense from that which they intend; to lose sight of the main point of the cause; and to reply to something that is not asserted. 3This mode of reply, indeed, may be adopted as an artifice in some cases, as when a bad cause requires to be supported by foreign aid; thus, when Verres was accused of extortion, he was defended for having bravely and actively defended Sicily against pirates.

3The same rules may be given with regard to objections that we may have to encounter, but they require the more attention in this case, as many speakers fall into two opposite errors as to objections. Some, even in the forum, neglect them as matters troublesome and disagreeable, and being content, for the most part, with what they have premeditated, they speak as if they had no opponent, an error which is still more common in the schools, in which not only are objections disregarded, but the declamations themselves are in general so framed that nothing can be said on the opposite side. 3Others, erring from too great caution, think that they must reply, if not to every word, at least to every thought or even the lightest insinuation of their adversary, a task which is endless and superfluous, for then it is the cause that is refuted and not the pleader. For my own part, I shall consider a speaker eloquent only when he speaks in such a way that whatever he says to benefit his party, the credit of it may seem to be due to his talent and not to his cause, and, if he says anything to injure his party, the blame of it may seem attributable to his cause and not to his talent.

3Invectives—such as that against Rullus for the obscurity of his language, against Piso for his foolishness of speech, or against Antony for his ignorance of things and words, as well for his stolidity—are allowed to passion or just resentment, and are effective in exciting dislike towards those whom the speaker may wish to render hateful. 3The mode of reply adopted towards advocates should be different, though at times not only their mode of speech, but even their character, their look, their walk, or their air are excusably attacked. For example, Cicero, in speaking against Quintius, assails not only such personal peculiarities, but even his purple-bordered toga descending to his heels, for Quintius had pressed hard upon Cluentius by his turbulent harangues.

40. Sometimes, for the purpose of effacing an unpleasant impression, what is said severely by one party is eluded with a jest by the other. In this way Triarius was mocked by Cicero, for when he had observed that the pillars of the house of Scaurus were conveyed through the city on wagons, Cicero retorted, "And I, who have pillars from the Alban mount, had them brought in panniers." Such ridicule is more freely allowed against an accuser, whom a defender sometimes assails with severity out of concern for his client. 4But what is allowed against all pleaders, without any violation of good manners, is complaint, if they can be said to have craftily passed in silence, or abbreviated, or obscured, or put off any point. change in the direction of the defense, too, is often a subject of blame, a point on which Accius objects in pleading against Cluentius; Aeschines in his speech against Ctesiphon; Accius complaining that Cicero would adhere only to the letter of the law; and Aeschines that Demosthenes would say nothing on the subject of the law. But our declaimers should be especially admonished not to offer such objections as may be easily answered, or imagine that their opponent is an absolute fool. But as fertile commonplaces, and thoughts that may please the multitude, occur to us, we make for ourselves matter for our speeches, molding it to our fancy, so that this verse may be not disadvantageously borne in mind:

Non male respondit; male enim prior ille rogârat.

The answer's nonsense, that we all admit;
But nonsense only could the objection fit.
4Such a practice will be fatal to us in the forum, where we shall have to reply to our adversary and not to ourselves. It is said that Accius, being asked why he did not plead causes when he displayed in his tragedies such power in making able replies, gave this reason, "that on the stage he made his characters say what he wished, but that in the forum his adversaries would say what he did not wish." 4It is therefore ridiculous in exercises which are preparation for the forum to consider what reply may be made before we consider what objections may be offered, and a good teacher ought to commend a pupil when he ably imagines anything favorable to the opposite side as much as when he conceives anything serviceable to his own.

4There is another practice with regard to objections that seems to be always permissible in the schools, but ought rarely to be allowed in the forum. For when we have to speak first on the side of the prosecutor, in a real cause, how can we make replies to objections when our opponent has not yet spoken? 4Many speakers, however, fall into this absurdity, whether from a habit contracted in the schools, or from fondness for speaking, and they afford amusement and sport to those who answer them, who sometimes jestingly remark that they said nothing and could have said nothing so foolish, or sometimes, that they have been well reminded by their opponent and thank him for his assistance. But most frequently, it is, indeed, a very strong argument in their favor, that their opponent would never have replied to objections that had not been made, unless he knew that such objections were well founded and had been impelled to acknowledge their justice by the voice of conscience. 4Thus Cicero, in his speech for Cluentius says,

You have repeatedly observed, that you are informed that I intend to defend this cause by the aid of the letter of the law. Is it so? Am I then to suppose that I am secretly betrayed by my friends? Is there someone among those whom I fancy to be my friends that reports my designs to the enemy? Who is it that told you of my intention? Who has been so perfidious? To whom have I communicated it? No one, I conceive, is to blame; it was, doubtless, the law itself that informed you.

4But some, not content with answering imaginary objections, amplify whole portions of them, saying that they knew the opposite party would say so and so and support their assertions with such and such arguments. This practice Vibins Crisptus, a man of pleasing and refined humor, very happily ridiculed when I was at the bar: "I," said he, in reply to an opponent of that sort, "do not make those objections, for to what purpose is it that they should be twice made?" 4Sometimes, however, something like an answer to an objection may be made, if anything be comprised in the depositions on the part of the adversary be discussed in a private consultation of advocates, for we shall then reply to something said by the opposite party and not to anything imagined by ourselves, or if the cause be of such a nature that we can state certain objections besides which no others can be offered. For example, when stolen goods are found in a house, he who is accused of having stolen them must, if he deny the charge, necessarily say either that they were brought there without his knowledge, or deposited with him, or given to him, to all of which allegations we may reply, even though they have not been advanced. 50. In the schools, too, we may very properly obviate objections, so as to exercise ourselves for speaking in both places, the first and the second, on the side of the prosecutor. Unless we do so, we shall never acquire practice in combating objections, as we have no adversary to whom we are called upon to reply.

5It is also a fault in a pleader to be too anxious and to labor at removing everything that stands in his way; for such solicitude excites distrust in the judge, and very frequently arguments, which, if stated off hand, would have removed all doubt, but which are tardily advanced through excessive precaution, lose credit because the advocate himself seems to think something additional is necessary to support what he alleges. An orator, therefore, should carry confidence in his manner and speak as if he had the highest assurance of the success of his cause, 5This quality, like all others, is eminently apparent in Cicero, for his extraordinary affectation of security is like security itself, and there is such authority in his language as supplies the place of proof, so that we do not venture to doubt his statements. But he who can perceive what is the strongest point in his adversary's case and his own will easily judge what arguments he will have to oppose or to urge.

5As to order, there is no part of a cause in which it will give us less trouble; for, if we are the prosecutors, we have first to support our own allegations, and then to refute what is brought against them; if we are defendants, we have to commence with refutation. 5But from what we advance against any objection there arise other objections, and sometimes to a great extent; as the hands of gladiators, which are called the second, become the third, if the first was intended to provoke the assault of the adversary, and the fourth, if the challenge be repeated, so as to make it necessary to stand on guard twice and to attack twice; and this process may lead still further.

5Refutation includes also that simple kind of proof of which I have given an example above, proceeding from the feelings and consisting in mere affirmation, such as that of Scaurus, of which I have already spoken; and I know not whether such sort of proof may not even be used more frequently when a denial is made. But the chief object of each party must be to see where the main point lies, for it too frequently happens in a cause that many points are disputed, while judgment is to be passed on few.

5In these particulars consists the art of proving and refuting, but it requires to be supported and embellished by the powers of the speaker, for however well adapted our arguments may be to establish our case, they will nevertheless be weak unless they are urged with extraordinary vigor by him who uses them. 5Those commonplace observations, accordingly, concerning witnesses, written evidence, arguments, and other matters of the kind, produce great impression on the minds of the judges, as well as those peculiarly arising from the cause, in which we praise or blame any action, show that it is just or unjust, or make it appear greater or less, worse or better, than it really is. Of these, some are useful in the comparison of one argument with another, others in the comparison of several, others in influencing the decision of a whole cause. 5Some, too, serve to prepare the mind of the judge, others to confirm it in the opinions which he has already formed; and such preparation or confirmation has reference sometimes to particular heads and may be offered as may be suitable for each. 5I wonder, therefore, that it should have been disputed, and with no small acrimony, between two leaders of opposite sects as it were, whether arguments from moral considerations should accompany each particular head, as Theodorus would have it, or whether the judge should be informed before his feelings are excited, as Apollodorus directs, as if no middle course could be pursued and as if nothing could be ordered to suit the interests of the cause. But it is men who do not speak in the forum themselves that give these directions, and the systems of rules which they have composed at leisure and at ease are disturbed by the necessary confusion of battle. 60. For almost all authors who have set forth methods of speaking, as a kind of mysteries, have bound us not only to certain subjects for our arguments, but by fixed laws as to the form of expressing them. But having offered these few remarks on this head, I shall not shrink from communicating what I myself think about it, that is, what I observe to have been the practice of the most eminent orators.

 
5 - 14 Of the enthymeme and its parts, § 1-4. Of the epicheirema and its parts, 5-9. Not always of the same form, 10-13. The epicheirema of the orators is the syllogism of the philosophers, 14-16. All the parts of it not always necessary to be specified, 17-19. Three modes of opposing this form of argument, 20-23. How the enthymeme differs from the syllogism, 24-26. We must not crowd our speech with rhetorical forms of argument, 27-32. We must not leave our arguments unembellished, 33-35.

THE term enthymeme rhetoricians apply not only to the argument itself, that is the matter which is used for the proof of anything else, but to the enunciation of the argument, which they make, as I said, twofold. The first kind is formed from consequents, which consists of a proposition and a proof immediately following it, as in this passage of Cicero's speech for Lijarius: "The cause was then doubtful, because there was something that might be sustained on each side, but now that side must be deemed the stronger to which even the gods have given support." This is an enthymeme, for it contains a proposition and a reason, but no logical conclusion. and is therefore an imperfect syllogism. The other kind is formed from opposites, which some call the only form of enthymeme and in which the proof is much stronger. Such is that in the speech of Cicero for Milo: "You sit, therefore, as avengers of the death of a man to whom you would be unwilling to restore life even if you thought it could be restored by your means." This form is sometimes made to consist of several clauses, of which we have an example by the same orator on behalf of the same client:

Him, therefore, whom he would not kill to the satisfaction of all, was he willing to kill to the dissatisfaction of some? Him, whom he did not dare to kill with the sanction of the law, in a favorable place, at a favorable time, and with impunity, did he boldly resolve to kill unjustly, in an unfavorable place, at an unfavorable time, and at the hazard of his own life?

But the best kind of enthymeme appears to be that in which a reason is subjoined to a proposition dissimilar or opposite, as in this passage of Demosthenes:

For if acts have at times been committed against the laws, and you have imitated them, it does not follow that you should therefore escape punishment, but much rather that you should be condemned, for if any of the violators of laws had been condemned, you would not have written this, and if you are condemned, no other will write anything similar.

Of the epicheireman four, five, and even six parts are made by some rhetoricians; Cicero makes at most five: the proposition, or major, with its reason; the assumption, or minor, with its proof; and as the fifth, the conclusion. But as the major has sometimes no need of a reason, and the minor no need of proof, and as there is sometimes, too, no need of a conclusion, he thinks that the epicheirema may at times consist of only four, or three, or even two parts. To me, as well as to the greater number of authors, there appears to be not more than three, for such is the nature of reasoning, that there must be something about which there is a question, and something by which it is to be proved, and a third may be added as resulting from the agreement of the two former. Thus, there will be first the proposition, or major; secondly, the assumption, or minor; and thirdly, the conclusion, for the reason of the first part and the proof of the second may be included in those parts to which they are attached. Let us take, accordingly, an example of the five parts from Cicero: "Those things are better managed which are regulated by some plan than those which are conducted without any fixed design; this," says Cicero, "they call the first part, and think that it ought to be established with various reasons and the most copious eloquence possible." For myself, I consider the whole proposition with its reasons as but one part; else, if the reasoning be called a part, and that reasoning be various, there must necessarily be various parts. He then gives the assumption, or minor: "But of all things nothing is managed better than the whole world; and," he adds, "of this assumption they introduce its proof as a fourth part." But I say the same concerning the assumption as concerning the proposition. He continues:

In the fifth place, they place the conclusion, which either infers that only which necessarily results from all the preceding parts, as, Therefore the world is regulated by some plan, or, after briefly bringing together the proposition and assumption, adds what is collected from them, as, But if those things are better managed which are regulated by a plan than those which are conducted without a plan, and if of all things nothing is managed better than the whole world, it follows therefore that the world is regulated by a plan.

A third part I accordingly admit.

In the three parts, however, which I have made, there is not always the same form. There is one form in which the same is expressed in the conclusion as in the major proposition: "The soul is immortal, for whatever has its motion from itself, is immortal. But the soul has its motion from itself. Therefore the soul is immortal." This form prevails not only in detached arguments, but throughout all causes, such at least as are simple and in the various questions in causes. 1For all causes and all questions have a first proposition, as, "You have committed sacrilege," and, "It is not every one that has killed a man that is guilty of murder," and attached to this proposition is a reason (which, however, is more expanded in causes and portions of causes than in detached arguments), and lastly, a conclusion, in which they commonly show, either by a full enumeration of particulars or a short recapitulation, what they have established. In this kind of epicheirema the proposition is doubtful, for the question is about the proposition. 1In another form, the conclusion is not indeed the same as the major proposition, but has the same force: "Death is nothing to us, for what is dissolved into its elements is without consciousness, and that which is without consciousness is nothing to us." In a third form, the proposition is not the same as the conclusion: "All animated things are better than things inanimate. But nothing is better than the world. The world, therefore, is animated." What is here the conclusion might be made the major proposition, for the reasoning might be stated thus: "The world is animated, for all animated things are better than things inanimate." 1But this major proposition is either an acknowledged truth as in the last example, or requires proof, as, "He who wishes to lead a happy life ought to become a philosopher," this is not universally admitted. and the conclusion cannot be drawn unless the premises be established. The minor proposition, too, is sometimes universally acknowledged, as, "But all wish to live a happy life," and sometimes requires to be proved, as, "What is dissolved into its elements is void of consciousness," for it is uncertain whether the soul, when detached from the body, may not be immortal or exist at least for a certain time. I may observe that what some call the assumption, or minor proposition, others call the reason.

1But the epicheirema differs in no respect from the syllogism, except that the syllogism has a greater number of forms and infers truth from truth, while the epicheirema is generally employed about probabilities, for if it were always possible to prove what is disputed by what is acknowledged, there would scarcely be any work for the orator in the matter, since what need would there be of superior ability to reason thus: 1"The property belongs to me, for I am the only son of the deceased," or, "I am the sole heir, since by the laws respecting property, the property of a testator is given to the heir according to the purport of the will, and to me therefore the property belongs." 1But when the reason given becomes itself a matter of dispute, we must render that certain by which we seek to prove what is uncertain. For instance, if it be said by the adversary, "You are not his son," or, "You are not legitimate," or, "You are not the only son," or, again, "You are not the heir," or, "The will is not valid," or, "You are not capable of inheriting," or, "You have co-heirs," we must establish a just ground on which the property ought to be adjudged to us. 1But when a long chain of reasoning intervenes, a recapitulatory conclusion is requisite. In other cases, a proposition and reason may often be sufficient: "The laws are silent amidst arms and do not require their sanction to be waited for, when he who would wait for it must suffer an unjust death before a just penalty could be exacted." Hence it has been observed that the form of enthymeme which rests upon consequents is similar to a reason. Sometimes, again, a single proposition is judiciously given alone, without any reason, as that which we just now cited, "The laws are silent amidst arms." 1We may also commence with the reason and then draw a conclusion, as, in the same speech, "But if the twelve tables allow a thief to be killed with impunity under any circumstances, and a thief in the day if he defend himself with a weapon, who can suppose that in whatever case a man has been killed, he who killed him must suffer punishment?" Cicero has also made some variation in this form and put the reason in the third place: "When he sees that the sword is sometimes put into our hands by the laws themselves." 1The following sentence, again, takes the form of that which precedes: "But how can death be unjustly inflicted on an ambusher and a robber?" This is the proposition. "What is the object of our escorts, of our weapon?" This is the reason. "Which certainly we should not be allowed to have, if we were under no circumstances to make use of them." This is a conclusion from the proposition and the reason.

20. This mode of argument is refuted in three ways, that is, it is attacked in each of its parts, for the proposition may be combated, or the assumption, or the conclusion, or sometimes all the three. For example, the proposition that "He is justly killed who ambushes to kill" may be combated, for the first question in the defense of Milo is, "Whether he should be allowed to live who confesses that a man has been killed by his hand?" 2The assumption, or minor proposition, may be assailed by all the arts which I have mentioned in the chapter on refutation. As to the reason, we may observe that it is sometimes true when the proposition to which it is attached is false and that a false reason is sometimes attached to a true proposition. "Virtue is a good," is a true proposition, but if any one add as a reason, "because it makes men rich," a false reason is given for a true proposition. 2As to the conclusion, it is either denied to be just when it expresses something different from what can be fairly deduced from the premises or is alleged to have nothing to do with the question: "An ambusher is justly put to death, for he who prepared himself to offer violence as an enemy ought also to be repelled as an enemy; Clodius, therefore, as an enemy, was justly put to death." Here, the conclusion is false, for it has not yet been proved that Clodius was an ambusher. 2On the other hand, it would be a just conclusion to say, "An ambusher, therefore, as an enemy, was justly put to death," but it would be nothing to the purpose, for it had not previously been proved that Clodius was an ambusher. But though the proposition and reason may be true and the conclusion false, if the proposition and reason are false, the conclusion cannot be true.

2The enthymeme is called by some an oratorical syllogism, by others a part of a syllogism, because the syllogism has always its regular proposition and conclusion and establishes by means of all its parts that which it has proposed, while the enthymeme is satisfied if merely what is stated in it be understood. 2A syllogism is of this form: "Virtue is the only good, for that only is good of which none can make an ill use. But none can make an ill use of virtue. Therefore virtue is the only good." The enthymeme will consist only of the consequents, "Virtue is a good, because none can make an ill use of it." A negative syllogism will be of this nature: "Money is not a good, for that is not a good of which any one can make a bad use. But any one can make a bad use of money. Therefore money is not a good." Here the enthymeme will consist of the opposites: "Is money a good, when any one can make a bad use of it?" 2The following sentence has the syllogistic form: "If money, which consists of coined silver, comes under the general term silver, he that bequeathed all his silver bequeathed also his money consisting in coined silver. But he did bequeath all his silver. Therefore he bequeathed also his money consisting of silver." But for an orator it is sufficient to say, "When he bequeathed all his silver, he bequeathed also his money which consists of silver."

2I think that I have now gone through the mysteries of those who deliver precepts on rhetoric. But judgment must be exercised in applying such directions as I have given. For though I do not think it unlawful to use syllogisms occasionally in a speech, yet I should by no means like it to consist wholly of syllogisms, or to be crowded with a mass of epicheiremata and enthymemes, for it would then resemble the dialogues and disputations of logicians, rather than oratorical pleading, and the two differ widely from one another. 2Your men of learning, who are seeking for truth among men of learning, examine every point with the utmost minuteness and scrupulosity, with the view of bringing it to clearness and certainty, claiming to themselves the offices of discovering and judging what is right, of which they call the one τοπική (topikē), "the art of finding arguments," and the other κριτική (kritikē), "the power of judging of their soundness." 2But we orators must compose our speeches to suit the judgment of others and must frequently speak before people altogether uneducated, or at least ignorant of any other literature than what we teach them, and unless we allure them by gratification, attract them by force, and occasionally excite their feelings, we shall never impress upon them what is just and true. 30. Oratory should be rich and brilliant, but it will have neither of those qualities if it be pieced out of regular and frequent syllogisms, expressed almost always in the same form, for it will then incur contempt from appearing mean and aversion from looking servile. If it is copious, it will excite satiety; if it attempts to be swelling, it will meet disdain. 3Let it hold its course, therefore, not along foot paths, but through open fields; let it not be like subterranean springs confined in narrow channels, but flow like broad rivers through whole valleys, forcing a way wherever it does not find one. For what is a greater misery to speakers than to be slaves to certain rules, like children imitating copies set them, and, as the Greeks proverbially express it, "taking constant care of the coat which their mother has given them?" 3Must there always be proposition and conclusion from consequents and opposites? Is the speaker not to animate his reasoning, to amplify it, to vary and diversify it with a thousand figures, making his language appear to grow and spring forth naturally, and not to be manufactured, looking suspicious from its art, and showing everywhere the fashioning of the master? What true orator has ever spoke in such a way? In Demosthenes himself, are there not very few traces to be found of such regularity and art? Yet the Greeks of our own day (the only respect in which they act less judiciously than ourselves) bind their thoughts as if they were in chains, connecting them in an inexplicable series, proving what is undisputed, confirming what is admitted, and calling themselves, in these points, imitators of the ancients. But if they are asked whom they imitate, they will never give an answer.

3Of figures I shall speak in another place. At present, it seems necessary only to add that I do not agree with those who think that arguments are always to be expressed in a pure, lucid, and precise style, but neither copious nor ornate. That they should be precise and perspicuous indeed, I admit, and on matters of little consequence, set forth in plain language and in terms as appropriate and familiar as possible; but if the subject be of a higher nature, I think that no ornament should be withheld from them, provided that it causes no obscurity. 3For a metaphor often throws a flood of light on a subject, so much so that even lawyers, whose solicitude about the propriety of words is extreme, venture to call litus, '"the sea-shore," the place where the wave eludit, "sports." 3The more rugged a subject is, too, by nature, the more we must recommend it by charms of expression; argument is less suspected when it is disguised, and to please the hearer contributes greatly to convince him. Otherwise we must pronounce Cicero deserving of censure, for using, in the heat of his argumentation, the metaphorical expressions, "The laws are silent amid arms," and, "The sword is sometimes presented to us by the laws themselves." But moderation must be observed in the use of such figures, that, while they are an embellishment to a subject, they may never be an incumbrance to it.

 
6 5 87.3
6 - Introduction Quintilian laments that his son whose improvement, in conjunction with that of the sons of Marcellus and Caesar, he had had in view in the composition of this work, had been carried off by death, § 1, 2. He had previously lost, during the composition of another work, a younger son, as well as his wife, 3-6. Abilities of which his children gave indications, 7-9. His grief; he intreats indulgence if, in consequence of it, he pursues his work with less spirit, 10-16.

HAVING entered upon this undertaking, Marcellus Victor, principally at your request, but with a desire, at the same time, that some profit to well-disposed youth might arise from my labors, I have applied to it recently with great diligence, from the necessity, almost, of the office conferred upon me, yet with a regard also to my own gratification, thinking that I should leave this work to my son, whose remarkable ability deserved even the most anxious attention of a father, as the best portion of his inheritance, so that if the fates should cut me off before him, as would have been but just and desirable, he might still have his father's precepts to guide him. But while I was pursuing my design day and night, and hastening the completion of it, through fear of being prevented by death, fortune sent so sudden an affliction upon me that the result of my industry interests no one less than myself, for I have lost by a second severe bereavement that son, of whom I had conceived the highest expectations, and in whom I reposed my only hopes for the solace of my age. What shall I now do? Or what further use can I suppose that there is for me upon the earth, when the gods thus animadvert upon me? When I had just begun to write the book which I have published, On the Causes of the Corruption of Eloquence, it happened that I was struck with a similar blow. It would have been best for me, therefore, to have thrown that inauspicious work, and whatever ill-omened learning there is in me, into the flames of that premature funeral pyre which was to consume what I loved, and not to have wearied my unnatural prolongation of life with new and additional anxieties. What parent, of right feelings at least, would pardon me if I could pursue my studies with my accustomed diligence and would not hate my insensibility if I had any other use for my voice than to accuse the gods for causing me to survive all my children and to testify that divine providence pays no regard to terrestrial affairs? If such neglect of the gods is not visible in my own person, to whom nothing can be objected but that I am still alive, it is certainly manifest in the fate of those whom cruel death has condemned to perish so undeservedly, their mother having been previously snatched from me, who, after giving birth to a second son, before she had completed her nineteenth year, died, though cut off prematurely, a happy death. By that one calamity I was so deeply afflicted that no good fortune could ever afterwards render me completely happy, for, exhibiting every virtue that can grace a woman, she not only caused incurable grief to her husband, but, being of so girlish an age, especially when compared with my own, her loss might be counted even as that of a daughter. I consoled myself, however, with my surviving children, and she, knowing that I should be left alive (what was contrary to the order of nature, though she herself desired it), escaped the greatest of pangs in her untimely death. My younger son, who died, first of the two, when he had just passed his fifth year, took from me, as it were, the sight of one of my eyes. I am not ostentatious of my misfortunes nor desirous to exaggerate the causes which I have for tears; on the contrary, I wish that I had some mode of lessening them. But how can I forbear to contemplate what beauty he showed in his countenance, what sweetness in his expressions, what nascent fire in his understanding, and what substantial tokens he gave (such as I know are scarcely credible in one so young), not only of calm but of deep thought? Such a child, even if he had been the son of a stranger, would have won my love. It was the will, too, of insidious fortune, with a view to torture me the more severely, that he should show more affection for me than for anyone else, that he should prefer me to his nurses, to his grandmother who was educating him, and to all such as gain the love of children of that age. I, therefore, feel indebted to that grief which I experienced a few months before for the loss of his excellent mother, whose character is beyond all praise, for I have less reason to mourn on my own than to rejoice on her account.

I then rested for my only hope and pleasure on my remaining son, my little Quintilian, and he might have sufficed to console me, for he did not put forth merely flowers, like the other, but, having entered his tenth year, certain and well-formed fruits. I swear by my own sufferings, by the sorrowful testimony of my feelings, by his own shade, the deity that my grief worships that I discerned in him such excellences of mind (not in receiving instruction only, for which, in a long course of experience, I have seen no child more remarkable, or in steady application, requiring, even at that age, as his teachers know, no compulsion, but in indications of honorable, pious, humane, and generous feelings), that the dread of such a thunder-stroke might have been felt even from that cause, as it has been generally observed that precocious maturity is most liable to early death, and that there reigns some malignant influence to destroy our fairest hopes, in order that our enjoyments may not be exalted beyond what is appointed to man. 1He had also every fortuitous advantage: agreeableness and clearness of voice, sweetness of tone, and a peculiar facility in sounding every letter in either language, as if he had been born to speak that only. But these were still only promising appearances; he had greater qualities, fortitude, resolution, and strength to resist pain and fear, for with what courage, with what admiration on the part of his physicians, did he endure an illness of eight months! How did he console me at the last! How, when he was losing his senses and unable to recognize me, did he fix his thoughts in delirium only on learning! 1O disappointment of my hopes! Did I endure, my son, to contemplate your eyes sinking in death and your breath taking its flight? Could I, after embracing your cold and lifeless body, and receiving your last breath, breathe again the common air? Justly do I deserve the affliction which I endure and the thoughts which affect me! 1Have I, your parent, lost you, when just raised, by being adopted by a man of consular dignity, to the hopes of enjoying all the honors of your father, you, who were destined to be son-in-law to the praetor, your maternal uncle; you who, in the opinion of all, were a candidate for the highest distinctions of Attic eloquence, surviving myself only to grieve? May my sufferings at least, if not my obstinate clinging to life, make atonement to you during the rest of my existence! We in vain impute all our ills to the injustice of fortune, for no man grieves long but through his own fault. 1But I still live, and some occupation for life must be sought, and I must put faith in the learned who have pronounced letters the only consolation in adversity.

If the present violence of my grief, however, should in time subside, so that some other thought may be admitted among so many sorrowful reflections, I shall not unreasonably crave pardon for the delay in my work, for who can wonder that my studies were interrupted, when it must rather appear wonderful that they were not relinquished entirely? 1Should anything, then, in this part of my work, appear less finished than that which I commenced when less oppressed with affliction, let it be excused on account of the rigorousness of fortune, who, if she has not extinguished the moderate power of mind which I previously possessed, has at least succeeded in weakening it. But let me, on this very account, rouse myself to action with the greater spirit, since, though it is difficult for me to bear her oppression, it is easy for me to despise it, for she has left nothing further to inflict upon me and has brought to me, out of my calamities, a security which, though unhappy, is certainly stable. 1It is right to look favorably on my efforts, too, for this reason, that I persevere for no interest of my own, but that all my pains are devoted to the service of others, if what I write, indeed, be of any service. My work, like the acquisitions of my fortune, I, unhappy that I am, shall not leave to those for whom I designed it.

 
6 - 1 Peroration of a speech; the objects of it; some think that it should consist wholly of recapitulation, § 1-8. Appeals to the feelings may be made by the accuser and the advocate alike, 9. What the exordium and the peroration have in common, and in what respects they differ, 10-14. The accuser excites the feelings either by showing the heinousness of the charge which he makes, or the pitiable condition of the party for whom he seeks redress, 15-20. What qualities excite feeling in favor of an accused person, 222. Solicitation for pity may have great effect, but should not be long, 23-28. Modes of exciting pity, 29-36. How persons who are introduced to move pity at the conclusion of a speech, should behave themselves, 37-43. No orator must attempt to draw tears from the judges unless he be a man of great ability, 445. It is the part of the peroration to dispel compassionate emotions, as well as to excite them, 46-49. Perorations sometimes of a very mild character, 50. Appeals to the feelings may be made in other parts of a speech as well as in the peroration, 51-65.

WHAT was to follow was the peroration, which some have termed the completion, and others the conclusion. There are two species of it, the one comprising the substance of the speech, and the other adapted to excite the feelings.

The repetition and summing-up of heads, which is called by the Greeks ᾽ανακεϕαλαίωσις (anakephalaiōsis), "going over the headings," and by some of the Latins "enumeration," is intended both to refresh the memory of the judge, to set the whole cause at once before his view, and to enforce such arguments in a body as had produced an insufficient effect in detail. In this part of our speech, what we repeat ought to be repeated as briefly as possible, and we must, as is intimated by the Greek term, run over only the principal heads, for if we dwell upon them, the result will be not a recapitulation, but a sort of second speech. What we may think necessary to recapitulate must be put forward with some emphasis, enlivened by suitable remarks and varied with different figures, for nothing is more offensive than mere straightforward repetition, as if the speaker distrusted the judge's memory. The figures which we may employ are innumerable, and Cicero affords us an excellent example in his pleading against Verres: "If your father himself were your judge, what would he say when these things were proved against you?" where he subjoins an enumeration of particulars, and there is another instance, in which the same orator, in the same speech, enumerates, on invoking the gods, all the temples spoiled by Verres in his praetorship. We may also sometimes affect to doubt whether something has not escaped us and to wonder what our opponents will reply to such or such a point, or what hope the accuser can have when our case is so fully established. But what affords us the greatest gratification is the opportunity of drawing some argument from the speech of our adversary, as when we say, "He has omitted this point in the cause," or, "He made it his object to oppress us with odium," or, "He had recourse to entreaty, and not without reason, when he knew so and so." But I must not go through such figures of speech, severally, lest those which I may now notice should be thought the only ones that can be used, since opportunities for varying our forms of speech spring from the nature of particular causes, from the remarks of the adversary, and even from fortuitous circumstances. Nor must we recapitulate only the points of our own case, but call also upon our opponent to reply to certain questions. But this can only be done when there is time for further speaking, and when we have advanced what cannot be refuted, for to challenge the adversary on facts which make strongly for him is to be not his opponent, but his prompter.

Most of the Attic orators, and almost all the philosophers who have left anything written on the art of oratory, thought this the only legitimate kind of peroration, a tenet which the Attic orators adopted, I suppose, for this reason: at Athens, an orator was prohibited even by an officer of the court from attempting to excite the feelings. At the philosophers I am less surprised, since with them all excitement of the feelings is accounted vicious, nor is it consistent with morality, in their opinion, that a judge should be thus diverted from truth, nor appropriate for a good man to use vicious means. Yet they will allow that to move the feelings is justifiable, if what is true, and just, and subservient to the public good, cannot be established by any other method. It is admitted, however, among all orators that a recapitulation may he made with advantage even in other parts of a pleading, if the cause be complex and requires support by numerous arguments. Nobody doubts, on the other hand, that there are many short and simple causes in which recapitulation is by no means necessary. This part of the peroration is common alike both to the prosecutor and the defendant.

Both of them also have recourse to the excitement of the feelings, but the defendant more rarely, the prosecutor more frequently and with greater earnestness, for the prosecutor has to rouse the judge, while the defendant's business is to soothe him. But the prosecutor at times produces tears from the pity which he expresses for the matter for which he seeks redress, and the defendant sometimes inveighs with great vehemence at the injustice of the calumny or conspiracy of which he is the object. It is therefore most convenient to divide these duties, which are for the most part similarly introduced, as I said, in the exordium, but are in the peroration more free and full. A feeling of the judge in our favor is sought but modestly at the commencement, when it is sufficient that it be just admitted, and when the whole speech is before us. But in the peroration, we have to mark with what sort of feeling the judge will proceed to consider his sentence, as we have then nothing more to say, and no place is left us for which we can reserve further arguments. 1It is therefore common to each party to endeavor to attract the favor of the judge towards himself, to withdraw it from his adversary, and to excite the feelings and to compose them. This very brief admonition may be given to both parties, that a pleader should bring the whole force of his cause before his view and, when he has noticed among its various points what is likely, or may be made likely, to excite disapprobation or favor, dislike or pity, should dwell on those particulars by which he himself, if he were judge, would be most impressed. 1But it is safer for me to consider the parts of each separately.

What recommends the prosecutor to the judge, I have already noticed in the precepts which I have given for the exordium. Some particulars, however, which it is sufficient to intimate in the commencement, must be stated more fully in the conclusion, especially if the cause be undertaken against a violent, odious, or dangerous character, or if the condemnation of the accused will be an honor to the judges, and his acquittal a disgrace to them. 1Thus Calvus makes an admirable remark in his speech against Vatinius: "You know, judges, that bribery has been committed, and all men know that you know it." Cicero, too, in pleading against Verres, observes that "the disrepute which had fallen on the courts might be effaced by the condemnation of Verres," and this is one of the conciliatory modes of address to which I have before alluded. If intimidation, too, is to be used, in order to produce a similar effect, it has a more forcible position here than in the exordium. What my opinion is on this point, I have already stated in another book. 1It is possible also to excite jealousy, hatred, or indignation more freely in the peroration than elsewhere; in regard to these feelings, the influence of the accused contributes to excite jealousy in the judge. Likewise, the accused's ill-reputation can cause hatred in the judge, and disrespect for the judge (if the accused be contumacious, arrogant, or full of assurance) can cause indignation, as the judge is often influenced, not only by an act or word, but by a look, air, or manner. The accuser of Cossutianus Capito was thought, when I was young, to have made a very happy remark, in Greek, indeed, but to this effect, "You are ashamed to fear even Caesar." 1But the most effective way for the accuser to excite the feelings of the judge is to make that which he lays to the charge of the accused appear the most atrocious act possible, or, if the subject allow, the most deplorable. Atrocity is made to appear from such considerations as these, "What has been done, by whom, against whom, with what feeling, at what time, in what place, in what manner," all which have infinite ramifications. 1We complain that somebody has been beaten; we must first speak of the act, and then state whether the sufferer was an old man, or a youth, or a magistrate, or a man of high character, or one who has deserved well of his country. We also state whether he was struck by some vile contemptible fellow, or, on the other hand, by some tyrannical person, or by some one from whom he ought least of all to have received such treatment; also whether he was struck as it might be, on a solemn festival, or when prosecutions for similar offenses were being rigorously conducted, or at a time when the government was unsettled, or, as to place, in a theater, in a temple, in a public assembly, for under such circumstances the offense is aggravated. 1We might also consider whether it can be proved that he was not struck by mistake, or in a sudden fit of passion, or, if in a passion, with great injustice, when, perhaps, he was taking the part of his father, or had made some reply to the aggressor, or was standing for office in opposition to him, and whether the aggressor would have proceeded to greater violence than he actually committed. But the manner contributes most to the heinousness of the act, if he struck the person violently or insultingly, as Demosthenes excites odium against Meidias by alluding to the part of his body which was struck, and the look and mien of the striker. 1A man has been killed; we must consider whether it was with a sword, or fire, or poison; with one wound or with several; whether suddenly; or whether he was made to languish in tortures, all which have great effect in this way.

The accuser, also, often attempts to excite pity, as when he bewails the sad fate of him whose cause he is pleading or the destitution of his children or parents. 1He may also move the judges by a representation of the future, showing what will be the consequences to those who complain of violence and injustice, unless their cause be avenged, that they must flee from their country, sacrifice their property, or endure everything that their enemies may be disposed to inflict on them. 20. But it is more frequently the part of the accuser to guard the feelings of the judge against that pity which the accused would seek to excite and to urge him to give judgment with boldness. In doing so, he may also anticipate what he thinks his opponent is likely to say or do, for this course makes the judges more cautious in adhering to the sacredness of their oath and diminishes the influence of those who have to reply, since what has been once stated by the accuser will, if urged in favor of the accused, be no longer new. Thus, Messala, in pleading for Aufidia, admonishes Servius Sulpioius about arguments regarding the danger to both the defendant herself and those who had signed the instrument. It is also previously intimated by Aeschines what sort of defense Demosthenes was likely to use. Judges may sometimes be instructed, too, as to answers which they should make to those who may solicit them in favor of the defendant, an instruction which is a species of recapitulation.

2As to a party on trial, his dignity, or manly pursuits, or wounds received in war, or nobility of birth, or the services of his ancestors, may be subjects of recommendation to him. This kind of consideration Cicero and Asinius Pollio have urged even emulously, Cicero for Scaurus the father, and Pollio for Scaurus the son. 2The cause, also, which has brought him into danger, may be pleaded in his favor, if he appear, for example, to have incurred enmity for some honorable act, and his goodness, humanity, pity, may especially be eulogized, for a person seems justly to solicit from the judge that which he himself has shown to others. In this part of a speech, too, allusions may be made to the public good, to the honor of the judges, to precedent, and to regard for posterity. 2But that which produces the most powerful impression is pity, which not only forces the judge to change his opinions, but to manifest the feelings in his breast even by tears. Pity will be excited by dwelling either on that which the accused has suffered, or on that which he is actually suffering, or on that which awaits him if he be condemned. Such representations have double force when we show from what condition he has fallen and into what condition he is in danger of falling. 2To these considerations, age and sex may add weight as well as objects of affection, by which I mean children, parents, and other relatives, and all these matters may be treated in various ways. Sometimes, also, the advocate numbers himself among his client's connections, as Cicero in his speech for Milo: "O unhappy that I am! O unfortunate that thou art! Could you, Milo, by means of those who are this day your judges, recall me into my country, and cannot I, by means of the same judges, retain you in yours?" 2This is a very good resource, if, as was then the case, entreaty is unsuited to the party who is accused, for who would endure to hear Milo supplicating for his life, when he acknowledged that he had killed a nobleman because he deserved to be killed? Cicero, therefore, sought to gain Milo the favor of the judges for his magnanimity and took upon himself the part of suppliant for him.

In this part of a speech, prosopopoeiae are extremely effective, that is, fictitious addresses delivered in another person's character, such as are suitable either to a prosecutor or defendant. Even mute objects may touch the feelings, either when we speak to them ourselves or represent them as speaking. 2But the feelings are very strongly moved by the personification of characters, for the judge seems not to be listening to an orator lamenting the sufferings of others, but to hear with his own ears the expressions and tones of the unfortunate suppliants themselves, whose presence, even without speech, would be sufficient to call forth tears. As their pleadings would excite greater pity if they themselves uttered them, so they are in some degree more effective when they are spoken apparently by their own mouth in a personification; as with actors on the stage, the same voice and the same pronunciation have greater power to excite the feelings when accompanied with a mask representing the character. 2Cicero, accordingly, though he puts no entreaties into the mouth of Milo, but rather commends him to favor for his firmness of mind, has yet attributed to him words and lamentations not unworthy of a man of spirit: "O labors, undertaken by me in vain! O deceitful hopes! O thoughts, cherished by me to no purpose!"

Yet our supplications for pity should not be long, as it is observed, not without reason, that nothing dries sooner than tears. 2Since time lessens even natural sorrows, the representation of sorrow which we produce in a speech, must lose its effect still sooner, and if we linger in it, the hearer, wearied with tears, will recover his tranquillity and return from the emotion which had surprised him to the exercise of his reason. 2Let us not allow the impressions that we make, therefore, to cool, but when we have raised the feelings of our audience to the utmost, let us quit the subject and not expect that any person will long bewail the misfortunes of another. Not only in other parts of our speech, accordingly, but most of all in this part, our eloquence ought gradually to rise, for whatever does not add to that which has been said seems even to take away from it, and the feeling which begins to subside soon passes away.

30. We may excite tears, however, not only by words, but by acts, and hence it becomes a practice to exhibit persons on their trial in a squalid and pitiful garb, accompanied with their children and parents. Hence, too, we see blood-stained swords produced by accusers, with fractured bones extracted from wounds and garments spotted with blood; we behold wounds unbound and scourged backs exposed to view. 3The effect of such exhibitions is generally very strong, so that they fix the attention of the spectators on the act as if it were committed before their eyes. The blood-stained toga of Julius Caesar, when exhibited in the forum, excited the populace of Rome almost to madness. It was known that he was killed, his body was even stretched on the bier, yet his robe, drenched in blood, excited such a vivid idea of the crime that Caesar seemed not to have been assassinated, but to be subjected to assassination at that very moment. 3But I would not, for that reason, approve of a device of which I have read and which I have myself seen adopted, a representation, displayed in a painting or on a curtain, of the act at the atrocity of which the judge was to be shocked. For how conscious must a pleader be of his inefficiency who thinks that a dumb picture will speak better for him than his own words? 3But a humble garb and wretched appearance, on the part of the accused as well as of his relatives, has, I know, been of much effect, and I am aware that entreaties have contributed greatly to save accused persons from death. To implore mercy of the judges, therefore, by the defendant's dearest objects of affection (that is to say, if he has children, wife, or parents) will be of great advantage, as well as to invoke the gods, since such invocation seems to proceed from a clear conscience. 3To fall prostrate, also, and embrace the knees of the judge may be allowable at times, unless the character of the accused, and his past life and station, dissuade him from such humiliation, for there are some deeds that ought to be defended with the same boldness with which they were committed. But regard is to be had to the defendant's dignity, with such caution that an offensive confidence may not appear in him.

3Among all arguments for a client, the most potent, in former times, was that by means of which Cicero seems chiefly to have saved Lucius Muraena from the eminent men who were his accusers, when he persuaded them that nothing was more advantageous for the state of things at that period than that Muraena should enter on his consulship the day before the Kalends of January. But this kind of argument is wholly set aside in our days, as everything depends on the care and protection of our sovereign and cannot be endangered by the issue of any single cause.

3I have spoken of prosecutors and defendants, because it is on their trials that the pathetic is chiefly employed. But private causes also admit both kinds of perorations, that which consists in a recapitulation of proofs and that which depends on the excitement of the feelings, the latter having place whenever the accused party is in danger either as to station or as to character. For to attempt such tragic pleadings in trifling causes would be like trying to adjust the mask and buskins of Hercules on an infant.

3Nor is it improper for me to intimate that much of the success of a peroration depends, in my opinion, on the manner in which the defendant, who is presented before the judge, accommodates his demeanor to that of him who pleads in his favor, for ignorance, rusticity, stiffness, and vulgarity in a client sometimes damp a pleader's efforts, and against such untowardness he should take diligent precaution. 3I have seen the behavior of clients quite at variance with the language of their advocate, showing no concern in their countenance, laughing without reason, and, by some act or look, making even others laugh, especially when anything was delivered at all theatrically. 3On one occasion, an advocate led a girl, who was said to be the sister of the adverse party (for it was about that point that the controversy was) over to the opposite benches, as if intending to leave her in the arms of her brother. But the brother, previously instructed by me, had gone off, and the advocate, although an eloquent man at other times, was struck dumb by his unexpected disappearance and, with his ardor cooled, took his little girl back again. 40. Another advocate, pleading for a woman who was on her trial, thought it would have a great effect to exhibit the likeness of her deceased husband, but the image excited little else but laughter, for the persons whose business it was to produce it, being ignorant what a peroration meant, displayed it to view whenever the advocate looked towards them and, when it was brought still more into sight at the conclusion, it destroyed the effect of all his previous eloquence by its ugliness, being a mere cast from an old man's dead body. 4It is well known, too, what happened to Glycon, surnamed Spiridion: A little boy, whom he brought into court, and asked "Why he was weeping," replied, "That he had had his ears pulled by his tutor." But nothing is better adapted to show the dangers attendant on perorations than the story of Cicero about the Cepasii. 4Yet all such mishaps are easily remedied by those who can alter the fashion of their speech; but those who cannot vary from what they have composed are either struck dumb at such occurrences or, as is frequently the case, say what is not true, for hence are such impertinences as these: "He is raising his supplicating hands towards your knees," or, "He is locked, unhappy man, in the embraces of his children," or, "See, he recalls my attention, etc.," though the client does no single thing of all that his advocate attributes to him. 4These absurdities come from the schools, in which we give play to our imagination freely and with impunity, because whatever we wish is supposed to be done. But reality does not allow of such suppositions, and Cassius Severus made a most happy retort to a young orator who said, "Why look you so sternly on me, Severus?" "I did not, I assure you," replied Cassius, "but you had written those words, I suppose, in your notes, and so here is a look for you," when he threw on him as terrible a glance as he could possibly assume.

4The student ought, above all things, to be admonished, also, that an orator should not attempt to excite tears unless he be endowed with extraordinary genius, for as the effect on the feelings, if he succeeds, is extremely powerful, so, if he is unsuccessful, the result is vapidity. A middling pleader had better leave the pathos to the quiet meditations of the judges, 4for the look, tone, and even the very face of a defendant called to stand before the judges are a laughing-stock to such persons as they do not move. Let a pleader, therefore, in such a case, carefully measure and contemplate his strength and consider how difficult a task he will have to undertake. In the result there will be no medium, he will either provoke tears or laughter.

4But the business of a peroration is not only to excite feelings of pity, but also to deaden them, either by a set speech, which may recall the judges, when shaken by compassion, to considerations of justice, or by some jocose remark, as, "Give the child a cake, that he may leave off crying," or as a pleader said to his corpulent client, whose opponent, a mere child, had been carried round among the judges by his advocate, "What shall I do? I cannot carry you." 4But such pleasantries must have nothing of buffoonery, and I cannot praise the orator, though he was among the most eminent of his time, who, when some children were brought in at the peroration by the opposite party, threw some playthings among them, towards which they began to scramble, for the children's insensibility to any ill that threatened them might of itself excite compassion. 4Nor can I commend him, who, when a blood stained sword was produced by his adversary, which he offered as a proof that a man had been killed, suddenly took flight, as if terrified, from his seat, and looking out from the crowd, with his head half covered with his robe, asked whether the man with the sword was yet gone, for he raised a laugh, indeed, but made himself at the same time ridiculous. 4The effect of such acting is to be dispelled by the calm power of eloquence, and Cicero gives us excellent examples, such as in his oration for Rabirius, when he attacks with great force the production of the likeness of Saturninus, and, in his speech for Varenus, when he rallies with much wit the young man whose wound was unbound from time to time during the trial.

50. There are also perorations of a milder sort, in which we seek to pacify an adversary, if his character, for instance, be such that respect is due to him, or in which we give him some friendly admonition and exhort him to concord. This kind of peroration was admirably managed by Passienus when he pleaded the cause of his wife Domitia, to recover a sum of money, against her brother Aenobarbus, for after he had enlarged on their relationship, he added some remarks on their fortune, of which both had abundance, saying, "There is nothing of which you have less need than that about which you are contending."

5But all these addresses to the feelings, though they are thought by some to have a place only in the exordium and the peroration, in which indeed they are most frequently introduced, are admissible also in other parts, but more sparingly, as it is from them that the decision of the cause must be chiefly evolved. But in the peroration, if anywhere, we may call forth all the resources of eloquence, 5for if we have treated the other parts successfully, we are secure of the attention of the judges at the conclusion, where, having passed the rocks and shallows on our voyage, we may expand our sails in safety, and as amplification forms the greatest part of a peroration, we may use language and thoughts of the greatest magnificence and elegance. It is then that we may shake the theater, when we come to that with which the old tragedies and comedies were concluded, Plaudite, "Give us your applause."

5But in other parts we must work upon the feelings, as occasion for working on any of them may present itself, for matters of a horrible or lamentable nature should never be related without exciting in the mind of the judges a feeling in conformity with them, and when we discuss the quality of any act, a remark addressed to the feelings may be aptly subjoined to the proof of each particular point. 5And when we plead a complicated cause, consisting, it may be said, of several causes, we shall be under the necessity of using, as it were, several perorations, as Cicero has done in his pleading against Verres, for he has lamented over Philodamus, over the captains of the vessels, over the tortures of the Roman citizens, and over several other of that praetor's victims. 5Some call these μερικοὶ ἐπίλογοι (merikoi epilogoi), by which they mean "parts of a divided peroration," but to me they seem not so much parts as species of perorations, for the very terms (epilogos) and peroratio show, clearly enough, that the conclusion of a speech is implied.

 
6 - 2 Necessity of studying how to work on the minds of the judges, § 1, 2. This department of oratory requires great ability, 3-7. Of πάθος (pathos) and ἦθος (ēthos)8-24. If we would move others, we must feel moved ourselves, 25-28. Of presenting images to the imagination of our hearers, 29-35. Pupils should be exercised in this in the schools, 36.

BUT though the peroration is a principal part of judicial causes and is chiefly concerned with the feelings, and though I have of necessity, therefore, said something of the feelings in treating of it, I could not bring the whole of that subject under one head, nor indeed should I have been justified in doing so. A duty of the orator, accordingly, still remains to be considered, which is of the greatest efficacy in securing his success and is of far more difficulty than any of those already noticed. By this, I mean influencing the minds of the judges and of molding and transforming them, as it were, to that disposition which we wish them to assume. With regard to this point, I have touched on a few particulars, such as the subject called forth, but so as rather to show what ought to be done than how we may be able to effect it. The nature of the whole subject must now be considered more deeply.

Throughout the whole of any cause, as I remarked, there is room for addresses to the feelings. The nature of the feelings is varied and not to be treated cursorily, nor does the whole art of oratory present any subject that requires greater study. As to other matters, moderate and limited powers of mind, if they be but aided by learning and practice, may invigorate them and bring them to some fruit. Certainly there are, and always have been, no small number of pleaders who could find out, with sufficient skill, whatever would be of service to establish proofs. Such men I do not despise, though I consider that their ability extends no farther than to the communication of instruction to the judge, and, to say what I think, I look upon them as fit only to explain causes to eloquent pleaders, but such as can seize the attention of the judge and lead him to whatever frame of mind he desires, forcing him to weep or feel angry as their words influence him, are but rarely to be found. But it is this power that is supreme in causes; it is this that makes eloquence effective. As to arguments, they generally arise out of the cause and are more numerous on the side that has the greater justice, so that he who gains his cause by force of arguments will only have the satisfaction of knowing that his advocate did not fail him. But when violence is to be offered to the minds of the judges and their thoughts are to be drawn away from the contemplation of truth, then is this peculiar duty of the orator required. This the contending parties cannot teach; this cannot be put into written instructions. Proofs in our favor, it is true, may make the judge think our cause the better, but impressions on his feelings make him wish it to be the better, and what he wishes he also believes. For when judges begin to feel indignant, to favor, to hate, or to pity, they fancy that their own cause is concerned, and as lovers are not competent judges of beauty, because passion overpowers the sense of sight, so a judge, when led away by his feelings, loses the faculty of discerning truth; he is hurried along as it were by a flood and yields to the force of a torrent What effect arguments and witnesses have produced, it is only the final decision that proves, but the judge, when his feelings are touched by the orator, shows, while he is still sitting and hearing, what his inclination is. When the tear, which is the great object in most perorations, swells forth, is not the sentence plainly pronounced? To this end, then, let the orator direct his efforts; this is his work, this his labor. Without this, everything else is bare and meagre, weak and unattractive; so true is it that the life and soul of eloquence is shown in the effect produced on the feelings.

Of feelings, as we are taught by the old writers, there are two kinds, the first of which the Greeks included under the term πάθος (pathos) , which we translate rightly and literally by the word "passion." The other, to which they give the appellation ἦθος (ēthos), for which, as I consider, the Roman language has no equivalent term, is rendered, however, by mores, "manners;" whence that part of philosophy, which the Greeks call ἠθική (ēthikē), is called moralis, "moral." But when I consider the nature of the thing, it appears to me that it is not so much mores in general that is meant, as a certain proprietas morum, or "propriety of manners," for under the word mores is comprehended every habitude of the mind. The more cautious writers, therefore, have chosen rather to express the sense than to interpret the words and have designated the one class of feelings as the more violent, the other as the more gentle and calm, under pathos they have included the stronger passions, under ēthos the gentler, saying that the former are adapted to command, the latter to persuade, the former to disturb, the latter to conciliate. Some of the very learned add that the effect of pathos is but transitory; but while I admit that this is more generally the case, I consider that there are some subjects which require a permanent strain of pathos to run through the whole of them. Addresses, however, to the milder feelings require not less art and practice, though they do not call for so much energy and vehemence, and they enter into the majority of causes, or rather, in some sense, into all. 1For as nothing is treated by the orator that may not be referred either to pathos or ēthos, whatever is said concerning honor or advantage, concerning things that may be done or may not be done, is very properly included under the term "ethic." Some think that commendation and palliation are the peculiar duties of ēthos, and I do not deny that they fall under that head, but I do not allow that they are its only object. 1I would also add that pathos and ēthos are sometimes of the same nature, the one in a greater and the other in a less degree, as love, for instance, will be pathos, and friendship ēthos, and sometimes of a different nature, as pathos in a peroration will excite the judges, and ēthos soothe them.

But I must develope more precisely the force of the term ēthos, as it seems not to be sufficiently intimated by the word itself. 1Ēthos, of which we form a conception and which we desire to find in speakers, is recommended, above all, by goodness, being not only mild and placid, but for the most part pleasing and polite, and amiable and attractive to the hearers. The greatest merit in the expression of it is that it should seem to flow from the nature of the things and persons with which we are concerned, so that the moral character of the speaker may clearly appear and be recognized, as it were, in his discourse. 1This kind of ēthos ought especially to prevail between persons closely connected, as often as they endure anything from each other, or grant pardon, or satisfaction, or offer admonition, all which should be free from anger or dislike. But the ēthos of a father towards his son, of a guardian towards his ward, of a husband towards his wife (all of whom manifest affection for those with whom they are offended and throw blame upon them by no other means than showing that they love them) is very different from that which is shown by an old man towards a young one from whom he has received an insult, or from that of a man of rank towards an inferior who has been disrespectful to him (for the man of rank may only be provoked, while the old man must also be concerned). 1Of the same character, though less affecting to the feelings, are solicitations for forgiveness or apologies for the amors of youth. Sometimes, too, a little gentle raillery of another person's ardour may have its source in ēthos, though it does not proceed from such a source only. But what more peculiarly belongs to it is simulation of some virtue, of making satisfaction to some one, and εἰρωνεία (eirōneia), "irony" in asking questions, which means something different from that which it expresses. 1Hence also springs that stronger appeal to the feelings, adapted to draw the dislike of the judge on an overbearing adversary, when, by feigning submission to him, we imply a quiet censure on his presumption. For the very fact that we yield to him proves him to be arrogant and insupportable, and orators who are fond of invective or affect liberty of speech are not aware how much more effective it is thus to throw odium on an opponent than to reproach him, since that kind of treatment renders him disliked, while reproach would bring dislike on ourselves. 1The feeling arising from our love and regard for our friends and relatives is, we may say, of an intermediate character, being stronger than ēthos and weaker than pathos.

It is not without significance, too, that we call those exercises of the schools ēthos in which we are accustomed to represent the characters of the rustic, the superstitious, the avaricious, the timid, agreeably to the thesis proposed for discussion. For as ēthos are mores or manners, we, in imitating manners, adapt our speech to them.

1All this species of eloquence, however, requires the speaker to be a man of good character and of pleasing manners. The virtues which he ought to praise, if possible, in his client, he should possess or be thought to possess himself. Thus he will be a great support to the causes that he undertakes, to which he will bring credit by his own excellent qualities. But he who, while he speaks, is thought a bad man, must certainly speak ineffectively, for he will not be thought to speak sincerely; if he did, his ēthos or character would appear. 1With a view to credibility, accordingly, the style of speaking in this kind of oratory should be calm and mild; it requires, at least, nothing of vehemence, elevation, or sublimity. To speak with propriety, in a pleasing manner, and with an air of probability is sufficient for it, and the middling sort of eloquence is therefore most suitable.

20. Pathos, or what we very properly call affectus or "emotion," is quite different from that which is referred to as ēthos, and that I may mark, as exactly as I can, the diversity between them, I would say that the one is similar to comedy, the other to tragedy. This kind of eloquence is almost wholly engaged in exciting anger, hatred, fear, envy, or pity, and from what sources its topics are to be drawn is manifest to all and has been mentioned by me in speaking of the exordium and peroration. 2Fear, however, I wish to be understood in two senses, that which we feel ourselves and that which we cause to others, and I would observe that there are two sorts of invidia, "dislike," one that makes invidum, "envious," and another that makes invidiosum, "disliked." The first is applied to persons, the second to things, and it is with this that eloquence has the greater difficulty, for though some things are detestable in themselves, such as parricide, murder, or poisoning, others require to be made to appear so. 2Such representation is made, either by showing that what we have suffered is more grievous than evils ordinarily considered great, as in these lines of Virgil,

O felix una ante alias Priameia virgo,
Hostilem ad tumulum Trojae sub moenibus altis
Jussa mori!
O happy thou above all other maids,
Daughter of Priam, doom'd to die before
Thy enemy's tomb, beneath the lofty walls
Of Troy!
(for how wretched was the lot of Andromache, if that of Polyxena, compared with hers, was happy!), 2or by magnifying some injury that we have received, so as to make even injuries that are far less appear intolerable, such as, "If you had struck me, you would have been inexcusable; but you wounded me." But these points I shall consider with more attention when I come to speak of amplification. In the meantime, I shall content myself with observing that the object of the pathetic is not only that those things may appear grievous and lamentable, which in reality are so, but also that those which are generally regarded as inconsiderable may seem intolerable, as when we say that there is more injury in a verbal insult than in a blow or that there is more punishment in dishonor than in death. 2For such is the power of eloquence, that it not only impels the judge to that to which he is led by the nature of the matter before him, but excites feelings which are not suggested by it or strengthens such as are suggested. This is what the Greeks call δείνωσις (deinōsis), language adding force to things unbecoming, cruel, or detestable, in which excellence, more than in any other, Demosthenes showed his extraordinary power.

2If I thought it sufficient merely to adhere to the precepts that have been delivered, I should do enough for this part of my work by omitting nothing, at all reasonable, that I have read or learned on the subject, but it is my intention to open the deepest recesses of the topic on which we have entered and to set forth what I have acquired, not from any teacher, but from my own experience and under the guidance of nature herself. 2The chief requisite, then, for moving the feelings of others is, as far as I can judge, that we ourselves be moved, for the assumption of grief, anger, and indignation will be often ridiculous if we adapt merely our words and looks, and not our minds, to those passions. For what else is the reason that mourners, when their grief is fresh at least, are heard to utter exclamations of the greatest expressiveness and that anger sometimes produces eloquence even in the ignorant, but that there are strong sensations in them,and sincerity of feeling? 2In delivering, therefore, whatever we wish to appear like truth, let us assimilate ourselves to the feelings of those who are truly affected and let our language proceed from such a temper of mind as we would wish to excite in the judge. Will he grieve, let me ask, who shall hear me, that speak for the purpose of moving him, expressing myself without concern? Will he be angry, if the orator who seeks to excite him to anger and to force him to it, shows no like feeling? Will he shed tears at the words of one who pleads with dry eyes? 2Such results are impossible. We are not burned without fire or wet without moisture, nor does one thing give to another the color which it has not itself. Our first object must be, therefore, that what we wish to impress upon the judge we may impress upon ourselves, and that we may be touched ourselves before we begin to touch others.

2But by what means, it may be asked, shall we be affected since our feelings are not in our own power? I will attempt to say something also on this point. What the Greeks call φαντασίαι (phantasiai) we call visiones, images by which the representations of absent objects are so distinctly represented to the mind that we seem to see them with our eyes and to have them before us. 30. Whoever shall best conceive such images will have the greatest power in moving the feelings. A man of such lively imagination some call εὐφαντασίωτος (euphantasiōtos), being one who can vividly represent to himself things, voices, or actions with the exactness of reality, and this faculty may readily be acquired by ourselves if we desire it. When, for example, while the mind is unoccupied and we are indulging in chimerical hopes and dreams, as of men awake, the images of which I am speaking beset us so closely that we seem to be on a journey, on a voyage, in a battle, to be haranguing assemblies of people, to dispose of wealth which we do not possess, and not to be thinking but acting, shall we not turn this lawless power of our minds to our advantage? make a complaint that a man has been murdered; shall I not bring before my eyes everything that is likely to have happened when the murder occurred? Shall not the assassin suddenly sally forth? Shall not the other tremble, cry out, supplicate or flee? Shall I not behold the one striking, the other falling? Shall not the blood, and paleness, and last gasp of the expiring victim present itself fully to my mental view? 3Hence will result that ἐνάργεια (enargeia), which is called by Cicero "illustration" and "evidentness," which seems not so much to narrate as to exhibit, and our feelings will be moved not less strongly than if we were actually present at the affairs of which we are speaking. Are not the following descriptions to be numbered among representations of this nature?

Excussi manibus radii, revolutaque pensa:

The shuttle from her hands was shaken forth,
And all the web unravelled.
3Levique patens in pectore valnus;

The gaping wound
In his smooth breast.
And that of the horse at the funeral of Pallas,

--positis insignibus--

His trappings laid aside--.
Has not the same poet also conceived with the deepest feeling the idea of a man's dying moments, when he says

--Et dulces moriens reminiscitur Argos,

And on his dearest Argos thinks in death!
3Where there is occasion for moving compassion too, we must endeavor to believe and to feel convinced that the evils of which we complain have actually happened to ourselves. We must imagine ourselves to be those very persons for whom we lament as having suffered grievous, undeserved, and pitiable treatment. We must not plead their cause as that of another, but must endeavor to feel for a time their sufferings, and thus we shall say for them what we should in similar circumstances say for ourselves. 3I have often seen actors, both in tragedy and comedy, when they laid aside their mask after going through some distressing scene, quit the theater weeping, and if the mere delivery of what is written by another can add such force to fictitious feelings, what effect ought we to produce when we should feel what we express and may be moved at the condition of those who are on their trial?

3In the schools, also, it would be proper for learners to feel moved with the subjects on which they speak and imagine that they are real, especially as we discuss matters there more frequently as parties concerned than as advocates. We assume the character of an orphan, of a person that has been shipwrecked, or one that is in danger of losing his life, but to what purpose is it to assume their characters if we do not adopt their feelings? This art I thought should not be concealed from the reader, the art by which I myself (whatever is or was my real power) conceive that I have attained at least some reputation for ability, and I have often been so affected that not only tears, but paleness and sorrow, similar to real sorrow, have betrayed my emotions.

 
6 - 3 Of the power of exciting laughter in an audience, § 1. There was little of it in Demosthenes; perhaps a superabundance of it in Cicero, 2-5. Causes of laughter not sufficiently explained, 7. Is of great effect, 8-10. Depends far more on nature and favourable circumstances than on art, 11-13. No instructions given in exciting laughter, 14-16. Various names for jocularity or wit, 17-21. Depends partly on matter, partly on words; subjects of it, 22-24. Laughter may be excited by some act, or look, or gesture, 25-27. What is becoming to the orator, 28-32. What to be avoided by him, 33-35. Topics for jesting, and modes of it, 36-46. Ambiguity in words, 47-56. The best jests are taken from things, not from words; of similarity, 57-62. Of dissimilarity, 63-64. From all forms of argument arise occasions for jesting, 666. Jests in the form of tropes and figures, 67-70. Of jocular refutation, 71-78. Of eluding a charge; of pretended confession, 79-81. Some kinds of jests are beneath an orator, 883. Of deceiving expectation, 84-87. Of jocular imitation, 88. Of attributing thoughts to ourselves or others; and of irony, 89-92. The least offensive jokes are the best, 93-95. Quotations from poets, proverbs, and anecdotes, 96-98. Apparent absurdities, 9100. Domitius Marsus confounds politeness with humour, 101-107. His distinctions, 108-112.

VERY different from this is the talent which, by exciting laughter in the judge, dispels melancholy affections, diverting his mind from too intense application to the subject before it, recruiting at times its powers and reviving it after disgust and fatigue.

How difficult it is to succeed in that way even the two greatest of all orators, the one the prince of Greek and the other of Latin eloquence, afford us sufficient proof. Most think that the faculty was altogether wanting to Demosthenes and moderation in the management of it to Cicero. Demosthenes, certainly, cannot be thought to have been unwilling to cultivate it, as his jests, though very few, and by no means correspondent to his other excellences, plainly show that jocularity was not disliked by him, but that it had not been liberally bestowed on him by nature. But as for our own countryman, he was regarded, not only when not engaged in pleading, but even in his public speeches, as too much an affecter of pleasantry. To myself, whether I judge rightly in that respect, or whether I err through immoderate admiration for our great master of eloquence, there appears to have been an extraordinary vein of delicate wit in him. For in his common conversation, in disputes, and in examining witnesses, he uttered more jokes than any other orator. The dull jests in his orations against Verres he attributed to others, repeating them as a part of his evidence, and the more vulgar they are, the more probable is it that they were not of his invention, but had been circulated among the people. I could wish, too, that his freedman Tiro, or whoever it was that published the three books of his jests, had been more sparing as to their number and had used greater judgment in selecting than industry in gathering, for he would then have been less exposed to calumniators, who, however, as in regard to all the productions of his genius, can more easily discover what may be taken away than what may be added.

But what causes the chief difficulty in respect to jesting is that a saying adapted to excite laughter is generally based on false reasoning and has always something low in it. It is often purposely sunk into buffoonery; it is never honorable to him who is the subject of it, while the judgments of the hearers with regard to it will be various, as a thing which is estimated, not by any certain reasoning, but by some impulse, I know not whether inexplicable, of the mind. Certainly I think that it has not been sufficiently explained by any one, though many have attempted explanations, whence laughter proceeds, which is excited, not only by actions or words, but sometimes even by a touch of the body. Besides, it is not by one kind of jests only that it is produced, for not merely witty and agreeable acts or sayings, but what is said or done foolishly, angrily, or fearfully are equally the objects of laughter. Thus, the origin of it is doubtful, as laughter is not far from derision. Cicero has said that it has its seat in some deformity or offensiveness, and if this is made to appear in others, the result is called raillery, but if what we say recoils on ourselves, it is but folly.

Though laughter may appear, however, a light thing, as it is often excited by buffoons, mimics, and even fools, it has power perhaps more despotic than anything else, such as can by no means be resisted. It bursts forth in people even against their will and extorts a confession of its influence not only from the face and the voice, but shakes the whole frame with its vehemence. It often changes, too, as I said, the tendency of the greatest affairs, as it very frequently dissipates both hatred and anger. Of this the young Tarentines afford an instance, who, having spoken at a banquet with great freedom about king Pyrrhus and being called before him to account for their conduct, when the fact could neither be denied nor justified, saved themselves by a fortunate laugh and jest, for one of them said, "Ah! if our flagon had not failed us, we should have murdered you," and by this pleasantry, the whole odium of the charge was dispelled.

1But though I should not venture to say that this talent, whatever it is, is certainly independent of art (for it may be cultivated by observation, and rules relating to it have been composed both by Greek and Latin writers), yet I may fairly assert that it chiefly depends on nature and opportunity. 1Nature, moreover, has influence in it, not only so far that one man is more acute and ready than another in inventing jokes (for such facility may certainly be increased by study), but that there is in certain persons a peculiar grace in their manner and look, so that the same things that they say would, if another were to say them, appear less happy. 1As to opportunity and circumstances, they have such effect that not only unlearned persons, but even peasants, when favored by them, make witty repartees to such as are first to address them, for all facetiousness appears to greater advantage in reply than in attack. 1It adds to the difficulty that there is no exercise in this department nor any instructors in it. It is true that at convivial meetings and in the familiar intercourse of life, many jesters are to be met, but their number arises from the circumstance that men improve in jesting by daily practice. The wit that suits the orator is rare and is not cultivated on its own account, but sent for practice to the school of the world. 1Yet there would be no objection to subjects being invented for this exercise, so that fictitious causes might be pleaded with a mixture of jesting, or particular theses might be proposed to youth exclusively for such practice. 1Even those very pleasantries which are called jokes, and in which we are accustomed to indulge on certain days of festal license, might, if they were produced with some degree of method or if some serious matter were mingled with them, prove of considerable advantage to the orator; but now they are merely the diversion of youth or of people amusing themselves.

1In reference to the subject of which we are treating, we commonly use several words to express the same thing, but if we consider them separately, each will be found to have its own peculiar signification. The term "urbanity" is applied to it, by which is meant, I observe, a style of speaking which exhibits in the choice of words, in tone, and in manner, a certain taste of the city and a tincture of erudition derived from conversation with the learned, something, in a word, of which rusticity is the reverse. 1It is evident that that which is expressed with grace and agreeableness is "graceful." In common conversation, we understand "salty" only as something to make us laugh, but this notion is not founded in nature, though certainly whatever is to make us laugh must be "salty." Cicero says that "everything salty is in the taste of the Attics," but not because the Attics were most of all people inclined to laughter. And when Catullus says of a woman, "There is not a grain of salt in her whole body," he does not mean that there is nothing in her body to excite laughter. 1That therefore will be "salty" which is not insipid, and "salt" will be a natural seasoning of language, which is perceived by a secret taste, as food is tasted by the palate, and which enlivens discourse and keeps it from becoming wearisome. As salt, too, mixed with food rather liberally, but not so as to be in excess, gives it a certain peculiar relish, so salt in language has a certain charm, which creates in us a thirst, as it were, for hearing more. 20. Nor do I conceive that the facetum is confined solely to that which excites laughter, for if such were the case, Horace would not have said that "the facetum in poetry had been granted by nature to Virgil." I think it rather a term for grace and a certain polished elegance, and it is in this sense that Cicero in his letters quotes these words of Brutus: Nae illi pedes faceti ac deliciis ingredienti molles, "Graceful indeed are her feet, and more gently and with delicacy as she walks," an expression similar to that of Horace, Molle atque facetum Virgilio. 2Jest we understand as something contrary to that which is serious, for to feign, to intimidate, and to promise are sometimes modes of jesting. Dicacitas is doubtless derived from dico and is common to every species of jesting, but it properly signifies language that attacks a person in order to raise a laugh against him. Thus they say that Demosthenes was urbanus, "witty," but deny that he was dicax, "gifted with the faculty of humorous raillery."

2But what belongs properly to the subject of which we are treating is that which excites laughter, and thus all discussion on the topic is entitled by the Greeks περὶ γελοίου (peri geloiou). Its primary division is the same as that of every other kind of speech, as it must lie either in things or in words. 2The application of it is very simple, for we try either to make others the subject of laughter, or ourselves, or something that is foreign to both. What proceeds from others we either blame, or refute, or make light of, or rebut, or elude. As to what concerns ourselves, we speak of it with something of ridicule, and, to adopt a word of Cicero's, utter subabsurda, "apparent absurdities," for the same things, that if they fell from us unawares would be silly, are thought, if we express them with dissimulation, extremely humorous. 2The third kind, as Cicero also remarks, consists in deceiving expectation, in taking words in a sense different from that in which the speaker uses them, and in allusions to other things, which affect neither ourselves nor others, and which I therefore call intermediate or neutral.

2In the second place, we either do or say things intended to excite a laugh. Laughter may be raised by some act of humor, with a mixture, sometimes, of gravity, as Marcus Caelius the praetor, when the consul Isauricus broke his curule chair, had another fixed with straps (the consul was said to have been once flogged by his father), or sometimes without due regard to decency, as in the story of Caelius's box, which is becoming neither to an orator nor to any man of proper character. 2The same may be said of looks and gestures to provoke laughter, from which there may certainly be some amusement, and so much the more when they do not seem to aim at raising a laugh, for nothing is more silly than what is offered as witty. Gravity, however, adds much to the force of jests, and the very circumstance that he who utters a joke does not laugh, makes others laugh; yet sometimes a humorous look, a cast of countenance, or a gesture may be assumed, provided that certain bounds be observed.

2What is said in jest, moreover, is either gay and cheerful, as most of the jokes of Aulus Galba, or malicious, as those of the late Junius Bassus, or bitter, as those of Cassius Severus, or inoffensive, as those of Domitius Afer. But it makes a great difference where we indulge in jests. At entertainments and in common conversation, a more free kind of speech is allowed to the humbler class of mankind, amusing discourse to all. 2We should always be unwilling to offend, and the inclination to lose a friend rather than a joke should be far from us. In the very battles of the forum I should wish it to be in my power to use mild words, though it is allowed to speak against our opponents with contumely and bitterness, as it is permitted us to accuse openly, and to seek the life of another according to law. But in the forum, as in other places, to insult another's misfortune is thought inhuman, either because the insulted party may be free from blame or because similar misfortune may fall on him who offers the insult. Therefore, a speaker must first of all consider what his own character is, in what sort of cause he is to speak, before whom, against whom, and what he should say. 2Distortion of features and gesture, such as is the object of laughter in buffoons, is by no means suited to an orator. Scurrilous jests, too, and such as are used in low comedy, are utterly unbecoming his character. As for indecency, it should be so entirely banished from his language, that there should not be the slightest possible allusion to it, and if it should be imputable, on any occasion, to his adversary, it is not in jest that he should reproach him with it. 30. Though I should wish an orator, moreover, to speak with wit, I should certainly not wish him to seem to affect wit, and therefore he must not speak facetiously as often as he can, but must rather avoid a joke occasionally rather than lower his dignity. 3No one will endure a prosecutor jesting in a cause of a horrible nature, or a defendant doing so in one of a pitiable nature. There are some judges, also, of too grave a disposition to yield willingly to laughter. It will sometimes occur, too, that reflections which we make on our adversary may apply to the judge or even to our own client. 3Some orators have been found, indeed, who would not avoid a jest that might recoil even on themselves, as was the case with Sulpicius Longus, who, though he was himself an ugly man, remarked that a person